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1. Introduction
1.1  European protection of human rights
The European Court of Human Rights was established together with a Committee on 
Human Rights as a result of negotiations between a number of European states after 
the Second World War, by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1 (referred to as “the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights”). The Committee has been abolished through the adoption of Protocol 
No. 11 which set up a single European Court of Human Rights and brought about a 
few other procedural amendments to the Convention. The European mechanism with 
the Court was created to ensure external control of compliance by the States parties to 
the Convention with its provisions and to provide a last resort remedy for those who 
have suffered violations of human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights 
coexists with international instruments adopted for the protection of human rights, 
particularly at the level of the United Nations, and is supplemented by a number of other 
European Conventions, such as the European Social Charter, European Convention 
on the Prevention of Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, as well as by the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
competence of the European Court of Human Rights is limited to the protection of 
those rights that are set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
additional Protocols2, but when applying the Convention and interpreting the scope 
1 ETS 5, as amended by Protocol No. 11 (ETS 155) and Protocol No. 14 (CETS 194). Protocols 
No. 15 (CETS No. 213) and 16 (CETS No. 214) have not entered into force yet. They intro-
duce further procedural changes explained in sections 3.5 and 6.3below. Note: Conventions and 
agreements opened for signature between 1949 and 2003 were published in the “European Treaty 
Series” (ETS No. 001 to 193 included). Since 2004, this Series is continued by the “Council of 
Europe Treaty Series” (CETS No. 194 and following).
2 The rights set out in the Convention and the (first) Protocol thereto include the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security, 
the right to a fair trial, no punishment without law, the right to respect for private and family 
life, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
assembly and association, the right to marry, the right to an effective remedy, and the prohibition 
of discrimination, as well as the right to protection of property, the right to education and the right 
to free elections. Those have later been supplemented with the prohibition of imprisonment for 
debt, the freedom of movement, the prohibition of expulsion of nationals and the prohibition of 
collective expulsion of aliens (Protocol No. 4, ETS No. 46), the abolition of the death penalty (in 
all circumstances) (Protocol No. 6, ETS No. 114, and Protocol No. 13, ETS No. 187), procedural 
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of those rights, it has the possibility to resort to the provisions and international case 
law of other human rights instruments as well as to prevailing level of protection and 
legal opinions existing within the national legal systems.
The European Convention on Human Rights is a regional convention, whereas 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is open for accession to 
any State. The provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights are largely 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Like the latter, the European Convention 
on Human Rights only provides for civil and political rights (although e.g. the First 
Protocol affords protection of possessions). The economic, social and cultural rights 
are provided for in a separate instrument also at the European level in the same way 
as at the international level. Thus, the European Convention and the United Nations 
instruments, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
coexist and are in principle applicable at the same time3. In principle, a person claiming 
to be a victim of a human rights violation can file a complaint under the mechanism 
of his choice, either the European Convention or the International Covenant, but it 
may be advisable to apply some caution for tactical reasons4. Furthermore, there are 
some conditions of access to those remedies. First, the texts of those instruments set 
out some conditions of admissibility of complaints. The Committee under the Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant does not examine a complaint which is at the same time 
being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 
Second, those States that were already parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights at the moment of ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, entered a reservation to the text to the effect that in case the complaint has 
already been examined by another international monitoring body, the Committee under 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant has no competence to examine it. The provisions 
of the Covenant together with the reservations mean that the choice of procedure 
is somewhat limited. Of the States covered by the present study, Finland appears to 
be the only one without such a reservation. Although the accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights took place later, Finland did not enter a comparable 
reservation to it either despite certain other reservations. 
safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, the right of appeal in criminal matters, the right to 
compensation for wrongful conviction and the right not to be tried or punished twice (Protocol 
No. 7, ETS No. 117), as well as an extension of the general prohibition of discrimination (by any 
public authority) (Protocol No. 12, CETS No. 177).
3 There may also be other international mechanisms available for seeking redress in the case of 
human rights violations depending on the right in question, for example under Article 22 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(by filing a communication to the Committee against Torture) (UNTS, vol. 1465, p. 85).
4 Hannum 1994, p.35. Hannum suggests that it is advisable for the reason that international bodies 
tend to compare applications with other situations that may be more compelling.
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Nevertheless, today, most applicants appear to rather file a complaint with the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights particularly for the reason of a rather efficient control 
mechanism of the enforcement of judgments, whereas the views of the Committee 
are not legally binding in the same sense as the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights5. The numbers of complaints dealt with by the Committee are also 
modest with those dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights. However, 
according to Bunn-Livingstone, one may speak of legal pluralism in the sense that the 
international legal system provides for more than one legal order (i.e. a regional one 
and an international one) which might result in differing outcomes of proceedings. 
In principle, if the international legal system was understood as encompassing both 
international and regional human rights conventions, such a situation would in her 
view entail weak legal pluralism as the legal system itself provides for the alternative 
legal orders. However, she also points out that in the case of human rights treaties, one 
may speak of strong legal pluralism. This, in her view, lies in the nature of the conven-
tions themselves as human rights are considered universal and thus the system claims 
universal standards instead of pluralistic ones.6 However, this view can also be criticised. 
The view of Bunn-Livingstone may be sustained in case the international human rights 
instruments are applied universally as such. However, the opponents of this view are 
also right in pointing out that despite the widespread support for the human rights 
conventions, not all their provisions are equally applied in all States parties to them7.
Thus, despite the rather universal nature of human rights and the apparent similarities 
between international and regional instruments, there are also differences. The differ-
ences are explained by the fact that at a regional level, States share more in common 
than they do on an international scale and they might, for example, be prepared to 
agree on a higher level of protection in some respects, whereas in others they might 
prefer a looser formulation than the international instrument provides for. The language 
used in the European Convention on Human Rights and that used the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have considerable similarities, which is not 
surprising, given that they are products of the same decade, and share a large number 
of States parties having contributed to the negotiations. One must not forget, however, 
5 Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee shall forward its views to the State 
Party concerned and to the individual. Thus, the wording is not particularly strong. However, in 
1990, the Committee has adopted measures to monitor compliance with its views. Under those 
measures, the Committee asks the State to provide information on action taken in response to a 
violation found, and findings on non-compliance can be published in the Committee’s Annual 
Report. (See Hannum 1994, p. 48.)
6 Bunn-Livingstone 2002, p. 51 and 53.
7 States have, for example, introduced a number of reservations to them. This, in turn, is explained 
by the fact that any human rights convention reflects the legal systems and legal cultures of a large 
number of States – thus existing in the background – and not all the provisions are acceptable to 
all of them.
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that there are considerable differences between legal systems and legal cultures of the 
variety of States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was subject to 
negotiations simultaneously and was adopted slightly later, the European Convention 
on Human Rights together with its control mechanism meant a dramatic change to the 
protection of fundamental rights that had traditionally been considered to fall within the 
scope of national sovereignty. The constitutional traditions of protecting fundamental 
rights in the States parties to the Convention varied from the rather advanced ones in 
France and Germany to weaker ones. There were also differences in the preparedness 
of States parties to accept the binding jurisdiction of the created European Court of 
Human Rights. Despite the rather advanced pieces of legislation that had existed in 
Germany prior to the era of national socialism, the historical developments with the 
World Wars proved that it was necessary to ensure a strong protection of human rights 
at the European and universal levels. In the light of the Preamble to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the intention of the signatories was to take into account 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 10th December 1948 as well as the common heritage of politi-
cal traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, with a view to taking the first steps 
for the collective enforcement of certain rights stated in the Universal Declaration. 
Thus, their aim was to go enforce those rights, but in some respects to go further at the 
European level. The feature making the European system unique is the binding nature 
of the final judgments of the Court under Article 46 of the Convention. However, 
the fact that recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction remained for a long time optional 
weakened the development of the case law until the 1970s. The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights also provides for a further guarantee of compliance with the 
Convention by vesting in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe a 
competence to supervise the execution of judgments.
The number of States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights has 
constantly increased, and along with the expanding workload of the European Court 
of Human Rights has expanded as knowledge of the Convention and of the Court 
has grown in the States parties. The Convention provides for inter-State cases and 
individual applications including applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the rights set forth in the Convention or an additional Protocol. An individual ap-
plication to the European Court of Human Rights is the last resort judicial remedy, 
meaning that all available domestic remedies must have been exhausted first. After 
the final decision in the domestic proceedings, the applicants have six months to file 
an application. The rights protected under the Convention are not absolute, however, 
but the Convention provides for certain restrictions on those rights. The Convention 
also allows reservations, which must nevertheless not be general in character. The 
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possibility for restrictions provided for in the Convention has lead to an extensive 
and complex body of case law which is increasingly also applied as a source of law by 
national jurisdictions when faced with cases involving the protection of fundamental 
rights or human rights. That case law is a unique international source of law and the 
European Court of Human Rights has further developed the meaning given to the 
provisions of the Convention through case law. The Court has also developed its own 
judicial style and legal language. The application and interpretation of the Court’s case 
law has consequently lead to the emergence of a body of national case law serving 
also today as one applicable source of law for the European Court of Human Rights.
The present study falls within the rather wide context of the application and inter-
pretation of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights but focuses on the 
gradual transition of the legal culture of protecting human rights and fundamental 
rights in the Finnish legal system, which has developed through the discourse used in 
that case law and in Finnish case law, as delimited in section 1.3 below. The present 
study is addressed at the research community, as a contribution to a series of studies 
on the European Convention on Human Rights and its impact on the case law of 
national jurisdictions. The aim is to show, with the example of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions, how the change of legal culture in that respect is dependent on both the 
constitutional traditions and the characteristics of the legal system, including tradi-
tions of interpreting law. The discourse of courts is dependent on that legal framework, 
which may slow down the transition of legal culture. The present study is, however, also 
addressed at the national judiciary, for whom even recommendations are presented on 
how the culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights could be made 
even stronger through a dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights. The 
aspect of such a dialogue has been addressed to a lesser extent in Finnish legal research 
than in continental Europe.
1.2  Discourse of the European Court of Human Rights  
and earlier research
Given the abundance of case law, concerning a variety of States and legal systems, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its control mechanism have also given 
inspiration to extensive research, including comprehensive overviews of the case law 
under the Convention8. However, there is not that much research focusing particularly 
on the language used by the Court, although its discourse has been touched upon in 
8 The works of scholars consulted for the purposes of the present study include, in particular, Harris 
& al. 2014, Pellonpää& al. 2012, Danelius 2012, White & Ovey 2010, and Frowein & Peukert 
2009.
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some studies9. Those studies have focused on the standards and methods of interpreta-
tion of the Convention, particularly as used by the Court itself, and not that much on 
how those principles have been approached by national jurisdictions although some 
of the most recent studies concerning legal systems other than the Finnish one have 
paid some attention to it. Judicial language or discourse develops particularly through 
case law. Furthermore, discourse highlights the approach of the court to sources of law 
and principles of interpretation. In Finland, one of the most recent studies includes 
an analysis of the changing argumentation of the Supreme Court with regard to the 
protection of human rights, although with a focus on the control of constitutionality 
of legislation10. Insofar as judicial language of national courts is concerned, it has been 
studied to some extent, including the judicial style of court decisions in various countries. 
Furthermore, particularly in the past few years, quite a few works have been produced 
on the methods of interpretation of the European Court of Justice. The language of 
law and the field of legal translation have also been subject to a wide range of research, 
from various perspectives, whereas the language of international treaties, in particular, 
has not been studied to the same extent although there is considerable research into 
the interpretation of treaties: such research has mainly focused on the methods and 
principles of interpretation in general. There is also some research on the language 
policies of different international organisations, most notably on the language policy 
of the European Union and the interpretation of Union law, as well as on the language 
of diplomacy and international co-operation in general. 
Levi draws a distinction between three major areas of research on language and 
law, 1) the study of spoken language in legal settings; 2) the study of language as a 
subject of the law; and 3) the written language of the law11. Legal language may be 
divided into sub-sectors depending on the users of the particular type of language, 
such as the language used by courts and the language of legislation. Insofar as courts 
are concerned, one might speak of official language or judicial language, depending 
on the context or of discourse of the court. Furthermore, there may be different types 
of legal language depending on the field of law, each having its own typical style, ex-
pressions and terms and concepts.12 The language of international human rights law 
would be one of such fields. In the case of international human rights law, one may 
further distinguish expressions and concepts that are specific to the context of protec-
tion of human rights as well as those that are specific to the language of international 
agreements. The language of international treaties is a particular type of legal language, 
being a result of compromises between the legal concepts and expressions of different 
9 For example Senden 2011.
10 Lavapuro Juha, Uusi perustuslakikontrolli, University of Turku 2010.
11 Levi 1990, p. 13.
12 For more details, see Mattila 2012, p. 4-6.
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legal systems and cultures, on the one hand, and between the diverse political views 
of different state parties to the treaty in question, on the other. One could also say 
that the language of international treaties constitutes a sector of its own within the 
science of legal linguistics, although one may note quite a few similarities between the 
language of international treaties and that of the legislation of the European Union, 
for example. In a human rights convention, the impact of the political views of States 
that have contributed to its drafting are intertwined with the desire to guarantee as 
high a level of collective enforcement of human rights as possible. 
In the present study, however, the principles of interpretation of the European 
Court of Human Rights play a more significant role than linguistic issues, although 
the focus is on judicial discourse. The purpose is to analyse in what manner the prin-
ciples of interpretation have been applied through discourse, and whether the Court’s 
discourse reflects a transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and 
human rights, although discourse is understood in a rather wide sense. Such signs may 
include, in particular, expansion of the scope of the Convention rights, development 
of the meaning of the concepts used in the Convention, and various methods and 
expressions used by the Court to give priority for stronger protection of certain rights 
over the State’s discretion to legislate on such matters. Thus, those signs may be both 
linguistic expressions and statements of fact or law. The same applies to the discourse 
of the national supreme jurisdictions. The present study focuses on the application and 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court 
of Human Rights and the application of its case law by the Finnish supreme jurisdic-
tions, but given the abundance of research on the Court’s case law and the methods 
of interpretation and the variety of national case law, the research topic is delimited 
to certain groups of cases that demonstrate the transition most clearly in Finland. In 
most cases, treaty interpretation is a matter for the parties to the treaty in question. 
However, under international treaties, there are cases where a specific treaty body has 
been established, entrusted with the task of controlling compliance with treaty provi-
sions and interpreting those provisions. In this respect, the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights)13 and the European Court of Human Rights constitute a unique 
example of control mechanism, comprising a judicial body which has produced an 
abundant body of case law and which has provided authoritative interpretations and 
clarified the meaning of the Convention. 
13 ETS No. 5, done at Rome on 4 November 1950. The Convention entered into force on 3 Sep-
tember 1953. Finland ratified the Convention on 10 May 1990.
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1.3  Transition of the legal culture
The present dissertation is interdisciplinary, combining the sciences of legal linguistics, 
constitutional law and international treaty law or, to be more precise, international 
human rights law. The study analyses the transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights in Finland from the emergence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and development of the language of the European Court 
of Human Rights to their reception at the national level. Finland is today a member 
State of the Council of Europe and a party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The text of the European Convention on Human Rights reflects the standards 
of protection that the States parties thereto have been willing to afford to their citizens. 
The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights provide authoritative state-
ments on how it should be read and interpreted, which further develop the standards 
of protection and thus the legal culture of protecting human rights and fundamental 
rights. The development of case law continued for decades before Finland acceded to 
the Convention, and has continued since Finland’s accession for approximately 25 
years. The late accession to the Convention means that of the 65 years of its existence, 
the Finnish judiciary has only been applying it for 25 years, taking aboard 40 years of 
development of the standards of protection as such. This is a strong generalising state-
ment. The aim with this research is to analyse that development, which now constitutes 
an essential element of the Finnish legal system, from a wide historical perspective, 
ending at the analysis of national case law to see how its adoption has succeeded by the 
supreme jurisdictions. It is argued that the transition of the legal culture in an individual 
legal system does not take overnight in a case where the standards of protection have 
developed without the presence of that legal system for a long period of time. It is 
further argued that their reception is still not complete. Therefore, the development of 
the legal culture as a consequence of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Finland is studied at three phases and comparisons are made with other legal systems 
to explain how foreign that element of the legal system is traditionally for the Finnish 
judiciary. Finally, those presumptions are confirmed by analysing the discourse of the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions.
Thus, the present dissertation is based on the underlying presumption that the 
language of international human rights instruments reflects the political will and 
international culture of protecting human rights, as stated by the entity of states par-
ties to the instrument in question. As for individual states, however, the legal culture 
of protecting human rights is a more complex issue, involving also the intertwined 
aspect of constitutional or fundamental rights. The texts of international human rights 
conventions are static until officially amended, and in individual states parties they 
receive their meaning from state practice, including case law. Thus, the legal cultures of 
protecting human rights vary from those showing less respect for the internationally 
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agreed standards to more advanced ones. Political declarations, government documents, 
legislation and court judgments, through their language, further reflect the culture and 
standard of protecting human rights and fundamental rights. Considering that legal 
culture is a wide concept, it is necessary to delimit it. For the purposes of the present 
research, the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights is lim-
ited to the legal texts guaranteeing that protection and their enforcement through 
the judiciary. As a whole, the national legal culture would comprise a large variety of 
other elements, such as legislative policies and general legal opinions. Although only 
the final stage of the research focuses on national supreme jurisdictions, to include or 
exclude certain factors affecting the transition in national case law, it is necessary to 
approach that topic from a wide perspective. Thus, a wide perspective of development 
of the Convention is meant to assess how foreign that new European element was 
originally for the Finnish legal system, and an analysis of the development of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights – taking first place without the presence 
of Finnish cases – is meant to explain to what extent this extensive body of case law 
meant new elements in the legal system. For that purpose, also selected other legal 
systems are briefly analysed to exclude the impact of those foreign legal systems on 
the Finnish case law. It is well known that those legal systems are the most familiar 
ones for the Finnish judiciary and foreign materials are widely consulted. However, 
those elements are not necessarily visible in the discourse of the national supreme ju-
risdictions as explicit references, but are rather indirectly present in the legal thinking. 
Therefore, their presence is examined through comparison of sources of law, methods of 
interpretation and judicial style. An effort is made to assess whether and how the new 
element, European case law, has affected judicial style and legal culture of protecting 
human rights and fundamental rights in Finland.
The study is divided into three phases of transition of the language of human 
rights law and legal culture in Finland under the impact of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, where the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
constitutes the key element which has brought about a dramatic change in how the 
Convention rights are to be interpreted and understood. The aim of the research is 
to study, first, how the language of international human rights law has emerged, as a 
particular legal culture, starting from a historical overview of the protection of basic 
rights and liberties and the emergence of constitutional instruments protecting such 
rights, and moving to the emergence of international instruments for the protection of 
human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights. This historical 
overview covers the first phase of transition, where the Convention is drafted under 
the influence of negotiating States having their own traditions and cultures which are 
brought under a common umbrella, which in turn has an impact on the national legal 
systems and judiciaries. This first phase, placing the European Convention in a wider 
context, took place without Finland participating in the negotiations. The European 
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Convention on Human Rights has, nevertheless, been implemented in the Finnish 
legal system as such, which makes it important to analyse the elements that have 
existed in the Finnish legal system prior to the emergence of the Convention and its 
implementation, and those that appeared as a result of the Convention. The purpose of 
this rather extensive phase of the study is to assess from a historical and constitutional 
point of view the efforts required for the national supreme jurisdictions to adopt the 
new element in the Finnish legal system. Should the national constitutional traditions 
of protecting fundamental rights, including their scope, have considerable similarities 
with those that are visible in the European Convention on Human Rights, it would 
presumably require fewer efforts than in the opposite case. Whereas Finland did not 
take part in the negotiations, Sweden did. Finland shares a considerable part of legal 
history with Sweden, which has also had an impact on constitutional traditions, and 
the Swedish law was largely maintained even during the Russian era although there 
was influence from Russia on the political and administrative institutions. Those do 
not fall within the scope of the present dissertation. However, there is also influence 
from legal systems other than the Swedish one, particularly the German legal system. 
The concepts of human rights and fundamental rights are used without separating 
them from one another for the reason that in the Finnish case law which has emerged 
upon Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, they have 
been interpreted on the basis of the same criteria. Thus, it is necessary to also assess 
the historical constitutional developments.
The second phase of transition is the development of the language of the Conven-
tion in a wide sense, i.e. under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
within the framework of a unique control mechanism, partly independently but partly 
also under the influence of a variety of legal cultures. In this context, although the 
development of case law takes place under the impact of the individual complaints 
and indirectly the languages and legal cultures of States parties, the transition of the 
meaning of Convention provisions takes place rather independently and has changed 
considerably from what the negotiating States perhaps had originally in mind. The 
underlying presumption in this part of the study is that the language of the European 
Court of Human Rights, used in its judgments, develops under the impact of a variety 
of elements, including the legal cultures represented by the judges themselves and those 
of the states subject to complaints, but also the personal capacities of the judges. Thus, 
when looked into from the perspective of an individual state party to the Convention, 
in this case Finland, the language of the Court develops under a great variety of legal 
cultures, some of which may be extremely foreign to the Finnish one. Until Finland’s 
accession to the Convention, which took place at a late moment when compared with 
the other selected States, this development took place without the presence of Finn-
ish cases. The Finnish judiciary has not needed to pay attention to the development 
of European case law until rather recently. Therefore, the focus of the second phase of 
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the study is on the abundant case law which was upon Finland’s accession adopted in 
the Finnish legal system as such, although some of the more recent cases are looked 
into as they represent clear changes in the interpretation of the Convention meaning 
and some of them have ended up to the Court’s case law through Finnish applicants. 
However, this is all brought under the umbrella of protecting human rights, and the 
judgments are considered to reflect the legal culture of protecting human rights and 
fundamental rights. This element is no longer a static one, and is again implemented 
at the national level through the application of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights as a source of law, although it does not tell the entire truth about the 
cultures of protecting fundamental rights at the national level. However, it does provide 
some important elements for the analysis of the transition at the national level. This 
is particularly so because in this phase of transition, highlighting the development of 
the interpretation of the Convention, Finnish cases have gradually begun to play a 
role. This element of the protection of human rights and fundamental rights requires 
constant awareness of the European case law by the national judges to allow gradual 
transition of the legal culture.
The third and last phase of transition is what takes place at the national level, under 
the impact of the Convention system and the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on national case law and legal culture. The third phase of the research aims, in 
particular, to assess in more detail whether and to what extent the argumentation of the 
European Court of Human Rights has in practice been received by the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions. This is the most relevant phase for the analysis of the de facto transition of 
the legal culture of protecting human rights at the national level. The study is based on 
the underlying assumption that the language of national jurisdictions is a reflection of 
that culture, bearing in mind that it is only one element of the legal culture as a whole, 
in the same way as the texts of international human rights conventions reflect the 
standards of protection. National judgments tell what the reality is at the national level. 
An analysis is made of how the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has 
been taken into account in national cases involving the interpretation of certain human 
rights or constitutional rights and how the manner of treating it has changed since the 
earliest judgments until today, as reflected in the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions.
Prior research made into case law in Finland has shown that before Finland’s acces-
sion to the European Court of Human Rights, there were hardly any references to the 
provisions of international conventions on human rights and it was even rare to directly 
refer to the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution14. Instead of repeating 
14 See Scheinin 1991, p. 215, 216 and 222 concerning the Supreme Court. According to Scheinin, 
the Supreme Administrative Court has been a foregoer and there have been somewhat more 
references to both the Constitution and human rights conventions (Ibid. p. 241 and seq.) although 
it is far from the existing practice.
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that research, the case law with references to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the relevant case law is analysed instead of older case law to assess whether 
there is an ongoing transition of the legal culture in Finland, through the application 
and interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and whether and 
how that transition is visible in the judicial discourse of the supreme jurisdictions. It 
is a well known fact that the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in Finland is dramatic when compared with the United Nations instruments. It is also 
rather well known in Finland that the application of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and the relevant case law has gradually increased since Finland’s accession 
to the Convention to a significant extent, and this has been addressed in some studies. 
However, hardly any research has been made into whether there are other signs of 
change in the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions indicating a transition of the legal 
culture. In particular, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights can be 
treated by national jurisdictions as purely external elements to be taken into account, 
but the way they are applied through methods and standards of interpretation may 
bring them gradually towards strong internal elements. The bigger the difference in 
style is between early cases and the more recent ones, the stronger the transition of the 
legal culture is. The relevance of changes in legal discourse for the conclusions of the 
present dissertation is explained in more detail in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 below. At 
the outset, it appears that where the applicable international human rights convention 
is not supported by case law of a court, national jurisdictions are not willing to provide 
interpretations of their own. The European Convention on Human Rights appears to 
have the opposite effect particularly because of the binding European case law.
The final stage of the study is to assess the impact of the legal argumentation used 
by the European Court of Human Rights on legal culture and discourse of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions, as well as its conceptualisation and understanding by the judici-
ary. The European Court of Human Rights and the Finnish supreme jurisdictions (the 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court) have been chosen as a research 
topic due to the abundance of advanced case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and its rather strong impact on the Finnish legal culture over a relatively short 
period of time. The impact on the discourse appears to be stronger than in the big 
legal systems used as sources of comparison for the present research. However, the aim 
with this thesis is to demonstrate through an analysis of the discourse of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions that the real understanding of that case law has taken place only 
later. A further aim is to demonstrate that the development of a dialogue between the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Finnish supreme jurisdictions is still an 
ongoing process, and the reception of the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights is still not complete. For that purpose, dialogue is understood as a form 
of interaction whereby the two levels of jurisdictions take one another’s case law into 
account. Such a dialogue is on occasion said to exist also in other legal systems. Where 
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dialogue is successful, the emphasis of the legal culture of protecting human rights 
is at the national level in an effort to correct violations before them ending up to the 
European Court of Human Rights. That would be an indication of a more profound 
change of the legal culture, and one aim with the most recent reforms of the European 
Court of Human Rights and national legislations has been to go to that direction. 
Therefore, such a dialogue should perhaps be recommended.
Finland has been chosen as an example for the analysis of the transition of legal 
culture of protecting human rights and fundamental rights at the national level, first, 
for the reason that Finland acceded to the Convention later than the other Nordic 
countries part of the same family of legal systems and the other States used as sources 
of comparison and, second, the impact of the European case law on the national ju-
risprudence has been strong over a shorter period of time than for those other States. 
Thus, despite having been under the influence of the Nordic and Germanic legal tradi-
tions, Finland represents a State which has implemented the result of negotiations in 
which it did not take part around forty years later. Further, to assess the overall impact 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is interesting to look into other 
international instruments and the constitutional traditions of protecting fundamental 
rights. The Finnish legal system had been applying the United Nations instruments for 
a while before acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights, which makes 
it interesting to assess the impact of the Convention on the legal culture in more detail 
when compared with other human rights instruments. Even the accession to the United 
Nations covenants took place somewhat twenty years after their adoption. However, the 
impact of those instruments on national jurisprudence has been modest and they were 
only seldom referred to. Furthermore, a few years after the accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights 
were revised, which allows assessment of the impact of the Convention on them too. 
Furthermore, the case law of the supreme jurisdictions of Finland in which the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights has been applied is easily available. That 
is particularly important in scientific research that aims at analysing the discourse used 
by those jurisdictions. It is argued in this thesis that the constitutional developments in 
Finland have been equally important for the transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights as the European Convention on Human Rights. However, those 
constitutional amendments were made around the time of accession to the Conven-
tion. Further, it is interesting to note that the references to constitutional rights or 
other international human rights law were rare and rather mechanic in nature prior 
to Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, and have also 
increased upon the application of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the relevant European case law.
For a transition of the legal culture to be possible, it is necessary that there is the 
technical preparedness to receive European case law, consisting of the implementation 
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of the Convention into the national legal system as well as the possibility to apply 
international case law as a binding source of law. Those technical requirements as well 
as the relationship between the national Constitution and the Convention and the 
approach of the national judiciary to principles of interpretation of law, when compared 
with those of the Court, play a strong role. In the assessment of the transition of legal 
culture and in the analysis of judicial discourse, it is to be kept in mind that there are 
other strong elements affecting the legal culture as represented by the judgments of the 
supreme jurisdictions, and what takes place as a result of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights does not happen in isolation from the other elements. There 
may be other changes taking place in the legal system prior to or simultaneously with 
the increasing number of European materials, which make it possible to increasingly 
receive the European case law, such legislative or procedural changes. In the Finnish 
legal system, the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights were revised shortly 
after Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, expanding 
their scope and aligning them with the Convention. Another factor to be kept in mind 
is the impact of changes in political views and attitudes. For the transition in the human 
rights culture in Finland to be possible in the first place, it was necessary that certain 
changes took place in political settings. Those changes lead to the Europeanisation of 
the legal system in general.
Furthermore, another essential factor making a transition of the legal culture is the 
knowledge and experience of national judges of the European system of protecting 
human rights. It is further required that the national judiciary in general has a positive 
attitude towards the application of foreign and European sources of law, in addition 
to the national ones.
Therefore, in the conclusions, an effort is made to assess also various external fac-
tors that might partly explain the extent to which the national judiciary is receptive 
to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. Some scholars have 
analysed the scope of existing studies on the Convention and the Court and, finding 
that until recently most of them have focused on the normative and procedural aspects, 
have called for more research on the social aspects of the Convention and protection 
of fundamental rights and human rights15. It is true that human rights are not a purely 
legal phenomenon16. As pointed out by Verschraegen17, the significance of human rights 
is not only about the legal protection of individuals against abuse of power, but is part 
15 See e.g. Greer 2013, p. 149-153. This would indeed be relevant in view of the fact that the devel-
opment of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights was for a while affected by the 
geo-political settings in Europe. (Madsen 2011, p. 43-45. Those settings also essentially affected 
the late accession of Finland to the Convention.
16 Madsen 2013, p. 82.
17 Verschraegen 2013, p. 78. The development of society has also lead to the expansion of the list 
of rights (Ibid. p. 67).
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of a wider societal context. The change of legal culture of protecting human rights and 
fundamental rights is a long process involving not only changes of law but also of the 
societal and constitutional settings. The changes of law and judicial discourse (surface 
structure of law) may reflect a change of legal culture (deep structure of law) but there 
may be a difference in terms of time. This research makes a further effort to go the 
direction of assessing the signs of change in the legal culture instead of only providing 
an overview of cases, as reflected in the judicial discourse. However, the purpose of this 
thesis is not to go deep into political or social change18, but to remain in the legal settings 
of judicial behaviour, including the wider context of the constitutional developments.
To assess the interaction between different legal and other factors on the transition 
of legal culture of protecting fundamental rights, it is also relevant to carry out some 
research into such other foreign elements as may play a role, particularly other legal 
systems, to exclude misinterpretation of the influence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the relevant European case law. The Nordic legal systems and 
particularly that of Sweden have played a major role in the shaping of the Finnish 
legal system, due to historical reasons19. It is important to assess the relationship 
between their respective constitutional provisions on fundamental rights. Further, it 
is a known fact that the German legal system has had considerable influence on the 
Nordic ones20. Therefore, even Germany has been chosen as an example of a foreign 
legal system subject to analysis to ensure the correctness of presumptions concerning 
the rather modest foreign impact when compared with the European case law. The 
French legal system has been chosen as a further example due to its high significance 
in the historical developments protecting human rights and fundamental rights and its 
impact on other modern legal systems in Europe, and the English legal system as an 
example of an entirely different legal system with strong focus on precedents, which, 
nevertheless, has served as a source for many other legal systems in the world and 
the English legal culture and language has gradually gained a dominating position as 
regards the presence of foreign elements in Finnish legal studies in the past decades21. 
The English-speaking world is also where the first human rights instruments appeared.
18 As pointed out by Madsen, the study of human rights as a societal phenomenon would necessarily 
imply addressing the structural societal transformations prompted by the evolution of human 
rights. (Madsen 2013, p. 82.)
19 See Koivu and Mattila 2006, p. 27-28.
20 This applies to the role of civil-law tradition in general, which is clearly visible in the field of 
interpretation of law (Ibid. p. 24).However, in Finland, the influence of the German legal culture 
and language has been particularly strong, when compared with the influence of the French legal 
culture, for example, which is largely explained by societal developments in general, including trade 
relations already in the middle ages and the common practice of studying in German universities 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. The cooperation has continued widely until the 1990s, whereafter 
the German influence has gradually diminished. (Mattila 2012, p.301-305)
21 See Mattila 2012, p. 448-449.
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The numbers of judgments finding a violation of human rights may also provide some 
indication of the preparedness of the legal system to apply human rights or fundamental 
rights provisions, although it is necessary to go into the texts of the relevant judgments 
to draw any conclusions or assessments. Those judgments may also indicate even con-
siderable differences in the standards and legal culture of protecting human rights and 
fundamental rights. There are considerable differences particularly between Finland and 
Germany in the numbers of violations found by the European Court of Human Rights, 
in view of the periods of time of applying the Convention and the sizes of population. 
An effort is made by means of comparison, also with reference to the English, French 
and Swedish legal systems, to see whether there are essential differences that explain the 
problems faced by the Finnish legal system in paying attention to the provisions of the 
Convention, and to what extent they can be explained by systemic differences or other 
internal or external factors. The nature of violations found against an individual respond-
ent State may also impose a change in the legal culture of protecting human rights and 
fundamental rights. It may in a way encourage national jurisdictions to change the way 
in which they treat the European case law, i.e. gradually change their discourse to avoid 
further cases ending up to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court’s case law 
can be applied in different ways, depending on to what extent it is recognised as a source 
of law. The underlying assumption is that in the interpretation of the Convention, the 
discourse of the European Court of Human Rights plays a rather significant role and 
that there are differences in the receptiveness of national legal systems to the judicial 
argumentation or discourse of the Court. The analysis of Finnish case law is limited to 
the discourse used by the national supreme jurisdictions, in an effort to analyse to what 
extent the national judiciary is receptive to the argumentation of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and what type of an impact it has had on the transition of the legal 
culture. Further, an analysis is made of whether the transition of the Finnish legal culture 
is visible in the discourse used by the supreme jurisdictions.
In the analysis of the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
supreme jurisdictions of Finland, the development of the legal framework of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights and the development of the language of human 
rights law, as factors delimiting discourse, as well as the principles of interpretation 
of law as a relevant element affecting the discourse are taken into account. Thus, 
apart from the aforementioned developments, an analysis is made of the relationship 
between the principles of interpretation of treaties and those of the interpretation of 
law in general. The said principles are placed in the framework of the interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights. The sources of law and the principles of interpretation of law affect and define 
the judicial discourse. Considering that there are differences between legal systems, 
which might at least partly explain some of the problems faced by States parties to 
the Convention and particularly those faced by the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, a 
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brief analysis is made of the principles of interpretation applied in the selected States 
to see whether there are so significant differences in their approach to application of 
international law or to the interpretation of law in general that might play a role in 
the problems faced by national courts in the application and interpretation of human 
rights law, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, as demonstrated 
by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, an effort is made 
to conclude whether those differences affect the receptiveness of the legal system to 
the methods of interpretation developed by the European Court of Human Rights, 
in order to draw conclusions concerning the Finnish legal system. The purpose of 
this analysis is to find support for the conclusions made about the developments in 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, but the purpose of this thesis is not to present any 
definitive conclusions concerning those other legal systems. Therefore, the relevant 
sections remain rather descriptive.
1.4  Research methods
The topic of this research is approached from a wide perspective. First, it has been 
necessary to go through a variety of research materials to see what is worth studying 
in the field of the European Convention on Human Rights apart from research al-
ready done by others. Second, without looking into European and national case law it 
would have been impossible to see what kind of a change in the judicial discourse of 
the supreme jurisdictions has taken place, and on which elements that change is based. 
Thus, to select the research materials, it has been necessary to carry out not only some 
comparison of the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in the selected five legal systems but also some analysis of judicial discourse. Judicial 
discourse is also, for the purposes of this research, understood in a rather wide sense, 
encompassing entire judgments in an effort to find those elements in the judgments 
that provide signs of a transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights 
and human rights. Even the provisions of the legal instruments on which the judicial 
discourse is based constitute fragments of discourse. It was found out that in national 
judgments, those parts of the judgments that contain references to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights indicate most clearly a change of the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights and human rights. Another change in the background 
consists of changes made to the Finnish Constitution. All these have been imposed by 
the European Convention on Human Rights to a large extent.
Comparison is a rather general method used in legal research, whereas discourse 
analysis goes deeper into the contents of law placing the emphasis on the language 
instead of systems. The study of constitutional instruments and international human 
rights instruments may remain at a rather general level, being rather comparison and 
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general text analysis. The first phase of the research also represents a rather traditional 
type of legal research. Instead, the second phase of the research goes deeper into the 
language of human rights law as represented by judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights. However, given that the purpose is to arrive at conclusions concerning 
the transition of the legal culture of protecting human rights and fundamental rights 
in Finland, the discourse analysis of the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights remains rather descriptive but introduces some elements of critical discourse 
analysis as explained in section 1.4.3 below. A more detailed discourse analysis is left 
for the third and final phase of this research, to look for concrete signs of change of 
legal culture in the national judgments. Such signs could be for example increase of 
detailed argumentation in the light of European case law, the use of different standards 
or methods of interpretation or emergence of new concepts or other elements.
1.4.1  Comparative law
Comparative law as a method of legal science is traditionally understood as the com-
parison of the legal systems of different nations. According to Zweigert & Kötz, this 
can be done on a large scale or on a smaller scale. They draw a distinction between 
macro-comparison, i.e. the comparison of the spirit and style of different legal systems, 
the methods of thought and procedures they use, and micro-comparison, dealing with 
specific legal institutions or problems, i.e. with the rules used to solve actual problems 
or particular conflicts of interest. However, as Zweigert & Kötz point out, the divid-
ing line between macrocomparison and microcomparison is flexible, and one must 
often do both at the same time.22 A similar comparison has been drawn by David23. 
The comparison of the selected four legal systems in the present thesis, in addition to 
the Finnish one, remains mainly at the macro level. However, some case law of those 
legal systems is looked into, entailing some micro-level comparison. That is necessary 
to confirm the findings of scholars. A similar division as has been made by Zweigert 
& Kötz and David may also be applied to legal linguistics, and comparison is a rather 
usual research method used for the study of legal language. According to Mattila, 
macro-level legal linguistics means research that focuses on legal languages at a general 
level, covering e.g. history, main characteristics or coherence, whereas micro-level legal 
linguistics deals with the use and meaning of individual terms.24 For the purposes of 
the present study, both are needed. As pointed out by Husa, it is not sufficient to study 
case law, but it is also necessary to know the context i.e. the prevailing customs and 
practices25. Thus, a wider context with the history of the European Convention on 
22 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 4 and 5.
23 David 1982, p.110-112.
24 Mattila 2010 (1), p. 729.
25 See Husa 2011, p. 222.
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Human Rights and the development of its interpretation has been chosen as the basis 
of comparison, added by a comparison of the approaches of the selected legal systems 
to the case law under it, before advancing to the comparison of national case law of 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions.
The overall approach to comparison in this research is rather descriptive when the 
constitutional developments, sources of law and methods of interpretation of law in the 
five legal systems as well as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
are studied. The purpose such macro-comparison is to see to what extent the Finnish 
constitutional traditions have similarities with the other legal systems, and whether any 
differences found may explain the late accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and whether there are such differences in constitutional traditions compared 
with the other four legal systems that may explain challenges in the reception of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The more the developments in the 
legal systems share similarities upon accession to the Convention, the more reason 
there is to conclude that the changes have been imposed by the Convention. The wider 
historical reasons for the Finnish constitutional developments are kept in mind while 
comparing the legal systems. A similar comparative approach is used to the study of 
the judicial style and traditional methods of interpretation, in the light of those of the 
European Court of Human Rights. As explained in the foregoing, the purpose of that 
comparison is also to exclude the presence of foreign influence in the transition of 
the way of interpreting the European case law by the Finnish supreme jurisdictions.
To start with, comparison is carried out to analyse the presence of selected consti-
tutional traditions in the language of the European Convention on Human Rights 
as well as the further impact of the Convention on the development of national legal 
traditions. This does not mean that those constitutional traditions would be the only 
ones that have affected the contents of the Convention. The language of the Conven-
tion is analysed in the light of other corresponding human rights conventions, and 
compared with selected national instruments for the protection of fundamental rights 
or basic rights and liberties, in an effort to see how the elements included in other 
instruments have affected the European Convention. Further comparison is made 
between the approaches of the selected legal systems to the different sources of law 
and particularly to the application of case law as a source of law, as well as between 
the judicial styles of those legal systems. To what extent discourse of the European 
Court of Human Rights fits in the judicial traditions of Finland, by drawing some 
comparisons with the selected other States, is analysed. Furthermore, to what extent 
the European Court of Human Rights has paid attention to either internal or lateral 
traditions of states parties is also briefly analysed. Comparison is also used in the dis-
course analysis of the case law of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, in an effort to see 
to what extent the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the transition 
of the legal culture is visible in the national case law. Furthermore, the language used 
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by the Court in its judgments is analysed and compared with the terminology used in 
the Convention, and further with the judicial language of selected states, to assess the 
transition taking place in the Finnish case law in an effort to see to what extent it can 
be explained through national implementation of the European case law. The purpose 
of looking into other legal systems is to exclude the impact of other foreign elements 
that would be more dominating than the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the relevant case law. Furthermore, it is presumed that the development may be 
similar in the selected European legal systems as regards changes in the application of 
the European Convention and the European case law as sources of law, and that the 
changes have emerged for the same reason, although there may be differences in the 
techniques used for interpretation. Thus, as the final step of comparison, the judicial 
style of the judgments of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions is analysed over a defined 
period of time, to see whether and in what manner the judicial style of the European 
Court of Human Rights has affected or has started to affect the judicial style in Fin-
land. In doing that, the cases of both Finnish supreme jurisdictions are compared with 
one another. Micro-comparison through discourse analysis is used to analyse details.
David identifies various problems that may be related to comparison, most im-
portantly the different conceptions of what is understood by rules of law, differences 
between concepts, as well as differences between the structures of law and different 
classifications of rules of law26. Those differences are paid attention to in the present 
study when comparing the different approaches to sources of law and interpretation of 
law. However, as explained in the foregoing, some micro-level comparison is done by 
means of a more refined research into national case law. When compared with the earlier 
research carried out on the application and interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Finland, which has been close to the mainstream research on the Convention, the 
purpose of the last phase of research is to carry out in in-depth analysis of the case law 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. That also involves necessarily macro-comparison 
between the different judgments, but discourse analysis is used for the purposes of 
micro-comparison. Thus, in the present thesis, discourse analysis is a more detailed 
method of comparative research. Discourse analysis as a method of research is addressed 
in more detail below to highlight its relevance for micro-comparison and in-depth 
analysis of change in the legal culture.
The approach of Mattila to legal linguistics and comparative law shares much in 
common with that of Zweigert & Kötz. According to Husa, the latter represent the 
so-called functional comparative law which is the mainstream theory27. Thus, it is 
interesting from the point of view of legal linguistics in that both sciences attempt to 
26 David 1982, p. 110-113.
27 Husa 2011, p. 211.
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study the functions that a given concept or term have in different contexts, i.e. in differ-
ent legal systems28. In the present study, it is particularly the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights that constitutes such a concept, and it is supplemented by the 
different approaches to its interpretation. Glenn applies a somewhat different approach 
to the study of legal systems. Abandoning the traditional and perhaps more practical 
comparison between legal systems, Glenn goes beyond the limits of a nation-state by 
analysing legal traditions from a wider perspective. Glenn draws a distinction between 
internal traditions (i.e. traditions that exist within a larger tradition) and lateral tradi-
tions that appear to exist across the borders of several larger legal traditions29. This 
distinction is interesting for the purposes of the present study in that the language of 
human rights law may be stated to exist across the borders of national legal systems and 
traditions, representing thus a lateral tradition in terms of Glenn, while it coexists with 
national traditions both with regard to the interpretation of law and to the protection 
of human rights. In the Finnish legal system and jurisprudence, the interpretation 
of constitutional rights coexists with that of the rights protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Also, there are other elements existing in several or 
all legal systems, which are based on the common origins of law for example through 
the influence of Roman law and the use of Latin. In the view of Glenn, for a tradition 
to become universal, i.e. applicable within all the legal traditions to which it adheres, 
a certain degree of normativity is required. Furthermore, he suggests that it is also 
necessary to pay attention to other traditions. As Glenn points out, “whether a given 
tradition is universalising […] will be a question of how it reconciles its own normativity 
with its own tolerance of other traditions. This latter question raises the general issue 
of the complexity of traditions, of how traditions manage their relations with other 
traditions.”30 Indeed, this is relevant for the transmission of human rights language 
across borders. It may be held that for a supranational element to be internalised by 
a national legal tradition, it must some way or another fit in the existing framework.
1.4.2 Micro-comparison through discourse analysis 
The essential method used for the purposes of comparing and analysing the judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights and those of the supreme jurisdictions of 
Finland against one another is discourse analysis. It is based on the understanding that 
judicial discourse is a demonstration of legal culture where legal linguistic expressions 
gradually change along with changes of law, bearing in mind that the more profound 
changes of legal culture may require more time than the judicial discourse. The more there 
28 See Husa 2011, p. 223 and 224. Husa finds that this concerns, in particular, legal translation. 
Indeed, for a comparatist studying the legal system, knowledge of the language at least to some 
extent is necessary for the understanding of that system.
29 For more details, see Glenn 2004, p. 343-347.
30 Glenn 2004, p. 347 and 348.
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is variation in the linguistic expressions, the less complete the change is. The linguistic 
fragments are necessarily analysed for the purposes of the micro-level comparison of 
judgments to detect the signs of change. Those linguistic fragments both in European and 
national case law include the use of various concepts and expressions that demonstrate 
cultural change such as references to the Convention as a living instrument, references 
to the existence of a European standard or explicit references to the development of 
law or morals. Relevant linguistic fragments may also consist of increased presence of 
such references as the Convention as a living instrument or autonomous meaning, or 
certain standards of methods of interpretation. It is presumed that certain methods of 
interpretation are resorted to in those cases where the protection of human rights has 
been strengthened more clearly than in other cases and thus the legal culture has under-
gone a transition. In the national case law, the relevant linguistic fragments include, in 
particular, the fragments of discourse where references are made to the European case 
law and the ways of doing it. Micro-comparison through discourse analysis is used to 
see how the way of applying the European Convention and the European case law has 
gradually changed. It is also applied to the judgments of the Finnish supreme jurisdic-
tions. The purpose is to arrive at a conclusion concerning the changes in legal culture 
by means of analysing the supreme jurisdictions’ discourse, in an effort to see whether 
the changes in legal culture are traceable through changes in discourse.
The European Court of Human Rights combines a variety of sources of law, includ-
ing sources indicating changes in society (making the Convention a living instrument). 
The Convention provisions are rather static, but the Court uses other sources of law 
in the interpretation of those provisions, and developments in the Court’s judicial 
discourse demonstrate changes in how the judges see the European standards of pro-
tecting human rights. In the same way, the changing judicial discourse of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions indicates how the approach to the application of the European 
Convention and the relevant case law has changed. Those changes may include, among 
others, not only changes in opinions or interpretation but also additional elements in 
the discourse which have not existed before. In particular, the judgments of the Finn-
ish supreme jurisdictions are compared against one another to see whether there are 
increased details, references to concepts, standards or methods of interpretation that 
have not been used before, or different style of argumentation. In view of the limita-
tions set by the legal system on the discourse used by the national courts, it is also 
relevant to analyse the approach of the legal system to the sources of law and methods 
of interpretation of law, to explain the particular characteristics of the discourse of the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions. The implications of those factors on the discourse of 
the supreme jurisdictions of Finland are assessed not only in the light of the domestic 
approach, but also in the light of the sources of law and methods of interpretation used 
by the European Court of Human Rights and the jurisdictions of the selected legal 
systems used as sources of comparison.
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The focus of the research into case law is on micro-comparison through discourse 
analysis, but discourse cannot be analysed in isolation from the principles and methods 
of interpretation of law. This allows not only comparison between different human 
rights instruments, the two authentic language versions of the Convention and conse-
quently the Court’s case law, but also between different linguistic and legal cultures31. 
In the conclusions, an effort is made to see whether and how the Court’s discourse 
has been received by Finnish supreme jurisdictions, and what the general attitude 
of the national courts is to the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights, 
including the methods of interpretation of law. However, Van Hoecke points out that 
problems of statutory interpretation are often approached from the point of view of 
interpretation arguments rather than interpretation methods. Furthermore, a distinction 
is drawn between objective or scientific methods, on the one hand, and subjective or 
evaluative methods, on the other. According to Van Hoecke, in most argumentation 
approaches a mixture of both is found. He refers to external and internal perspec-
tives of argumentation.32 When put in the context of interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, internal perspectives of argumentation would include 
various aspects such as the facts of the case and applicable provisions of law, whereas 
external perspectives would consist of a wider context including prevailing conditions 
of society. Argumentation analysis could focus on the means by which the parties at-
tempt to convince the court of their views, on the one hand, and by which the court 
attempts to convince the audience (the parties, higher courts, and the general public) 
of its judgment, on the other.33 Both appear in the judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights and in those of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, although the 
structure of reasoning has some differences.
The conclusions concerning the Finnish supreme jurisdictions are made on the basis 
of analysing to what extent they resort to the case law and style of judicial reasoning 
of the European Court of Human Rights as an external or internal perspective of 
argumentation in relation to the elements of the national legal system as an internal 
perspective. The concepts used by Van Hoecke are brought to a more concrete level 
in the light of the references to European case law. It is suggested that the closer to 
31 Legal culture is understood as meaning the characteristics or qualities that a State or group of 
States has in its procedural and substantive law and legal system. Bunn-Livingstone includes in 
the concept of legal culture the country’s or group of countries’ (or regions’) set of rules, values, 
ideologies, traditions, attitudes, and norms inherent in the law and legal system. She points out 
that these are dynamic concepts that change with time as they are shaped by historical, political, 
economic and social factors. (Bunn-Livingstone 2002, p. 41 and 43)
32 Van Hoecke 2002, p. 134 and 135. 
33 Van Hoecke 2002, p. 125. Van Hoecke observes that those sets of arguments consist of both 
elements that are worded in terms of ”empirical truth” and of elements that inevitably require 
some evaluative choice. The latter cannot be approached in terms of “true” or “false” but in terms 
of “better” or “worse” interpretation.
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the style of argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights the discourse of 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions is, the more it is used as a strong internal element 
of argumentation. Signs of such strong internal elements include, among others, the 
use of similar methods of interpretation – although not necessarily bearing the same 
name – and the use of autonomous concepts as developed through the European case 
law. It is also assessed through discourse analysis to what extent there is transition in 
the use of such elements of argumentation. This can be done through objective analysis. 
However, apart from what types of expressions are clearly visible in the discourse of the 
supreme jurisdictions and may be analysed on objective grounds, it is inevitable that 
there are also subjective elements present, which may be more difficult to analyse. Such 
elements would include for example signs of a general attitude of judges. Thus, a further 
element subject to discourse analysis in the present study is the use of the subjective 
or evaluative perspectives of argumentation advocated by Van Hoecke. Those perspec-
tives may, in particular, include societal elements. An effort is made to see whether the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Finnish supreme jurisdictions focus mainly 
on legal argumentation, or whether it is supplemented by practical argumentation.
In the view of Alexy, mere legal discourse or argumentation is not sufficient but a 
decision needs to be reached, by reducing the number of solutions into one by means 
of the rules of rational practical argumentation.34 Thus, particularly in the field of hu-
man rights, the judges need to resort to even complicated balancing of rights against 
one another, with a view to giving priority to one of them. That is typical particularly 
in the balancing of the freedom of expression or the protection of national security 
against the right to private life. The outcome may be different depending on how 
much weight the judges put on the different criteria. This, in turn, is particularly 
challenging for a legal system which traditionally underlines literal interpretation of 
law. Further, even if the legal system relies on rather strict legalistic traditions and 
judgments are bound by the rules of law, there may be differences in the ways in 
which the judges combine the legal rules with a wider perspective. The possibility for 
different outcomes even through the application of the same provisions of law or the 
same case law constitutes a further challenge for discourse analysis. However, signs of 
change in the legal culture may be detected by looking into the presence and ways of 
balancing of the different criteria for giving priority for a certain constitutional right 
or Convention right, in an effort to see those fragments of discourse have changed. 
How successful this is depends on how explicitly the judgments set out the balancing 
of those criteria. Insofar as constitutional rights argumentation is concerned, Alexy 
appears to be of the view that there necessarily is a rationality gap. The constitutional 
rights argumentation is determined and structured to some extent by the legal basis, 
but this determination is incomplete. Therefore, general practical argumentation is a 
34 See Alexy 2004, p. 371.
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necessary component of constitutional rights discourse, sharing also the uncertainty 
of its outcome.35 This could be said to apply to the argumentation of the European 
Court of Human Rights and there are examples of such supplementing general practi-
cal argumentation. Inevitably, the discourse and argumentation is supplemented with 
general practical arguments based on experience and on the subjective views of the 
judges and not everything is necessarily explicitly written in the text of the judgment, 
as part of the reasoning of the courts remain behind “closed doors”. Nevertheless, even 
in the case of constitutional rights argumentation, or fundamental rights argumenta-
tion, rationality is relevant to make it convincing and to afford it a law-making effect, 
i.e. to make it legitimate, and it is necessary to justify the argumentation by sufficient 
proof. Habermas draws a distinction between two sides of law: its positivity and its 
claim to rational acceptability36. According to Habermas, there is an internal relation 
between the validity of a proposition and the proof of its validity. In the words of 
Habermas, “what is valid must be able to prove its worth against any future objec-
tions that might actually be raised”.37 Thus, the receptiveness of the argumentation 
of the European Court of Human Rights by its audience, i.e. the national courts and 
authorities, requires internal coherence between the statement and the justifying 
arguments. It must be both understandable and acceptable in the experience of the 
audience. The requirement of acceptability of argumentation also imposes restrictions 
on the formulation of the courts’ discourse i.e. on the manner of using the language. 
Legal argumentation, when supported with binding rules, is usually legitimate as 
such, but the persuasiveness of judgments may be supplemented by means of general 
practical argumentation.
1.4.3  Critical discourse analysis
It is mentioned in the foregoing that apart from micro-comparison of national case 
law, comparison is also made between different human rights instruments, the two 
authentic language versions of the Convention and consequently the Court’s case law, 
but also between different linguistic and legal cultures. For this purpose, even macro-
comparison is carried out to some extent by means of discourse analysis, and discourse 
is put in a wider constitutional and legal context. The study of judicial discourse is 
typically placed within the framework of the science of legal linguistics. There are 
different ways of characterising legal linguistics as a branch of science. According to 
Mattila, legal linguistics is a branch of science that studies the development, charac-
35 Alexy 2004, p. 386 and 387.
36 Habermas 1996, p. 38.
37 Habermas 1996, p. 35. In the view of Habermas, there is a tension between facticity and valid-
ity, constituting the validity dimension of language: truth and the discursive conditions for the 
rational acceptability of truth claims are mutually explanatory. (Ibid.)
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teristics and use of legal language38. Essentially, legal linguistics has as its main object 
the linguistic study of legal language in its different aspects and manifestations, in 
order to find the means and define the appropriate techniques to improve its quality. 
In the view of Gémar, the methods of legal linguistics are, due to this close link with 
linguistics, those of social sciences and particularly socio-linguistics.39 Or, as expressed 
by Cornu, legal linguistics is, in general, a particular application of the science of lin-
guistics to the legal language. He characterises legal linguistics as applied linguistics, 
where those key concepts (signifié/ significant) and branches of linguistics (semantics, 
syntax) are chosen that best serve the purposes of the research. For the purposes of 
applying linguistic analysis to the language of law, it is semantics that plays the most 
important role.40 Without going into details, suffice it to note that semantics is a sub-
division of semiotics, which is a relatively new branch of linguistics. Semantics focuses 
on the relations between the sign (la signe) and the significant (la chose signifiée), in the 
search for meaning.41 Semantic theories of law, in turn, refer to such theories of law 
according to which lawyers must follow certain linguistic criteria when interpreting 
law, and which originally have focused also on the meaning of words. According to a 
more modern approach, this encompasses the use of legal concepts.42
It is worth noting that discourse analysis is closely associated to a variety of fields of 
science such as cultural anthropology, sociology, critical social and linguistic theories, 
structural linguistics, communication theories, speech act theories and theories of 
text analysis43. One could also speak of text analysis instead of discourse analysis. In 
general, in a legal context, linguistic analysis can contribute to correct understanding 
of what is said or written. However, the difference between the concepts of text and 
 
 
38 Mattila 2010 (1), p. 719.
39 Gémar 1982, p. 135.
40 For more details, see Cornu 2005, p. 24-31.
41 Didier 1990, p. 91. Words can be studied in isolation or together with other words in which case 
one can speak of semantics of discourse. (Ibid. p. 111) In the search for the meaning of a particular 
treaty provision, the ordinary meaning of words, i.e. the way in which a certain word is normally 
understood by any reader, is relevant. However, as is pointed out by Lauzière, the search for the 
meaning of words in a piece of legislation is not that easy, and the words may not have the same 
meaning in a literary work as they have in a piece of legislation. Nor may synonyms be used to 
the same extent in legislative texts as they are used in literature (Lauzière 1982, p. 41-47).
42 Dworkin 1986, p. 32. According to Dworkin, semantic theories of law presuppose that lawyers 
and judges use mainly the same criteria when deciding whether the propositions of law are true 
or false; they suppose that lawyers actually agree about the grounds of law. The semantic theories 
have a close link with legal positivism (Dworkin 1986, p. 33) and with the literal meaning ap-
proach to the interpretation of law.
43 For details, see a figure presented by Titscher & al. 2000, p. 51.
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discourse analysis44 is not dramatic, and both aim at interpreting the meaning of the 
text or discourse. Some scholars prefer to speak of critical discourse analysis, referring 
to a rather recent field of social sciences and putting emphasis on societal aspects of 
discourse. According to Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al., the traditional methods of legal 
sociology appear to neglect sociological analysis of legal discourse, i.e. the process in 
which legal argumentation constructs concepts and social reality45 although, according 
to Levi, the areas of psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics are an increasingly significant 
trend in linguistics46. The present research aims at paying attention to social realities in 
the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights without, however, 
constituting research in the field of social sciences. Even the European Court of Hu-
man Rights pays attention to the prevailing standards and morals in democratic society, 
which may impose some limits to the development of case law. Through discourse 
analysis, it is assessed to what extent development may be detected through fragments 
of discourse, in the light of external factors. Such fragments of discourse could include 
for example extensive explanations of developments of society or moral conceptions. 
One may note that discourse analysis does not exclude analysis of external factors, as 
is explained below in section 1.4.1, and in view of the Court’s approach to the inter-
pretation of law, they are even called for. Discourse does not take place in isolation 
from external factors but is dependent on the legal framework and is affected by social 
realities. As pointed out by Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al., the system of facts is independ-
ent from the existence of a text or discourse, whereas discourse analysis is based on a 
theory of social construction in which the discourse, including legal discourse, is seen 
as constructing the social world.47 Therefore, extensive analysis is carried out of the 
constitutional developments and traditions of interpreting law. Following the idea of 
critical discourse analysis, the purpose in the present research is to carry out research 
into the change of legal culture through the analysis of three stages of development, 
where three major stages of the research all require a considerably different approach. 
Therefore, a flexible method of discourse analysis is chosen. Also, considering the need 
for cross-disciplinary materials, the concepts of argumentation and discourse are used 
44 Some scholars prefer to draw a distinction between discourse or conversation analysis and text 
analysis, the first one meaning in the first place the analysis of speech acts, and the latter mean-
ing the analysis of written language. However, for the purposes of this study, discourse analysis 
is understood as a wider concept, covering also written discourses. (See Green 1990, p. 249) In 
the view of Garre, also translation strategies have a close link with legal interpretation, both 
dealing with aspects of text and sentence structure. (Garre 1999, p. 116) However, the objective 
of translation is different from that of legal interpretation, and the strategies of translation are 
not discussed in this study.
45 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al. 2006, p. 24 and 25.
46 Levi 1990, p. 8.
47 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al. 2006, p. 21-23.
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interchangeably48. Only the study of case law is close to the traditional idea of discourse 
analysis but is still focusing on the signs of change in the legal culture through judicial 
discourse, since individual linguistic elements would not be very useful for that purpose.
In view of the wide range of elements to be compared, Fairclough’s approach to 
discourse analysis appears to be particularly convenient in that in each case of changes 
in society – in the present case changes in the legal culture of protecting human rights 
and fundamental rights – critical discourse analysis is brought into dialogue with other 
sociological and social scientific research in order to investigate to what extent and in 
what ways these changes are changes in discourse, as well as to explore the socially 
transformative effects of discursive change49. According to Fairclough & al. (2011), “in 
contrast with some branches of linguistics, critical discourse analysis is not a discrete 
academic discipline with a relatively fixed set of research methods, but a problem-
oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of approaches. Those 
approaches share interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse, and 
political-economic or cultural change in society.”50 In the present case, research into 
historical constitutional developments as well as development of the legal system and 
legal language in Finland represents the other sociological and social scientific research of 
relevance for the research into judicial discourse. The judgments of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions reflect the transition of legal culture of protecting human rights to the extent 
that there are changes in discourse. Fairclough sees discourses as diverse representations 
of social life, and critical discourse analysis is the analysis of the dialectical relationships 
between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices51. In the 
present study, the approach of the Finnish legal system to applying and interpreting the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights is treated as an example of social practice, and the case law of 
the supreme jurisdictions of Finland are treated as a discourse representing that system.
48 In doing so, the author does not intend to neglect the fact that linguists rather see argumentation 
as a specific type of discourse. See e.g. Van Eemeren & al., according to whom argumentation 
uses language to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing an agreement in views. 
The study of argumentation typically centres on one of two subjects: either interactions in which 
two or more people conduct or have arguments such as discussions or debates; or texts such as 
speeches or editorials in which a person makes an argument. (Van Eemeren & al. 2011, p. 85) 
Thus, a court judgment typically involves argumentation.
49 See Fairclough & al. 2011, p. 362.
50 Fairclough & al. 2011, p. 357. The critical discourse analysis has, however, its origins in linguistic 
research and is closely associated with critical linguistics and social semiotics. (Ibid. p. 361 and 
362.)
51 Fairclough 2001, p. 123. “Semiosis” refers to semiotics/ semantics, and includes all forms of mean-
ing making – visual images, body language, as well as language. (Ibid. p. 122.) See also Fairclough 
2010, p. 234-239, where he proposes a four-step methodology for critical discourse analysis (a 
dialectical-relational version of critical discourse analysis), which is rather a combination of theory 
and methods instead of a clear-cut method.
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Discourse is both historical52 (context bound) and interpretative and explanatory53. 
The constitutional protection of fundamental rights and the international protection 
of human rights constitute a wider historical context, to which the application and 
interpretation of the European case law belong. However, for the purpose of discourse 
analysis, it is necessary to even limit the context. Context can be used as a representation 
of a whole communicative episode, including the communicative event (text, talk) itself, 
or as a representation of the relevant social environment of such an event54. In other 
words, one may speak of a verbal context or a social situation or context55. Consequently, 
the analysis of context may be restrictive and focus only on the user context (e.g. the 
court), or assess wider implications that the use of particular discourses may have even 
externally56. One manner of limiting the analysis is the principle of local interpretation. 
This principle instructs the hearer/ reader not to construct a context any larger than 
he needs to arrive at an interpretation.57 Although the historical and legal framework 
plays a role in the shaping of discourse, for the final stage of the present study it is only 
relevant to look into those cases where the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have been applied. Thus, 
while bearing in mind the wider historical context of protecting fundamental rights 
and human rights, research is carried out into such Finnish judgments over a certain 
period of time and the fragments of discourse in those judgments are compared with 
one another. It is noted in the foregoing that the discourse of the European Court 
of Human Rights – as an example of constitutional rights argumentation – and the 
discourse of national courts inevitably entails some degree of general practical argu-
mentation as well as subjective evaluative elements. Thus, it is useful to assess also some 
52 There is also a historical approach to critical discourse analysis, which is nevertheless not treated 
in more detail in the present study. The discourse-historical approach, which is closely associated 
with the idea of emphasizing context, adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical 
theory, and follows a complex concept of social critique. (See Wodak 2001, p. 64.) However, 
some of the general ideas of critical discourse analysis relevant for the present research are also 
found in the historical approach, the interdisciplinary nature, the problem oriented nature, and 
the analysis of the historical context and its integration into the interpretation of discourses and 
texts (Ibid. p. 69 and 70).
53 Fairclough & al. 2011, p. 372. Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be under-
stood without taking the context into consideration. Discourses are always connected to other 
discourses which are produced synchronically and subsequently. Discourse can be interpreted in 
very different ways, depending on the context and audience. (Ibid.)
54 Van Dijk 2010, p.117. Van Dijk speaks of an inclusive definition and an exclusive one, and appears 
to prefer in his book the latter definition, i.e. the one referring to the relevant social environment. 
(Ibid. p. 118)
55 Van Dijk 2009, p. 2. The verbal context includes preceding or following words, sentences, speech 
acts or turns within a discourse or conversation, whereas the social situation refers to the specific 
situation of a given text or talk.
56 Ruuskanen 2006, p. 57.
57 Brown & Yule 1983, p. 59.
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wider implications instead of the communicative event only. Furthermore, one needs 
to bear in mind that even context-bound discourse allows some degree of variation in 
the choice of expressions58, which have an impact on the judicial style59. 
Critical discourse analysis begins with defining the research topic, and methodology 
is the process during which this topic is further refined so as to construct the objects 
of research60. To define the topic, a decision needs to be made on what one wishes to 
observe. To do that, it is necessary to know why it is interesting to carry out research 
on a particular part of cultural change. Once that has been established, the procedures 
to arrive at the observations can be decided.61 Various scholars have stated that the 
culture of applying international human rights instruments in Finland has dramati-
cally changed over the past two decades since accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and some have also said that this has had an impact on the judg-
ments. It is interesting to assess whether and to what extent this has taken place, and 
whether the change in that part of the legal culture is visible in the national courts’ 
discourse. For that purpose, it is necessary to find those types of Convention rights 
under which the national case law shows the strongest examples of cultural change, 
and further to detect those fragments of judgments in which it may be seen, through 
the phase of micro-comparison of the references to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. Upon detecting the elements of discourse demonstrating cultural 
change, the research method may be further refined to assess the degree of transition 
in the reception of the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. It is 
further interesting to assess what would be the recommended approach of the national 
courts to the application and interpretation of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, to continue the scientific dialogue.
58 See Van Dijk 2010, p. 134. Apart from variation, discourse is related to the concept of style, which 
is a property of discourse and could be described as being the result of choices among alternative, 
variable structures. Most of the properties of style coincide with those of variation. (Ibid. p. 143.) 
For the purposes of the present study, one could speak of judicial style.
59 Another concept which is closely related to those of discourse and context is that of genre. Ac-
cording to Van Dijk, genre may refer to either the contextual features or the discourse structure 
type. (Van Dijk 2010, p. 149.) For the purposes of the present study, the relevant genre would be 
the discourse type or style of judgments.
60 Fairclough & al. 2011, p. 358. Fairclough does not wish to present a strict method of critical 
discourse analysis, but provides a suggestion for the analytical framework. According to the 
proposed framework, analysis should be carried out on the network of practices within which 
the analysed problem is located, on the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the 
particular practice concerned, and on the discourse (the semiosis itself ). (See Fairclough 2001, 
p. 125.)
61 See Titscher & al. 2000, p. 12.
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1.5  Selection of materials
Both the chosen research methods and the selection of materials need to serve, first, 
the purpose of analysing the emergence of the Convention and its implementation, 
second, the purpose of analysing the development of the language of the Convention 
through the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights and, third, the purpose 
of analysing the development of the discourse of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. 
Some explanations need to be provided for the selection of European and national 
case law. In the selection of relevant case law, a decision needs to be made on whether 
to carry out research into the whole body of case law concerning Finland or whether 
one should focus on the most interesting cases, or whether to carry out a more pro-
found research into the case law on certain Convention provisions. According to Van 
Hoecke, the comparison of case law instead of mere comparison of rules has become 
increasingly popular, which is understandable in that the analysis of legal rules alone 
does not provide an adequate picture of the way in which a legal system works. He 
nevertheless draws attention to the fact that research very often focuses on so-called 
hard cases or cases decided by the highest court instances, and raises the question of 
whether this is sufficient. However, as is pointed out by Van Hoecke, the case law 
also needs to be accessible to allow reliable comparison, and another challenge would 
be to assess to what extent the cases are identical in facts and/or in law, although the 
practical solutions might be the same.62 Thus, apart from the purpose of the research 
and the research methods, the accessibility of the case law has to be taken into account.
The final decision on which judgments to include in the research may need to be 
done in the course of the discourse analysis as only that analysis proves whether they 
are useful for the purposes of the research. On the one hand, even a rather limited 
sample may sometimes be sufficient, but on the other hand, the conclusions become 
the more reliable the more extensive the data is. Once again, since the purpose is to 
analyse the transition of the legal culture in Finland, attention is paid to those cases 
that are most useful for assessing that transition and provide a sufficient selection of 
cases that are at least to some extent analogical or similar. Thus, in the selection of the 
national cases for the purposes of discourse analysis, attention has been paid to those 
articles of the European Convention on Human Rights that have produced the larg-
est number of judgments against Finland, based on an underlying assumption that 
they also constitute important groups of cases at the national level. It is also presumed 
that those groups of cases provide a sufficient degree of analogy. This is not limited to 
so-called hard cases, but in respect of the given group of cases, all judgments of the 
supreme jurisdictions are looked into. A reasonable balance has been sought between 
the number of judgments of the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the number of 
62 Van Hoecke 2004, p. 168-171.
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judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court, and attention has been paid to the 
total numbers of judgments relating to the application of the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. In the drawing of conclusions, it is important to bear 
in mind that lower courts of law are an inherent part of the judiciary and the extent 
to which the European case law is received by the judiciary as a whole, would provide 
a more solid and reliable ground for a statement concerning a change in the legal 
culture as a whole. However, given that the case law of the supreme jurisdictions is de 
facto followed by the lower courts of law, the study is limited to that case law. Thus, 
the underlying assumption is that the main trends of the transition of legal culture are 
reflected or visible in the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions. All judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights are easily accessible, including a detailed statement 
of reasons. Furthermore, Finnish case law of the supreme jurisdictions is also easily 
available, and cases relating to the application of European case law are most often 
published as precedents. In respect of the Supreme Administrative Court, even non 
published judgments are included. This makes it possible to draw reliable conclusions 
within the framework of the selected groups of cases.
As regards sources of comparison in the theoretical assessment of the receptive-
ness of the legal system to European case law, in the light of the characteristics of the 
legal system and judicial style of judgments of the legal system, the United Kingdom 
and France have been chosen as reference states for the reason that they represent 
authentic languages of the Convention and official working languages of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Those two legal systems are also among the big European 
legal systems the elements of which are rather well known by Finnish judges. Fur-
ther, Germany has been chosen as an additional reference State for the reason that 
it constitutes an essential element in the development of continental legal cultures, 
and the German legal system and thinking have also had considerable impact on the 
Finnish legal system among the various foreign legal systems throughout the legal 
history. Germany also provides an interesting example of a State party where it appears 
to have been relatively easy to adapt to the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights when analysed in the light of the numbers of violations found against 
different States parties. Instead, in Finland, the development has taken place over a 
much shorter period of time, and there is some controversy of views as to whether 
considerable development actually exists. When compared with Germany, the number 
of violations found is relatively high considering the size of the population and the 
shorter period of time. Sweden is included in the research as a reference State for 
the reason of a partly common legal history with Finland and the smaller number of 
violations despite the much earlier ratification of the Convention. Not only works of 
scholars but also some judgments of supreme jurisdictions of the selected four legal 
systems have been studied to look for similar elements of discourse as in respect of 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. This makes it possible to assess to what extent 
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the transition of the legal culture in Finland might have been affected by other legal 
cultures instead of merely by the development of European human rights law. Some 
case law of the selected legal systems is looked into. However, a detailed analysis of 
the transition of the legal culture, by means of micro-comparison through discourse 
analysis, is only carried out in respect of Finland. A further reason for the selection of 
States is the history of protection of fundamental rights and human rights, to which 
particularly the English-speaking world and France have contributed considerably but 
with different results at the national level. The constitutional traditions of protecting 
fundamental rights in Finland and Sweden have been considerably different from those 
in France and Germany. The selection of States thus provides an interesting overview 
of different constitutional traditions some of which have played a larger role in the 
international developments. Further, the historical developments in Germany were 
a major reason for the emergence of the strong protection of human rights after the 
Second World War, whereas the United Kingdom and France were among the victors 
of war that played an important role in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Germany and Sweden also participated in 
the negotiations, whereas Finland did not.
The main challenge in the selection of data has been how to decide which provi-
sions of the Convention would be most useful to assess, in particular, the change of 
legal culture in Finland. For that purpose, some statistical and empirical research has 
been carried out into the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For the 
purpose of selecting the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
to analyse the Court’s discourse, that case law has been analysed in the light of the 
Court’s statistics as on 31 December 2013, including the total number of judgments 
rendered by the Court concerning the aforementioned States, particularly judgments 
finding a violation of the Convention and judgments concerning the specific provi-
sions of the Convention subject to the present study. Two specific Convention articles 
have been selected for closer analysis of the development of the language used by 
the European Court of Human Rights for the reason that they have raised interest-
ing conceptual and linguistic problems and have also produced a large number of 
cases from several States, largely due to the fact that the European Court of Human 
Rights has expanded the meaning and scope of those Convention provisions. The 
other provisions have been chosen by verifying which Articles of the Convention 
have been subject to a relatively large number of cases against Finland, using other 
States included in the scope of the study as reference States. Thus, for comparative 
purposes, attention has also been paid to the most relevant articles concerning the 
selected States parties. An overwhelming majority of cases against Finland have con-
cerned fair trial rights under Article 6 of the Convention, which provision has also 
raised interesting linguistic issues. France and the United Kingdom, representing the 
two authentic languages of the Convention and States which have also faced the two 
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largest numbers of judgments, appear to have had the same problem. On the basis of 
the Court’s statistics as on 31 December 2013, it may be concluded that in respect 
of the five States covered by the present study, when taken together, the numbers 
of cases under Articles analysed were as follows: the number of cases concerning 
Article 6, covering both the right to a fair trial and the length of proceedings, was 
915, whereas those concerning Article 5 was 154, those concerning Article 8 was 152 
and those concerning Article 10 was 66. The cases concerning Article 6 constitute 
thus an overwhelming majority of cases. When compared with the other selected 
States and the numbers of cases taken together under Article 10, in particular, the 
total number of cases against Finland concerning the application of Article 10 is 
considerable in proportion to the total number for all the five states (18 out of the 
total of 66) although the number of cases under Article 8 is also significant (23 out 
of the total of 152). Furthermore, the total number of judgments against Finland in 
which a violation has been found (129) is high when assessed in the light of the total 
number of judgments against Finland (166).
Furthermore, for the purpose of analysing the development of the discourse of the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions in the application and interpretation of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, an analysis was made of which provisions of 
the Convention have produced the largest groups of cases at the national level. Those 
appear to include particularly Article 8 and Article 10. They also represent groups of 
cases with clearest change as regards the application and interpretation of the Con-
vention, with increasingly detailed references to the European case law. Furthermore, 
in the overall research into the published precedents of the supreme jurisdictions, it 
appears that the development of argumentation has been more rapid in respect of 
those two Convention provisions than in respect of other provisions thereof. Thus, 
the selection of national case law subject to the closer discourse analysis has been 
made on that basis, as they provide a relatively solid basis for assessing whether there 
are signs of transition of the legal culture visible in case law. However, in view of the 
overwhelming number of judgments against Finland before the European Court of 
Human Rights concerning compliance with Article 6, the national case law concern-
ing that provision has been analysed to support the conclusions made, and a sufficient 
number of cases exist. The number of cases under Article 5 dealt with by the supreme 
jurisdictions of Finland is too low to draw conclusions on as an isolated group of cases, 
although it has produced some interesting examples of detailed argumentation in the 
light of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, including a clear change 
of transition of the standards of protection at the national level.
The selection of cases has been done by having the target audience of the research 
in mind. In order to allow a scientific dialogue, and to make the conclusions interest-
ing for a wider audience including the national judiciary, the procedures chosen to 
arrive at conclusions must be recorded in such a way that they are verifiable by both 
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the researcher and others, i.e. they must be transparent63. A further challenge is the 
limitation of the research materials, i.e. the discourses, keeping in mind the requirement 
of transparency. A researcher employs discourse analysis and other qualitative methods 
to analyse what types of discourses exist and how they are used, particularly in the case 
of empiric studies. In the view of Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al., for the purpose of limiting 
the discourses, a rather small sample of examples may be sufficient, without needing 
significant statistical surveys. They suggest that saturation is critical in this respect, i.e. 
no further research is required at the point where no new discourses are found.64 The 
data studied in discourse analysis is always a fragment of discourse and the discourse 
analyst always has to decide where the fragment begins and ends.65 Thus, the quality 
of the research materials, i.e. the case law of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, in view 
of the purposes of the study is born in mind in the selection of cases for the detailed 
analysis of signs of transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights 
and human rights in the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions. At the same time, it is 
ensured that the selected research materials are representative enough for the purpose 
of drawing reliable conclusions. To define the fragments of discourse to be analysed, 
those parts of the judgments are chosen in which the supreme jurisdictions apply and 
interpret the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Those fragments of 
discourse are rather easily identifiable and they should be sufficient to assess the visi-
bility of the change of legal culture in that respect.
Data collection is not considered to constitute a specific phase of research that must 
be completed before the analysis begins. Thus, it is useful to first carry out the collection 
of initial data and through the first analysis find indicators for meaningful samples. On 
the basis of those results, decisions on further collection of data can be made.66 For the 
purposes of the present study, the whole case law of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions 
in which the case law of the European Court of Human Rights constitutes the large-
scale data, from which the cases with references to a particular Convention article are 
63 Titscher & al. 2000, p. 11 and 12. Titscher & al. observe that the clearer the relationship between 
the selected theoretical approach, the research strategy, and the methods and procedures employed 
in a piece of research, the easier it will be for other researchers to reconstruct and even repeat the 
conclusions derived from it. (Ibid. p. 11.)
64 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al. 2006, p. 29.
65 Brown & Yule 1983, p. 69. To decide what constitutes a satisfactory unit for analysis, a chunk 
of conversational discourse can, for example, be treated as a unit of some kind because it is on 
a particular topic. The notion of topic is clearly an intuitively satisfactory way of describing the 
unifying principle which makes one stretch of discourse about something and the next stretch 
about something else. (Ibid. p. 70) When the elements in the topic framework and the interrela-
tionships between them have been identified, the analyst has some basis for making judgments 
of relevance with regard to conversational contributions. (Ibid. p. 83)
66 See Meyer 2001, p. 23 and 24. This type of an approach is called ”theoretical sampling”, where 
the collection of data is continued as the research is carried out and new questions may arise, to 
be analysed through the collection of new data or re-examination of existing data. (Ibid. p. 24)
68 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
analysed through discourse analysis as a method of micro-comparison. On the basis 
of that analysis, a decision has been made on the number of further cases needed and 
on the further Convention articles to be analysed, with a view to finding support for 
the conclusions made in the light of the first analysed cases. 
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2.  First phase of transition of the legal culture – from 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights to 
the European Convention on Human Rights
2.1  Finnish constitutional traditions prior to accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights
Despite its existence since the 1950s, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and its monitoring mechanism are relatively new elements in the Finnish legal sys-
tem. Prior to Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
protection of fundamental rights of citizens was essentially based on the provisions of 
the Constitution until 1975 when Finland ratified the relevant United Nations instru-
ments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The constitutional provisions on 
fundamental rights also remained for a long time unchanged since their enactment 
upon declaration of independence until a reform of those provisions in 1995, which 
took place shortly before a complete reform of the Constitution that entered into 
force in 2000. Until Finland’s independence, the constitutional traditions were largely 
affected by those of the neighbouring states.
Finland remained under the Swedish rule until 1809 and thus the legal traditions 
as well as the constitutional traditions and the traditions of protecting fundamental 
rights were largely those of Sweden throughout the Swedish rule. Already the unified 
local laws (i.e. those of towns and rural communities) of the 14th century applied to 
the Finnish territory as such67. Even the history of a written constitution can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages, where the first constitutional instrument regulated certain 
privileges of the estates68. The first rather advanced constitutional acts did not emerge, 
however, until in the 18th century69. The cession of Finland to Russia did not change 
67 Mattila 2002, p. 312.
68 Kastari 1972, p.11. The King was under an obligation to protect those privileges, although they 
were rather restricted.
69 Kastari 1972, p. 12. Those Swedish acts can be said to have been advanced even at a universal 
level in that they regulated systematically and in detail the legal structures and functions of the 
state and were also rather effective. (Ibid.) The first individual right that enjoyed the protection 
of a constitutional act was the freedom of press. (Ibid. p.30)
70 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
the settings of the legal system, but the Finnish legal system maintained its Nordic 
character, and the Swedish-Finnish legal system still existed in the 19th century70. Some 
reception of foreign law took place in the 19th century, particularly that of German law, 
but the Swedish law constituted the basis for Finnish law.71
Similarly with other legislation, during the period of autonomy under the Russian 
rule between 1809 and 1917, the Swedish constitutional acts remained in force72, 
which meant that Finland still shared to a large extent the constitutional law traditions 
with Sweden. However, the Finnish constitutional traditions began to emerge shortly 
after the declaration of independence. In the 1920s, the leading international model 
of a constitution was the French Charte of 1814, which was further developed by the 
southern states of Germany.73 Thus, inspiration for the Finnish national constitutional 
acts was derived from continental Europe in addition to the existing Swedish traditions. 
Jyränki points out that due to the late codification, as well as different conceptions of 
codification between the Finns and Russians, there were lacunae in the constitutional 
law during the period of autonomy74. A new Parliament Act (valtiopäiväjärjestys, 
riksdagsordning) was adopted in 1906, although a reform of the Constitution Act (hal-
litusmuoto, regeringsform) was not achieved. At the same time, a freedom of expression, 
assembly and association act (1906) was adopted as a new constitutional act, following 
the models of Prussia, Austria and Belgium.75
The already repealed Constitution Act of Finland of 1919 was the first Finnish 
constitutional act to contain rather classical fundamental freedoms. This is rather late 
70 Mattila 2002, p. 312.
71 Björne & Vepsä 2010, p 22 and 23. That concerned for example the 1734 civil code, which was 
the basis of civil law in Finland. The reception of foreign law was made easier by the fact that the 
natural law traditions remained in Finland until the 19th century.
72 Suksi 2011, p. 88. Those constitutional acts included the 1772 Form of Government (Constitu-
tion) and 1789 Union and Security Act. See also Jyränki 1989, p. 418 and 419. Jyränki notes that 
the Swedish constitutional acts were only partly applicable in the autonomous grand duchy of 
Finland, but no new codifications were made of the applicable parts of those acts. Nor were the 
governmental and administrative arrangements of the period of autonomy codified in a single 
constitutional act.
73 Jyränki 1989, p. 407. 
74 Jyränki 1989, p. 422. Suksi 2011, p. 90. Suksi observes that this was also partly due to resistance 
by Finns against Russian influence.
75 Jyränki 1989, p. 460. Suksi 2011, p. 90 and 91. That was later replaced by the Freedom of press 
Act (painovapauslaki 1/1919), which was supplemented in 1971 by an Act on broadcasting re-
sponsibility (radiovastuulaki 219/1971), and those two Acts have later been replaced with the Act 
on the use of freedom of expression in the mass media (laki sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkov-
iestinnässä 460/2003). Also the new Act has the status of ordinary law. The Act, which provides 
the details on the responsibilities relating to the use of the freedom of expression, but has been 
applied only seldom (see e.g. KHO:2011:22, KHO:2009:82, KKO:2012:58, KKO:2010:88 and 
KKO:2009:9). Both supreme jurisdictions most often rely on the provisions of the Constitution 
and of international conventions on the freedom of expression.
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in comparison with the traditions of continental Europe, which is largely due to the 
common history with Sweden. A separate Chapter on fundamental rights was included 
in the Constitution Act of 191976 although that list of rights was still rather modest77. 
Furthermore, a possibility to enact derogations from the Constitution by means of a 
special procedure was included in the Constitution Act78. Further constitutional acts 
were enacted in 1922 and 192879. However, the fundamental rights provisions of the 
Constitution Act of 1919 remained in force without amendments for more than 70 
years and were at the beginning of the 1990s among the oldest fundamental rights 
provisions in force in Europe. It was a typical product of the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, protecting mainly the classical rights and freedoms of citizens, such as the liberty 
of person, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, assembly and association, and 
equality before the law.80 In the view of Nergelius, there was a particular characteristic 
of the Finnish system of protecting fundamental rights, i.e. the traditionally strong 
protection of property rights, which is strong even at the international level, although 
this conclusion is not so easy to make on the basis of the provisions on fundamental 
rights alone. Such a conclusion can, according to Nergelius, rather be made on the basis 
of the fact that other provisions of law, destined to restrict the enjoyment of possessions, 
have been enacted through the procedure applied to the enactment of constitutional 
laws, whereas this has not been done so often in respect of legislation in other fields.81 
Apart from the protection of property rights, the protection of the freedoms of as-
sociation and assembly, the freedom of personal liberty and requirements of a fair 
trial can be said to have long traditions, although the particularly formal protection of 
those rights and liberties is a more recent phenomenon82. Thus, before accession to the 
76 See Kastari 1960, p.1 and Jyränki 1989, p. 490. According to Jyränki, its provisions followed 
largely at least those of the constitutions of Prussia and Belgium. In his view there were no signs, 
however, of that the fundamental rights provisions would have been meant to restrict the measures 
of the legislator. (Ibid. p. 490 and 491)
77 According to Hidén, the list of rights was not only brief when compared with those of several 
other states, but the rights provisions were also rather compact. (Hidén 1971, p. 15 and 16.)
78 For details, see Jyränki 1989, p. 495. This appears to be an element in common with the Constitu-
tion of Prussia. The possibility of enacting derogations from the Constitution was also applied 
(see Jyränki 1989, p. 496).
79 Suksi 2011, p. 92. Those included the Act of 1922 on the right of Parliament to control the 
lawfulness of official duties of members of the Government, the Chancellor of Justice and the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Court of Realm Act of 1922 and the Parliament Act of 1928.
80 HE 309/1993 vp, p. 5. According to Kastari, the list of rights was drawn up in the spirit of the 
universal liberalistic trend which had originated in the Bill of Rights in some North American 
Colonies and in the Declaration of Rights promulgated by the French revolution (Kastari 1960, 
p. 3).
81 Nergelius 1996, p. 198.
82 Hidén 1971, p.11 and 12. The fair trial provisions have not originally been in the Constitution 
but in other legislation regulating judicial procedure.
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European Convention on Human Rights, the Finnish constitutional traditions have 
been affected by both its common history with Sweden and the Russian era, as well 
as to some extent by continental European elements. Those constitutional traditions, 
being part of the common traditions of States parties to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, are visible in the text of the Convention although Finland did not 
take part in the negotiations. However, when compared with the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the provisions of the Finnish Constitution 
on fundamental rights were modest and not well suited to be applied by courts of law 
as such. That observation finds support from research made into the application of 
fundamental rights provisions and international human rights conventions prior to 
Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The constitutional provisions on fundamental rights were not particularly actively 
applied by the national courts before the 1980s but were rather used as a means of en-
suring the constitutionality of ordinary legislation83. Considering that Finland acceded 
to the European Convention on Human Rights later than the other States examined 
in this study, and the ratification of the International Covenants did not take place 
until in the late 1960s, the transition of the legal culture of a strengthened protection 
of human rights subject to international monitoring began somewhat later, although 
the constitutional provisions enacted in 1919 did provide stronger protection than 
prior to Finland’s independence. The ratification of the two International Covenants, 
however, brought about some change in the culture of protecting human rights and 
fundamental rights and the national courts started to apply both the constitutional 
provisions and the provisions of international human rights conventions to an increasing 
extent around mid-1980s. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides for similar rights as the European Convention on Human Rights. Unlike in 
the other Nordic countries, Finland incorporated the Covenant into the national legal 
order through an incorporation act at the level of ordinary law, which made it directly 
applicable law in national courts in the same way as other laws at the same hierarchical 
level84. Thus, the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights were 
enforceable through the relevant United Nations instrument already prior to Finland’s 
accession to the Convention, and there was also an international monitoring mechanism 
ensuring compliance with the United Nations obligations. At that time, the provisions 
of the Constitution were not as extensive. Despite that, the International Covenant 
83 See e.g. Kastari 1960, p. 2. According to Kastari, the provisions on fundamental rights were, 
however, rather influential in limiting the scope of the legislator.
84 Scheinin 1989, p. 195. The direct applicability of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights was more limited in that it was incorporated by a presidential decree, which 
meant that it would be superseded by a domestic act of Parliament (Ibid. p. 197), although there 
are other applicable rules of interpretation in addition to the rule of lex superior (including lex 
posterior and lex specialis).
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on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights also had an impact on the interpretation of the Constitution, meaning that they 
could be interpreted more broadly than earlier, as well as on the interpretation of other 
legislation. They also had the potential of limiting the competence of the legislator in 
that the international human rights obligations should be taken into account in the 
enactment of further legislation85.
In the light of the foregoing, the first signs of a changing legal culture, imposed by 
the international requirements of protecting human rights, emerged in national case 
law. However, those cases in which international provisions were effectively applied re-
mained isolated ones as the courts still appeared to prefer reference to the provisions of 
the Constitution. Before Finland’s accession to the European Court of Human Rights, 
there were hardly any references to the provisions of international conventions on human 
rights and despite the slight preference for constitutional provisions, it was still rare to 
directly refer to the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution86. The national 
courts in Finland started to apply international human rights conventions more actively 
upon accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. This is explained in more 
detail in sections 2.6.3 and 4.3 below. It is interesting to note that the court practice of 
applying even fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution seems to have changed 
rather dramatically upon accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It is argued that before that element in the legal system, the standards and culture of 
protecting human rights ad fundamental rights were relatively weak. Both the technical 
preparedness and the general willingness of the judiciary to apply those provisions were 
lacking, despite the existence of legal provisions including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Therefore, it is relevant to study the European developments 
in detail to see, first, what exactly has been adopted to be applied at the national level 
and how foreign it is for the national legal system. It is asserted that the more differ-
ences there are between the Convention rights and the constitutional system, the more 
difficult it is for national courts to adapt to the Convention system. In the following, 
an analysis is made of how the international human rights law first emerged alongside 
the national constitutions, which elements of the selected legal systems are visible the 
contents of the European Convention on Human Rights and what the impact of the 
Convention has been on those systems, and how the first phase of transition of the legal 
culture of protecting human rights and fundamental rights in Finland took place upon 
implementation of the Convention. It is well known that the application of fundamental 
rights and human rights law by the supreme jurisdictions has increased gradually since 
then, but it is argued in this thesis that the historical developments explain at least to 
some extent why the transition is still ongoing.
85 See Scheinin 1989, p. 197 and 198.
86 See Scheinin 1991, p. 215, 216 and 222 as well as 241 and seq.
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2.2  Emergence of international human rights instruments 
International human rights law is, on the one hand, part of public international law 
but is, on the other hand, to a large extent today based on specific international human 
rights treaties. International human rights law is a branch of international law aimed at 
ensuring compliance with the obligation of states to respect the fundamental rights and 
human rights of its citizens87, and consists of a body of international rules, procedures 
and institutions developed to implement it and to promote respect for human rights 
in all countries on a worldwide basis88. The difference between traditional international 
law and international human rights law is indeed that international human rights 
conventions limit the sovereignty of States as regards jurisdiction over their citizens, in 
the same way as national constitutions impose limits on governmental and legislative 
action. Traditionally, individuals were considered to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the State in which they resided. Gradually, the situation started to change already as 
of the first instruments prohibiting slave trade and early legal doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention in the 19th century, although the increase of international human rights 
law did not start until after the Second World War.89 However, as De Schutter warns, 
there are some limits on the binding force of international human rights law due to the 
fact that it is addressed at a limited group of subjects of international law instead of all 
subjects of international law90. However, human rights may also be seen as embodying 
certain collective values which at the same time define the legal interests of individual 
states91. Another characteristic of international human rights law is the lack of reci-
procity in contrast to other branches of international law, although there are exceptions 
among human rights treaties92. Furthermore, despite the international character, effective 
implementation of human rights law requires some adherence to the domestic legal 
systems and law. As pointed out by Meron, the effectiveness of international human 
rights instruments depends on their observance and implementation by domestic ju-
87 See the Charter of the United Nations of 26 June 1945, Article 1, paragraph 3.
88 Hannum 1994, p.3.
89 Cassese 2005, p. 376. De Schutter 2009, p. 39. Brownlie 1990, p. 564 and 565, as well as 570-572. 
Brownlie also draws attention to the creation of the Commission on Human Rights in 1946, 
entrusted with the function of preparing the texts of the Universal Declaration, the Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women and the draft covenants. (Ibid. p. 571)
90 De Schutter 2009, p. 40. De Schutter reminds that sceptical views have also been expressed about 
the binding nature of the human rights obligations as set out in the United Nations Charter, 
which only bind the States and the UN institutions.
91 See Craven 2000, p. 515.
92 Craven 2000, p. 498. Craven names as one of such exceptions to the idea of non-reciprocity 
the European Social Charter under which the enjoyment of certain rights is dependent on the 
nationality of one of the States parties, on the basis of reciprocity. (Ibid. p. 499)
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dicial and administrative agencies93. International law does not need to be in a written 
form, but there are also rules that are considered to constitute customary law, although 
there is some controversy as to how the evidence of the existence of customary rules is 
derived. As concluded by De Schutter, declarations or resolutions and identifiable state 
practice provide some evidence of the commitment of the international community to 
certain values, whereas inconsistent state practice could speak against it – although even 
condemnations expressed by states against violations made by other states may provide 
evidence of customary law94. Thus, not even wide adherence to certain rules would tell 
the entire truth of the opinio juris in case state practice demonstrates flagrant violations 
of those rules, although certain rules are considered absolutely binding95. One must 
remember, however, that international treaties constitute the clearest evidence of cus-
tomary rules in that they codify existing and emerging custom, although this statement 
entails the problem that treaties only bind the parties thereto and saying that they state 
customary law would mean that even non-parties would have to accept the contents96. 
Codified rules also strengthen compliance with international law particularly where they 
provide for monitoring, whereas the possibility for reservations accompanying ratifica-
tion weakens their binding force97. Today, most rules of international law have already 
been codified. The same in principle applies to international human rights law98. It is 
widely accepted that the rights set out in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have become part of customary international 
93 Meron 1989, p. 80.
94 De Schutter 2009, p. 41-43.
95 Certain human rights norms may be considered to have a jus cogens character. De Schutter suggests 
that instead of jus cogens, one could also speak of the erga omnes character of those obligations. 
Certain rights are of such a fundamental nature that all states have an interest of protecting them 
as an obligation towards the international community as a whole (De Schutter 2009, p. 51).
96 Meron 1989, p. 80. There would also be further consequences, including the question of jurisdiction 
of international monitoring bodies over non-parties and access to international law remedies. 
(Ibid. p. 80 and 81)
97 It is to be noted, however, that the regime of reservations does not fit that well in the context 
of human rights conventions in that the essential effect of reservations and of the acceptance 
thereof or objection thereto is between the State entering the reservation and that accepting it 
or objecting to it. (See e.g. Craven 2000, p. 495)
98 Cassese 2005, p. 393 and 394. According to Cassese, the customary human rights norms consist, 
in particular, of certain important norms including the norm forbidding grave, repeated and 
systematic violations of human rights; those banning slavery, genocide and racial discrimination; 
the norm prohibiting forcible denial of the right of peoples to self-determination; and the rule 
banning torture. In his view, they constitute rules binding on States irrespective of whether they 
are included in a convention that has been ratified by those States. Further, in his view, there are 
rules of customary international law requiring States to intervene in gross and large-scale viola-
tions of human rights to discontinue such violations. (Ibid.) It is to be observed that all those 
rules have been codified at least in one international convention, although not all of them have 
been ratified by all States.
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law99. A large part of those rights, in turn, have later been included in other binding 
human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The most effective international rules of human rights law are thus included in binding 
multilateral conventions. There is also a large body of instruments that rather have the 
character of recommendations than that of binding norms. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights may be placed between recommendations and conventions, insofar 
as the legal effect is concerned100. In general, an international human rights convention 
is a treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties101 in 
the same way as any other treaty entered into with other subjects of international law 
(states or international organisations), with an intention to create obligations under 
international law102. However, one distinctive feature is that human rights conventions 
create obligations on state vis-à-vis their citizens, instead of merely creating obligations 
towards other states parties to the convention concerned.
The European Convention on Human Rights is the international human rights 
instrument subject to this study, although it is not the only one playing a role in the 
national case law applying fundamental or human rights provisions but is even today 
accompanied by other instruments at the United Nations level. The historical devel-
opments leading to the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
their meaning for the English legal system have been described by Francis Bennion 
– sarcastically but with a brilliant sense of humour – as follows:
“[…] unlike the legislatures of other nations, Britain’s Westminster Parliament was 
not in any way confined by the detailed conditional clauses of a written constitution, 
usually written by different people in the distant past and required in the present to 
be construed by uncontrolled and unelected judges. The ideal situation of the British 
lasted for a long while, but was too good to last for ever. As usual, the path to Hell 
was paved with good intentions. […] Who would have expected that the victors in 
a war against opponents of democracy would engineer what was, as it turned out, a 
dire reverse for democracy? Yet history teems with such quirks. Things rarely turn 
out the way well-meaning people expect.”103
99 Meron 1989, p. 82.
100 For details, see Sohn and Buergenthal 1973, p. 518-522.
101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), UNTS vol. 1155, p. 331, Article 2, paragraph 
1, point (a).
102 This distinguishes international treaties from agreements between states governed by domestic law 
(see Aust 2013, p. 17). Such agreements include instruments with a variety of denominations, such 
as Memoranda of Understanding, concluded typically directly between the competent authorities, 
with a view to facilitating cooperation and leaving their implementation to be arranged within 
the framework of existing national provisions of legislation.
103 Bennion 2009, p. 141 and 142.
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That is perhaps one of the most radical views expressed by legal scholars, but of 
course, is not the whole truth. What is true is that the European Convention on Human 
Rights is a product of peoples who wished to prevent the atrocities leading to World 
War II from happening again, and most certainly, the intentions were good. However, 
the Convention and its language is not exclusively a product of victors of World War 
II but should rather be seen as a product of longer historical developments as will be 
given account of below. At the same time with the drafting of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, similar efforts were taken at the international level within the 
framework of the United Nations in an effort to strengthen the international protection 
of human rights, and largely for the same historical reasons.
The history of international agreements may be traced back to ancient times but, as 
Bunn-Livingstone points out, the ancient agreements would hardly meet the criteria 
set for treaties as we understand them today. The first treaty considered to represent 
international law in the eyes of the Western world is perhaps the Treaty of Westphalia 
of 1648.104 In this perspective, and as mentioned in the foregoing, the first interna-
tional instrument for the protection of human rights was adopted rather late. Until 
World War II, the responsibility for such protection was considered to belong to the 
domestic affairs of states, and no international interference was considered appropri-
ate. However, the atrocities of World War II, particularly those under the German 
national socialist rule105, changed the attitudes in this respect. The international efforts 
to create instruments and mechanisms for the purpose of ensuring universal respect 
for human rights and for preventing the atrocities of World War II from happening 
again were launched by the Allied Powers. It was decided that the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms should become one of the main functions of the new 
United Nations organisation (UN). The United Nations Charter provides for a general 
obligation of respect for human rights, as well as for the establishment of a Human 
Rights Commission to implement this task. However, it is to be noted that the political 
philosophy and the human rights agenda of the Allied Powers largely determined the 
selection of human rights to be protected through international instruments and the 
104 For more details, see Bunn-Livingstone 2002, p. 78-80.
105 See e.g. Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. I, in which the statement of France 
provides an example of the concerns caused by the Second World War (p. 40): “… Three things 
still threaten our freedom. The first threat is the eternal reason of State. […] Montesquieu said: 
“Whoever has power, is tempted to abuse it.” […] Then there is the second threat: Fascism and 
Hitlerism have unfortunately tainted European public opinion. These doctrines of death have 
infiltrated into our countries. They have left their mark. They have poisoned certain sections of 
public opinion. Racialism did not die out with Hitler. […] Finally, and above all, freedom is in 
danger in our countries […] because of the economic and social conditions of the modern world.”
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mechanisms of protection.106 The idea of drafting a Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was presented at the same conference in which the Charter of the United Na-
tions was drafted, but more detailed consideration was needed and the Declaration 
was finally adopted in 1948107.
As is pointed out by Hannum, the UN involvement in the protection of human rights 
has rapidly expanded since then. New international instruments have been adopted 
throughout the existence of the United Nations.108 Such instruments include, among 
others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights109 and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide110 in 1948, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination111 in 1965, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights112 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights113 in 1966, the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women114 in 1979, the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment115 
in 1984, the Convention on the Rights of the Child116 in 1989, and, most recently, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities117 and the International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance118 in 2006. 
This international involvement was also reflected at the regional level, in particular in 
Europe. The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) was adopted shortly after 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration.
An international convention is the result of a complex process of negotiations 
and drafting, involving a variety of sources for the formulation of provisions. Among 
106 Sohn and Buergenthal 1973, p. 506 and 507. Hannum 1994, p. 4 and 5. Wesel 2010, p. 570. 
White & Ovey 2010, p.3. The instruments resulting from the work of the Allied Powers include, 
apart from the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide. In the view of Cassese, the United Nations 
Charter was the turning point in the protection of human rights, as it constitutes the basis for 
internationally binding human rights obligations. (Cassese 2005, p. 378.) See also Brownlie 1990, 
p. 569.
107 Sohn and Buergenthal 1973, p. 514 and 515.
108 Hannum 1994, p. 5.
109 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948.
110 UNTS vol. 78, p. 277.
111 UNTS vol. 660, p. 195.
112 UNTS vol. 999, p. 171, and vol. 1057, p. 407.
113 UNTS vol. 993, p. 3.
114 UNTS vol. 1249, p. 13.
115 UNTS vol. 1465, p. 85.
116 UNTS vol. 1577, p. 3.
117 UNTS vol. 2515, p. 3.
118 UNTS vol. 2715, Doc. A/61/448.
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these sources, both other international instruments and national legislations play an 
important role. States participating in the negotiations contribute to the drafting by 
proposing different wordings, often containing elements of their own legislations. This 
is very often due to the fact that for a treaty provision to be acceptable for a negotiat-
ing State, it must fit in its national legal system when implemented. It is in principle 
possible that the wording of the national legislation of a negotiating State ends up in 
the text of a provision of the international treaty as such, although it is more likely to 
be adjusted in the process of the negotiations based on the views and wishes of all the 
States involved. The final result is a compromise of those views and wishes, which is 
also reflected in the language of the treaty in question. The same holds true for inter-
national human rights conventions.
2.3  Development of the language of international human rights law
The language of international treaties shares much in common with the language of law 
in general, but is still a branch of its own within the general concept of legal language. 
The language used in international treaties is a result of negotiations between the 
contracting states, containing elements of the legal systems of two or more states with 
regard to both the language and the contents. Although an examination of the texts of 
agreements reveals that the language of treaties contains the same kinds of concepts 
and expressions as any legislative texts, the final outcome is a political compromise, 
which has its impact on the language. Therefore, it is typical of treaties that clear and 
precise legal language may often give way for intentionally ambiguous formulations.
The most usual original language of international treaties today is English, but this 
has not always been the case. In the Middle Ages, the language of international rela-
tions and treaties was Latin, which was replaced with national languages along with 
the rise of nation states. At first, the prevailing language was French, which remained 
for a long time the language of diplomacy and aristocracy. Until the end of the Second 
World War, French enjoyed an equal position with English e.g. in the League of Na-
tions and in the Permanent Court of International Justice. French as the language of 
diplomatic and international relations was only overthrown by English after the Second 
World War.119 The position of English as the language of international relations was 
further strengthened by the rise of the number of international organisations.120 The 
number of different types of international organisations has increased since the 19th 
century as inter-state relations increased along with industrialisation and increase in 
international trade. The increased international relations made it necessary to create 
119 See Hardy 1962, p. 72, and Tabory 1980, p. 4 and 5.
120 Hardy 1962, p. 72.
80 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
an appropriate framework for the adoption of certain common rules and standards.121 
In most international organisations, English is at least one of the official languages. 
In the United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations, English and French 
remained first the working languages, although the status of an official language was 
in 1945 given to Chinese, Russian and Spanish as well. These three languages became 
working languages by 1973, and in addition the status of an official language and 
working language was also given to Arabic.122 
Although in most international organisations today, including in Europe, English 
today is the mostly used language of diplomacy and the most usual language of drafting 
of treaties, in formal terms it enjoys an equal position along with one or more other 
languages, and particularly multilateral conventions are usually drafted in two or more 
authentic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In fact, international conven-
tions have for a long time been drafted in several languages and their number has 
steadily grown since the end of the First World War123. The fact that an international 
organisation has several languages most often means that even treaties negotiated 
under the auspices of that organisation are drafted in several languages – the choice of 
authentic languages seems to coincide with the official languages of the organisation 
in question. European conventions concluded within the framework of the Council of 
Europe, including the European Convention on Human Rights, are authentic in two 
languages, English and French. United Nations conventions are today done in the six 
official languages of the organisation. The Council of Europe applies, at least officially, 
a principle of simultaneous drafting (co-drafting) of the two authentic language ver-
sions of its Conventions. 
The change in the language of international relations has, in a way, its counterpart 
in the developments of the language of national legislation. In the same way as for 
international agreements, the language of law in Europe was originally Latin due to 
the Roman influence. Latin as the language of law is based on Roman law (jus com-
mune) which refers to the legal system that developed within the Roman Empire and, 
serving as a basis for supranational law, has had an impact on all modern legal systems. 
Although there were differences in the reception of Roman law in the selected States, 
Latin has played a role in the language of law in all five of them and was particularly 
strong in the States of continental Europe (France and Germany).124 Thus, the use 
of Latin coincided with the reception of Roman law that served as the basis for the 
construction of European, continental law125. It did have an impact even in the Nordic 
 
121 Groom 1990, p. 5. Hannikainen 1988, p. 37.
122 For more details, see Groom 1990, p. 6-9.
123 See Tabory 1980, p. 4 and 5.
124 Mattila 2012, p. 207. See also Glenn 2004, p. 134.
125 Glenn 2004, p. 133.
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states, although the reception of Roman law remained modest as law as a science also 
developed rather late. The influence of Roman law and Latin was perhaps the least in 
Finland that remained for a long time under Swedish influence and the first pieces 
of legislation were in Swedish. In addition, in the 19th and 20th centuries German 
played a more important role in the development of legal terminology. The role of 
Latin can be partly explained by the influence of the Church on all sectors of society 
in the Middle Ages, as Latin was also the language of the Church. Furthermore, in 
the early Middle Ages, national languages were still underdeveloped particularly as 
written languages. Roman law and Latin were also taught at universities.126 Thus, 
Latin served as a lingua franca for a long time despite the fall of the Roman Empire, 
particularly as written language and as the language of sciences including law.127 All 
European legal languages are originally based on Latin, and the transition from Latin 
to the new national languages was particularly slow in the field of law when compared 
with other fields of sciences.128
The Latin dominance gradually diminished, however. In England, this took place 
already since the 14th century129, which may be explained by the history of the coun-
try and its legal system as explained in the foregoing, as well as by the history of the 
English language. In continental Europe, the break-up of Latin dominance took place 
considerably later, due to the reception of Roman law. According to Šarčević, in France, 
the French language began to replace Latin as the language of law in the 16th century, 
whereas in Germany there were efforts to draft laws already in the 13th century, but 
Latin was reinstated as the language of law in Germany towards the end of the 15th 
century as a result of the reception of Roman law. High German was not accepted as 
a uniform written language until in the first half of the 17th century.130 Thus, as Latin 
remained the dominant language of law in Europe for a long time, and was in practice 
the only common language, it was natural that its position in international relations 
also remained strong until a rather late moment. At the moment of drafting of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, however, the position of French and English 
as the languages of diplomacy and the language of international relations had already 
overthrown that of Latin.
Despite that, the influence of Latin can still be seen in the national legal systems 
and languages, first, in the style of modern legal languages that still reflect the phrasal 
126 See Šarčević 2000, p. 26, and Letto-Vanamo 2008, p. 1130 and 1131.
127 Mattila 2012, p. 207.
128 Mattila 2012, p. 212 and 213.
129 Šarčević 2000, p. 28. Although English courts never received Roman law, Latin had become the 
dominant written language for statutes, charters and writs, and statutes written in Latin could 
still be found around 1461. (Ibid.)
130 Šarčević 2000, p. 29 and 30. See also Arntz 2002, p. 40-44. The influence of Latin on legal Ger-
man has varied in the course of history, but was the strongest during the adoption of Roman law.
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rhythm of old Latin of the law and, second, in the legal vocabulary of which a large 
part derives from Latin that was used in the Antiquity, in the Middle Ages or at the 
beginning of the New Age.131 However, although the influence may be even consider-
able, the influence of Latin on a modern legal language is not always that apparent132. 
As regards the phraseology and vocabulary, one may note that there are examples of 
concepts and expressions in which Latin is used as such to use the language as precisely 
as possible133, in which case the meaning is more or less the same in all languages us-
ing those concepts and expressions, whereas in other situations the Latin heritage can 
be seen in terms that have a Latin origin but that have been adapted to the rules of 
language (formulation of vocabulary and writing)134.
Thus, today, the influence of Latin on modern legal languages can be seen as an ele-
ment creating uniformity, although there are also other elements creating uniformity 
in legal cultures and legal thinking, such as the increased supra-national elements of 
legal systems including both international human rights law and EU law. The influ-
ence of Latin can even be seen in the language used by international judicial bodies, 
which serves as a basis for increasing coherence in the understanding of that language 
and thus in the application and interpretation of European case law, although the 
direct use of Latin concepts and expressions in the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is not necessarily that usual or apparent. However, considering the 
common roots of the modern legal languages in Europe, there is at least considerable 
indirect influence. This is particularly so because of the influence of the French “Charte” 
on international human rights instruments and of the strong influence of Latin and 
Roman law on French law. This aspect is assessed more closely in section 2.5.2 below. 
Furthermore, although the language of international relations and law has changed into 
English, it does not mean that there would be less influence of international languages 
on the national legal cultures. To the contrary, the overwhelming use of English today 
in various sectors of society, including legal literature, and modernisation of society has 
lead to even more rapid influence of other legal cultures and particularly international 
 
131 Mattila 2012, p. 224. For details, see Ibid. p. 243-246. The Latin influence on the judicial style is 
perhaps still the strongest in the case of French. In the case of the other legal languages covered 
by the present study, the influence has gradually diminished to a greater extent.
132 Arntz 2002, p. 39. This is the case, for example, in respect of German the relationship of which 
with Latin is a complex one and has undergone fundamental changes in the course of history. 
(Ibid.)
133 Mattila 2012, p. 235. According to Mattila, this is particularly the case with new legal languages 
as the concepts and expressions do not still have a counterpart in that language, but it may also 
be used in older legal languages to ensure preciseness. (Ibid.) On occasion, Latin citations are also 
used in international contexts to ensure the comprehensibility of the legal texts. (Ibid. p. 237)
134 Mattila 2012, p. 240.
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law on the national legal cultures135, which results in challenges in reconciling those 
legal cultures which all have an impact, for example, on the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights which in turn shapes the contents of the modern European 
legal traditions. Thus, today, the national legal cultures and languages are increasingly 
shaped by the language of international human rights law and the international judicial 
bodies created to interpret it, particularly through the English language.
2.4  Drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights
The European concerns for the protection of human rights arose in the same decade 
as those of the Allied Powers at the international level and largely for the same reason. 
The European efforts to improve the protection of human rights was a response to the 
concerns that arose as a result of World War II and by the new threats to human rights 
caused by new forms of totalitarianism after the War, with an aim to prevent aggravated 
violations of human rights136. It is worth noting that although Germany took part 
in the process, its contribution to the negotiations was rather modest. The historical 
events of Germany had an impact on what was considered important to be included 
in the European Convention on Human Rights137, but the victors of the war played 
a determining role in the negotiations.138 That influence included, among others, that 
of the United States139. However, one must not forget that the German constitutional 
traditions share some elements in common with those of France, which is explained 
in more detail in section 2.5 below. Thus, there can be considered to have been at least 
some degree of indirect influence of German constitutional traditions too, in the form 
of common history. It is worth underlining, however, that the constitutional traditions 
presented in the following section are not the only ones that affected the contents of 
the Convention, but it is a product of a larger group of negotiating States. As a result 
of the international efforts, the European Convention on Human Rights shares more 
in common with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as with the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, than with any individual national 
constitution. The Covenant was under negotiations partly simultaneously, deriving 
135 This does not mean, however, that the legal traditions behind the English legal language would 
be dominating, but that they co-exist and interact with one another. The process of exchange 
between traditions is accelerating today. (See Glenn 2004, p. 32.)
136 Sohn and Buergenthal 1973, p. 1000-1002, Bates 2011, p. 18, and White & Ovey 2010, p. 4. 
Communism was considered, in particular, to be a new form of totalitarianism.
137 Bates 2011, p. 21. In particular, the aim was to prevent the degradation of human rights from 
happening again, by creating an enforcement mechanism.
138 For details, see Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, particularly Vol. I.
139 See Henkin 1990, p. 13 and 14.
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also some of its contents from the French constitutional traditions but also from other 
traditions such as the American constitutional texts, although one may note that the 
outcome of the international instruments is more detailed than the constitutions of 
France and the United States, for example. This also applies to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, although the common constitutional traditions of European 
states played perhaps a bigger role. Indeed, as is pointed out by White & Ovey, the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights may legitimately be 
based on a common tradition of constitutional laws and a large measure of legal tra-
dition common to the Member States of the Council of Europe.140 A further reason 
affecting the contents of the final text of the Convention in the course of negotiations 
was the need to have a European mechanism of protection of human rights rather 
rapidly, for which reason for example economic and social rights were excluded, and 
some others were left to be regulated by additional protocols such as the protection of 
property. Instead, the Convention provides for rather detailed provisions on fair trial 
rights. Also, the in the original convention that has later been replaced with a revised 
one, the system of individual applications and the competence of the European Court 
of Human Rights were made optional141. Although a majority of states were originally 
against the creation of a Court, most of them finally were prepared to accept the idea 
of an optional court142. The aim to have a speedy decision on the draft Convention 
resulted in a compromise text based on the majority opinion, but was not necessary a 
product that would please everyone143. The optional nature of the system of individual 
applications has been seen as a factor that weakened the development of the case law 
for a long period of time.
Some concerns were raised during the negotiations on the drafting of the European 
Convention on possible duplication of efforts at the United Nations and European 
 
140 White & Ovey 2010, p. 77.
141 See the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. I, Introduction, p. XXVI and XXVIII. 
The European protection mechanism has, however, been later subject to changes through the 
adoption of the additional protocols. By Protocol No. 11, the Human Rights Committee was 
abolished and replaced with a single permanent European Court of Human Rights. The former 
case law of the Committee and the Court is, however, still relevant, and the former and present 
case law constitute a continuous development of the protection of the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention and its additional protocols. For details of the former and present mechanism, see 
e.g. Pellonpää et al. 2012, p. 141 and seq.
142 Bates 2011, p. 28. Of the States subject to the present research, only France was in favour of the 
idea of a Court. It is interesting to note that despite this, France finally ratified the Convention 
and accepted Court’s jurisdiction very late.
143 See, for example, the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. IV, p. 56, for the statement 
of France. According to Bates, the Convention was also consistently criticised after its adoption 
for the inadequacy of the substantive text as a free-standing bill of rights. (Bates 2011, p. 32)
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levels144. Thus, a considerable part of the provisions of the Convention are directly based 
on those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights145. Even the drafting of the 
International Covenant on Human Rights was paid attention to at the European level, 
due to the two sets of negotiations taking place partly at the same time.146 However, 
some elements were excluded intentionally from the European system147. Differences 
between the legal systems of the negotiating States were also paid attention to. For 
example the question of civil rights, covered by the present study, was subject to dis-
cussions, particularly for the reason that there is an important difference in concepts 
between the statutory law and common law countries148. A comparison between the 
final texts of the three instruments reveals that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights covers a wider range of rights149 than the two others, as the binding nature of 
those two made it necessary to exclude such rights as would have been difficult to 
approve for some negotiating states, which were thus left to be included in a separate 
instrument. The comparison of the three instruments also reveals that the European 
Convention on Human Rights includes considerable similarities with the United 
Nations instruments, but its provisions go in some respects further. Those provisions 
include, in particular, the provisions on the powers of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The final fair trial provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have similarities but are 
structured somewhat differently.
The languages used for drafting also have an impact on the exact contents of the 
provisions. As noted in the foregoing, the English and French language versions of 
144 See the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires. For example, the definition of human rights 
was one of those issues that a number of negotiating States found unnecessary to deal with. (See 
e.g. Vol. I, p. 10 and 12)
145 For details, see the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. I, p. 196 and 198. All the 
articles of the European Convention on Human Rights covered by the present study are originally 
based on those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
146 See the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. III, p. 26, 28, 30 and 32. The negoti-
ations for the International Covenant on Human Rights had been initiated somewhat earlier 
than those on the European Convention on Human Rights, but the text was not adopted until 
in 1966. (See Pellonpää et al. 2012, p. 12.)
147 Such elements included for example due process elements existing only in the American legal 
system. (See the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vol. III, p. 28.)
148 ”It should be noted that there was some discussion in Committee about the term ”civil”. The 
“common law” countries pointed out that “civil rights and obligations”, as recognized by the 
administrative authorities, were not protected by an administrative tribunal. In this respect, 
there was an important difference from the “civil law” countries. Hence the words “in a suit at 
law” (“contestation” in the French text) which would enable administrative proceedings to be ex-
cluded from the field of application of the Convention.” (See the Collected Edition of the Travaux 
Préparatoires the Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires , Vol. III, p. 30.)
149 Including the right to seek asylum (Article 14), the right to nationality (Article 15), and a variety 
of economic, social and cultural rights (Articles 22 to 27).
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the European Convention on Human Rights are authentic language versions. The 
Convention does not provide for the precedence of either language version. Thus, 
in accordance with Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention, the terms used in both 
authentic language versions of the European Convention on Human Rights are pre-
sumed to have the same meaning. However, this does not exclude the possibility that 
national courts in the English or French speaking States parties to the Convention 
have faced problems in the application or interpretation of its text. In principle, even 
those States parties where the official languages of the legal system are languages other 
than English or French, the authentic language versions should be resorted to in the 
application and interpretation of the Convention, despite that the Convention has 
been translated into other languages. The Finnish courts in practice use the Finnish 
and Swedish translations, for example, but official language versions are resorted at 
least in cases of doubt as to the correctness of the translation150. This is necessary not 
only to ensure a correct interpretation of the Convention, but also because it is on the 
basis of the original texts that the European Court of Human Rights develops the 
meaning of its provisions.
2.5  Elements in common between the national constitutional 
traditions and the Convention
It is not rare to have human rights or fundamental rights provisions in domestic 
legislation, particularly in the constitution, and in fact the protection of fundamental 
or human rights emerged first at the national level, long before the first international 
instrument to that effect was drafted. The national provisions of some states have even 
been used as a model for certain international conventions for the protection of human 
rights. The first American declarations of human rights as well as the French declara-
tion of human rights and citizen’s rights can be considered sources of inspiration for 
present-day human rights conventions adopted at the international or regional level151. 
However, when looking into the texts of the relevant instruments, one may note that 
despite the national sources of inspiration, the texts of international human rights 
conventions and particularly the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are considerably more detailed 
and developed than the provisions of early national constitutions such as the French 
one, or the American one. One may note that unlike the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the most recent examples of European constitutions, the United 
150 See more on this issue e.g. Koivu and Mattila 2006, p. 43-48, particularly p. 45.
151 See e.g. Favoreu 1990, p. 38-40. According to Favoreu, the United States exported to Europe the 
idea of a written constitution, and contributed to the idea of a bill of rights.
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States Constitution is rather a political document instead of a legal one152 although 
the rights are enforceable in courts of law153. In turn, the international conventions 
have served as models for countries that have later adopted national constitutional or 
statutory provisions on the protection of fundamental rights and also for the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union154. Further, there is also uncertainty 
about the impact of the United States constitution in France due to the strong tradi-
tions in France and continental Europe155.
The concepts of human rights and fundamental rights156 have a close connection 
with the emergence of the concepts of constitution and constitutional law. The first 
instruments that may be classified as constitutions or constitutional acts in Europe were 
created in an effort to set certain limits on the exercise of power by the sovereign. At 
the same time, a number of rights were guaranteed to certain groups of citizens. Thus, 
not all citizens were considered equal and not all had the same political rights. The 
guaranteed rights rather belonged to the privileged estates of society. At the same time, 
however, the idea of equality of citizens before the law emerged in France along with 
 
 
152 Henkin 1990, p. 1.
153 Henkin 1990, p. 9-12. The nature of the constitutional rights, in turn, affects the jurisprudence as 
the rights are essentially “negative”, prohibiting government e.g. to resort to racial discrimination. 
Thus, they do not as such create obligations on government to actively protect citizens in the 
same way as the European Convention on Human Rights does. (Ibid. p. 11) Such privileges are 
rather provided by other laws.
154 Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/02, p. 391, 26.10.2012.
155 Favoreu 1990, p. 39. Even the Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution drew some 
inspiration from the European intellectuals and the English traditions, although the United 
States was the first to adopt a modern written constitution with a bill of rights. (Ibid. p. 38, and 
Henkin 1990, p. 1)
156 A distinction is often drawn between human rights and fundamental rights in that the first 
mentioned ones have their origin in international conventions of universal application, whereas 
the latter are based on a constitution guaranteeing them a certain permanent and legal nature 
due to the higher hierarchical status of constitutional law provisions. Both are understood to 
reflect fundamental social values. In addition, human rights are considered to belong to all ir-
respective of the person’s origin, sex, age or social status, for example. (See Ojanen 2001, p.38 
and 39) The material contents of the two may be identical, and identical provisions may be found 
in an international human rights instrument and a constitution. Other denominations are also 
used referring to a narrower set of rights, including citizen’s rights, civil rights and liberties or 
fundamental freedoms. The European Convention on human rights speaks of both human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Fundamental freedoms refer to the same concept as civil liberties 
which relate to the principles regulating the relationship between the individual and the state in 
representative democracy (see Gearty 2004, p. 33). Thus, they largely refer to political freedoms, 
whereas human rights include the remaining protected rights of the individual that can only be 
restricted in exceptional circumstances.
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the revolution of 1789 and in the United States.157 However, since the 18th century, the 
idea of the equality of citizens was linked to the efforts to change existing structures 
of society. This is what the five States parties to the European Convention on Human 
Rights covered by this study, i.e. the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden and 
Finland, roughly speaking had in common insofar as constitutional developments were 
concerned, although those developments did not result in a written constitution for 
the United Kingdom and there were quite a few other differences due to the particular 
historical developments and settings158. Furthermore, for the purposes of this chapter, 
one must bear in mind that Finland was not among those States parties that took part 
in the negotiations for the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
whereas the other States covered by the present study participated159. Although the 19th 
century has been described as the century of written constitutions160, the development 
of the protection of human rights was not remarkable161. The following provides a brief 
overview of the historical developments of constitutional law and of the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the selected four States162, in an effort 
157 In comparison, in the United States, the essential factor behind the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights was the “sin of slavery”. Thus, the American Constitution and the idea of protecting 
fundamental rights rely on the principle of equal protection of citizens, although slavery was not 
abolished entirely until upon the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. (See Dorf & Mor-
rison 2010, p. 125 and 127) In other respects, the Bill of Rights does not underline very strongly 
the principle of equality or prohibition of discrimination (see Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States (Bill of Rights), December 15, 1791).
158 Although the constitutional traditions in France and Germany and to a certain extent also 
in England were founded on the feudal system, particularly since the late Middle Ages they 
continued to develop in different settings. In France, the developments lead to a stronger status 
of the monarchy, whereas in Germany the monarchy began to erode and in England, a rather 
influential Parliament began to develop alongside the monarchy, laying thereby the foundations 
of the European parliamentarism. See Wesel 2010, p. 285.
159 For details on the negotiations, see Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires. A total of twelve 
nations took part in the negotiations. The final text was signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, (the Saar), Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom. The signature of Greece and Sweden was effected slightly later. (See Vol. 
VII, the Final Text of the Convention, p. 48 and seq.) Of the States covered by the present study, 
France, the United Kingdom and Sweden appear to have been rather actively involved in the 
discussions (see Vol. I to VIII).
160 Wesel 2010, p. 437.
161 Wesel 2010, p. 445.
162 As regards the legal systems subject to the present study, a rough division is made between the 
English legal system as a common law system and the others as statutory law systems. Statutory 
law systems are in some studies referred to as civil law systems. “Statutory law systems” is preferred 
for the reason that “civil law” may have several meanings. Civil law is considered to encompass 
the law governing the relations between and among private individuals, or it is considered to 
encompass municipal law in contrast to natural law or international law. The Anglo-American 
lawyer would think of this generally as all law other than criminal law and constitutional law, 
whereas in continental Europe, civil law is generally considered to include the civil code as well 
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to see whether and how those constitutional traditions are visible in the text of the 
Convention, and in section 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 it is assessed whether the Convention 
has had a further impact on the constitutional traditions. As pointed out by Höfling, 
constitutional law should be open and develop along with time163. At least in principle, 
adapting the legal system to the requirements of the Convention should be the easier 
the more there is in common with the constitutional traditions of the legal system in 
question. Although the first constitutional instruments protecting human rights were 
English ones, the French constitutional developments in respect of the protection of 
fundamental rights are particularly important because of the strong influence that the 
French declaration of human rights has had not only on international conventions 
on human rights but also indirectly on the legal systems of many states. The German 
developments are also worth examining for the reason of the impact of the German 
history on the drafting of the Convention and the impact of the German legal system 
on the Swedish and Finnish legal systems. At the European level, the Swedish histori-
cal developments are not that significant when compared with France and Germany, 
as there was no detailed list of fundamental rights in the Swedish Constitution at the 
moment of adoption of the Convention. Despite that, particularly the freedom of press 
(and expression) has strong traditions in the Swedish legal system.
The fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution that Finland had at the 
time of drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights shared very little in 
common with the final result of the Convention. Instead, the constitutional develop-
ments in Finland demonstrate how significant the impact of the Convention has later 
been on the Finnish constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, but there is also 
indirect influence from the constitutional traditions in Sweden and in continental 
Europe. Sweden has been slow in reforming its fundamental rights provisions, which 
has perhaps had some impact in Finland too. As explained in more detail in section 
as various other branches of law such as contract law and family law. It is rather common to 
use the expression private law to mean more or less the same as civil law, to draw a distinction 
between private law and public law. Continental European legal systems are often described by 
comparative lawyers as civil law systems, primarily based on civil codes derived from Roman law 
(as distinguished first from canon law and then from common law). One distinguishing char-
acteristic of civil law systems is that they do not consider torts and contracts as separate areas 
of law but consider them to constitute together the law of obligations, although this is separate 
from commercial law. (Rossini 1998, p. 7. See also Black’s Law Dictionary.) However, the details 
of the legal systems apart from constitutional law and methods and principles of interpretation 
of law are not covered by the present study.
163 Höfling 1987, p. 77. Höfling speaks of ”die offene Ordnung des Grundgesetzes”.He further speaks 
of the openness of the Constitution, dividing it into structural, functional and linguistic-material 
openness. In his view, the linguistic and material openness of constitutional interpretation is par-
ticularly important in respect of the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution (Ibid. p. 
78-82) In German, the terms used by Höfling are „strukturelle Offenheit“, „funktionelle Offenheit“, 
and „sprachlich-materielle Offenheit“.
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2.6.2.5 below, even the fundamental rights provisions Constitution of Finland have 
rather recently undergone a major reform, which took place late when compared with 
Germany but in the same way, around the same time as accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. However, there are considerable differences in the 
problems faced by these two legal systems with the Convention. It is argued that this 
is due to historical constitutional developments. Therefore, it is relevant to provide an 
overview. In the foregoing, a brief historical overview is given of the constitutional 
protection of fundamental rights in order to provide for the constitutional framework 
for the preparedness of the national legal system to adopt the European practice of 
applying human rights and to assess what kind of an impact the European Convention 
on Human Rights has had on further developments of the constitutional protection 
of fundamental rights. Furthermore, although the Finnish constitutional traditions 
have not played a role in the drafting of the Convention, they do contribute to the 
development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the same way 
as those of any State party to the Convention today. The present fundamental rights 
provisions of the Constitution are relatively strong and in line with the Convention.
2.5.1  English traditions
Instruments protecting human rights or fundamental rights first appeared in the 
English-speaking world. The British Magna Carta (1215, 1225), Petition of Right 
(1627), Habeas Corpus Act (1679) and Bill of Rights (1688) are considered to be 
the first adopted texts. However, the first declarations of human rights in the modern 
sense were included in the Constitution of the State of Virginia (1776) as well as in 
the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America (1776). These latter 
instruments in turn had an impact on the French Déclaration des droits de l ’homme et du 
citoyen adopted in 1789 which was followed around the same time by the Bill of Rights 
in the United States 164. Magna Carta provided for a limited set of fundamental rights, 
including recognition that no one should be denied of justice or punished except by 
judgment of their peers or by the law of the land165. That protection against denial of 
justice could be considered the foregoer of the more recent protection of the right to 
a fair trial which has later become established in the common law systems and which 
has also served as a source of inspiration for international human rights instruments. 
 
164 Déclaration des droits de l ’homme et du citoyen de 1789, and Amendments (three through twelve) 
to the Constitution of the United States, known as the Bill of Rights, ratified on December 15, 
1791 (proposed on September 17, 1787). See Ségur 2007, p. 13 and 25, and Wesel 2010, p. 315. 
For more details on the development of the American Constitution, see e.g. Tushnet 2006, p. 
8-17, and for details concerning the contents and interpretation of the Constitution, see e.g. Dorf 
& Morrison 2010.
165 See Leyland 2007, p. 10.
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In other respects, the early British constitutional acts mainly provided for privileges 
aimed at the protection of property rights166, which appears to also have been the case 
for example in Sweden.
Despite that there was an example in England of fundamental rights provisions as 
early as in the 13th century, there has been no written constitution providing for such 
rights in more recent times and, although there is an increasing body of statutory law, 
the legal system has still largely developed through case law. This does nevertheless 
not mean that there has been no constitutional law in England. To the contrary, such 
rules and principles have been developed by means other than a specific statutory 
instrument167. However, the documentation of the British constitution would be a 
hard task as even today, the constitutional rules and principles are found in numerous 
statutes and reports as well as in a multitude of case law, including European mate-
rials.168 A basic constitution can be considered to consist of the Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, and Government of Wales Acts, the Representation of the People Act 2000, 
and the Freedom of Information Act 2000169. This will not be elaborated on in more 
detail in the present study170. In fact today, although there is still no written instrument 
called a constitution, most of the applicable law in the English legal system as well 
as in other common law systems is already in statutory form. In England, this means 
not only the laws enacted by Parliament, and subordinate legislation, but also EU law 
and other international elements incorporated into the legal system.171 It may also be 
noted that although the expression “public law”172 is not used in common law systems, 
 
 
166 See Leyland 2007, p. 10 and 11, and Gearty 1997, p. 56-59.
167 Marshall 2003, p. 31. In the view of Marshall, the United Kingdom does have a constitution in 
the sense that there is a “combination of legal and non-legal (or conventional) rules that currently 
provide for the framework of government and regulate the behaviour of the major political ac-
tors”, and further n the sense that there is a “totality of legal rules, whether contained in statutes, 
secondary legislation, domestic judicial decisions or binding international instruments or judicial 
decisions, that affect the working of government”. However, there is neither any particular instru-
ment called “a constitution” nor other statutes or instruments having such a particular status as 
would make it necessary to apply a special procedure to their amendment or repeal.
168 See Marshall 2003, p. 36, and Leyland 2007, p.9.
169 See Gearty 2004, p. 38. Gearty finds those acts to constitute more a “written constitution” and 
more democratic than it was before.
170 For details on the sources of constitution and on constitutional conventions, see e.g. Leyland 
2007, p. 20-32.
171 Bennion 2009, p. 5 and 6.
172 Public law is the law governing relations between the sovereign and private individuals, as un-
derstood by continental lawyers. Public law covers administrative law, constitutional law and, in 
some countries, criminal law. See Rossini 1998, p. 7.
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the concept of constitutional law173 is known in common law systems, including the 
English legal system.
Insofar as the protection of human rights or fundamental rights is concerned, 
the developments in the United Kingdom were affected by many factors, including 
wars and economic growth, but unlike in Germany, for example, they did not lead to 
strengthened protection of fundamental rights, although some rights and particularly 
the protection of property did enjoy considerable protection.174 According to Leyland, 
those constitutional arrangements have evolved in phases reflecting the political, social, 
and economic experiences of many centuries175. Furthermore, some improvements took 
place throughout the 20th century in the protection of equality as well as in the freedom 
of thought, association and expression.176 Although the government increasingly paid 
attention to human rights, particularly as a result of the ratification of various interna-
tional human rights conventions, it took time before those international conventions 
actually had an effect on municipal law.177 They are, however, today among the sources 
of constitutional law. Although the more recent sources of constitution were not avail-
able at the time of drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights, and there 
was very little in common with the English constitutional sources of constitutional 
law and the Convention, they mean today as part of the English law that the English 
constitutional law has gradually become closer to those of the continental legal systems 
as regards the rights enjoying protection.
The lack of a written constitution at the moment of drafting of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the relatively slow development of national provisions 
on the protection of fundamental rights mean that the impact of English constitu-
tional traditions on the text of the European Convention on Human Rights is rather 
modest. Despite that, the ideas of the equality and freedoms of thought, association 
and expression as well as the protection of property are among those common values 
and traditions of European States that are visible in the text of the Convention. The 
early civil rights instruments of the English-speaking world, with the idea of basic 
civil liberties, do play a role as a source of inspiration, but rather indirectly through the 
constitutional developments in continental Europe, particularly in France. However, 
173 Constitutional law means the law affecting the exercise of sovereign power over the individual, as 
well as the structure of government and the balance of powers among the branches of government. 
In the United States, constitutional law is derived solely from the Constitution. In the United 
Kingdom, constitutional law is not derived from a single instrument, but from various documents, 
statutes and case law, as well as constitutional conventions (i.e. practice). See Rossini 1998, p. 7.
174 Feldman 2003, p. 402-404. It may be noted that the strong protection of property is a feature 
that emerged early also in the French legal system and is a feature in common with the Finnish 
constitutional traditions, for example.
175 Leyland 2007, p.9.
176 For more details, see Feldman 2003, p. 406-410.
177 Feldman 2003, p. 439.
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in the light of the preparatory work of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the common law system has played a role in the draft text, particularly through the 
American constitutional traditions which have served as an example for the drafting 
of the relevant United Nations instruments. Those, in turn, have been used as the 
main model for the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
United States was among those victors of war that played a strong role in the drafting 
of the human rights instruments. An example of the strong elements of common law 
traditions visible in the text is particularly the fair trial rights strongly established in 
the American legal system. The fair trial elements similar to the ones in the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution are missing in the early constitutional acts 
of the States covered by the present study, but due to the shared common law tradi-
tions with the United States, some English influence can be found to exist in the fair 
trial provisions of the Convention as explained in the foregoing. Those have also been 
included in the present fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution of Finland. 
Apart from the fair trial rights, the clearest elements in common with the English 
constitutional traditions and the Convention include property rights as well as later 
the right to equality and the freedoms of thought, association and expression. These 
developments have some similarities with the Swedish ones.
2.5.2  French traditions
As mentioned in the foregoing, the French declaration of human rights and citizen’s 
rights (Déclaration des droits de l ’homme et du citoyen) can be considered one of the sources 
of inspiration for present-day human rights conventions. At the time of its adoption 
as a result of the French revolution, it was also one of the most advanced instruments 
protecting the rights of citizens. The emergence of the French Constitution and of the 
idea of protecting the rights of citizens, resulting in the adoption of the Declaration, 
have their origins in the period of Enlightenment and the revolution of 1789 referred 
to above, which clearly distinguish the French developments from the English and 
German ones178, for example, where no comparable revolution took place. Further, as 
explained in the foregoing, there was influence from the United States, although the 
degree of impact has been subject to debate179. According to Boyron, the revolution of 
1789 meant a total shift in constitutional change, and modern constitutional history 
is often regarded as having begun at that time180. The Declaration of human rights 
and citizen’s rights can also be considered to have launched the gradual change in the 
culture of protecting the rights of citizens at a European level.
178 See Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 136.
179 Favoreu 1990, p. 39.
180 Boyron 2011, p. 116. There was an ideological, societal, cultural and legal change.
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When looking into the constitutional texts of France, existing at the moment of 
drafting the European Convention on Human Rights, it becomes clear that there are 
certain provisions in the Declaration that have served as a source of inspiration for 
those of international instruments. Those provisions include, in particular, the early 
equivalents of the prohibition of forced labour, the liberty and security of person, the 
principle of no punishment without law, the freedom of religion and thought, the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly181. The Declaration also became 
an important source from which general principles of law have been derived in France, 
such as the equality of citizens before the law182. However, considering that the French 
Declaration of human rights and citizen’s rights is a product of an earlier century, it 
is evident that the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
other international instruments are considerably more detailed and provide for more 
extensive lists of rights as a result of negotiations. One may note, for example, that 
the existing French constitutional texts did not provide for the protection of private 
life. In comparison, the Belgian constitution of 1831 did provide for a right to enjoy 
such protection183. Both the French and Belgian constitutions provide for the right to 
equality before the law. However, although the Belgian constitution appears to have bor-
rowed several elements from the French Declaration, it had a few additional elements 
including an explicit prohibition of death penalty, which is an indirect way to provide 
for the right to life184. Thus, despite that the French Declaration has been a source of 
inspiration for several national and international instruments protecting fundamental 
and human rights, it is not the only one but the international instruments are prod-
ucts joining a large number of constitutional traditions, and the efforts to provide an 
even stronger protection of human rights after World War II lead to more advanced 
instruments than any national ones. Nevertheless, the fact that the fundamental rights 
provisions of the Belgian constitution have considerable similarities with those of the 
French one, demonstrates that the influence of the French constitutional traditions is 
not limited to the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights, but there is 
further going influence. Both have been looked into even in the drafting of the Finnish 
Constitution, as well as a variety of other ones such as the German and Dutch ones.
Historical reasons may be found for the relatively strong influence of French con-
stitutional traditions on the European Convention on Human Rights. The creation of 
181 See Déclaration des droits de l ’homme et du citoyen de 1789. The French Declaration, supplemented 
by a Preamble to the Constitution in 1946, is most clearly a document underlining natural rights, 
deriving from the sovereignty of the nation, when compared with other continental European 
instruments.
182 Steiner 1997, p. 268 and 269.
183 To be precise, the Belgian constitution provides for the inviolability of home and secrecy of 
communications.
184 See Constitution de la Belgique du 7 février 1831, Titre II – Des Belges et de leurs droits.
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new constitutional law in France began as a result of the revolution in 1789 through 
the drafting of a declaration of human rights and citizen’s rights which was adopted 
in 1789, whereas the new Constitution was adopted two years later in 1791.185 Al-
though the Declaration was the first advanced instrument protecting human rights 
in continental Europe, only a certain privileged group of the nation could exercise 
political rights. That limitation on the enjoyment of political rights appears to have 
been shared with the other legal systems covered by the present study. Furthermore, 
a distinction was made between passive and active rights, i.e. civil rights and political 
rights.186 The concepts of civil rights and political rights have later found their way to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, albeit their meaning today 
may be somewhat modified, and the enjoyment of political rights is not limited to a 
privileged group of the nation. Thus, the early French idea of drawing a distinction 
between passive and active rights is visible in the Covenant, and even in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Also, the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides for both sets of rights despite some differences in terminology.
The basic ideas in the Declaration, deriving influence from the earlier texts drafted 
in the English-speaking world187, are that all human beings were born free and equal, 
insofar as their rights and obligations were concerned, which is also the underlying 
idea of the existing international human rights instruments including the European 
Convention on Human Rights. However, there is no explicit prohibition of discrimi-
nation in the Declaration comparable with Article 14 of the Convention, which is a 
stronger expression of the principle of equality, except that the Preamble of 1946 pro-
hibits discrimination between men and women. In the view of Glenn, the emergence 
of rights is linked with the idea of the centrality of person188, which thus interestingly 
coexisted with the developments of the law of property. However, as referred to in the 
foregoing, certain groups of persons still at the end of the 18th century enjoyed stronger 
rights than others, and only certain types of rights belonged to all. The principle of 
equality of citizens before the law has found its way to constitutions in other States 
and is also visible in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Declaration was attached as preamble to the 1791 Constitution. In addition, the 
first chapter of the Constitution consisted of a provision protecting certain fundamental 
rights (Dispositions fondamentales garanties par la Constitution). The guaranteed rights 
were still considered natural rights that the Constitution also defined as rights of the 
185 Jyränki 1989, p. 145.
186 See Jyränki 1989, p. 148 and 149, and Steiner 1997, p. 269.
187 Ségur 2007, p. 13. In the view of Ségur, the main difference between the Anglo-Saxon texts and 
the French Declaration was that the first-mentioned ones were rather pragmatic, whereas the 
latter was more ideological.
188 Glenn 2004, p. 142.
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citizen that could not be restricted by the legislator.189 Apart from those rights, important 
aspects included in the 1793 Constitution were a stronger protection of property rights 
and the idea of the freedom of religion, which included the right to civil marriage and 
divorce as well as the separation of the state and the church. The early property rights 
can be considered as the origin of modern economic, social and cultural rights.190 The 
early emergence of the protection of property rights should perhaps be seen in the 
context of the development of society in general, particularly the growing industriali-
sation and trade and the growing influence of those involved in trade. Such a special 
status afforded to property rights, along with the classic civil liberties, also existed in 
other legal systems, including the English, German and Nordic ones. As regards the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the protection of property is included in a 
separate protocol, which is due to that the level of protection is considerably different 
in the various States parties. Including the provisions in a separate protocol allows 
for those with a higher level of protection or protection by national constitutions to 
advance with implementation faster.
Further amendments were made to the Constitution in 1814, 1830 and 1848191, 
but despite the ideological change, no major changes really took place insofar as the 
material contents of the rights were concerned, apart from included the freedom of 
expression in 1814 and a possibility of derogating from the rights in time of ‘état de 
siège’ in 1848192. Freedom of association was recognised for the first time in 1901193. 
Later, the fundamental rights provisions of the French Constitution became a combi-
nation of the old Declaration of 1789 and the preamble of the Constitution of 1946. 
Particularly the old Declaration links citizens’ rights strongly with the sovereignty of 
the people, but this fundamental idea is also reflected in the 1946 addition. The list of 
rights – as understood today – is also included in the preamble to the Constitution of 
1958 which is still in force. Thus, the present Constitution affords a relatively strong 
protection of fundamental rights, following the spirit of early times. However, when 
compared with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Basic Law of Germany, the fundamental rights provisions of the French Declaration 
and Constitution appear to be rather outdated, and therefore the strong protection of 
human rights and fundamental rights is a combination of the Constitution and the 
Convention.
189 Jyränki 1989, p. 163. See also Ségur 2007, p. 13. Ségur names three particular characteristics of 
the rights protected by the Declaration: first, they were individual i.e. they could not be enjoyed 
by groups or communities; second, they were absolute; and third, there is a strong focus on the 
idea of liberty (of which the political rights were derived).
190 Jyränki 1989, p. 163 and 164.
191 Boyron 2011, p. 116, footnote 2.
192 Jyränki 1989, p. 182, 190 and 195.
193 See Boyron 2011, p. 137.
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The impact of the French constitutional traditions on the development of the text 
of the European Convention on Human Rights can be said to be particularly strong, 
when compared with that of other States parties to the Convention covered by the 
present research. This is even more so because the French traditions have also served 
as a significant source of inspiration for the constitutions of other European states, 
meaning also indirect influence on the Convention through the other States parties at-
tending the negotiations. One may note, however, that the economic, social and cultural 
rights (apart from the freedom of religion) existing in the French constitution as from 
early times, particularly employment rights and educational rights, did not end up in 
the text of the Convention. Instead, a separate international instrument at universal 
level has been drawn up to protect those rights, and another one at the European level. 
In principle, the French legal system should have been more prepared to adopt the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights than the Finnish one, if assessed purely in the light of constitutional 
law which in Finland was until recently less developed in respect of the protection of 
fundamental rights. However, the question of legal and technical preparedness is not 
that simple. Even though the French constitutional fundamental rights provisions were 
more detailed than the Finnish ones, they were not necessarily that well suited either 
for being directly applied by the judiciary.
2.5.3 German traditions
The early developments of German constitutional law appear, in the eyes of a foreigner, 
rather complicated, due to the existence of small principalities, cities and villages that 
were loosely associated for centuries until this association was institutionalised at the 
end of the 15th century, the impact of the Roman empire, the Reformation which divided 
Germany into Catholics and Protestants, and finally the Thirty Years’ War that resulted 
in the Peace Treaty of Westphalia which could be said to constitute a predecessor of 
German constitutions.194 According to Heun, the constitutional developments followed 
closely the revolutionary developments in France195, which can be said to be largely 
a result of the influence of Roman law on the legal system in general. In the view of 
Jyränki, insofar as the German constitutional law is concerned, the most interesting 
developments from a European perspective started in 1815 as the German empire split 
into several sovereign duchies, constituting the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) 
which replaced the Empire. As mentioned above, the South German states had been 
under considerable influence of France, and although a relatively modern Constitution 
was adopted for Bavaria in 1808, its form and contents resembled those of the French 
194 Heun 2011, p. 13.
195 Heun 2011, p. 15.
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Constitution.196 The German history is characterised by variation between the existence 
of several German States and a united Germany, and the individual German States 
also had their own constitutions. The Constitution of Prussia (1850) was the first one 
in which the provisions on fundamental rights were more numerous and more detailed 
than in the earlier constitutions of South German States The possibility of restricting 
the fundamental rights by means of law was also included in the Constitution of Prussia, 
for example concerning the protection of property, although the constitution protected 
property rather against interference by other individuals than by the state197 which 
has been a rather disputed aspect of the protection of human rights in modern times. 
In essence, it is considered that human rights instruments provide protection against 
interference by the state, but the state may be under an obligation to take legislative 
measures to ensure the enjoyment of rights even vis-à-vis individuals. Nevertheless, 
the protection of property and the possibility of derogating from the afforded rights 
has also been included in the European Convention on Human Rights, although in 
a modernised form.
Although the fact that the Constitution of Prussia contained fundamental rights 
provisions should perhaps not be overemphasised, the new Constitution of the German 
Empire meant a weaker protection of the rights of citizens as no list of fundamental 
rights was included in the text198. Furthermore, in the same way as the Constitution 
of Prussia, the Constitution of the German Federation provided for the possibility 
to derogate from the provisions of the constitution to protect national security or to 
intervene in a situation of emergency by means of an emergency decree (Notverord-
nung).199 As mentioned in the foregoing section concerning France, such a possibility 
also existed in the French constitution of 1848, i.e. in the same period of time. It is 
possible that the early German provisions allowing for derogations have played a role 
in the drafting of the limiting clauses in the European Convention on Human Rights, 
although the concept of margin of appreciation is based on French law as explained 
in section 3.3 below. 
After World War I, the Constitution of Weimar of 1919 derived elements from the 
French and US constitutions as well as from the constitution of Belgium of 1831 and, 
in the view of Heun, it was the first really democratic and liberal constitution200. The 
provisions on fundamental rights and obligations of citizens included in the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Weimar (1919) were already close to their modern counterparts. 
The protection of fundamental rights was now seen as an element providing for the 
196 Jyränki 1989, p. 196. See also Wesel 2010, p. 441, and Heun 2011, p. 14. On earlier developments 
in more detail, see Wesel 2010, p. 318, and Heun 2011, p. 13.
197 Jyränki 1989, p. 236 and 237. See also Wesel 2010, p. 448.
198 Wesel 2010, p. 448.
199 See Jyränki 1989, p. 239 and 240.
200 Heun 2011, p. 17.
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economic and social security of citizens, and also the cultural rights of citizens were 
considered to be of importance. A separate chapter providing for fundamental rights was 
thus included in the Constitution, and particularly the provisions on economic, social 
and cultural rights and property rights can be considered advanced ones, although as 
mentioned in the foregoing, there were rather extensive property rights in the French 
Constitution already in 1793.201 This strong protection against interference with prop-
erty rights is one of the elements existing also in modern human rights instruments. 
Thus, it seems that the strongest element of the early German constitutions that is 
visible in the European Convention is that of the protection of property – in Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention – although the nature of protection differed in the German 
constitutions. This is also something that the German constitutional traditions share 
in common with those of the other legal systems covered by the present study.
Without going into details about the more or less complete disruption of the pro-
tection of fundamental rights during the national socialist era, suffice it to say that the 
development of national socialism and the atrocities of World War II meant a disaster 
for respect for the equality of citizens before the law. However, the defeat of Germany 
as a result of World War II and the resulting war crimes proceedings might at least 
partly explain the strong protection of fundamental rights in the present Constitution 
of Germany. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany or as it is called in 
German, “the Basic Law” (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland)202 was initi-
ated and influenced by the Allied Powers, although it was drafted by a parliamentary 
council. The draft Constitution passed by the parliamentary council was adopted by the 
parliaments of all German Länder in 1949, subject to approval by the Allied Powers, 
and provided for the federal and regional levels of government203. Thus, although the 
Basic Law was drafted largely as a result of pressure by the Allied Powers, its contents 
are essentially based on old constitutional traditions and the contents have been decided 
by the Germans themselves. Furthermore, as explained in the foregoing, the provisions 
of the Weimar Constitution and thus those of the Basic Law have drawn elements 
from the Western constitutional traditions, particularly the French and American ones, 
in general. The Constitution was adopted with a view to preventing future disasters 
comparable to that of the dictatorship, and to ensuring the control of constitutionality 
and the protection of fundamental rights204 and thus the reasons for its adoption were 
largely the same as those for the adoption of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Chapter I of the Basic Law provides for the protection of fundamental rights 
and contains a list of rights, including not only individual liberties but also certain 
201 Jyränki 1989, p. 339, and Heun 2011, p. 17 and 18.
202 Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, 100-1, 23.5.1949.
203 Wesel 2010, p. 556 and 557, and Heun 2011, p. 9-11. East Germany had its own constitution 
also adopted in 1949 (Heun 2011, p. 12).
204 Wesel 2010, p. 566.
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collective rights. According to Kommers, these are known as institutional guarantees 
some of which are in fact outside the list of rights.205 According to Heun, the list of 
fundamental rights was placed at the beginning of the Constitution so as to underline 
the liberal and free character of the new political system206, which is also visible in the 
contents of certain rights of the Basic Law207. According to Kommers, many of the 
basic rights provisions of the present Basic Law are based on those of the old Weimar 
Constitution208, the difference being that in the Weimar Constitution, the basic rights 
were considered goals, whereas in those in the Basic Law are enforceable209. This view 
is supported by Heun, according to whom also the enforceability of fundamental rights 
introduced a new era of protection of fundamental rights210.
Although Germans appear to have played a rather modest role in the discussions on 
the contents of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is largely a product 
of the victors of war, the German constitutional traditions are part of the common 
European traditions and values that are visible in the text of the Convention. When 
looking into the fundamental rights provisions of the Basic Law, one may note that 
they have more similarities with those of the European Convention on Human Rights 
than the French constitutional texts, which is due to that it was drafted at the same 
time and largely for the same reason. Despite that, the provisions of the Basic Law 
clearly indicate the need to provide even further going provisions in some respects, 
caused by the aggravated violations of the rights of protection of private life and home 
and lack of equality of parts of the population during the National Socialist era. That 
is demonstrated by both strong protection of home and property and strong emphasis 
on the protection of equality of all citizens. Those do exist in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, but in less detail. It is interesting to note that despite the German 
205 Kommers 2006, p. 170.
206 Heun 2011, p. 1.
207 Kommers explains that the core principles in the Basic Law are rooted in three major legal tradi-
tions that have shaped contemporary German constitutionalism, namely those of classical-liberal, 
socialist and Christian-natural law of thought (Kommers 1989, p. 36). The liberal tradition is 
behind the classical freedoms listed in several articles of the list of fundamental rights. According 
to Kommers, the substantive values represented by all those traditions are, however, enormously 
important in the intepretation of the Basic Law (Ibid. p. 37).
208 Apart from the basic rights provisions of the German Constitution, there are such provisions 
also in the new constitutions of Länder. In those cases, the latter remain in force insofar as they 
are in conformity with the provisions of the federal Constitution (see Fisher 1997, p. 23). 
209 Kommers, 1989, p. 38. In the view of Kommers, the Basic Law as a twentieth-century consti-
tution is interesting in that it subjects positive law to a higher moral order. (Ibid. p. 39) Further, 
Germans commonly agree that the Basic Law is a constitution of substantive values, embracing 
both rights and duties. (Ibid. p. 37) Thus, basic rights provisions as constitutional values are given 
a higher hierarchical status than the provisions of law.
210 Heun 2011, p. 191 and 192. The increased importance given to fundamental rights has meant a 
fundamental change practically in all fields of law (Ibid. p. 191).
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influence on the legal system of Finland, particularly through the common legal history 
with Sweden, the constitutional traditions of protecting fundamental rights appear 
to have had less influence. Nor has Sweden had as detailed provisions as Germany 
on fundamental rights until rather recently. The longer constitutional traditions with 
lists of fundamental rights may have introduced a stronger culture of protecting those 
rights earlier than in Finland. That together with the Basic Law which has considerable 
similarities with the Convention may partly explain the fact that the German legal 
system has not appeared to have problems with the Convention system to the same 
extent as the Finnish one. The fundamental rights thinking appears to be a more recent 
product in Finland, which may still be visible in the development of national case law 
despite that the Finnish constitutional provisions on fundamental rights were revised 
entirely to align them with the Convention rights.
2.5.4  Swedish traditions
Sweden is seldom mentioned in the context of historical studies on constitutions, 
perhaps for the reason that it is difficult to place Sweden in an international frame-
work in this respect. According to some views, the real constitutional developments 
of Sweden may be considered to begin around 1693211 although the konungabalken 
(Magnus Erikssons landslag) from the 14th century may be said to be the first written 
constitution, providing e.g. for the election of the king and a minimum protection for 
citizens against interference with their rights by the state212. The reason for why the 
latter has not always been considered a constitutional act is perhaps that no distinction 
was really drawn between it and other acts. The first pieces of legislation that were 
specifically called constitutional laws appeared in the 18th century.213 Indeed, the most 
important other pieces of legislation that appeared alongside the aforementioned 1734 
codification were constitutional laws. These included the Form of Government of 1720 
(regeringsform) and the Parliament Act of 1723 (riksdagsordning) as well as the Free-
dom of Press Decree of 1766 (tryckfrihetsförordning).214 In the view of Jyränki, those 
Swedish constitutional acts, particularly the Form of Government and the Parliament 
Act, were rather advanced in comparison with those of other countries in the same 
era.215 Furthermore, the Freedom of Press Decree did not have many equivalents in 
Europe, the closest examples being found in Great Britain and the Netherlands. This 
Decree, in the view of Inger, was of crucial importance for the further development 
of the freedom of expression in Sweden216 although according to Axberger, it lost its 
211 See e.g. Wesel 2010, p. 316 and 317.
212 Nergelius 1996, p. 589.
213 Nergelius 1996, p. 590.
214 Inger 1986, p. 134.
215 Jyränki 1989, p. 52.
216 Inger 1986, p. 135.
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relevance in a few years’ time and the freedom of expression was even abolished for a 
while217. Nevertheless, the freedom of expression could also be perhaps the strongest 
element that the Swedish legal traditions have in common with the high European 
level of protection, although there was protection of the freedom of expression also in 
other European states. It is interesting to note that despite the common legal history 
with Sweden, it is particularly the freedom of expression that is among those Con-
vention rights that have produced most challenges for the Finnish judiciary although 
the situation has clearly improved along with new national case law. The freedom of 
expression is today one of the core elements of democratic society, and is included in 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
The old constitutional acts were repealed by subsequent enactments, the Form of 
Government of 1772 and an association act (förenings- och säkerhetsakt) of 1789218, 
which were again repealed by a new Form of Government in 1809.219 The new Form 
of Government included quite a few elements of the French constitutions of 1791 
and 1795, although it was a new type of entity with a large number of new character-
istics of its own. Nor did the Form of Government of 1809 provide for the protection 
of fundamental rights in the same way as the French or German constitutions, but 
contained a similar basic provision as the acts of 1720 and 1772, which, in the view 
of Jyränki, rather seemed to protect the king. The provision indeed only set a require-
ment for the king to use power in a legal and fair manner and to avoid unnecessary 
interference with citizens’ rights.220 The only example of a stronger and rather modern 
fundamental right, as also earlier, was the freedom of press (guaranteed by means of 
a separate decree).221 The decree on the freedom of press of 1812 remained in force 
until 1949 when it was replaced again by a new one222.
The Constitution was not amended again until in 1866223. Although there was an 
apparent conflict between the outdated provisions of the Constitution of 1809 and the 
existing state practice and organisation and despite the rather unclear legal situation224, 
217 Axberger 2012, p.18.
218 See Jyränki 1989, p. 73. Wesel 2010, p. 443. Inger 1986, p. 139.
219 Jyränki 1989, p.259.
220 See Jyränki 1989, p. 275 and 276. See also Nergelius 1996, p. 592, who largely appears to share 
the view of Jyränki. In his view, the 1809 constitutional act was largely affected by the ideologi-
cal perceptions of the time in other parts of Europe and the most relevant questions were the 
distribution of powers and the question of whether the provisions of the act were binding on the 
legislator. This latter question was later elaborated on through case law.
221 Axberger 2012, p. 18. For more details, see Jyränki 1989, p. 261-264.
222 Axberger 2012, p. 20. The 1949 decree differed strongly from the prior one, which was partly 
affected by the experiences during World War II. (Ibid.) The decree has been amended on several 
occasions (Ibid. p. 21 and 22).
223 Wesel 2010, p. 443.
224 Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 29.
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the Constitution of 1809 remained in force until 1974, and the 1974 Constitution225 is 
the first one to contain a more detailed list of fundamental rights. Thus, the protection 
of fundamental rights in the Swedish constitutional law was strengthened rather late 
and the Swedish constitutional traditions had very little in common with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Rather, the Convention has had a positive impact on the 
development of Swedish legislation, including the Constitution. However, the prepara-
tory work of the European Convention on Human Rights indicate that the Swedish 
delegation has contributed actively to the discussions on the draft text and thus, the 
Swedish legal traditions and ideas of the protection of human rights have played a role 
in the same way as those of other negotiating States. As regards the strong constitutional 
law protection of the freedom of expression, the Swedish legal system appears to have 
faced no major problems with the Convention system which may be explained by that 
the traditions have emerged rather early when compared with other European states. It 
is difficult, however, to draw such generalising statements. In respect of the protection 
of property rights, which in Sweden has traditionally been strong, the Swedish legal 
system has struggled with the wide meaning given to the concept of civil rights in con-
nection with certain property rights. One may observe that the slow development of the 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights, and the fact that the old constitutional 
provisions were not well suited for being directly applied by the national judiciary, has 
had the potential of creating problems. Due to the relatively long common legal history 
between Finland and Sweden, and the similarities of the legal systems, the problems 
faced by Finland could have been similar without legislative amendments. 
2.6  Transposition of the European Convention into  
the national legal systems
2.6.1  Legal framework
In the foregoing, it is explained how the constitutional traditions of the selected States 
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have affected the emergence of 
the text and language of the Convention. For that text to be part of the national legal 
culture, however, it is necessary that it is part of the applicable law in the State party 
concerned. Apart from the characteristics of the legal system and judicial traditions in 
general, the status of international agreements in the legal system may affect the way in 
which their provisions are taken into account in adjudication. The aim with the examples 
of legal systems selected for this study is to show how the way of implementation plays 
225 Regeringsform SFS 1974:152. This constitutional act is supplemented by constitutional acts on 
crown succession, freedom of the press and freedom of expression, i.e. by Successionsordning SFS 
1810:0926, Tryckfrihetsförordning SFS 1949:105 and Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag SFS 1991:1469.
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a role. Furthermore, the legal systems may have different hierarchies of sources of law 
and legal rules226. Even in the case of international law, certain rules may enjoy a higher 
hierarchical status than others. De Schutter suggests that human rights occupy such a 
position among the rules of international law227. However, traditionally, there has been 
no hierarchy of norms between the different sources or rules of international law, at 
least as regards customary law and treaties228. Gerards and Fleuren point out that the 
dualist tradition is considerably younger than the monist tradition, and is closely con-
nected with the increasingly strong role given to national parliaments229. Apart from 
customary law and treaties, there are various other sources of international law such as 
general principles of law recognised by the community of nations230, international case 
law and different types of soft law (recommendations and declarations). Treaties have 
differing statuses in the legal systems of the states covered by this study. Traditionally, 
the legal systems have been divided into monistic and dualistic systems in respect of 
the status of treaties. However, this may be rather misleading as legal systems often 
226 Cassese 2005, p. 198.
227 De Schutter 2009, p. 48. He justifies his argument with reference to the wording of Article 103 
of the UN Charter, according to which “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”. One 
of those obligations is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all. Further justification for the superior hierarchical position can be derived from 
the peremptory character of certain norms of international law, such as certain fundamental rights.
228 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice mentions international con-
ventions, international custom, and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, and 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of highly qualified publicists of the various nations. Cassese 2005, p. 198. However, since late 
1960s, certain fundamental rules have been upgraded to give the status of peremptory norms 
of international law (jus cogens), including certain norms of international human rights law (the 
self-determination of peoples, the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimina-
tion and, in particular, racial segregation or apartheid). (Ibid. p. 199) This higher status means 
that those norms cannot be derogated from. 
229 Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 335 and 336. Therefore, whether the constitutional law fits in the 
monist or dualist tradition depends on constitutional history of the state in question. (Ibid. p. 
336)
230 In the view of Cassese, general principles of international law are rather considered a subsidiary 
source of law, to which recourse may be had if there are no rules produced by a primary source 
of law (treaties, custom, unilateral acts of states). Such a rule could be, for example, the principle 
of respect for human rights, but even it has been codified e.g. in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. (Cassese 2005, p. 188) However, Brownlie pays attention to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice and points out that t escapes the classification as a subsidiary 
means, but is not immediately dependent on the consent of states in the same way as interna-
tional conventions and customary law. (Brownlie 1990, p. 15) One may note that such principles 
of law as have been codified in several conventions, have a stronger status than others, as those 
conventions also provide evidence of the existence of the general principles of law. Also judicial 
decisions provide evidence of established principles of law.
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contain elements of both monism and dualism231, as also appears from the analysis of 
the selected States below. Thus, the relevance of the division into monistic and dualistic 
legal systems could even be questioned, as suggested by Gerards and Fleuren232. Their 
position can be shared in that a mere technical implementation does not necessarily 
mean that the international treaty in question is de facto applied by national courts. 
What is more relevant is that the means of implementation offers the national courts 
the tools that they need for applying it. However, it is undeniable that the provisions of 
international law have a stronger role where they are clearly made part of applicable law 
and enforceable by courts of law. Further, for the legal systems of the Member States 
of the European Union, changes have been imposed by the membership of the Euro-
pean Union, as the status of EU law differs from other international law233. However, 
as is pointed out by Frowein, although this discussion on monism and dualism seems 
to be somewhat outdated, it is clear that the international legal order and the many 
national legal systems remain separate234. Therefore, an examination of the monistic 
and dualistic elements of legal systems is relevant, particularly as effective application 
by the domestic courts of the provisions of a human rights convention requires that it 
is applicable and enforceable as law at the national level. This assertion is demonstrated 
in the light of the examples of the selected five legal systems, particularly by comparing 
the Swedish and English legal systems with the other cases. Those two legal systems 
allow technical implementation, but there is the additional possibility to actually insert 
substantive provisions into national law.
231 See e.g. Aust 2013, p. 162. Aust suggests that the United Kingdom represents the purist form of 
dualism.
232 Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 337. The authors points out that the theoretical notions of monism 
and dualism say very little about the kind of methods and instruments a certain state will have at 
its disposal to give effect to international norms in its national legal system, and that those con-
cepts should therefore rather be regarded as ”schemes” which can assist in ordering the different 
constitutional systems and mechanisms states employ to implement international law in their 
domestic legal orders.
233 EU law, including the case law of the European Court of Justice, enjoy a similar status in each legal 
system of the European Union irrespective of whether the traditional system of implementation 
is dualist or monist.
234 Frowein 1996, p. 85. The reason for why the classification of legal systems between monist and 
dualist ones has to some extent been abandoned by jurists is perhaps that it is traditionally based 
on theories or schools of thought, where some scholars advocate monism and others dualism. 
(For traditional schools of thought, see Brownlie 1990, p. 32-34) However, it appears that mod-
ern scholars rather examine the way in which legal systems de facto treat international law and 
treaties. This appears rather clearly in respect of commentaries on the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It has proven that its application is the more efficient at national level the more 
effectively it has been incorporated.
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In monistic systems, treaties are considered to be part of the domestic legal system 
upon signature235 or acceptance/ ratification as such, without separate incorporation 
into domestic law236. Instead, in dualistic systems treaties and national law are regarded 
as distinct sources of law and courts are in principle only bound by national law. Thus, 
in order for treaties to become applicable law in a dualistic system, they need to be 
specifically made part of the domestic legal system. The methods of doing this (and 
the denominations given to those methods) vary from state to state, but they could all 
be considered to fall under the concept of incorporation237 in its most general sense. 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not require incorporation, and nor 
has the European Court of Human Rights considered this necessary, but it has been 
considered to have certain advantages with regard to the efficiency of protection of 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention. Furthermore, the practical meaning of the 
distinction between monist and dualist countries has diminished as nearly all the States 
parties to the Convention, whose legal system requires separate incorporation, had 
incorporated it into their domestic legal systems238. However, in the view of Pellonpää 
& al., the fact that a State Party to the Convention has incorporated the Convention 
into its domestic law does not seem to have a significant effect on the de facto signifi-
cance of the Convention in the national application of law. He justifies this argument 
with reference to cases against Austria, where the Convention has been given a strong 
constitutional status from the beginning, and to those against the United Kingdom, 
where the Convention had a rather weak status for a long time.239
235 One must stress, however, that mere signature does usually not mean that the treaty becomes 
legally binding particularly as regards multilateral conventions, but is an expression of consent 
to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty.
236 Cassese draws a distinction between two types of monistic systems, the so-called monistic view 
advocating the supremacy of municipal law, as well as the monistic theory maintaining the unity 
of the various legal systems and the primacy of international law. (Cassese 2005, p. 213) The first 
one actually denied the existence of international law as a distinct and autonomous body of law, 
reflecting extreme nationalism, whereas according to the other theory, international law exists 
above national legal orders which must conform to international law and in cases of conflict, 
international law prevails. (See Cassese 2005, p. 214 and 215)
237 On occasion, the concept used is ”transformation” particularly when the treaty requires some implement-
ing legislation (see Aust 2013, p. 167, footnote 23 – Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 
31 and 32). This comes from the idea that to become binding on domestic authorities and individuals, 
international law must be ‘transformed’ into national law through the various mechanisms for the national 
implementation of international rules. (Cassese 2005, p. 214) Apart from automatic incorporation, there 
are various forms of legislative incorporation, including specific implementing legislation and simple one 
or two provisions stating that the treaty in question must be complied with, possibly together with the 
text of the treaty as a schedule or other annex. (Cassese 2005, p. 220 and 221)
238 Danelius 2012, p. 36, Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 47-49.
239 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 55 and 56. According to the Court’s statistics on 31 December 2013, 
the number of judgments against Austria, finding a violation, was 242, and that concerning the 
United Kingdom was 297.
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In brief, of the legal systems subject to this study, the French one is monistic, without 
requiring separate implementation of the Convention. Its status is below the Constitu-
tion, but it prevails over other legislation. The other legal systems, the English, German, 
Finnish and Swedish ones, are dualistic although all except the English one appear to be 
de facto mixtures of both. In all these States, the Convention has been given the status 
of ordinary law, but in England and Sweden, the Convention has been transformed 
into an act of Parliament with material contents. The status of the Convention in the 
legal systems covered by this study is already rather established, although England and 
Sweden enacted their specific implementing legislation long after ratification. The ap-
plication of the Convention in all those systems has been subject to research over a long 
period of time, and even in Finland it has been subject to research as of the accession of 
Finland to the Convention. The extent to which and the way in which the Convention 
is applied within the legal system concerned affects the degree to which it is capable 
of modifying the legal culture. In the following, comparative observations are made in 
respect of the four selected legal systems, followed by an analysis of its impact on the 
Finnish legal system. That allows an assessment of the first stage of transition of the 
Finnish legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights.
2.6.2 Impact of the European Convention on the protection of fundamental 
rights in the five selected legal systems – comparative remarks
2.6.2.1 English legal system
Insofar as treaties are concerned, the English legal system is dualistic, and in order for 
them to become applicable in courts of law, they need to be specifically made part of the 
national legal system. If any provision of a treaty requires implementation in the domestic 
law of the United Kingdom, legislative action is taken. Under the act of Parliament giv-
ing effect to the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community, when 
certain Community treaties are entered into, they operate in domestic law without the 
need for any further legislative action. If a law is made to give effect to the provisions 
of a treaty, that law has the same status as any other law of the same type.240 Thus, in 
principle, the system of implementation of international treaties into the English legal 
system is comparable to that of the Finnish legal system, but in practice the United 
Kingdom does not necessarily explicitly implement all those treaties to which it is a 
party. That has the potential of weakening the applicability of international agreements 
in the national legal system. Furthermore, in principle it is possible for Parliament to 
enact subsequent national legislation that is in conflict with the treaty provisions, as 
treaties are not considered supreme law in the English legal system241.
240 Treaty Making 2001, p. 289. Masterman 2014, p. 301.
241 Aust 2013, p. 171.
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Considering that there were no constitutional or other statutory provisions on fun-
damental rights in the English legal system, the application of international human 
rights conventions in English courts has been a challenge until the end of the 1990s. 
The number of violations found by the European Court of Human Rights against the 
United Kingdom is among the highest242. The United Kingdom was among the first 
states to sign and ratify the European Convention on Human Rights (the ratification 
taking place on 8 March 1951). The Convention was nevertheless not incorporated into 
the English legal system, which created certain difficulties. Traditionally, the Parlia-
ment has enjoyed strong powers of enactment of legislation, and this also meant that 
the Parliament could enact any laws, even by way of derogation of the provisions of 
the Convention. Furthermore, as the Convention was not incorporated, the courts of 
law could not apply its provisions in the same way as other laws. In cases of discrep-
ancies between an act of Parliament and the Convention, the Courts could not give 
precedence to the Convention, but could only declare that the act was in violation of 
the Convention’s provisions while still having to apply the national legal act as such. 
Even where the court noted that the application of the act entailed a violation of the 
Convention and would most likely lead to a complaint before the European Court of 
Human Rights, it had to apply it. Despite this, the courts did not entirely ignore the 
provisions of the Convention but could, for example where the meaning of domestic 
provisions was unclear, interpret the domestic provisions in a way that was in conform-
ity with the Convention243, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
could be taken into account when developing common law244. According to Gearty, a 
gradual change in the general attitude towards the Convention began to occur since the 
late 1960s, and there were occasional references to the Convention as of the 1970s245.
Schiemann suggests that on those rare occasions when courts did apply some provi-
sions of international human rights law, they were rather the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights than those of the UN Covenants, for example. In this 
respect, Schiemann draws a parallel with the European Court of Justice which has – 
although referring on occasion to the international treaties for the protection of human 
242 According to the Court’s statistics on 31 December 2012, the total number was 289 out of 486 
judgments.
243 Slapper & Kelly 2003, p. 24 and 25.
244 Feldman 2003, p. 440. As a result of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
changes were even made to domestic legislation, including the enactment of the Contempt of 
Court Act of 1981 (Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 6538/74, judgment of 26 
April 1979) and the Interception of Communications Act of 1985 (Malone v. the United Kingdom, 
Application no. 8691/79, judgment of 2 August 1984), and amendments to the Mental Health Act 
of 1983 (X. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 7215/75, judgment of 5 November 1981) (see 
Feldman 2003, p. 441).
245 Gearty 1997, p. 66 and 71. For a more detailed analysis of the developments in the 1970s and 
1980s, see Ibid. p. 71-77.
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rights in general, to which the Member States are parties – shown preference for the 
European Convention on Human Rights and to the findings of the European Court 
of Human Rights as evidencing common principles of Union law.246 Manchester & 
Salter point out, however, that before the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the 
Convention provisions were rather taken into account as a means of interpretation, 
to assist in cases of doubt.247 This appears to be somewhat equivalent to the principle 
of human rights friendly interpretation of law, which was the prevailing practice in 
Finland until the 1990s. Hoffmann names the principle of proportionality, referred 
to by both the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 
and the principle of legitimate expectations as examples of European influence on 
the English legal system. While the principle of proportionality was not traditionally 
known in the legal system, it has emerged in national case law bit by bit. According 
to Hoffmann, the principle first emerged in 1985248. That principle is also well-known 
in the Finnish legal system, and is capable of helping national jurisdictions to adapt 
themselves to the Convention system, although knowledge of the other principles of 
interpretation is also necessary.
However, the status of the European Convention on Human Rights in the English 
legal system changed along with the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998249. The 
Act incorporates the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, mak-
ing it thus possible for courts of law to apply the Convention. The first and foremost 
objective of the Human Rights Act was to enhance the application of the Convention 
at the domestic level, and it is considered to have changed the situation in the United 
Kingdom considerably, although there appear to be somewhat differing views on how 
extensive the impact has been. Another objective with the Act was to provide victims 
of violations a possibility to seek redress at the national level, without needing to have 
recourse to the European Court of Human Rights. While the English courts earlier 
could not afford sufficient protection for citizens in cases of violations of their rights 
through acts of the legislature that were in derogation of the Convention, but the only 
protection available was to exhaust all domestic remedies and take the case through 
the European control mechanism, the new Human Rights Act extended the means 
246 For details, see Schiemann 1998, p. 142-144. Case law cited: [1974] ECR 507 and [1978] 1366 
at 1378, as well as R v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith, [1996] 2 WLR 305.
247 Manchester & Salter 2006, p. 158 and 159. In the view of Manchester & Salter, the English 
courts did not show much willingness to resort to the Convention and the Court’s case law in 
those cases where there was ambiguity in statutory provisions, but rather did so in other cases. 
Furthermore, it was in principle possible for national courts to issue judgments that were not 
compatible with the obligations under the Convention.
248 Hoffmann 1998, p. 154 and 155. Case cited: Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the 
Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
249 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42.
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available to the domestic courts.250 The Human Rights Act also specifically provides 
for situations of incompatibility with the Convention. According to section 3(1) of 
the Act, “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legisla-
tion must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights.”251 In the view of Marshall, human rights legislation has also radically changed 
the way in which legislation in the United Kingdom is drafted and the conditions under 
which executive authority is exercised, thereby even affecting constitutional rules and 
principles252. However, although it is recognised to be an effective tool to implement 
the obligations under the Convention, there has also been some resistance towards its 
application253, which may also be partly due to its wording.
250 For details, see Masterman 2014, p. 308-310, White & Ovey 2010, p. 102-105, Slapper & Kelly 
2003, p 23-29, and Warbrick 2007, p. 34.
251 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 3(1).
252 See Marshall 2003, p. 64. However, according to a Review of the Implementation of the Human 
Rights Act published by the Department of Constitutional Affairs there has been no significant 
impact on criminal law, nor on counter-terrorism legislation, whereas in other areas of law the 
impact has been beneficial. According to Clayton, the said Report further concluded that there 
had also been a significant but benevolent effect on the development of government policy, and 
that the overall impact of the Human Rights Act was not marginal, and it had involved the courts 
in a more intense scrutiny of the Executive than had previously been concluded. (Clayton 2007, 
p. 12) As regards the principles of interpretation of law, MacCormick is of the view that the Act 
has had a significant effect on the application of the teleological method of interpretation of law, 
not only in respect of the provisions of the Human Rights Act itself but also those of other laws 
(MacCormick 2010, p. 132-134). This view is shared by Bennion (see Bennion 2009, p. 155). 
Bennion finds that the addition of a new strong criterion to the rules of statutory interpretation 
reopens old precedents.
253 See Warbrick 2007, p. 34, Clayton 2007, p. 12 and 13, and Manchester & Salter 2006, p. 90 and 
157. Marshall also points out that Article 13 of the Convention providing for the right to effective 
remedy has been omitted from the Act, which is why the effectiveness of the domestic system 
under the new Act should perhaps not be over-emphasised. He correctly notes that the question 
can in any case be tested by challenging the national procedure before the European Court of 
Human Rights. He further notes that the wording of the Act may also impose some challenges, 
naming as examples the meaning and scope of the term “public authority” as well as the uncertain 
relationship between the giving of declarations of incompatibility and the manipulation of the 
terms of statutes to achieve conformity with. He therefore questions whether the terms of the 
Human Rights Act have actually changed the rules for the interpretation of statutes. (Marshall 
2003, p. 61) Clayton also points out that the scope of application of the Human Rights Act is 
largely dependent on the meaning to be given to “public authority”. Problems in this respect 
have been recognised in a Joint Committee’s report (The Meaning of Public Authority under 
the Human Rights Act), noting that the combined effects of a restrictive judicial interpretation 
of the relevant subsection and the changing nature of private and voluntary sector involvement 
in public services have compromised a relevant provision of the Act in a way which reduced the 
protection it was intended to give. (See Clayton 2007, p. 14 and 15)
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Today, under section 2 of the Act, the English courts have a duty to take the judg-
ments of the European Court of Human Rights as well as any opinion of the earlier 
Human Rights Commission into account254 although the wording “take into account” 
is perhaps not very strong255. However, they do not take effect automatically in domes-
tic law, but the courts only need to take them into account so far as they are relevant 
to the proceedings in which a question relating to a Convention right has arisen256. 
Furthermore, if statutory provisions are found to be in conflict with the Convention, 
the courts have a duty to acknowledge and declare such a conflict. In the view of Man-
chester & Salter, it would also appear unlawful to give effect to provisions of common 
law that are in conflict with the Convention. Despite this, the Court’s case law is only 
considered to have persuasive authority as precedents.257
Thus, the ratification of the Convention by the United Kingdom was not a decisive 
factor in changing the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights in the English legal 
system, whereas the enactment of national legislation implementing it was. Before the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act, there was even resistance towards the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case law. In the view 
of Fenwick & al., this could be partly explained by the lack of solidly based political and 
popular support for the Act.258 Masterman adds that the structure of the Convention 
and the exceptions to the rights protected under it as well as relatively flexible expres-
sions have been a challenge for domestic courts.259 Furthermore, Masterman refers to 
the margin of appreciation doctrine and the use of flexible expressions by the Court 
as justifications that would support the view that the Strasbourg case law should not 
 
254 Under section 2(1) of the Act, “a court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right must take into account any a) judgment, decision, declaration 
or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, b) opinion of the Commission 
given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention, c) decision of the Commission 
in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or d) decision of the Committee of 
Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, whenever made or given, so far as, in the 
opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.
255 See Clayton 2007, p. 18. Clayton notes, however, that when treaty obligations are incorporated 
into domestic law, such an obligation is construed by reference to the principles of international 
law governing its interpretation rather than domestic principles.
256 See Gearty 2004, p. 12.
257 Manchester & Salter 2006, p. 58-60. The obligation, under the Act, to interpret legislation in 
accordance with the Convention applies to both existing and future legislation. According to 
Manchester & Salter, this also affects the doctrine of precedence in that even binding precedents 
may need to be rejected in case they are not in conformity with the Convention (Ibid. p. 168 and 
169).
258 Fenwick & al. 2007, p. 2 and 3. This view is confirmed by Gearty, according to whom the situation 
began to change in the mid-1990s. (Gearty 1997, p. 77 and 78.)
259 Masterman 2005, p. 915.
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be binding on the national judiciary.260 Despite the persisting resistance, there now 
exist national provisions of law providing for the protection of specific fundamental 
and human rights. In general, particularly the amendments to national legislation 
have had a strong impact on the English legal system261, although the developments 
as of the moment of ratifying the Convention until the present increased practice of 
applying the Convention have been relatively slow when compared with Finland. This 
could be explained by the relatively restrictive wording of the Human Rights Act262. 
However, it will only be possible to assess the impact of the Human Rights Act, in 
ensuring respect for the Convention rights, over a longer period of time once there 
is evidence of how its provisions have been interpreted and applied. A brief overview 
of the published precedents of the United Kingdom Supreme Court indicates that 
there is an increasing number of judgments in which references have been made to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and there are examples of judgments in which the references are 
relatively detailed263. However, it still appears to be far from an established practice264. 
Thus, an overview of the case law of the Supreme Court confirms the views presented 
by the aforementioned scholars in that the Human Rights Act has significantly im-
proved the protection of human rights at the national level. There appears to be an 
ongoing transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human 
rights, although the change has taken place relatively slowly. However, the more recent 
public debate on the role of the European Convention on Human Rights, showing 
once again signs of resistance towards it and of preference for national law, shows that 
the change is not necessarily that permanent.
260 Masterman 2007, p. 64. Such flexible expressions include e.g. admissible, ordinary, useful, reason-
able, desirable, and pressing social need. Those expressions leave considerable margin of discretion 
for judges. According to Clayton, it has even been suggested that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine could be used, through national case law, to remove problems that the English legal 
system has faced with the Convention and the Human Rights Act. (See Clayton 2007, p. 12) This 
is an interesting suggestion given that the margin of appreciation as a concept has been foreign 
to the English legal system. One might even raise the question whether such an approach could 
in some situations run counter the purpose of the doctrine.
261 Masterman 2014, p. 311-315.
262 See e.g. Gearty 2004, p. 12.
263 [2011] UKSC 35, Judgment of 13 July 2011, [2013] UKSC 23, Judgment of 1 May 2013, and 
[2014] UKSC 20, Judgment of 26 March 2014. These judgments provide even detailed references 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in a few opinions. In the view of Mas-
terman, the increased references have also been a result of the Human Rights Act (Masterman 
2014, p. 318).
264 See e.g. [2013] UKSC 9, 20 February 2013, and [2014] UKSC 28, 14 May 2014. It is also im-
portant to note that the UK Supreme Court judgments consist of opinions of individual justices, 
and it is possible that only one or two of them include references to the European Convention 
on Human Rights or to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
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2.6.2.2 French legal system
Insofar as the implementation and application of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights is concerned, France should not have faced similar problems as the United 
Kingdom with regard to treaties, and the French legal system is clearly monistic. The 
treaties to which France is a party are automatically incorporated into the domestic 
legal system. According to Article 55 of the Constitution, “duly ratified or approved 
treaties or agreements shall, upon their publication, have higher authority than statutes, 
subject, in respect of each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party”.265 
However, the Constitution is hierarchically above international law266. Article 55 of 
the French Constitution not only requires publication but also subjects the applica-
tion of the international agreement to a requirement of reciprocity. Thus, in principle, 
an agreement would only prevail over a domestic law where it is also applied by the 
other party or parties in question. In comparison, although the Finnish legal system is 
somewhere between a dualistic and monistic system, the Finnish practice of in blanco 
implementing acts mean that in both legal systems the text of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights is applied as such in the same way as in France.
However, one must remember that human rights conventions are a special case 
among international agreements. Although they require States parties to them to act 
in accordance with their obligations under the convention, in the same way as under 
any other international agreement, these obligations are characteristically not so much 
obligations vis-à-vis other parties but obligations to provide certain guarantees for the 
protection of the rights of individuals residing within their jurisdiction. Thus, human 
rights conventions directly create rights for individuals, and the requirement of recipro-
cal application would be misplaced. Considering that international agreements are not 
specifically transposed into French law, however, they need to be directly applicable 
to have relevance in the legal system. This also concerns the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The direct applicability is, according to Sudre, subject to two condi-
tions. Firstly, the direct applicability must have been intended by the States parties. 
When looking at the wording of international human rights conventions, it is evident 
that they are intended to create rights for individuals, which can be directly invoked 
by them before a court. Secondly, the provisions of the convention need to be precise 
265 Article 55 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou ap-
prouvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord 
ou traité, de son application par l ’autre partie.“ Incorporation occurs upon signature not subject to 
ratification or upon ratification, approval or accession, without the need for a separate statutory 
or administrative instrument. However, the text must be published in the official Gazette (Journal 
Officiel) to be valid vis-à-vis third parties. (Treaty Making 2001, p. 167) See also Aust 2013, p. 
164, and Lageot 2014, p. 155.
266 See Lageot 2014, p. 156.
114 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
enough to make it possible to apply them in a national legal system.267 Although the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights contain some ambiguity as 
has been observed in the foregoing, in the same way as any international agreement, 
they are clearly formulated and, as noted above, have a lot in common with national 
constitutional provisions and should be without any problems even in a legal system 
where the text has not been specifically incorporated. According to Lageot, all the 
human rights provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and of its 
additional protocols have been given direct effect in the French Legal system.268 Fur-
thermore, there is today a considerable amount of case law of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights supporting the application of the Convention, although it is 
another issue to what extent national courts follow its case law. According to Sudre, 
this view has generally been accepted in France insofar as the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are 
concerned, and these conventions are without doubt directly applied by French courts, 
but there has been more reluctance to accept direct applicability in respect of certain 
other human rights conventions269. Thus, the relatively strong wording used in the 
European Convention on Human Rights seems to be behind its recognition as part 
of the French legal system, as directly applicable law in France, without having been 
specifically implemented, and in cases of conflict with national laws, it is to be given 
precedence. Also, both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide for an international complaint 
mechanism.
Insofar as the application of the Convention in France is concerned, however, one 
should remember that France only ratified the Convention in 1974270. Despite the late 
ratification and even later recognition of the right to submit individual applications 
in 1981, France rather rapidly attained a high number of violations of the Conven-
tion, and it is today in fact the highest one of the States parties subject to the present 
study271. The French courts have, however, increasingly begun to resort to the text of 
the European Convention on Human Rights or its protocols, either ex officio or upon 
 
 
267 Sudre 2007, p. 39. Lageot 2014, p.156 and 157.
268 Lageot 2014, p. 157. According to Lageot, nor have the French courts found it difficult to admit 
the direct applicability of the Convention (Ibid.)
269 Sudre 2007, p. 40
270 The late ratification was explained by both problems in national legislation, particularly as regards 
the rules on the safeguards for people in custody after arrest, and political resistance (Steiner 
1997, p. 276-278).
271 According to the Court’s statistics on 31 December 2012, the total number of violations found 
was 646 out of 877 judgments.
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it being invoked by one of the parties to the case at hand272. Lageot suggests that the 
application of the Convention includes taking fully account of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and that there are almost standard references to the 
case law in national judgments273. Despite this, according to Pacteau, the references to 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have not entailed quotations of 
the case law, or its interpretations and doctrine.274 His view appears to be confirmed by 
an overview of judgments of the Cour de Cassation from the past few years275. Lageot 
has analysed the French judgments from the perspective of whether the French courts 
actually apply methods of interpretation similar to those of the European Court of 
Human Rights and suggests that it is only seldom clear and where they do so, the 
method most often applied is that of proportionality276. In the view of Margénaud, 
national judges in France in the field of civil and criminal law have, however, sometimes 
even shown excellent knowledge of the Convention277. The case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights has also gradually had an impact on the work of the judiciary 
 
 
272 See Steiner 1997, p. 282-288. Most of such case law has until late 1990s relates to criminal 
proceedings under Article 5 of the Convention (Ibid. p. 282), but the Convention has also had 
an impact on a variety of other types of national case law including those under Articles 6 and 
8 of the Convention (Ibid. p. 294-304). According to Margénaud, between January 1986 and 
September 1997, there were already as many as 5717 judgments issued by the Cour de cassation in 
which the Convention was referred to, of which a great majority (4642 judgments) were criminal 
law ones. In the view of Margénaud, there is no doubt that there is a positive tendency to take the 
Convention into account in national case law, although this conclusion has been made exclusively 
in the light of the case law of the Cour de cassation. (Margénaud 1998, p. 232) His conclusion 
appears to be supported by the application of the Convention in the field of administrative law, 
however, and by 1997, there were approximately 550 judgments of the Conseil d’Etat alone, in 
which the Convention had been referred to. (See Pacteau 1998, p. 252) In the light of the analysis 
made by Lageot, this practice has continued, and Lageot suggests that the French courts have 
never hesitated to apply the provisions of the Convention (Lageot 2014, p. 162).
273 Lageot 2014, p. 166 and 169. According to Lageot, the principle of proportionality is usually 
applied only if the case law of the European Court of Human Rights forms a sufficient basis for 
it. (Ibid. p. 180)
274 Pacteau 1998, p. 259. He suggests, however, that there is perhaps no obligation to do so as, formally, 
the Convention does not constitute part of the applicable administrative law in the French legal 
system. (Ibid. p. 161) As suggested in section 3.2.2 below, more profound references may appear 
in the non-published documentation relating to the judgments, which have not been covered by 
the present research.
275 See e.g. Cour de Cassation, Première chambre civile, Arrêt n° 688 du 11 juin 2009, Arrêt n° 689 du 
11 juin 2009, Arrêt n° 1308 du 10 décembre 2009, Arrêt n° 1309 du 10 décembre 2009, Arrêt n° 198 
du 25 février 2010, Arrêt n° 343 du 31 mars 2010, and Arrêt n° 301 du 17 mars 2011.
276 Lageot 2014, p. 178-181.
277 Margénaud 1998, p. 244.
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in France, which has been particularly strong in the field of criminal proceedings278, 
and Pacteau suggests that some degree of dialogue between national courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights could be already said to exist towards the late 1990s, 
and although such a dialogue takes place rather slowly279, this view is already shared 
by other scholars280. The existence of a dialogue is nevertheless hard to conclude from 
the relatively brief references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
Some improvements have also taken place in the constitutional provisions on the 
protection of fundamental rights, although the original provisions from 1789 and 
1946 still exist. The ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights has 
not as such entailed amendments to constitutional law, but the French Constitution 
has undergone amendments since the signing of the Convention to take into ac-
count, in particular, political changes281, the membership of France in the °European 
Union282, and more recently in 2008 (entry into force on 1 March 2010), to provide 
for a mechanism of review of legislation after its entry into force with regard to consti-
tutional rights and freedoms283. The latter reform brings the French system of control 
of constitutionality closer to the German system, although there still are differences, 
particularly the lack of a possibility to complain over measures taken by the national 
authorities. The new indirect constitutional complaint has three steps: 1) the question 
raised by a litigant, 2) the single or double transmission decision by a court, and 3) the 
ruling by the Constitutional Council on the constitutionality of the legislative act or 
provision.284 Some new rights have been introduced into the French Constitution in 
 
278 See Steiner 1997, p. 289-294, and Lageot 2014, p. 170. The 1993 reform of the Code penal (code 
of criminal procedure) was aimed at achieving compliance with the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Steiner 1997, p. 293), and the Code penal was amended for a 
second time to comply with the Convention in 2011 (Lageot 2014, p. 170). The case law has also 
had a significant impact on other types of cases, such as administrative law cases (Lageot 2014, 
p. 170-175).
279 Pacteau 1998, p. 281.
280 See Lageot 2014, p. 182-184.
281 Boyron 2011, p. 121. A new constitution was drafted in 1958 as a result of the Algerian war, the 
threat of a military coup, and a political crisis, and has later undergone amendments. No new list 
of rights was included in the constitution, but the old one was maintained.
282 See Favoreu and Oberdorff 2000, p. 97.
283 Décret n° 2010-148 du 16 février 2010, Code de procedure civile, Article 126-2 and seq., Code 
de procedure pénale, Article R49-22 and seq. Under the new legislative provisions, three courts 
(Conseil constitutionnel, Conseil d’État and Cour de cassation) have the possibility to state on the 
unconstitutionality of provisions of law and, where necessary, to repeal those provisions. For more 
detailed comments on the reform, see Pfersmann 2010, p. 223. Until the entry into force of the 
amendment, the Constitutional Council has only been able to exercise such review within one 
month of the adoption of the bill. See also Boyron 2011, p. 139.
284 Pfersmann 2010, p. 236.
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1971, 1999, 2005, and 2008285. Those amendments have not, however, entailed stronger 
protection for the rights included in the Convention, but a large part of the Conven-
tion rights still rely on the text of the Convention in France. From the point of view of 
the protection of fundamental rights, the most important new element common with 
the German system is the possibility of an individual litigant to raise the question of 
constitutionality, although Pfersmann considers the requirement of the initiative of a 
litigant to be at the same time a weakness of the system.286 Pfersmann also draws at-
tention to the importance of reasoning judgments, which in his view is a requirement 
by the law in respect of decisions on constitutionality.287 In respect of general courts 
of law, particularly Cour de Cassation, inadequate reasoning of judgments has been one 
of the problems France has faced before the European Court of Human Rights. The 
overall impact of this constitutional reform on the protection of fundamental rights 
and particularly on the resolution of problems at the national level, which at the outset 
should at least in the long run contribute to a decreasing number of complaints before 
the European Court of Human Rights, remains to be seen.
In conclusion, despite the rather clear status of the Convention in the French legal 
system, and the long existence of national provisions on fundamental rights, which 
would give reason to believe that no major problems should occur, there have been 
problems for other reasons. Despite the differences between the legal systems of France 
and Finland, the technical criteria for the direct applicability of the Convention exist 
in both legal systems, but the French courts have perhaps been slower in adapting 
themselves to the practice of applying it, and even slower in making references to the 
European case law. Furthermore, when compared with Finland, the transition of the 
legal culture of protecting human rights under the Convention appears to have taken 
place rather slowly, despite the long traditions of respect for fundamental rights in 
the French legal system. This concerns particularly the general attitudes towards the 
European control mechanism.
285 Boyron 2011, p. 136. Those rights include, in particular, strengthened protection of equality 
between men and women, and environmental rights.
286 For more details, see Pfersmann 2010, p. 236-238. Pfersmann points out, however, that the same 
weakness also exists in the German system, although the latter is in some respects a stronger 
system. In both systems, the constitutional complaint does not entail a right to have the question 
examined on the merits, but only the constitutionality of the provision or a legislative act will be 
examined. (Ibid. p. 237)
287 Pfersmann 2010, p.242. This requirement, in the view of Pfersmann, concerns particularly those 
cases where primary legislation is annulled, whereas routine-like decisions declaring the complaint 
inadmissible, for example, do not need to state such detailed reasons.
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2.6.2.3 German legal system
The German Basic Law states that the general rules of international law, including 
customary international law, are an integral part of national law, but does not provide for 
the status of international agreements288. However, upon certain amendments, the Basic 
Law provides for the principles of openness towards international law (Völkerrechtsfre-
undlichkeit, preamble to the Basic Law) and towards European law (Europarechtsfreun-
dlichkeit, Article 23 of the Basic Law).289 In respect of international agreements, Aust 
classifies Germany among monistic states, but I would rather suggest that the system 
is a mixture of both monistic and dualistic elements290. Aust also himself points out 
that although they are limited in number, such international agreements that contain 
normative elements and treaties affecting federal legislation or of high political impor-
tance require consent of Parliament291. Thus, in the cases of international agreements 
with normative elements, a national legal act is necessary to implement it, which means 
that such international agreements enjoy the same status as any other laws at the same 
hierarchical level. This has been also done in respect of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which was ratified by Germany on 5 December 1952, having been 
implemented at the national level by means of an Act on 7 August 1952292, which is an 
in blanco implementing act without any material contents. Thus, the German system 
resembles the Finnish one. In both legal systems, international treaty provisions are 
directly applicable upon implementation particularly where they are formulated in a 
sufficiently precise manner. In cases of conflict, the normal rules of the interpretation 
of law in principle apply293, which in principle could even entail the supremacy of the 
Constitution. However, as is suggested by Danelius, it could also be considered that 
the European Convention on Human Rights is given special weight as providing for 
fundamental rights of the individual294, and the Federal Constitutional Court has the 
 
288 Grundgesetz, Article 25.
289 Grundgesetz, Article 23. See also Voβkuhle 2010, p. 179.
290 Grundgesetz, Article 59, according to which the treaties relating to political relations or legislation 
must be consented to by Bundestag and Bundesrat (legislative bodies) in the form of a federal 
law. My view is supported by Klein, according to whom it is rather an academic question as to 
whether international rules are transformed into domestic law or whether they are applied as 
such. He calls the German system a moderately dualist system (Klein 2014, p. 190 and 193).
291 Aust 2013, p. 164. According to Aust, the German system does not allow reservations to be 
made to the treaty in question.
292 Gesetz über die Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl 1952 II, p. 685).
293 Klein 2014, p. 192, 195 and 196.
294 Danelius 2012, p. 37.
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possibility to interpret national law consistently with the rules of international law295. 
In any case, despite the existence of the formal framework for applying the provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention has played a smaller 
role in Germany than in most other States parties to it.296
In the same way as the Finnish Constitution, the German one has provided for a 
list of fundamental rights protected by the constitution. That list of fundamental rights 
also has considerable similarities with the European Convention list of rights. The list 
of fundamental rights in the Basic Law is detailed, but some of the amendments to 
the Basic Law have entailed restrictions on the enjoyment of fundamental rights297, 
although the list of rights has been amended only seldom. According to Woelk, those 
restrictions were at the time found controversial and raised even severe criticism. How-
ever, they were not as such found by the Constitutional Court to be incompatible with 
the essential core, human dignity, but were found to be proportionate to the objective 
of protecting public interest298. Despite the similarities with the European Conven-
tion, the Federal Constitutional Court has traditionally been more active in applying 
the national provisions protecting fundamental rights than in paying attention to the 
provisions of the Convention299. Frowein explains that this is because, strictly speak-
ing, the Federal Constitutional Court is only competent to interpret the fundamental 
rights provisions of the German Basic Law, and not those of international agreements, 
although he points out that there would have been no obstacle for the Federal Consti-
tutional Court to take the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
into account indirectly300 and, on occasion, they are taken into account. According to 
Voβkuhle, the Federal Constitutional Court today frequently consults the text of the 
Convention and the case law of the European Court, and suggests that in doing so, 
the Federal Constitutional Court has de facto raised them to a constitutional level 
295 Klein 2014, p. 196.
296 Frowein 2005(1), p 12.
297 Those amendments include the enactment of a law on phone-tapping that allows restrictions on 
Article 10 (privacy of communications) in 1968, the introduction of Article 16a in 1993, limiting 
the guarantees of political asylum, and the amendment of Article 13 (inviolability of home) in 
1998 allowing technical surveillance in the case of particularly serious crime. See Grundgesetz für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
298 Woelk 2011, p. 150 and 151. The criticism has concerned, in particular, the consequences that 
the restrictions would entail on the guarantees of effective legal remedies.
299 This observation can be made by examining the published case law of the Constitutional Court. 
On occasion, references are, however, made to the European Convention on Human Rights or 
even to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. See e.g. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
2 BvR 1436/02 vom 24.9.2003, 2 BvR 1481/04 vom 14.10.2004, 2 BvR 1113/06 vom 25.9.2009, 
2 BvR 1396/10 vom 16.4.2012 and 2 BvR 1380/08 vom 18.8.2013.
300 Frowein 2005(1), p. 12 and 13. See also Voss 1997, p. 155. Voss confirms the strict interpretation 
of the competence of the Federal Constitutional Court.
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as a means of interpretation.301 The rather significant change, which has taken place 
at a late stage, is in some respect comparable with that of the United Kingdom. It is 
most likely explained by the revised provisions of the Basic Law, but also the dialogue 
between scholars and the judiciary might be partly behind it – possibly also behind 
the constitutional amendments. As explained in the foregoing, the German judicial 
traditions have a close link with academic views.
When compared with the Finnish legal system, the technical criteria for the ap-
plicability of the Convention resemble those of the German legal system, but it ap-
pears that the Finnish judiciary have been more active in adapting themselves to the 
application of the Convention. This is interesting in that the number of violations 
found against Germany by the European Court of Human Rights is smaller than 
those against Finland. Thus, this gives reason to conclude that the existence of formal 
technical criteria for the applicability of international sources of law does not neces-
sarily lead to their active application.
The weaker role of the Convention in the German legal system, when compared 
with Finland for example, might be largely explained by the strong role of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. The German law provides for a system of constitutionality review 
and constitutional complaints which resemble the individual complaints mechanism 
of the European Court of Human Rights. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgerichtshof) has competence to examine the constitutionality of federal and 
state (Länder) legislation, including from the point of view from the protection of fun-
damental rights. This competence may be roughly divided into concrete judicial review 
(Article 100 of the Basic Law) and abstract judicial review (Article 93)302. However, from 
the point of view of the protection of fundamental rights, the possibility of individual 
citizens to file complaints against acts of public authorities (öffentliche Gewalt)303 (con-
stitutional complaints, Verfassungsbeschwerde) is a more interesting part of the work of 
the Constitutional Court. According to Heun, this also constitutes the overwhelming 
majority of the cases dealt with by the Constitutional Court.304 An overview of the 
301 Voβkuhle 2010, p. 187. He goes even further by stating that in fact, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has a constitutional obligation to take the Convention and the European Court’s case law 
into account in the light of the principle of openness towards international law. (See Voβkuhle 
2010, p. 188. The principle of openness towards international law was introduced by the revised 
provisions of Article 23 GG.) See also Frowein 2005(2), p. 280-282.
302 Heun 2011, p. 171.
303 See Fisher 1997, p. 21. This concept is considered to include the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary.
304 Heun 2011, p. 173. The right to lodge a complaint belongs to anyone entitled to enjoy the rights 
protected by the Basic Law, including foreigners and legal entities. The yearly number of complaints 
examined by the Federal Constitutional Court is around 6000, which amounts to approximately 
95 per cent of its workload. However, there are conditions to the admissibility of a complaint. 
The act of the public authority, subject to the complaint, must have a legal effect and the violation 
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case law of the Constitutional Court appears to confirm that observation, and there 
appears to be an abundant case law of constitutional complaints. This national practice 
of constitutional complaints by individual citizens perhaps at least partly explains why 
the number of human rights complaints at the European level against Germany305, in 
proportion to the size of population and the year of ratification of the Convention, is 
lower than those against Finland, although according to Voss, only a very small part 
of the constitutional complaints are successful306. Kastari, for example, has been of the 
view that the weakest point in the Finnish system has been that the Constitutional 
Law Committee of Parliament has not enjoyed a status comparable to that of a con-
stitutional court307. Having that status would make both the constitutionality review 
of legislation and the protection of fundamental rights stronger.
In any case, although some problems have been faced in the implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Germany also appears to have faced less 
problems before the European Court of Human Rights than the other states subject 
to the present study – with the exception of Sweden perhaps – particularly in view 
of the size of its population and the early moment of ratification of the Convention. 
In general, it appears that the German legal system has adapted itself without major 
problems to the European control mechanism, which might be partly explained by 
the heavy burden of the World Wars, whereby particular attention has been paid to 
respect for fundamental rights and to the control of constitutionality of legislation at 
the national level, but also by the relatively liberal approach to the interpretation of 
statutes that appear to be in conflict with the Convention. The German legal system 
also has a flexible approach to the applicable sources of law, whereby the Federal Con-
stitutional Court is able to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
as guidance, even for the interpretation of constitutional basic rights308. However, Voss 
points out that although it has been usual for German courts for a long time already to 
refer to the provisions of the Convention, it was rare for German courts to refer to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights309 until more recently. According to 
Klein, the impact of that case law on national judgments is becoming more and more 
must affect the complainant directly. It is also required that ordinary legal remedies must have 
first been exhausted. (Ibid. p. 174 and 175) These conditions in fact resemble the conditions of 
admissibility of the applications to the European Court of Human Rights. See also Voss 1997, 
p. 151.
305 According to the Court’s statistics on 31 December 2013, the total number of violations found 
against Germany was 173 out of 263 judgments.
306 Voss 1997, p. 151. The possibilities of success can to some extent be explained by the aforemen-
tioned strict criteria of admissibility.
307 See Kastari 1960, p. 9.
308 Voss 1997, p. 156.
309 Voss 1997, p. 168. Voss explains this with both the strong national system of protecting basic 
rights and possible general unfamiliarity with the published case law. (Ibid. p. 169)
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evident310, which conclusion is confirmed by the overview of the past judgments of the 
Federal Constitutional Court. Until recently, the impact of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the German legal system has also been considered generally low, and the majority of 
cases in which a violation has been found for a long time related to Article 6311. A 
significant change in the national law on criminal proceedings and civil proceedings 
has, however, been introduced as a result of the judgments against Germany. Under 
the amended provisions, it is possible to reopen national proceedings as a result of a 
violation found by the European Court of Human Rights.312 One could assert that 
the problems that Germany has faced in the European Court of Human Rights could 
even be explained by the strong reliance on national provisions. Furthermore, as is 
pointed out by Voβkuhle, the entry into force of Protocol No 11 to the Convention, 
strengthening the status of the individual complaints mechanism, has also resulted in 
more cases brought against Germany313. This appears to be so despite that Germany 
recognised the competence of the European Court of Human Rights to receive in-
dividual applications upon ratification of the Convention. Thus, people increasingly 
resort to the European mechanism in addition to the national one. The more recent 
problems faced by Germany have to a large extent been related to Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Those problems are repetitive in nature and 
created pressure to amend national legislation to better comply with the requirements 
of the Convention (see section 4.2.3 below). This is not necessarily a negative impact, 
but indicates that some dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights and 
the national jurisdictions exist. It also is a sign of an ongoing increased transition of 
the legal culture.
It is difficult to assess whether the earlier situation with relatively few complaints, 
when compared with France and the United Kingdom, for example, has been caused 
more by a general resistance to the international protection of fundamental rights or 
by the fact that the national legal system has provided for a rather effective system 
of protection, which may have not made it necessary for citizens to resort to further 
complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. As mentioned in the foregoing, 
according to a strict interpretation of the competence of the Federal Constitutional 
310 Klein 2014, p. 203.
311 Voss 1997, p. 129. There have nevertheless been cases of impact on national legislation, such as 
in the field of legal expenses, where the national law was amended to also allow compensation 
for legal costs in administrative or regulatory proceedings apart from criminal proceedings 
(Gerichtskostengesetz, BGBI vol. I p. 1082), as well as the legislation governing the length of 
proceedings in criminal and civil law cases. See Ibid. p. 161-164.
312 See Klein 2014, p. 204 and 205. Those changes took place in 1998, concerning criminal proceed-
ings, and in 2006, concerning civil proceedings.
313 Voβkuhle 2010, p. 180.
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Court, it only has competence to examine violations of constitutional rights and not 
those protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, which speaks in favour 
of a conclusion that the slow increase in the number of complaints to the European 
Court of Human Rights is explained by both. It appears, nevertheless, that there was 
a rather rapid transition of the legal culture directly upon enactment of the Basic Law 
together with the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights, but 
further developments in the German legal system have appeared rather late with the 
exception of the aforementioned amendments to the national legislation, which also 
raised some criticism from the point of view of effective remedies. Apart from the 
increasing numbers of complaints to the European Court of Human Rights, also the 
national constitutional complaints have increased in number.
2.6.2.4 Swedish legal system
Treaties to which Sweden is a party do not automatically become incorporated into 
domestic law. A separate legislation or administrative act is required if the treaty con-
tains provisions that are not in conformity with existing laws and regulations. Different 
methods may be used, varying from amending existing rules of law or introducing 
new legislation to prescribing that the text of the treaty or relevant provisions thereof 
shall have the force of Swedish law314. As a general rule, treaty provisions acquire a 
legal status in domestic law only if they are incorporated by means of a legislative or 
administrative act. Their status is thus determined by the level of the act chosen to 
incorporate them.315
Thus, although the Swedish legal system is usually placed among the dualistic systems 
in respect of international agreements, in view of the flexible means of implementing 
them Sweden seems to have rather applied for a long time a mixture of a monistic 
and dualistic system316. When compared with Finland, the difference is that the Finn-
ish legal system always requires specific implementation. The European Convention 
on Human Rights was not incorporated upon its ratification on 4 February 1952317, 
but this took place considerably later. There was a debate on the need to incorporate 
the Convention already in the 1970s but the idea met with resistance due to political 
314 Prop. 1993:94:117, kapitel 9.
315 Treaty Making 2001, p. 267. Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 266.
316 Prop. 1993:94:117, kapitel 9. See also Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 267, according to whom the 
present stricter approach to implementation appears to be a creation of case law of the Supreme 
Court (Högsta domstolen). Particularly as a result of the problems faced with the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Swedish Supreme Court and Supreme 
Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) found that the Convention did not create 
rights that could be directly invoked before national courts in the absence of national legislation 
implementing it.
317 Prop. 1951:165.
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reasons.318 The Act incorporating the Convention319 entered into force at the begin-
ning of 1995, providing explicitly that the Convention shall apply as law in Sweden. 
However, this did not entail any dramatic change in Sweden, as the Swedish courts had 
started to increasingly apply the provisions of the Convention in their case law already 
before the incorporation, towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s 
despite that they were not directly applicable law in the country320, as well as the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. Today, especially the Supreme Court 
strives at taking the provisions of the Convention into account as much as possible321, 
and the references have become more frequent and detailed. This is made easy by the 
technique of implementation in the same way as in Finland, whereby the provisions of 
the Convention have been implemented as such. Problems could be caused by possible 
conflicts between the implementing act and the constitution, as in such a situation 
the provisions of the constitution would prevail. However, such a situation has only 
seldom appeared322. According to Cameron and Bull, Swedish courts pay particular 
attention to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in those cases where 
Sweden has been a party to the case, and this may lead to changes in the traditional 
interpretations of national law or in the assessment of the proportionality of national 
measures323. In their view, however, it is not easy to assess the exact impact of the case 
law on the legal system, although particularly under the case law on Article 6 changes 
in national legislation have been made. In that particular case, Swedish legislation was 
also found to be in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
more significant influence is perhaps the way the Convention and the case law under 
it affect the interpretation of law in general, in conformity with the Convention.324 
 
318 Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 51.
319 Lag (1994:1219) om den europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheter-
na och de grundläggande friheterna. The amendments to the Convention have been taken into 
account by Act No. 2010:239. The English and French originals of the Convention have been 
published in the Swedish Treaty Series together with a Swedish translation.
320 However, Nergelius points out that although the Supreme Court showed willingness to pay 
attention to the Convention and the European case law, they were not formally part of appli-
cable law in Sweden and therefore the incorporation is in his view significant (Nergelius 1996, 
p. 611).
321 See e.g. Högsta domstolen, judgments B119-06 NJA 2006 s. 467 (NJA 2006:53), Ö1082-09 NJA 
2009 s. 280 (NJA 2009:30), B1982-11 NJA 2012 s. 1038 (NJA 2012:94), B4946-12 NJA 2013 
s. 502 (NJA 2013:48), and Ö1526-13 NJA 2013 s. 746 (NJA 2013:67). The judgments include 
even detailed references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
322 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 275.
323 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 277. In the same way as in Finland, the supreme jurisdictions play 
a particular role in taking a position on the impact of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
324 For details, see Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 278-283.
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In general, it is interesting to note that in Sweden, a transition of the legal culture of 
protecting fundamental rights started to take place directly as a result of the judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights, without waiting for the incorporation of 
the Convention.
Although Sweden had aimed at taking the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights into account when drafting the fundamental rights provisions in 
the 1970s, this effort was not too successful. As of 1982, Sweden was found to have 
violated the Convention provisions in a number of cases, particularly with regard to 
the right to a fair trial.325 Some of the problems faced in Sweden will be given account 
of in more detail below in the case study on Article 6, paragraph 1. Despite those 
problems, when compared with the Finnish legal system, the Swedish one appears to 
have had fewer problems in the light of the Court’s statistics326, and is the lowest of the 
States covered by the present study although the size of the population is also small.
The constitutional protection of fundamental rights has also been strengthened, 
largely due to the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights. After a 
number of part-reforms of the Constitution, a debate and preparations for an overall 
reform was launched in the 1950s, particularly as a result of revised provisions on par-
liamentary elections. The need for more effective and modern constitutional provisions 
was finally recognised.327 The final proposal for an overall reform of the Constitution 
was submitted in 1972 (1973:90).328 A separate Chapter on fundamental rights, i.e. 
certain basic civil and political rights, was included in the 1974 Form of Government329. 
The need to supplement those provisions was not reviewed until in the 1990s and at 
the same time, it was proposed that the European Convention on Human Rights be 
 
325 See Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 50. These cases include, inter alia, Sporrong and Lönnroth 
v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, Pudas v. Sweden, judgment of 
27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-A, Bodén v. Sweden, judgment of 27 October 1987, Series 
A no. 125-B, Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 159, 
Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (No. 1), judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, Håkansson 
and Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171-A, Mats Jacobsson v. 
Sweden, judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-A, Skärby v. Sweden, judgment of 28 June 
1990, Series A no. 180-B, and Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), judgment of 18 February 1991, Series 
A no. 192. 
326 On 31 December 2013, the total number was 54 out of 130 judgments issued for Sweden. 
The difference is considerable in view of the late moment of accession of Finland to the 
Convention.
327 Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 30 and 31. Despite that, a further part-reform of the Constitu-
tion was proposed in 1967 and approved in 1968-1969.
328 See Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 33.
329 Regeringsform, 2 kapitel (Grundläggande fri- och rättigheter), SFS 1974:152. See also Nergelius 
1996, p. 607.
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incorporated in Swedish law330. The reason for the specific incorporation, unlike in the 
case of other applicable human rights conventions, was the special character of the 
European Convention on Human Rights as an instrument creating law through the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Around the same time, the freedom 
of expression was further strengthened by supplementing the freedom of press decree 
with a new freedom of expression act in 1992 to adapt legislation to other forms of 
media331 which has again been amended to take into account new developments in 
the media332. Upon the legislative amendments and particularly the incorporation of 
the Convention into Swedish law, the protection of fundamental rights is now con-
sidered to be relatively strong in Sweden. In the view of Berggren & al., the protection 
of property could perhaps be even stronger, although it has also been suggested that 
in some respects, the protection of property in Sweden today is even stronger than it 
would be under the Convention.333 When compared with Finland, the technical criteria 
for the application and interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
have been entirely met later after ratification. That also made the transition of the legal 
culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights slower than in Finland, 
but it appears to have been slower also in France and England. In that respect, it is 
interesting to note the low total number of violations found against Sweden, which 
could perhaps be explained by inactivity or weaker awareness of the Convention provi-
sions among lawyers.
2.6.2.5 Finnish legal system
As regards the status of international agreements in the domestic legal system, Finland 
is in principle an example of a dualistic system. International treaties must be separately 
implemented in order for them to become applicable at the national level. This is done 
either at the level of an ordinary act of Parliament or at the level of a decree, affording 
international agreements the same hierarchical status, respectively. The implementing 
act is normally an Act (or decree) in blanco, meaning that the provisions of the treaty 
are incorporated as such, and therefore I would suggest that the Finnish legal system 
330 Prop. 1993/94: 117. The intention of the Government was to further strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by Chapter 2 of the Constitution (Regeringsform) (kapitel 11). In 
addition, the meaning oft he European Convention in the national legal system was strengthened 
by stating that national acts of Parliament or other legislation should not be in conflict with the 
Government’s obligations under the Convention (kapitel 10). See also Nergelius 1996, p. 609.
331 Axberger 2012, p. 24. The reason for maintaining both was a concern over that the freedom of 
press would be weakened through the new act as it was necessary to impose certain restrictions 
on media other than printed ones. (Ibid. p. 24 and 25.)
332 Axberger 2012, p. 27.
333 Berggren & al. 2001, p. 188 and 189. They refer to the opinion of Bengtsson B. (1994), according 
to whom such a stronger element is, in particular, the right to compensation in connection with 
the regulation of the use of land areas.
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is rather between a monistic and a dualistic system than a purely dualistic system. 
Sometimes, however, additional legislative amendments (transformation) may be 
necessary. The European Convention on Human Rights was implemented by means 
of an act of Parliament in blanco, which in principle means that eventual conflicts be-
tween the provisions of the Convention and those of other acts of Parliament would 
be resolved by means of normal rules of interpretation of laws. Thus, the Convention 
does not in principle enjoy any special status with regard to national legislation. It was 
nevertheless found necessary to make various amendments to legislation, to take the 
Convention duly into account. Such amendments concerned, among others, criminal 
investigations and enforcement of sentences. In addition, Finland found it necessary 
to make a reservation to the Convention.334 The reservation335 concerned, in particular, 
the right to an oral hearing under several procedural laws. In order to withdraw the 
reservation, Finland enacted various amendments to legislation, including provisions 
on both civil and criminal and administrative law proceedings. Thus, already acces-
sion to the European Convention on Human Rights brought about such considerable 
amendments to national legislation that meant a step forward in the transition of the 
legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, particularly in the 
form of strengthened provisions on fair trial. Those amendments made also the fun-
damental rights provisions more easily enforceable in courts of law. Despite that the 
Convention could in principle be overridden by special legislation or later legislation 
along with the normal rules of interpretation, however, Finnish courts tend to interpret 
national legislation in a way that takes the provisions of the European Convention 
(as well as other human rights conventions and the provisions of the Constitution on 
fundamental rights) into account. This is also considered to have been the intention of 
Parliament336. They have even been given effect of a binding source of law as indicated 
in sections 4.3 and 4.5 below. However, in the field of procedural law, human rights 
friendly interpretation of law is not sufficient as procedural rules are most often absolute 
in nature. The transition in respect of strengthened fair trial rights took place gradually.
It is observed in the foregoing that prior to the accession of Finland to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights 
remained unchanged for a long time. Slightly later than the debate on the reform 
of the constitutional acts in general, a debate on the need to revise the fundamental 
rights provisions was launched. These ideas were expressed first in the 1970s, but the 
reform was not carried out until in the 1990s. A constitutional law committee set up 
in 1970 outlined already the main principles, but a comprehensive list of fundamental 
334 For details, see Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 60-63.
335 Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 10 May 1990 – as amended 
by the partial withdrawals of reservation dated 20 December 1996, 30 April 1998, 1 April 1999 
and 16 May 2001.
336 PeVL 2/1990 vp, p. 2 and 3.
128 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
rights was proposed by a fundamental rights committee with mandate for the years 
1989 to 1992.337 That list of rights contained elements of international human rights 
conventions.338 In order to harmonise the Constitution with existing international 
instruments for the protection of human rights, particularly the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, and to make it better correspond to the needs of modern 
society, the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution were revised in 1995 
before an overall reform of the Constitution in 1999. In the reform of the provisions 
on fundamental rights, the protection of fundamental rights was extended to cover all 
persons residing within the jurisdiction of Finland, and not only the Finnish citizens, 
and provisions on economic, social and cultural rights were added. Thus, its contents 
became closer to those of the German Basic Law. A further aim with the reform was 
to increase the legal significance of fundamental rights in general. The Government 
recognised the fact that courts of law had only to minor extent applied fundamental 
rights provisions in their decisions.339
Thus, the transition of the legal culture in favour of stronger protection of fun-
damental rights and human rights began already partly as a result of other human 
rights conventions, which paved the way for accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights. However, the first element of a stronger change in the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights took place particularly as a result of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which was the harmonisation of the provisions of the 
Constitution with those conventions. Further, one of the aims with the reform was 
to increase the direct applicability of fundamental rights provisions by courts and 
other authorities.340 The classical civil rights were maintained in the list of rights, but 
in a more extensive and detailed form341. The greatest difference between the earlier 
fundamental rights provisions and the new ones is the insertion of fair trial provisions 
written from the perspective of the individual.342 The new fair trial provisions of the 
Constitution are also significant in that those of the European Convention on Human 
Rights are largely based on common law traditions, in the same way as those of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Finnish legislation on 
337 Jyränki 2000, p. 277.
338 Jyränki 2000, p. 277.
339 HE 309/1993 vp, p. 5 and 6. Act Nos. 969-972/1995.
340 See Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 797.
341 Saraviita 1997, p. 23. For example, the freedom of expression was made more precise by defining 
its scope, and by adding a restriction clause (Ibid. p. 24).
342 HE 309/1993 vp, p. 21. See also Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 789. Viljanen notes that the fair trial 
provisions, in particular, have been adopted rather directly from the provisions of human rights 
conventions. Another example of such provisions is the provision on the right to respect for 
private life. Other provisions are rather domestic in nature, such as access to public documents. 
(Ibid. p. 791)
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civil and criminal procedure differed in many respects from such traditions343. Scheinin 
has studied the application of fundamental rights and human rights provisions by the 
Finnish judiciary prior to accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and has observed that it has not been a consistent practice to directly refer to the fun-
damental rights provisions of the Constitution344. Also, the same observation concerns 
the provisions of international human rights conventions, and they were only gradually 
becoming an established binding source of law in the case law of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions345. Clear intentions of facilitating the direct applicability of the funda-
mental rights provisions, through the reform of the Constitution, also brought a clear 
change in the legal culture of applying international human rights conventions. The 
European Convention on Human Rights can be said to constitute a dramatic change 
in the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights. Therefore, it 
is possible that also the general attitude towards the protection of fundamental rights 
has changed although a stronger human rights thinking in the judiciary is a rather 
young product in Finland. This together with the fact that the earlier provisions of 
the Constitution were not designed for being directly applied by courts most likely 
explain the early rather mechanic references and the way in which the references to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights have developed in the past twenty years, as explained in more detail 
in sections 4.3 and 4.5 below.
The new Constitution of Finland was adopted in 1999, which entered into force 
on 1 March 2000346. The earlier reformed provisions on fundamental rights were 
included in the new Constitution as such, but there were some changes made to 
update the text to the needs of present-day society, such as in the provisions on the 
right to private life347. The Constitution of 1999 now contains rather detailed and 
modern provisions on fundamental rights, in a specific Chapter. However, as Jyränki 
points out, the overall reform of the Constitution has entailed a changed framework 
also for the protection of fundamental rights. Although the material contents of the 
343 See Saraviita 1997, p. 25. The differences between the Finnish legislation and the European 
Convention on Human Rights made it necessary for Finland to enter reservations to Article 6 
of the Convention, which have later been withdrawn.
344 Scheinin 1991, p. 274.
345 Scheinin 1991, p. 276 and 277. Despite slow development, there were already examples of such 
cases from the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court by 1991.
346 Act No 731/1999.
347 Saraviita observes that as of the reform of the Constitution in 1995, a series of amendments to 
legislation have been enacted, as a result of technical developments (particularly new forms of 
media) and new means of criminal investigations, entailing restrictions on the right to private 
life and also changes in legal terminology (Saraviita 2011, p. 179). Also, as regards the provisions 
on the freedom of expression, the publicity of official documents was made a fundamental right 
upon the reform. (Saraviita 2011, p. 207).
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fundamental rights provisions remained largely unchanged, some changes have taken 
place in the mechanisms of implementing them.348 Saraviita notes that whereas the 
modern fundamental rights system introduced by the reform of 1995 was made part of 
a constitutional act that remained in other respects outdated, the Constitution of 2000 
provided a more efficient framework for its implementation349. In the view of Saraviita, 
the new Constitution did not mean a sudden or dramatic change in the constitutional 
law traditions, but is rather a continuation of the old traditions350. Despite that, the 
adoption of the new Constitution supported the transition of the legal culture that 
started with the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
reform of the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights. Thus, the transition of 
the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights did not end but 
was further strengthened. Furthermore, the new Constitution entailed changes in 
other legislation, most importantly that on immigration. The new provisions extended 
the protection of fundamental rights to also concern immigrants residing in Finland, 
without a nationality requirement351. That means indirect influence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In section 4.3 below, the impact of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights on national legislation is assessed in more detail.
The transition of legal culture is not complete, however, by merely changing the 
applicable legislation but the provisions of the international conventions and the Con-
stitution also need to be applied. In Finland, the application of international human 
rights conventions and the constitutional fundamental rights provisions by domestic 
courts has increased along with years. They have also increasingly been paid attention 
to in the interpretation of other legislation. According to the view of the Constitutional 
348 Jyränki 2000, p. 277. The relevant provisions of the Constitution include, in particular, sections 
1(3), 2(2), 5, 73(1), 80, 94(3), 106, 118, 123 and 124.
349 Saraviita 2011, p. 117. An example of such new provisions was the prohibition in section 80 to 
delegate public duties to a level lower than acts of Parliament, where those duties entail restric-
tions on fundamental rights.
350 Saraviita 2011, p. 1. This means that in the interpretation of the constitutional law provisions, 
even the old provisions and materials relating to them have relevance even today. For example, 
the scope of the provisions on the freedom of expression in the new Constitution did not entail 
dramatic changes with regard to the earlier ones apart from the aforementioned publicity of official 
documents (note 347), although in this respect the technological development must be borne in 
mind. Also, as regards the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention, one may note that the right 
as such has existed from early times. Saraviita observes, however, that particularly the judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights have meant more precise provisions of the Constitu-
tion and other national law and have lead to more detailed judgments of national jurisdictions 
International human rights conventions and particularly the European Convention on Human 
Rights played a role in that administrative deprivations of liberty were made subject to judicial 
control. Thus, the scope of national law as regards judicial control has been extended due to the 
accession to international human rights conventions. (Saraviita 2011, p. 156 and 199)
351 HE 28/2003.
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Law Committee in 1982, the Finnish courts are under an obligation to interpret the 
provisions of ordinary law and decrees in a manner that contributes to the protection 
of fundamental rights, and this obligation is based on that the fundamental rights 
provisions are at a higher hierarchical level than the provisions of ordinary law. The 
Constitutional Law Committee has later confirmed and refined this view in the context 
of providing its report on the fundamental rights reform.352 Irrespective of whether 
the obligation to take fundamental rights provisions into account is based on their 
hierarchical status or not, it must be borne in mind that the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights are in force at the level of ordinary law in Finland. The 
Constitutional Law Committee has underlined that where there are several justified 
interpretations of law, the courts must choose the one that best contributes to achiev-
ing the purpose of fundamental rights and eliminates conflicts with the Constitution. 
Despite this, the Constitutional Law Committee has also pointed out that there is 
reason to interpret the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution in conformity 
with the international human rights conventions.353 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, it was still rather rare for Finnish courts to apply the 
provisions of international human rights conventions or even national provisions of 
law on fundamental rights354, but as of the beginning of the 1990s, human rights 
provisions have gradually gained an established status at least in the administration of 
law by the last-instance courts and they have been applied both directly and indirectly. 
One factor contributing to this development is, without doubt, the entry into force of 
the European Convention on Human Rights for Finland as well as the exceptional 
352 Perusoikeustyöryhmän muistio 1982, p. 21, and PeVM 25/1994 vp., p. 4. In the view of Scheinin, 
however, the obligation on a human rights friendly interpretation of law is not based on the higher 
hierarchical status of fundamental rights provisions, but rather on the fact that those provisions 
lay down rights for citizens and entail a strong value element, and as fundamental values they 
must be given the emphasis they deserve (Scheinin 1989, p. 65 and 195).
353 PeVM 25/1994 vp., p. 4 and 5. In principle, there might appear a conflict between a fundamental 
rights provision of the Constitution and a provision of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in which case the constitutional provision would in strict hierarchical terms prevail. How-
ever, along with the fundamental rights reform of the Constitution in 1995, the aim has been to 
harmonise the interpretation between the two. (See Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 797) Viljanen identi-
fies also limits to the harmonisation, including the fact that the Convention only provides for a 
minimum level of protection and the task of the national system is to define, where appropriate, a 
higher level of protection of individual rights. (Ibid. p. 797 and 798) Article 60 of the Convention 
explicitly provides that “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating 
from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of 
any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.” Furthermore, 
the possibility of applying the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is restricted by 
the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which constitutes an impediment 
to the use of that case law as a source of interpretation of the fundamental rights provisions of 
the Constitution. (Ibid. p. 799)
354 For details, see Scheinin 1991, p. 273-279.
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control mechanism under the Convention. By 2005, Finnish case law contained al-
ready a good number of references to the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 
particular. The Convention and the case law have mostly been taken into account as 
part of the so-called human rights friendly interpretation of law.355 As is pointed out 
by Pellonpää & al., “human rights friendly” interpretation of law requires, however, 
that there is sufficient knowledge of the provisions of the Convention356. The reform of 
the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution further strengthened the direct 
application of fundamental and human rights by national courts.357 Thus, practice has 
confirmed the good intentions with the introduction of strengthened protection of 
fundamental rights and human rights. 
Although there were also some reserved attitudes towards the European Convention 
at the end of the 1980s, Finland is today among those States parties to the Convention 
that take its provisions seriously and judgments of the Court are complied with at the 
national level. Even judgments finding a violation of the Convention are seen rather 
as an element improving the protection of human rights.358 Thus, although the courts 
generally welcomed a more flexible approach to the application and interpretation of 
fundamental rights provisions before accession to the European Convention, it seems 
that the latter had an even more dramatic impact. It appears that a rather profound 
change has been taking in place in the Finnish judiciary. This involves not only an in-
creased application of international elements, including the case law of the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, but also an increased role 
given to case law as a source of law in general.359
Insofar as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, in 
particular, the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights played an im-
portant role in the formulation of the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights 
has further underlined the role of the Court’s case law.360 The impact of the European 
355 Ojanen 2005, p. 1215 and 1216, and Jääskinen 2001, p. 605 and 606. This appears to reflect the 
situation in State administration in general. Prior to 1989, it was rare for State officials to pay 
attention to human rights issues in daily administration, whereas since Finland’s accession to 
the Council of Europe, the situation started to change gradually, and today human rights are 
increasingly taken into account and voluntary training is arranged particularly for judges and 
prosecutors. (See Heyns & Viljoen 2002, p. 273 and 274)
356 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 65.
357 Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 797.
358 See e.g. Ervo 2006, p. 411 and 416. According to Ervo, some lawyers saw the Convention even 
as a threat towards national democracy Ervo herself sees it rather as a possibility. (Ibid. p. 411 
and 412)
359 Ojanen 2005, p. 1214.
360 On the relevance of the Convention, see HE 309/1993 vp, p. 8. On the assessment of the meaning 
of the Court’s case law, see Ojanen 2005, p. 1215. On the one hand, the Convention has brought 
about some positive developments, particularly in the field of procedural law (see e.g. Ervo 2006, p. 
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Convention on Human Rights and the Court’ case law on the legal system as a whole 
should not, however, be over-emphasised. Finland acceded to the Convention relatively 
late and as is observed by Pellonpää361, the foundation for the protection of human 
rights was rather solid, when compared with certain new democracies at that moment. 
Finland was already a party to the International Covenant on Human Rights and, 
in principle, the legal system and the judiciary should have been rather receptive to 
the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The extent 
to which the national supreme jurisdictions have effectively applied the Convention 
provisions is assessed in more detail in section 4.5 below. As is further observed by 
Pellonpää, however, the accession was not without problems, but there were some chal-
lenges relating to the principles of a fair trial, such as deficiencies in the guarantees of 
an oral hearing362 which was also one of the reasons for Finland’s reservation to the 
Convention. The provisions of Article 6 of the Convention and the corresponding 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were also the 
reason for supplementing the provisions of the Constitution, thereby affording the 
fair trial rights the status of constitutional law instead of merely providing for them 
at the level of ordinary law as earlier363. Despite the problems, upon acceding to the 
Convention, there was already a large amount of information on the impact that the 
Convention has had on other legal systems and on the problems faced by other legal 
systems in compliance with the Convention provisions, including through an abundant 
body of case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, in principle, this has 
helped the Finnish legal system to adapt to the Convention requirements.
In conclusion, the general impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
on the Finnish legal system has been significant. The first phase of transition of the 
legal culture of protecting fundamental rights in Finland began already upon the rati-
fication of the two International Covenants, but the most radical change took place 
upon accession to the Convention and through the related revision of the fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution. The transition brought about by the accession to 
international human rights conventions and particularly the European Convention on 
Human Rights has taken place without major problems. However, due to the fact that 
420). Ervo, on the other hand, expresses concern over that the increased emphasis in the national 
judiciary on the application of the Convention and the Court’s case law as sources of law has lead 
to a situation where the case law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution’s fundamental 
rights provisions has developed to a lesser extent (Ervo 2006, 417) and draws attention to the 
need to develop their interpretation particularly in respect of those rights that are not covered 
by the Convention (Ibid. p. 418).
361 Pellonpää 2009(2), p. 221.
362 Pellonpää 2009(2), p. 223. Pellonpää compares Finland with Sweden where the most fundamental 
problem was a lack of sufficient legal remedies in administrative law. For more details on fair trial 
requirements, see Ibid. p. 224-233.
363 Saraviita 2011, p. 281.
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the practice of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions of referring directly to human rights 
or fundamental rights provisions has only become an established practice upon receiv-
ing the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights as sources of law, it is interesting to analyse the Court’s case 
law. The provisions of the Convention as such, when compared with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not dramatically different. However, it is 
presumed that the fact that its provisions are enforceable through international judicial 
proceedings is the decisive element which has imposed a change at the national level.
The language of the European Convention has also been adopted in technical terms 
by the harmonisation of the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, and the 
Convention has been made effectively applicable. However, although the Convention 
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have been increasingly ap-
plied by national courts as sources of law, it is another issue of interest in which manner 
the case law has been applied in practice, which has been subject to study to a lesser 
degree. The transition of a legal culture is not simple and does not take place overnight. 
Even considerable time may be needed for a more profound change, which may be 
detected in the way in which the national jurisdictions treat the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The 
discourse of national jurisdictions may show similarities or differences with that of 
the European Court, which may constitute signs of the degree of understanding and 
conceptualisation of the Convention. The methods of interpretation of law constitute 
the basis for the courts’ approach to the case law. In section 4.1, efforts are made to 
assess whether there are any major differences between the Finnish legal system and 
the selected other legal systems as regards technical criteria for the applicability of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. the applicable sources of law and the 
methods and rules of interpretation of law, and as regards the de facto impact of the 
Convention on those legal systems, that could provide explanations for the large number 
of applications made against Finland before the European Court of Human Rights. In 
particular, there is a striking difference with the German legal system. However, one 
must bear in mind that it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on the basis of 
applications or numbers of violations found, as particularly in respect of Finland, the 
violations have to some extent been repetitive in nature, which is a sign of systemic or 
legislative problems rather than of problem of interpretation of law. There may also 
be other factors behind large numbers of applications such as increased knowledge of 
the Convention among lawyers and the lack of a national mechanism for redressing 
violations of fundamental rights and human rights, separate from the regular court 
procedures. To draw conclusions about the preparedness of national supreme jurisdic-
tions apply the Convention and the case law under it necessarily requires research into 
judgments of those jurisdictions. However, the foregoing analyses of the impact of the 
Convention, as well as of constitutional developments, may provide explanations for 
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how the Finnish supreme jurisdictions have approached the new sources of law and 
for any changes that have taken place. Thus, constitutional developments constitute a 
contextual framework for the transition in the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions.
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3.  Second phase of transition of the legal culture – 
development of the meaning of the Convention 
under the case law of the European Court of  
Human Rights
The first phase of transition of the legal culture, i.e. a strengthened protection of human 
rights at the European level, took place as the States parties to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights reached a common understanding of what they understood 
to be acceptable from the point of view of all negotiating States364 and needed for 
ensuring adequate level of protection through its implementation in the national legal 
systems. That level of protection and the wording of the Convention are binding on the 
States parties to the Convention, and signifies a transition of legal culture particularly 
in those States parties where the level of protecting human rights has been lower or 
where the practice of applying human rights or fundamental rights provisions by the 
national judiciary has been modest or even inexistent. However, at the same time, the 
States parties transferred the competence for the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Convention to the European Court of Human Rights. In the view of Madsen, the 
development of the Court’s case law was largely affected by the geopolitical settings 
in Europe until mid-1970s365, and the first decade of action was indeed dominated 
rather by inter-state complaints as the Court’s jurisdiction was only accepted by the 
required eight States in 1958. The development of more refined case law began upon 
the increasing acceptance of the optional jurisdiction of the Court to examine indi-
vidual complaints and has undergone a significant transformation since late 1970s366. 
It is through the individual complaints that the Court has given independent mean-
ings to the concepts used in the Convention and has widened the scope of the rights 
protected. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly underlined the nature 
364 As observed by Bates, there was a wide agreement on the adoption of the Convention, but 
originally, the majority of states participating in the negotiations objected to the idea of a Court. 
Finally, the optional nature of the Court made it possible to reach agreement on its creation. 
(Bates 2011, p. 28)
365 During the 1950s the Commission only admitted five applications and a little more than 50 in 
the 1960s, of which only a limited number ended up in actual decisions (see Madsen 2011, p. 
51).
366 Madsen 2011, p. 46, 51 and 52). Whereas Sweden and Germany accepted that jurisdiction rather 
early (1952 and 1955), France and the United Kingdom did so considerably later (1981 and 1966, 
respectively).
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of the Convention as being a living instrument367. This means that the substance of 
the provisions of the Convention is not static, but their interpretation develops along 
with a modern understanding of their contents, bearing in mind the development of 
society and ideas of law and morals.
Thus, the transition of the legal culture of protecting human rights has continued, 
and the presumption for the purpose of this chapter is that a second phase of transi-
tion of the legal culture has taken place as the language of the Convention in a wide 
sense, i.e. under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, has developed 
within the framework of a unique control mechanism, partly independently but partly 
also under the influence of a variety of legal cultures. The legal cultures and particularly 
constitutional traditions of the States parties played a role in the drafting of the text 
of the Convention, but their influence did not stop there. The different legal traditions 
still have a continued impact on the interpretation of the Convention. In this context, 
the impact of individual complaints and indirectly the languages and legal cultures 
of States parties on its interpretation is analysed, while assuming that the transition 
of the language of the Convention takes place rather independently and has changed 
considerably from what the negotiating States perhaps had originally in mind. One of 
the clearest examples of Convention articles in the interpretation of which the existence 
of common legal traditions (or common legal ground or European consensus) play a 
significant role is Article 8, which can be rather easily detected where the Court carries 
out comparison between the legal systems368. Typically, where the Court considers that 
no European consensus exists, it affords the national authorities a wide margin of ap-
preciation in the application of the Convention. The situation does not, however, need 
to be static but the legal situation in the States parties to the Convention may change 
along with the development of society and through case law. Vice versa, the changing 
legal traditions in States parties have a further impact on the way in which the Court 
interprets the Convention. Although the Court works rather independently, some 
degree of interaction between it and the national jurisdictions does exist. However, in 
this context it is also important to underline that the personal capacities and profes-
sional backgrounds of the individual judges participating in judicial decision-making 
play a significant role in the development of the case law369. A further development is 
367 See e.g. the judgments in the cases of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, 
Series A, no. 26, § 31, and Matthews v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 18 Febru-
ary 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, § 39.
368 See e.g. Rees v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, series A 106, § 37; Christine 
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2002-VI, §§ 84 and 85; and Hämäläinen v. Finland (appl. No. 37359/09), Grand 
Chamber judgment of 16 July 2014, §§ 72 and seq., which clearly indicate the emerging change 
in the legal situation and morals, while leaving still a considerable margin of appreciation for the 
national authorities in providing for adequate protection of rights under national legislation.
369 Madsen, for example, has studied this in more detail (see Madsen 2011, p. 55).
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taking place as the European Union is currently negotiating on accession to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, and the exact relationship between the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice is decided in the course 
of those negotiations. The possible impact of the case law of the European Court of 
Justice is not covered by this study, but some comparative remarks are made between 
the methods of interpretation of the two courts in the conclusions as regards possible 
future developments. When looking into the case law of both European courts, some 
indications of resorting to the case law of the other court already exist in those situ-
ations where the Convention or the provisions of European Union legislation play a 
role in deciding the case.
In the application and interpretation of the Convention, the European Court of 
Human Rights applies a variety of sources of law and principles and rules of interpre-
tation. As regards the sources of law applied by the Court, they have similarities with 
both those applied by the International Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Justice, and with those applied by national courts, although the Rules of Court of the 
European Court of Human Rights remain silent on the sources of law and principles 
of interpretation. Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, that Court 
may apply international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law370. The 
rules concerning the applicable sources of law in national legal systems are often similar, 
but they are often divided into binding and permissible sources of law. In some legal 
systems, mainly written legislation and case law are used as binding sources of law. Nor 
are they always stated in writing, but may rather be based on established practice. The 
sources used by the European Court of Human Rights include a variety of sources in-
cluding both international and national ones, although the main emphasis appears to be 
on the text of the Convention and on its own previous case law. As regards the principles 
and rules of interpretation, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in 
interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights has been affected particularly 
by general principles of interpretation of treaties based on the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties371, which serve as the starting point. However, the European Court 
of Human Rights has developed its own approach to the interpretation of treaty provi-
sions in view of the purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights, including 
additional principles of interpretation. Thus, the sources of law and rules and principles 
of interpretation applied by the Court have become established through the case law.
370 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.
371 UNTS vol. 1155, p. 331.
 | 1393. Second phase of transition of the legal culture – development of the meaning of the Convention under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
In the following, a closer analysis is made of the principles and rules affecting the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied and de-
veloped by the European Court of Human Rights. It is worth underlining that both 
the general principles of interpretation of international treaties and those developed 
by the Court itself apply, the first mentioned being the starting point. The analysis is, 
however, started with an overall examination of the discourse and judicial style of the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. That analysis is followed by a 
comparison of the Court’s judicial style with those of the selected five States, in order 
to see to what extent the style of the Court’s discourse is affected by national legal 
systems and to what extent it is unique. In view of the working languages of the Court, 
it is presumed that the impact of the judicial languages and styles of the English and 
French legal systems on the judicial style of the European Court of Human Rights is 
greater than that of other legal systems. Comparative remarks are, nevertheless, made 
of the German, Swedish and Finnish judicial styles too. In the subsequent sections, 
the interaction with the Court’s general judicial discourse and the treatment of the 
various principles and rules of interpretation is analysed.
3.1  Discourse and style of judgments of the European Court  
of Human Rights
For the purposes of the present study, the judgments of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights are treated as an example of legal discourse. Maley has adopted a rather 
extensive definition of legal discourse, covering any sources of law, in which case the 
legal discourses are written texts, as well as pre-trial processes (spoken and written 
texts), trial processes (spoken texts) and recording and law-making (written texts)372. 
Even fragments of judgments are treated as examples of discourse. As observed by 
Bengoetxea, discourse represents the context in which argumentation takes place, and 
justification occurs within a given discourse373. This may be an entire section of the 
judgment or a paragraph thereof. In the introduction, it is observed that the judicial 
discourse of the European Court of Human Rights – as an example of constitutional 
rights argumentation –entails some degree of general practical argumentation as well 
as subjective evaluative elements. In this section, the Court’s discourse is assessed in 
general terms in the light of both judgments and fragments thereof as communica-
tive events as well as in the light of wider implications instead of the communicative 
events only, paying attention to other eventual elements of interpretation apart from 
the strictly legal arguments. Further, the context of interpretation may consist of both 
372 Maley 1994, p. 16.
373 Bengoetxea 1993, p. 144.
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internal and external elements, such as other provisions of the Convention and other 
instruments of international law and even existing standards in the States parties to the 
Convention. The Court may refer e.g. to a European consensus by means of carrying 
out comparison between the legislations of States parties instead of merely interpreting 
the Convention articles, and may resort to flexible reasoning. When assessing wider 
implications, even the wider historical context of constitutional protection of funda-
mental rights and the international protection of human rights is on occasion used.
The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are structured in general 
in a rather formalistic manner and usually include a description of the national proce-
dure, the facts of the case, the applicable national law and Convention provisions, the 
parties’ statements, the dispositif i.e. a summary of the Court’s rulings on the alleged 
violations of the Convention, and any concurring or dissenting opinions of the indi-
vidual judges374. The Court systematically provides an overview of its earlier case law 
expressing established meanings given to the provisions, followed by its application 
to the instant case. Thus, in its reasoning, the Court advances from general principles 
to conclusions in individual situations, thereby applying a method of deduction375. 
This method is easily identifiable in the judgments as the Court clearly separates the 
statement of general principles from their application to the case at hand. An overall 
analysis of the language used by the European Court of Human Rights reveals that 
despite that it could be criticised in some respect (for a lack of precision), the Court is 
rather transparent in its reasoning particularly as regards the application of case law. 
It is to be admitted, however, that the Court tends to use repeatedly rather abstract 
expressions when reasoning its judgment with reference to prior case law. On the one 
hand, it may leave questions as to how exactly it has reached its conclusions and this 
makes the discourse analysis approach a challenge, but on the other hand, the idea of 
critical discourse analysis makes it possible to apply a flexible approach to the assess-
ment of the Court’s argumentation. Thus, the idea is not to carry out a very detailed 
374 According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, paragraph 1, a judgment as referred to in Articles 28, 
42 and 44 of the Convention shall contain (a) the names of the President and the other judges 
constituting the Chamber or the Committee concerned, and the name of the Registrar or the 
Deputy Registrar; (b) the dates on which it was adopted and delivered; 
(c) a description of the parties; (d) the names of the Agents, advocates or advisers of the parties; (e) an 
account of the procedure followed; (f ) the facts of the case; (g) a summary of the submissions 
of the parties; (h) the reasons in point of law; (i) the operative provisions; (j) the decision, if any, 
in respect of costs; (k) the number of judges constituting the majority; (l) where appropriate, a 
statement as to which text is authentic. Further, according to paragraph 2, any judge who has 
taken part in the consideration of the case by a Chamber or by the Grand Chamber shall be 
entitled to annex to the judgment either a separate opinion, concurring with or dissenting from 
that judgment, or a bare statement of dissent.
375 See e.g. Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, judgment of 16 November 2004, §§ 37 to 42 for a 
statement of general principles, and §§ 43 to 55 for their application to the individual case.
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discourse analysis, but to assess the signs of cultural change in the Court’s discourse as 
wider communicative events, which is why I have placed the method in the framework 
of critical discourse analysis which is interdisciplinary in nature. The signs of change 
looked for are nevertheless linguistic or textual elements. 
In the view of Ruuskanen, the language used by the judiciary is for various reasons 
more objective than that used by other authorities, and elements traditionally attached 
to the judiciary include impartiality and objectivity. On occasion, however, courts may 
directly cite the language used by parties, in which case it may be characterised even 
by strong expressions of values and other subjective elements. Courts may also refrain 
from using the language of the parties, either in parts of the judgment or in the whole 
judgment, in which case the objective nature of the language is at its strongest.376 
The European Court of Human Rights does refer to the arguments presented by the 
parties, but they are clearly separated from those of the Court. That practice makes 
the Court’s reasoning to appear particularly objective. As regards the general style of 
the Court’s judgments, one may note a change after the first few judgments. The first 
judgments follow the judicial style used by the French courts, whereas that strictly 
formalistic single-sentence form was abandoned in later ones377. In the view of Mer-
rills, that change of the Court’s style of judgment has had a significant bearing on its 
ability to develop the law378. Although the main duty of the court is to decide cases 
before it, it may support its decisions with judgments which, if they are fully reasoned, 
may develop the law379. As observed by Merrills, poor reasoning of judgments would 
also create an obstacle to the acceptance of its reasoning by those using its judgments, 
whereas a good style improves acceptance380. One may indeed observe that there is 
significant development of law taking place through the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. One may note that in general, the judicial argumentation of 
the European Court of Human Rights appears to be rather persuasive, given that the 
Court uses affirmative statements of fact and law, on the basis of which conclusions 
are made. The judicial style is also clear. The receptiveness of the national jurisdictions 
to the Court’s discourse is affected not only by the capacity and preparedness of the 
376 Ruuskanen 2006, p. 51-53.
377 See Lawless v. Ireland, judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3, compared with the Case ”re-
lating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium (Application no 
1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64) judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A 
No. 6.
378 Merrills 1993, p. 29. In the view of Merrills, there is a close relation between style and substance, 
and the single-sentence style, being cumbersome, makes it difficult to support a conclusion with 
different kinds of arguments. Thus, the new style has removed at least one of the obstacles to 
adequate reasoning. (Ibid.)
379 Merrills 1993, p. 35. The Court may even decide to go further and deliberately develop the law. 
(Ibid.)
380 Merrills 1993, p. 30.
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national jurisdictions to apply and interpret the case law, but also by the quality of the 
Court’s judgments.
The quality of judgments consists of different elements of discourse that together 
make them persuasive. Alexy defines legal discourse as a special case of general practi-
cal discourse, where legal discourse and general practical discourse are integrated381. 
Legal discourse is usually persuasive by nature, where there is no uncertainty about the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of law. However, where different outcomes 
would be possible, general practical discourse is needed to supplement legal discourse. 
This is often the case with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. 
It is interesting to see whether there are structural differences between legal discourse 
and general practical discourse. Nordman has compared the structure of Swedish 
legal language with that of ordinary language, and notes that there are in fact no huge 
differences between the two, although legal language perhaps uses more nouns and 
more relative and conditional clauses and inserted clauses than the ordinary one382. Her 
findings would speak in favour of the concept of “special case” of Alexy. Bengoetxea 
also supports the idea of special case, but refines the thesis by suggesting that general 
discourse is only resorted to where specific legal arguments are not sufficient383. This 
is typical of legalistic traditions that underline legislation as the most relevant source 
of law. One may note that the facts of the case in the judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights are clearly separated from the statement of law. In general, it 
is possible to find support for the view of Nordman also in these judgments as there 
are no major differences in the linguistic structures of the two sections of judgments, 
although language in the statements of facts is more flexible. In those parts of the 
judgments where the Court states the applicable Convention provisions and applies 
them to the case at hand, the reasoning appears to be somewhat more mechanic, which 
would represent the special case of ordinary language.
Bengoetxea further raises the question of whether the special case thesis could be 
applied to moral argumentation too, noting that this question is related to the larger 
question of the relationship between ethics and law. He appears to be of the view 
that moral discourse is a paradigm of general practical argumentation, and therefore 
381 Alexy 1989, p. 212. Alexy justifies this definition with three grounds: 1) legal discussions are 
concerned with practical questions (what should or may be done or not done); 2) these questions 
are discussed under the claim to correctness; and 3) legal discussions take place under constraints, 
although he recognises that the special case thesis is open to attack on all three points.
382 Nordman 1984, p. 958, 963 and 964.
383 Bengoetxea 1993, p. 142. Bengoetxea refers to the case law of the European Court of Justice and 
notes that the Court appears to resort to legal justification in clear cases, but where legal argu-
ments drawn from the clear text of the law are not sufficient to justify the judgment, other forms 
of argumentation are used to supplement them and the latter become legal by the mere fact of 
them being used in a judicial context. (Ibid. p. 143)
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legal argumentation would also be a special case of moral argumentation.384 The main 
difference, in his view, between legal justification and moral justification is that legal 
justification is more context-bound, i.e. consist of reasons that fit in the legal system.385 
Alexy considers that legal discourses are concerned with the justification of a special 
case of normative statements which express legal judgments, and draws a distinction 
between two aspects of justification: internal justification and external justification. 
With internal justification, he means the question of whether an opinion follows 
logically from the premises adduced as justifying it, while external justification refers 
to the correctness of those premises.386 Alexy further divides external justification into 
six groups of rules and forms: 1) interpretation, 2) dogmatic argumentation, 3) use of 
precedents, 4) general practical reasoning, 5) empirical reasoning, and 6) the so-called 
special legal argument forms.387 The use of elements of internal justification and external 
justification, methods of interpretation and use of precedents in legal argumentation, 
as well as general practical (or moral) reasoning are looked into in respect of both the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in section 3.4 and the judgments 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdiction in section 4.5 below. In the view of Merrills, the 
persuasiveness of a judgment is enhanced if a court can support its conclusion with 
cumulative reasons instead of resting the decision on a single point, and this technique 
is especially useful in cases where there are factual as well as legal issues and it is pos-
sible to deal with both in the judgment388.
In general, it may be observed that the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights appear to contain both legal justification and moral justification, and one could 
say that moral argumentation particularly fits the context of human rights. For example, 
where the Court examines whether interference with the enjoyment of rights has been 
justified, legal argumentation can be traced in the judgments with the key words “based 
on law”, followed by moral justification expressed by the words “necessary in a demo-
cratic society”. Whereas “based on law” expresses the condition that the interference 
must be allowed by the provisions of law (including the Convention), the expression 
“necessary in a democratic society” is more value-bound389 and leaves more margin of 
384 Bengoetxea 1993, p. 144, 145 and 147.
385 Bengoetxea 1993, p. 159.
386 Alexy 1989, p. 221.
387 A more simple division would be into: 1) statute, 2) dogmatics, 3) precedent, 4) reason, 5) facts, 
and 6) special legal argument forms. The latter include e.g. analogy, argumentum e contrario, ar-
gumentum a fortiori, and argumentum ad absurdum. See Alexy 1989, p. 231, 232 and 279.
388 Merrills 1993, p. 31.
389 Both legislation and international conventions may also contain other value-bound expressions 
such as ‘willful’, ‘reasonable’, ‘negligent’, ‘unconscionable’. Maley points out that in the drafting 
of legislation, deliberate flexibility is achieved by the use of such subjective terms, which provide 
judges with discretion to decide whether the relevant behavior was, in their judgment, ‘reasonable’, 
and so on, in the circumstances of the case. See Maley 1994, p. 27.
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discretion for the Court to assess whether the interference was justified. In the light of 
the aforementioned argument of a special case, the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights are considered to constitute judicial or legal discourse instead of general 
one, which includes supplementing general practical reasoning. The aforementioned 
expressions denoting legal argumentation and moral justification appear practically 
in all judgments. Insofar as Alexy’s division into internal and external justification of 
legal arguments is concerned, a few observations may be made on the basis of the judg-
ments of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, an essential question is 
whether the case references, i.e. the precedents, should be rather considered internal 
justifications (normative statements) or external justifications for the provisions of the 
Convention which are clearly internal justifications for the judgment, and what would 
be the implications that follow for national legal systems. Alexy treats precedents as 
an example of external justification, which should make them rather easy for national 
judiciaries to receive. However, as appears from the foregoing, the Court has repeat-
edly developed the meaning of the Convention provisions through its case law. Thus, 
there are clearly elements that only appear from the case law, which bring them closer 
to normative statements or internal justifications, although the case law is partly used 
to support the correctness of the interpretation of the Convention provisions. That 
conclusion also fits into the division made by discourse analysts into internal (verbal) 
context and a wider external context390. The wider context and external justifications 
require more subjective evaluation than internal rather objective justifications. Con-
sidering that the Court’s judgments follow often even more clearly from prior case law 
than from the Convention provisions, in the case of the European Court of Human 
Rights, it would perhaps be more correct to state that the case references are part of legal 
discourse which are integrated with the arguments concerning Convention provisions 
through general practical discourse and principles of interpretation. Accordingly, the 
more national legal systems treat precedents purely as external justifications, the more 
difficult it may be for them to adapt to the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights. This is also analysed in respect of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions.
As regards the manner in which the European Court of Human Rights applies 
precedents, the judicial style appears to be different from the traditional mechanic 
references in the Finnish case law, which is explained in detail in section 4.5 below. 
However, some variation in the style may be detected when assessing the Court’s 
judgments as a whole. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights provides 
numerous examples of situations where the Court has integrated Convention provisions 
with statements of case law by means of discourse. On occasion, the Court even gives 
priority to case law, for example as follows:
390 See, in particular, Van Dijk 2009 and 2010 (see notes 54 and 55).
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“According to the Court’s well-established case-law, freedom of expression constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions 
for its progress and each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 
10 of the Convention, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also 
to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness, without which there is no “democratic society”. This freedom is subject 
to the exceptions set out in Article 10 § 2, which must, however, be strictly construed. 
The need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see, for example, Lingens 
v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, § 41, and Nilsen and 
Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no 23118/93, § 43, ECHR 1999-VIII).”391
In that paragraph, the Court thus provides the main rule in the light of its estab-
lished case law (“According to the Court’s well-established case law …”) and makes 
it more precise with reference to the relevant Convention provision (“This freedom 
is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 10 § 2 …”), which is a clear example of 
using case law as an internal justification instead of an external one. Thus, the Court 
uses linguistic means to link those two elements of legal discourse. The Court’s case 
law also provides examples of situations where the Court fulfils the so-called rationality 
gap by means of external justifications, for example by criminal law principles and the 
principle of proportionality as follows:
“[…]In view of the margin of appreciation left to Contracting States a criminal 
measure as a response to defamation cannot, as such, be considered disproportionate 
to the aim pursued (see Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v.  France [GC], 
nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 59, ECHR 2007-..., Radio France and Others v. 
France, no. 53984/00, § 40, ECHR 2004-II and Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria, 
no. 36207/03, § 68, 14 February 2008).[…]”392
The Court thus also uses the margin of appreciation as a supporting justification 
for the possibility to set limits on the freedom of expression where the interference 
is carried out to provide a sanction in response to such expressions as fulfill the el-
ements of defamation. The Court appears to link even external justifications with 
statements in its own case law, which is a means of increasing the legitimacy of the 
Court’s reasoning, although it could be even more legitimate if the Court provided 
391 Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, judgment of 16 November 2004, § 37. See also Selistö v. 
Finland, judgment of 16 November 2004, § 46. The Court goes further in defining the limits of 
the freedom of expressions in the subsequent paragraphs of those judgments.
392 Ruokanen and Others v. Finland, judgment of 6 April 2010 (Appl. No. 45130/06), § 50. In that 
paragraph, the Court also refers to a Council of Europe resolution as a further external justification.
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clearer criteria for what would be considered disproportionate. One may note that 
there are cases in which the Court elaborates more on the reasoning, and which later 
constitute precedents. In such judgments, also the nature of argumentation is more 
complex, containing not only legal arguments and references to legal sources but also 
moral arguments to a larger extent than in other judgments. In later judgments of a 
similar kind, the so-called repetitive cases, the Court most often merely refers to the 
earlier case law without going into a very detailed justification. This also applies to the 
treatment of prior case law in the judgments.
In section 3.4 below, a micro-comparative analysis is carried out by looking into each 
principle or rule of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights when 
reasoning its judgments, to look for such limited fragments of discourse that disclose 
signs of transition of the legal culture of protecting human rights and fundamental rights 
in Europe. Instead of merely describing them, those principles or rules are studied in 
the light of case law to find such relevant linguistic elements. The selection of case law 
for closer scrutiny is based on some prior knowledge about those principles or rules 
of interpretation that are known to be referred to particularly in such cases where the 
Court has expanded the scope of application or meaning of Convention terms.The 
principles and rules of interpretation are classified by Alexy as belonging to examples 
of external justification. That view can be shared – the Court does not always elaborate 
in detail in which manner those principles and rules have been applied but rather uses 
them as elements linking the legal discourse and general practical discourse. The most 
relevant principles and rules of interpretation have been subject to numerous studies 
and are rather easily identifiable in the Court’s judgments. It is concluded that in gen-
eral, the Court applies a rather flexible approach to the different principles and rules 
of interpretation, although of the traditional rules of interpretation established in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it appears to put emphasis on the principle 
of object and purpose of the Convention. The technique by which the Court uses this 
principle has met some criticism as regards clarity. On the other hand, to meet the 
underlying idea of treating the Convention as a living instrument and the objective of 
collective enforcement of rights, it may be safer to apply a flexible wording. This may 
also help the national legal systems to adapt to the judicial style of the Court. However, 
flexibility should not be at the expense of the quality and clarity of style. As regards 
the fragments of discourse in the case law looked into, presenting signs of transition 
of the legal culture, they often appear to constitute elements of general practical dis-
course supplementing legal arguments. Such fragments include e.g. reasoning behind 
the expansion of the meaning of certain concepts (autonomous meaning).
The European Court of Human Rights also has also shown preparedness to deviate 
from its prior case law. One may note that this is a feature in common with the Finnish 
legal system in which precedents have traditionally not been binding. Although the 
Court has underlined the principles of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before 
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the law, it has stated the importance of being able to adapt its case law to changing 
conditions in the States parties to the Convention. It is observed that the fragments 
of discourse indicating that need, as simple statements, are also a sign of a transition 
of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights. When put in 
a historical context, two observations can be made. First, the stronger the transition 
is, the further it is from the original ideas of the meaning of the Convention provi-
sions. Second, the stronger the binding force of judgments, the more efficient is the 
collective enforcement of rights. In particular, changes in society make it necessary 
to change the national legislation that may be applied together with the Convention 
provisions. The Court pays attention to such changes in its case law, but no new rights 
may be written by means of new case law. Thus, there are signs of the transition of the 
legal culture of States parties to the Convention in the case law, but the more concrete 
evidence confirming such a transition is to be found in the national legal systems. 
Nevertheless, there is some degree of identifiable transition in the Court’s case law 
already in the sense that the Court extends the scope of the existing rights as set out 
in the Convention. However, as observed in the foregoing, the Court also pays atten-
tion to the existence of a European consensus in certain situations, and in its absence 
applies a more cautious approach to developing the scope of Convention provisions. 
This is assessed in more detail in section 3.4.6 below. Despite that the application of 
precedents by the Court should be considered as part of the legal discourse and as de 
facto internal justification, the rather flexible approach to the use of precedents as a 
source of law makes it closer to the doctrines applied in the German and Nordic legal 
systems, which are generally more flexible than the English one. Also the structure of 
judgments with the exception of the first few ones appears to be closer to those legal 
systems, whereas it has considerable differences with the French and English ones.
Although the analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as 
an example of discourse events proves that signs of transition of the legal culture are 
visible in the texts as a whole, the way in which such a transition has taken place may 
be easier to identify by analysing individual fragments of discourse by means of micro-
comparison through discourse analysis. For example, by analysing how the Court applies 
the principle of systematic or contextual interpretation, i.e. how the Court treats the 
different types of context in which it interprets the Convention provisions, one may see 
whether the signs of a transition are linked to a particular type of context (see section 
3.4.2). Those include, in particular, the other provisions of the article in question, the 
other articles of the Convention, the Convention and its Protocols as a whole, other 
international instruments, as well as case law of other judicial bodies. When analysing 
the judgments, the use of context as a means of interpretation appears rather clearly 
from the wording, one of the most typical expressions used being that “the provisions 
of the Convention and its Protocols must be assessed as a whole”. When referring to 
other international instruments, the Court usually uses a rather flexible expression, 
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stating e.g. that “the Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony 
with other rules of international law of which it forms part”.
On occasion, on may note that the Court refers to the legislations of member States 
of the Council of Europe, when stating a change in the legal or moral conceptions in 
Europe, for example. However, the use of comparison is not always that apparent or 
systematic, and the Court may also be criticised for the reason that it is not always 
clear how it has reached a conclusion on the existence or non-existence of a consensus 
between States parties or of a common legal tradition, although it is also recognised 
that a more transparent or substantiated approach could meet resistance in the national 
legal systems applying the Court’s case law. An analysis of case law reveals that there 
is some reason for that criticism. Although the Court may provide even an extensive 
analysis of sources when resorting to comparison, the conclusion made on the basis 
of that analysis may leave questions open as to how it has been reached393. In the case 
studies on Article 5, paragraph 1, in section 3.4.10.3 below, it is also observed that it is 
not always that clear how the Court has compared the legal systems and legislations. 
However, although the wording used in the conclusion may be rather loosely formulated, 
the reasoning behind it may be detected from the analysis of the sources referred to. 
Furthermore, one must remember that it is also typical of the judgments of national 
courts to express the sources used when resorting to comparison, whereas the precise 
line of reasoning is not necessarily stated but the statement of sources is followed by a 
rather loosely formulated conclusion. Thus, it may be even a recommended practice for 
an international judicial body to use flexible wordings as its case law should be received 
by all the States parties representing a variety of legal systems and cultures, although 
it is also necessary for the national judiciary to be able to detect the legal principle set 
out in the judgment. Furthermore, one must remember that courts must be treated as 
independent institutions where the judges enjoy a considerable margin of discretion 
as regards particularly the external elements of justification, whereas it is important to 
state the internal elements of justification, i.e. the normative statements, in a clear and 
transparent manner. The more transparent the general practical discourse is, however, the 
more legitimacy the judgments are given and the easier it is for other courts to receive 
it. However, one must also remember that the aforementioned elements of obscurity 
may be counter-productive and decrease the reception of the Court’s argumentation.
Nevertheless, those parts of judgments where the Court resorts to comparison 
between legal systems, underlining the development of society instead of a European 
393 See e.g. Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 21 November 2001, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-XI, § 66. The Court states that “The Court, while 
noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of torture, does 
not accordingly find it established that there is yet acceptance in international law of the propo-
sition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged 
torture committed outside the forum State.”
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standard, are a relatively clear sign of a transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights. As explained in the foregoing, Article 8 judg-
ments constitute an example of such situations where evolution of the legal situation 
and morals in the States parties is clearly taking place, and those judgments are referred 
to below. Before analysing the existence of such signs in respect of individual rules 
and principles of interpretation in detail, some comparative remarks are made of the 
judicial styles of the five selected States parties to the Convention to assess similarities 
and differences with the discourse and judicial style of the European Court of Human 
Rights. It is argued that closer the judicial style of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions 
and the manner of treating the European case law are to those of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the easier it should be to receive the Court’s argumentation, This 
is analysed in more detail in section 4.5 below, in the light of individual judgments 
and fragments of discourse, but the purpose of section 3.2 is to provide background 
for that analysis.
3.2  The European Court’s discourse and its similarities with 
and differences from the judicial style of national courts – 
comparative aspects
In the foregoing, an analysis is made of the structure and style of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In general, the approach of the national courts to 
the application of case law as a source of law and particularly the way in which they 
are applied play an important role in the preparedness to apply the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The rules and principles of interpretation are one 
important element from which it may be detected. It is concluded in the foregoing that 
the references made by prior case law by the European Court of Human Rights should 
rather be considered as part of legal discourse and as elements of internal justification 
than as elements of external justification. It is further observed that the main rules and 
principles of interpretation are easily detected from the Court’s discourse, but that it 
is not always clear how it has reached its conclusions through their application. The 
treatment of the various principles of interpretation in comparison with the way in 
which the European Court of Human Rights applies them, is one way of analysing 
the differences in the discourse and judicial style. This is one essential element that is 
analysed in section 4.5 below concerning the transition of the legal culture in Finland. 
There may also be other differences, such as general ideological and conceptual differ-
ences that affect the style of judgments.
The judicial style of the European Court of Human Rights, in the same way as the 
Convention system as a whole, derives elements from the languages and legal traditions 
of the States parties to the Convention. It is presumed that this is the case particularly in 
150 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
respect of the English and French language, but it is worth assessing the judicial styles of 
English and French courts to see to what extent there has been influence, in comparison 
with the three other legal systems covered by the present study. The purpose of this 
analysis is at the same time to help assess, in section 4.5 below, whether the discourse 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions is affected only by that of the European Court 
of Human Rights, or to whether there are other foreign elements present and to what 
extent. The underlying assumption being that in the past twenty years, the changes in 
discourse are mainly a result of European influence, the aim is to exclude the possibil-
ity of the impact of other foreign elements. It is customary for the Finnish judiciary to 
consult, in particular, Nordic sources of law, but also other foreign sources of law with 
which the judges are particularly familiar. It is to be underlined, however, that is not 
only the legal systems, but also the backgrounds of the judges that may have played a 
role, given that there is one judge from each State party present in the European Court 
of Human Rights. It is also important to bear in mind that the European Court of 
Human Rights works independently as an international judicial body, and its separation 
from the national legal systems and the application of international human rights law, 
in contrast to national legislation, have contributed to its judicial style and discourse.
3.2.1  English judicial style
The ideological and conceptual differences between the common law systems (English 
legal system) and the statutory law systems have implications on the legal discourse 
of judges in the said systems. In the view of Maley, the discourse of continental law 
judges is more restrained and frequently rigid in style and format, whereas that of 
common law judges focus more on the construction and balancing of argument394. The 
English style of judgments has been more flexible from early times, placing emphasis 
on personalized discourse and individual form and content395. Still today, in respect of 
the highest court (Supreme Court396), the judgment consists of individual speeches in 
which each judge participating in the case provides his own opinion397. However, it is 
 
394 Maley 1994, p. 42. In the view of Maley, common law judges have assumed an independence 
and individuality unmatched elsewhere, and developed guild-like skills of argumentation and 
reasoning and mastery of the specialized vocabulary. (Ibid. p. 42 and 43)
395 Wetter 1960, p. 32. Of the legal systems covered by the present study, Wetter has compared the 
English judicial style with the style of judgments in France, Germany and Sweden.
396 The United Kingdom Supreme Court replaced the judicial function of the House of Lords 
through the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
397 See e.g. judgments [2011] UKSC 35, judgment of 13 July 2011, [2013] UKSC 9, judgment of 
20 February 2013, [2013] UKSC 23, judgment of 1 May 2013, [2014] UKSC 20, judgment of 
26 March 2014, and [2014] UKSC 28, 14 May 2014, which have been analysed for the purposes 
of the present study.
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also possible that one judge proposes a judgment on appeal, agreed on by others398. The 
speeches are placed after one another without any joining elements or explanations. The 
language used in the speeches may be rather colourful, and particular attention is paid 
to reasoning. The judgments frequently refer to case law and legislation, but to varying 
degrees also to other materials, including case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights399. Today it is more common to refer to academic opinions than earlier. Dissent-
ing opinions are included in the judgment as such. Sometimes the judges may share 
each others’ views, but approach the question in a different way400. A typical English 
judgment starts with a description of facts, which is often fairly detailed, followed by 
a discussion of the legal issues401. On occasion, references to the European case law 
are even detailed and combined in a rather complex manner with the provisions of 
national legislation and the national case law402, whereas in others the references to 
the Convention or case law are brief403. According to Bankowski and MacCormick, 
the style of opinions in the higher English courts is discursive rather than deductive, 
which makes them considerably different from those in France. The reasoning involved 
is a mixture of the general and the formal, and particular and substantive. Thus, the 
style is rather formalistic but it tends to be argumentative rather than magisterial.404 
When looking into the aforementioned selection of judgments, one may confirm that 
particularly with regard to the application of sources of law the style of argumentation 
is more formalistic. Those fragments of discourse are indeed supplemented by oth-
ers representing rather general practical discourse. These peculiarities may make the 
understanding of the judgment rather challenging.
398 See e.g. [2013] UKSC 23, judgment of 1 May 2013, in which one justice only provided a concur-
ring alternative judgment (agreeing on the outcome, however).
399 See e.g. [2011] UKSC 35, judgment of 13 July 2011, in which both EU law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights together with relevant case law, and national case law are referred 
to.
400 Maley observes that a number of judges may come to the same conclusion, but by different 
reasoning processes; or they may come to entirely different conclusions. (Maley 1994, p. 43)
401 See e.g. the speech of Lord Reed in [2013] UKSC 23, judgment of 1 May 2013, which is a good 
example of such an approach. Lord Carnwath, with his concurring speech, proposes a more 
straightforward approach, which means that there is also some degree of variation of judicial 
discourse both within and between judgments.
402 Ibid. See also [2014] UKSC 20, judgment of 26 March, and [2011] UKSC 35, judgment of 13 
July 2011.
403 See [2013] UKSC 9, judgment of 20 February 2013, and [2014] UKSC 28, judgment of 14 May 
2014.
404 Bankowski and MacCormick 1997, p. 318 and.319. See also Mattila 2010 (2), p. 113-117, who 
has summarised the views presented by various authors. Common law judges do not regard the 
application of law as a purely mechanical process. Reasoning is involved, a kind of reasoning by 
analogy. They not only declare the law, but also make explicit the reasoning processes which have 
led them to the decision, the cases they have considered, the analogies they have considered and 
rejected. (Maley 1994, p. 43)
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The rather profound and balanced reasoning of common law judges is a feature 
in common with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
strong traditions of case law with references to prior cases are elements that at least 
in principle should make it rather easy for English courts to receive the argumenta-
tion of the European Court of Human Rights. The English legal system clearly uses 
precedents as internal elements of legal discourse. However, the doctrine of precedents 
used by the English judiciary is stricter and more formalistic than that used by the 
European Court of Human Rights, and the style of treating the precedents of the 
European Court of Human Rights is different. That may also be affected by the fact 
that there is no uniform way of writing Supreme Court precedents. Thus, although 
there is inevitably some influence of the English legal language on the judicial discourse 
of the European Court of Human Rights, there is less impact of common law on the 
structure of its discourse and judgments. When compared with the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the structure of English judgments, particularly 
Supreme Court judgments, is strikingly different as the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights is clearly set out as expressing the view of the whole Court, 
whereas the view of the Supreme Court needs to be derived from the opinions of 
individual judges. Although the European Court of Human Rights derives elements 
from its prior case law, it always states first the applicable provisions of the Convention, 
the meaning of which has then been made more precise through their interpretation 
in case law. Thus, the technique used by the European Court of Human Rights is 
different from that used by the UK Supreme Court405 although today, it has become 
more customary for the justices of the UK Supreme Court to also start with the ap-
plicable provisions of legislation. The peculiarities of common law judgments may 
in turn render it difficult to adopt the way of legal reasoning of the European Court 
of Human Rights, despite that in principle the English legal system might be more 
prepared for the application of case law as a source of law than the other legal systems 
covered by the present study. There are, however, examples of judgments already in 
which the references are rather skilful.
3.2.2 French judicial style
The language used by the French judiciary – especially the Cour de Cassation but to some 
extent also the lower courts – reflects the particular style of the French legal thought. 
405 However, as suggested by Goodman, the English courts today pay more attention to the state-
ment of reasons particularly as regards the clarity of language, partly due to the incorporation of 
the Convention into national law through the Human Rights Act of 1998 (see Goodman 2005, 
p. 10). There are various means for judges to clarify their opinions, e.g. by means of introducing 
titles, which have become common in lengthy judgments, or numbered principles (Ibid. p. 73 
and 74).
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This is visible in the content, structure and phraseology of decisions406. The judgments 
tend to follow a certain form407, with very brief and formal reasoning. When compared 
e.g. with German judgments, the French ones are strikingly shorter408. According to 
Wetter, the early French judgments (until 1960) have shared common elements with 
those in Germany and Sweden, particularly in so far as the format and compactness 
of expression are concerned409. One may note, however, that towards present times, 
the styles of writing judgments in the legal systems covered by the present study have 
departed from one another as it has become more common to provide detailed reasons 
for the judgments. Today, it is an established practice in the French judiciary to provide 
reasons for the judgment, although it has not always been the case410 and the reasons 
may still be rather compact. The late introduction of compulsory reasoning may explain 
the fact that even today, French judgments are more compact than those in Germany, 
and when looking into the selection of judgments analysed for the purposes of this 
study, one may note that in the Cour de Cassation, judgments are still very dense and 
compact. The reasons provided by the court mainly refer to legislation, and it is hard 
to analyse the way in which the principles of law and interpretation have in practice 
been applied, and it is not customary to have references to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights411. Even in the most elaborated cases, the references to the 
European Convention on Human Rights are rather definitions of the conduct that 
constitutes a violation of the Convention provisions. The judgments of the French 
Cour de Cassation have some similarities with those of the European Court of Justice, 
but differ considerably from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which are very extensive. The structure of judgments is also different, with the excep-
406 For the purposes of the present study, a selection of judgments of Cour de Cassation (Première 
chambre civile), have been looked into, including Arrêt n° 688 du 11 juin 2009, Arrêt n° 689 du 11 
juin 2009, Arrêt n° 1308 du 10 décembre 2009, Arrêt n° 1309 du 10 décembre 2009, Arrêt n° 198 du 
25 février 2010, Arrêt n° 343 du 31 mars 2010, and Arrêt n° 301 du 17 mars 2011.
407 The form and content of both civil and administrative law judgments are regulated by law. Any 
judgment is composed of five elements: mentions (public or not, parties, a report has been read, 
composition of the court), visas (summary of briefs and documents presented by the parties), 
motifs (brief statement of facts and justifying arguments), dispositif (decision proper, the ruling on 
the issue), and formule exécutoire (order to execute the judgment). See Troper and Grzegorczyk 
1997, p. 106 and 107, and Mattila 2011, p. 99.
408 David & Jauffret-Spinosi 2002, p. 113-114. See also Mattila 2010 (1), p. 720, Grewe 1998, p. 
214, Troper & al. 1991 [1998], p. 172 and p. 197-200, as well as Troper and Grzegorczyk 1997, 
p. 107. According to Troper and Grzegorczyk, the style can be described as being magisterial.
409 Wetter 1960, p. 28.
410 David & Jauffret-Spinosi 2002, p. 113. The compulsory practice of reasoning judgments was 
established in France in 1790 (Ibid.). The obligation to provide reasons for the judgment is today 
based on the provisions of the Code de procedure civile and Code de procedure pénale although they 
do not provide for detailed instructions.
411 See e.g. Cour de cassation, Première chambre civile, Arrêt n° 198 du 25 février 2010, which includes 
several references to the Convention, but those are very brief.
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tion of the first few judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that appeared 
to follow the structure of French judgments. The considerably different technique of 
writing judgments have the potential of creating problems in the reception of the 
argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights, and might be one factor 
behind the high number of violations found in cases against France, although there 
are most likely other more profound systemic or cultural problems.
The German way of reasoning is closer to that of the European Court of Human 
Rights, although it is perhaps more dogmatic than the rather concrete and pragmatic 
way of reasoning of the European Court, whereas the French style of reasoning is far 
from concrete412. In Germany, the statements of reasons in judgments tend to be wide-
ranging and loaded with citations. The judgments of French courts have, on the one hand, 
been criticised for not stating reasons clearly enough, and in the decisions of the Cour de 
Cassation there is no particular section devoted to the facts of the case or to the history 
of litigation. This also makes it difficult to assess in which manner the judiciary develops 
the law. Insofar as the Cour de Cassation is concerned, this brief and compact style is due 
to that the court does not review the decisions of lower courts as to facts (merits) but 
can merely quash the decision of a lower court due to incorrect application of statutes, 
and refer it back for a new hearing.413 As reminded by Troper & al., however, the French 
courts have now power to review legislation and to invalidate unconstitutional acts414, 
which might in future contribute to an increasing number of more elaborate judgments. 
There has already been a tendency to move towards more elaborate and substantiated 
decisions, especially by judicial courts, partly because of influence of European courts, 
but partly because of the influence of the Conseil Constitutionnel.415 On the other hand, 
Mattila points out that the texts of the French judgments do not provide an entirely cor-
rect picture of what the judges do. In reality, they go through sources of law profoundly. 
This is visible e.g. in commentaries (notes) on judgments that are published in legal 
periodicals. The judgments and the commentaries constitute a functional entity. The 
deliberations would also be visible in the memorandum of the judge and the opinion 
of the advocate general, which in respect of the highest jurisdiction are published in the 
court’s database. These instruments supplementing the judgment can be very detailed and 
refer to a wider range of materials than legislation alone.416 Thus, although on the basis 
of the judgments alone one would draw a conclusion that there is very little influence 
 
 
412 This is the view of Grewe, among others. See Grewe 1998, p. 214 and 215.
413 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 120-130. Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 171 and 172.
414 Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 172.
415 See Troper and Grzegorczyk 1997, p. 108.
416 Mattila 2011, p. 100, and Mattila 2010 (1), p. 720.
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from the French judicial style and discourse417 on the discourse of the European Court 
of Human Rights, there may be significantly more influence from the French legal 
language on the language of the Court – particularly as regards the French language 
versions of judgments. However, both the English and French language judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights follow an identical structure, and it is strikingly 
different from that of the French Cour de Cassation judgments.
3.2.3  German judicial style
The German style of writing judgments is very coherent and the language used is rather 
abstract and anonymous, without containing individual elements. This is largely due 
to the fact that the minimal content of a judicial decision is based on statutory provi-
sions418, the list of elements being rather detailed. The inclusion of dissenting opinions 
in the judgments is usually not allowed.419 As mentioned in the foregoing concerning 
French judgments, the style of early German judgments has shared some similarities 
with them, as well as with Swedish judgments420. Some of these characteristics are 
still common, although the style of detailed reasoning in those legal systems differs 
from one another. A selection of judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court421 
shows that the discourse is still neutral, but the reasoning is rather detailed. Accord-
ing to Alexy & Dreier, the style of German courts is in principle deductive, legalistic 
and magisterial, but at the same time to a high degree discursive, substantive and 
argumentative.422 In the view of Mattila, the German judgments resemble Finnish 
judgments in many respects, with the exception that in German ones, the conclusions 
of the court are placed at the beginning of the judgment, followed by the statement of 
reasons, contrary to the Finnish ones in which the reasons are provided first. The use 
417 A brief overview of judgments of the Belgian Cour de cassation indicates that nor has there been 
significant influence from the Belgian judicial style either. The Belgian judicial style is, however, 
more modern and straightforward than the French one, and there are some examples of rather 
extensive reasoning. However, the references to the European Convention on Human Rights are 
generally brief.
418 The various codes of judicial procedure provide listings of the elements to be included in a judg-
ment. According to s.313(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decision has to contain 1) the 
designation of parties, their representatives and the attorneys of record, 2) the designation of the 
court and judges, 3) the day on which the trial was brought to an end, 4) the operative provisions 
of the decision, 5) the facts, and 6) the reasons on which the decision is based. Similar listings 
are contained in other codes of procedure. See Alexy and Dreier 1997, p. 21.
419 Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 105. Dissenting opinions only appear in constitutional adjudi-
cation. For details of the structure of judgments, see Ibid. p. 103-106. 
420 See note 409.
421 The judgments analysed for the purposes of the present study include Bundesverfassungsgericht 
judgments 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 24.9.2003, 2 BvR 1481/04 vom 14.10.2004, 2 BvR 1113/06 vom 
25.9.2009, 2 BvR 1396/10 vom 16.4.2012 and 2 BvR 1380/08 vom 18.8.2013.
422 Alexy and Dreier 1997, p. 21.
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of subtitles is also rare in German judgments.423 When compared with French judg-
ments today, reasoning is profound and a variety of sources of law is usually referred 
to, including not only legislation but also case law, preparatory work and opinions of 
scholars424. In comparison with Finnish judgments, reference to academic views is 
more frequent425. The profound reasoning is interesting in that when compared with 
France, the reasoning of judgments became compulsory even later426. Alexy & Dreier 
draw a distinction between two styles of reasoning present in judgments, that of expert 
reasoning and that of justifying a decision, the expert reasoning being more discussive 
than the rather formal model of juristic syllogism427.
The German style can also be explained with historical reasons. At the end of the 
Middle Ages, Germany was divided into hundreds almost independent entities, which 
also lead to non-uniform legal system. This, together with the development of univer-
sities, lead to that Roman law was adopted in the areas part of the German-Roman 
empire. This in turn had a profound effect on the German legal system which became 
rather abstract and relied largely on concepts. In the administration of law, scholars 
were increasingly relied upon and they replaced non-learned judges. Court proceedings 
were more of a formality, and the decisions were based on the opinions of scholars 
(Aktenversendung). Thus, particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries, law faculties de 
facto acted as highest judicial instances. The tradition of dialogue between judges and 
scholars still continues today.428 This might give reason to presume that German courts 
would be particularly receptive to influence by the European Court of Human Rights 
and to a practice of referring to the Court’s case law as a source of law, and there are 
 
423 Mattila 2010 (2), p. 107, and Arntz 2001, p. 298. Arntz notes that a special characteristic of 
German judgments is to construct the descriptive part of the judgment (Tatbestand) by placing 
the statements of the parties (Vortrag/Antrag des Klägers, Vortrag/Antrag des Beklagten) after the 
statement of facts (Sachstand). The reasons (Entscheidungsgründe) are placed at the end of the 
judgment. That is also characteristic of Finnish judgments.
424 Arntz 2001, p. 300 and 301, David & Jauffret-Spinosi 2002, p. 113 and 114, Markesinis & al. 1997, 
p. 7 (opinions of scholars). See also Mattila 2010 (2), p. 108. For examples of such references, see 
e.g. paragraphs 40 and 44 in Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment 2 BvR 1481/04 vom 14.10.2004.
425 See Mattila 2010(2), p. 108. The German judgments have often been described as being close 
to scholarly writings and the style has from early times been abstract and objective (see Wetter 
1960, p. 26).
426 David & Jauffret-Spinosi 2002, p. 113. The compulsory reasoning of judgments was introduced 
in Germany in 1879.
427 Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 103 and 104.
428 Markesinis & al. 1997, p. 9. See also Mattila 2011, p. 98, and Mattila 2010 (2), p. 108 and 109. 
Arntz divides the development of German as a legal language into four periods, during which for 
example the influence of Latin has varied. The influence of Latin was particularly strong during 
the period from the adoption of Roman law in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries until the 
end of the eighteenth century. (Arntz 2002, p. 41. For details, see, p. 40-44)
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also examples of such references429. When compared with the references included in 
the UK Supreme Court judgments referred to in the foregoing, however, the tech-
nique of referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights appears 
to be somewhat less elaborate. In any case, the German way of reasoning judgments, 
although there are differences when compared with that of the European Court of 
Human Rights for example in the structure of judgments, suggests that the profound 
way in which the European Court of Human Rights reasons its judgments might be 
less “foreign” to German courts than to some others such as the French courts.
As regards the possible influence of the German judicial style on the discourse and 
style of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, one could say that they 
are closer to one another than the French judgments, apart from the earliest judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights. It is difficult to assess, however, to what 
extent there is German influence or to what extent it is influence from Germanic legal 
systems in general. There is a rather large group of States parties with legal traditions 
that are close to one another, including the Nordic ones. Even the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights appear to have some characteristics of scholarly 
writings and appear to be deductive in the same way as German judgments. The con-
tents of both are rather strictly regulated. Furthermore, the variety of sources of law 
is equally extensive. However, the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights 
with regard to the application of precedents appears to be more detailed and elaborate.
3.2.4  Swedish judicial style
Swedish is an official language of court proceedings in two States covered by the present 
study, i.e. Sweden and Finland. Given that Finland was part of Sweden and the legal 
system was thus the same until 1809 as explained in the foregoing, also the language 
of legislation was the same. Also, the language of court proceedings in Finland was 
Swedish until a rather late moment. Even under the Russian rule, part of legislation 
was still drafted in Swedish in Finland, until the original language of drafting gradually 
changed in favour of Finnish430. The language of legislation and other legal and official 
texts has been subject to systematic research in the Nordic countries since the 1960s431. 
Insofar as the language of judgments is concerned, the Swedish language in the 
429 See e.g. Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment 2 BvR 1380/08 vom 18.8.2013 with several references, 
in which the interpretation of law appears to be based on both national law and the Convention 
although the decision relates to a constitutional complaint. The references are not always that 
detailed, however, even where the reasoning may otherwise be even very detailed (see e.g. an older 
judgment 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 24.9.2003).
430 Svenskt lagspråk i Finland 2010, p. 47.
431 See Landqvist 2010, p. 47. In respect of research on legal Swedish, the majority studies have, 
according to Nordman, focused on the language of legislation. For more details, see Nordman 
2008, p. 254-257.
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two States started perhaps to develop their own ways earlier and more rapidly than in 
respect of legislation. Judgments are to some extent drafted in Swedish also in Finland 
in case it is the language of proceedings, although the number of such judgments is 
small. Each court of course writes its own judgments independently, although they do 
follow a certain pattern in both States, and in both States the judiciary is divided into 
general courts of law and administrative courts432, and the style of judgments in the two 
branches differs to some extent. Although the two States and their legal systems have 
been separate since 1809, there are still some similarities in the language and structure 
of judgments. However, in Finland, the same structure is followed in respect of both 
judgments issued in Finnish and those issued in Swedish. In general, in the judgments 
issued in both States, the statement of reasons and the conclusions are placed in the 
end of the text of the judgment, preceded by the parties’ claims, questions of law and 
facts, although in Sweden it has been suggested that the order be switched so that the 
decision is placed at the beginning of the text433. When compared with the judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights, the order is more or less the same in the 
judgments of Swedish and Finnish courts.
Landqvist observes that the language of judgments is to some extent affected by the 
fact that the judgments issued both in Sweden and Finland are primarily addressed at 
the parties, despite that they are of use for other courts and authorities as well as for 
scholars. This is perhaps the most striking difference between German and Swedish 
and Finnish judgments434. As observed in the foregoing, German judgments sometimes 
constitute a sort of a dialogue among courts and scholars. Landqvist is, nevertheless, 
of the view that the judgments issued in Finland are somewhat easier to conceive than 
those issued in Sweden for the reason that the sentences are usually shorter and subtitles 
are used435, which would give reason to assume that the addressees of the judgments 
have been taken better into account in Finnish courts.
An analysis of a few judgments of the Supreme Court of Sweden, in which the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been used as sources of law, gives reason to believe that the judicial 
style may be changing to some extent in Sweden436. This observation is supported by 
432 The names of the courts are partly different in the two countries.
433 See Landqvist 2010, p. 62. In respect of Sweden, Landqvist refers to a report concerning the 
increase of trust in the judiciary (SOU 2008:106).
434 The early Swedish judgments have shared elements in common with both French and German 
judgments, although the style has been somewhat closer to the French one (Wetter 1960, p. 25 
and 26).
435 Landqvist 2010, p. 62 and 63.
436 The judgments of Högsta domstolen analysed for the purposes of the present study include NJA 
2006 s. 467 (NJA 2006:53, mål B119-06), NJA 2009 s. 280 (NJA 2009:30, mål Ö1082-09), NJA 
2012 s. 1038 (NJA 2012:94, mål B1982-11), NJA 2013 s. 502 (NJA 2013:48, mål B4946-12), and 
NJA 2013 s. 746 (NJA 2013:67, mål Ö1526-13).
 | 1593. Second phase of transition of the legal culture – development of the meaning of the Convention under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
Bergholtz and Peczenik, who have analysed the style of judgments from the 19th cen-
tury until the present437. In the judgments issued before the entry into force of the Act 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into national law, there are 
some references to the Convention, but the references are very concise. One may also 
note that the courts rather paid attention to the provisions of the Convention instead 
of applying them.438 This can be explained by the fact that the Convention and thus 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights were not formally part of ap-
plicable law in Sweden. In the judgments issued after the entry into force of the Act 
incorporating the Convention, the Convention is clearly stated as being applicable 
law in Sweden. In the early judgments where references to case law already appear, 
the references are still in most cases brief and contain no analysis of the contents of 
the case law, despite that the Convention provisions are already used in a more de-
tailed manner in the reasoning. In some recent judgments the references are, however, 
extensive and detailed. In the judgments concerning the prohibition of double sanc-
tion439, referred to in section 4.2.2 below, the Supreme Court advanced from old case 
law to new one, and analysed the significance of the Convention provisions and of the 
change of interpretation in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights for 
the application of law in Sweden.440
Generally, given the rather flexible approach of the Swedish legal system to the use 
of sources of law and the more frequent resorting to the principle of objective and 
purpose of law than in Finland, the Swedish judiciary should in principle be able to 
adapt itself to the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights. The number of 
violations found against Sweden is rather low when compared with Finland, which 
gives reason to believe that there have been no major problems faced by the judiciary 
despite the slow resorting to the application of the case law. It is, however, only rather 
recently that the judiciary has shown preparedness to resort to more detailed reasoning 
437 In their view, the style of the opinions of Swedish higher courts have changed continually since 
the end of the 19th century, from deductive, brief and magisterial justification, resembling that of 
French judgments, towards a more discursive, elaborate and argumentative style. For details, see 
Bergholtz and Peczenik 1997, p. 295 and 296.
438 In the words of the Supreme Court of Sweden, ”I detta sammanhang finns det anledning att beakta 
innehållet i artikel 6 av Europakonvention om de mänskliga rättigheterna.” See NJA 1991, p. 512. Or 
alternatatively, ”Även bestämmelserna i artikel 6 punkt 1 i Europakonvention om de mänskliga 
rättigheterna har betydelse för prövning av frågan om muntlig förhandling borde hållits i TR:n.” See 
NJA 1993, p. 109.
439 NJA 2013 s. 746 (NJA 2013:67, mål Ö1526-13), in which the references to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights are rather close to those in recent Supreme Court judgments 
in Finland, with rather detailed argumentation, and NJA 2010 s. 168 I och II (NJA 2010:19, mål 
B2509-09 and mål B5498-09, decided jointly).
440 NJA 2010, p. 168. A very detailed analysis can also be found e.g. in NJA 2009, p. 280, whereas in 
NJA 2008, p. 868, the technique of referring to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights was still brief.
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with regard to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The potential 
problems faced by the Swedish judiciary in the receptiveness to the Court’s discourse 
are presumably rather similar to those faced by the Finnish courts. As regards the pos-
sible influence of the judicial style of Swedish courts on the discourse and style of the 
European Court of Human Rights, one could place the Swedish legal system in the 
same group of States with Germany, which together appear to have played a rather 
strong impact on the Court’s approach to reasoning. The impact of the Swedish legal 
system alone would be hard to assess.
3.2.5  Finnish judicial style
Swedish was, as observed in the foregoing, the language of legislation and court pro-
ceedings in Finland until a late moment and Finnish is thus rather young as a legal 
language. However, it is perhaps the language of court proceedings that played the 
most significant role in the development of Finnish as a legal language, despite the 
undeniable impact of early translations of legislation. Important steps in this respect 
were the first court records that were drafted in Finnish and the use of Finnish as a 
language of legal science, as well as441 a general change of the practice applied to the 
language of authorities and court proceedings, particularly a language decree issued in 
1863 that officially allowed the use of Finnish in official documents directly concerning 
the Finnish population. However, it was not possible to use Finnish in court proceedings 
until a new decree was issued in 1883, concerning the Swedish and Finnish in court 
proceedings. Thereby Finnish became the main language of court proceedings due to 
the fact that the majority of the population was Finnish-speaking.442 Despite this, the 
legislation was still drafted in Swedish, and then translated into Finnish, during the 
Russian rule.443 Nevertheless, the drafting of decisions and records in Finnish supported 
the development of the language of legislation and legal language in general in Finland.
The early Finnish judgments were not very clearly structured. Subtitles were not 
used to structure the judgment, and the reasoning and conclusion were typically placed 
in the same sentence, cut by several defining clauses. Consequently, the sentences 
tended to be long and hard to understand by others than lawyers. The understanding 
of judgments was made even more difficult by the Swedish influence, as the earliest 
judgments were drafted in Swedish and that language had a considerable influence 
even on the judgments drafted in Finnish. This style of writing judgments was for a 
long time defended by its preciseness and conciseness, but has later been given up. 
However, until the 1970s, the judgments followed a certain pattern, and the style was 
rather archaic. Today, particularly the statement of facts and the presentation of the 
441 Pajula 1960, p. 149 and 154.
442 Pajula 1960, p. 178-180, and p. 201.
443 Landqvist 2010, p. 45.
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views of the parties are, insofar as the sentence structure is concerned, like any de-
scriptive text. The different parts of the judgments are separated by subtitles and the 
conclusions are placed at the end of the judgment.444 When looking into the case law 
of the supreme jurisdictions445, one may note that there is some degree of variation in 
the discourse and style of judgments both between courts and within court, although 
the judgments generally follow a pre-determined structure.
As mentioned in the foregoing, the style of legal reasoning in Finnish court judg-
ments has similarities with the German traditions, with some minor differences. The 
focus is clearly on the contents of legislation, which is considered the primary source 
of law. Although the courts have increasingly started to refer to the case law of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, for instance, the legalistic tradition can still be clearly 
seen in the reasoning. This might be explained by the fact that the conceptual legal 
thinking (Begriffsjurisprudenz) was a strong element until the 1950s, as given account 
of by Aarnio446. According to Aarnio, over the past fifteen years, a clear development 
in the style of reasoning towards more discussive can be identified. However, the in-
ternal structure of reasoning is still more deductive than discussive as to its nature.447 
The rather recent developments in the style of legal reasoning used by the courts, most 
strikingly by the Supreme Court, is a result of a long process which seems to involve 
not only the change in the legal culture (legal theory) pointed out by Aarnio448, but 
also the increasing presence of international elements in the legal system449. Particu-
larly the binding nature of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
de facto forces national courts to take the judgments into account. This could be seen 
as a shift towards the recognition of case law as a source of law – in some cases with 
equally binding nature as that of written legislation – and towards harmonisation of 
legal traditions between statutory law and common law systems. One cannot speak of a 
system of precedence within the meaning of a common law system but, as was observed 
in the foregoing, the doctrine of precedents used by the European Court of Human 
Rights is in fact closer to the German and Nordic ones, which should make it easier 
for the Finnish judiciary to adapt to the discourse and style of judgments of the Court.
444 Mattila 2010(3), p. 195, 199 and 200.
445 For the analysed judgments, see Chapter V.
446 Aarnio 1997(1), p. 37-39.
447 See Aarnio 1997(2), p. 72. Aarnio observes that substantive arguments are increasingly an integral 
part of reasoning, which also means that in several cases the reasoning is nowadays quite extended 
and elaborate, although there are still examples of the contrary.
448 For details, see Aarnio 1997(1), p. 44-52.
449 Lavapuro 2011, p. 468. According to Lavapuro, a significant change in that respect has taken 
place around 2008, particularly in the Supreme Court but to some extent also in the Supreme 
Administrative Court, with has lead to a more detailed balancing of the principles set out in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. (Ibid.)
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When compared with the style of the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, one may note that until late 1990s, Finnish judgments were often criticised 
for not being well enough reasoned. Particularly in the field of administrative law, the 
reasoning sometimes consisted of the statement of the applicable provisions of law, 
without detailed explanation for the decision in other respects. As of the end of the 
1990s, however, the reasoning in the Finnish judgments has become more detailed, 
largely due to the influence of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
but also to that of the European Court of Justice. Thus, apart from strictly legal discourse, 
there is today increasingly supplementing general practical reasoning present in the 
judgments, which brings in more subjective elements. The rather persisting practice 
of brief reasoning might have had the effect that the Finnish courts have not been 
particularly receptive to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights, 
although in the past few years one may note a tendency to increasingly refer to the 
European Court’s case law. The change means, as a minimum, that the case law is now 
accepted as a binding source of law. Also, the technique of referring to case law appears 
to be undergoing a transition towards stronger internal elements, which is discussed in 
more detail in section 4.5 below. However, it does still not prove that the judicial style 
of the European Court of Human Rights would have been internalised. The degree of 
internalising the style of argumentation may be assessed by looking at how the vari-
ous standards and methods of interpretation as well as precedents are used, including 
both legal and general practical argumentation. Lavapuro observes that in principle, 
the national courts should increasingly interpret the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the light of corresponding principles of interpretation as the European Court 
of Human Rights does. He finds that they have done so to some extent, particularly 
the application of the principle of proportionality is self-evident and is traditionally 
an inherent part of the resolution of conflicts of interpretation, but finds that the same 
requirement concerns even the more controversial principles of interpretation, such as 
the principle of evolutive interpretation, and in his view they should be applied more 
often. Instead, he calls for caution in respect of the application of the principle of margin 
of appreciation.450 This is addressed also in more detail in section 4.5.
A closer comparison between the judicial styles indicates indeed that although the 
judicial style of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions has not as such changed dramatically 
over the past twenty years, the style of referring to the judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights has gradually changed, which might have even further-reaching 
effects on the reasoning. In the early judgments, the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights were already clearly treated as an internal element of justification, 
450 Lavapuro 2011, p. 469. According to Lavapuro, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation should 
rather be seen as a principle of determining the distribution of competence between the European 
Court of Human Rights and the national authorities. (Ibid.)
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in terms of Alexy, whereas there appears to be a gradual change towards using them 
increasingly as an even stronger internal element of legal discourse, although the change 
is still not definite. Lavapuro has studied that change particularly in the light of a 
number of judgments of the Supreme Court and considers that it represents a rather 
deep-going change in the legal culture and finds that the judicial argumentation has 
become wider in scope and that in his view there can already be seen some degree of 
dialogue in the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
He finds that it is also necessary for the national courts to adopt at least part of the logic 
of the European Court of Human Rights, to avoid future violations of the Conven-
tion, although there are challenges in its application at the national level.451 Lavapuro’s 
observation can be largely shared, particularly when looking at the national case law as 
a whole and comparing it with that of the European Court of Human Rights. Some 
form of dialogue can be observed not only in the cases of the Supreme Court referred 
to by Lavapuro452, but also in certain more recent cases of the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court453. Those cases are looked into in more detail below. 
Also, the question of whether one may speak of a real dialogue is analysed closer.
Thus, the impact of the European case law on the discourse of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions has been rather impressive, and it has taken place within a relatively 
short period of time, which merits that development to be studied further. Given that 
Finland was not a State party to the Convention during those years when the Court’s 
judicial style began to emerge and develop, there is hardly any impact from the Finn-
ish legal system on the case law despite the common legal traditions with Sweden. 
Today, however, there is influence through the interaction between the European 
Court of Human Rights and national jurisdictions, in the same way as for any legal 
system represented in the Court. As observed in the foregoing, the development of the 
Court’s case law is based on its discourse and judicial style. An essential part of this 
is the way in which the Court interprets law, i.e. the Convention. The following two 
sections provide an overview of how the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights develops through the application of the various methods of interpretation, 
including an analysis of whether the application of an individual method is typically 
451 Lavapuro 2011, p.474. Those challenges include, in particular, the difficulties in deriving rules of 
general application given that the Court’s judgments are based on individual applications, the 
differences in the traditional principles of interpretation which in Finland are often based on 
material law, and the changes taking place in the Court’s case law. Particularly the principle of 
evolutive interpretation imposes challenges as, in principle, each court should be able to interpret 
the European Convention on Human Rights in the light of its case law as it is at the moment 
of issuing the judgment. (Ibid. p. 475)
452 KKO:2001:96, KKO:2002:116, KKO:2005:136, KKO:2009:27 and KKO:2009:80.
453 Lavapuro has also paid attention to the latter judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
which is also interesting in that it was taken to the European Court of Human Rights which 
found that no violation had taken place.
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linked with signs of transition of the legal culture and what types of signs can be 
detected. It is argued that such a link exists with certain methods of interpretation, 
showing more signs of transition. As mentioned in the foregoing, those signs may 
include various linguistic or textual elements. Further, it is assessed to what extent 
the transition of the legal culture of protecting human rights and fundamental rights 
(through development of case law) has the potential of creating problems for national 
jurisdictions. In section 4.5 below, similar signs are looked for in the judgments of the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions. 
3.3  Starting point of interpretation – general principles of 
interpretation of treaties
It is typical of international treaties that they constitute political compromises, which 
may sometimes lead to ambiguous wordings that may be difficult to understand and 
to be translated into other languages. Or, sometimes treaty provisions may contain 
terms or concepts that are not familiar or are not used in some legal systems. In such 
cases, domestic courts inevitably need to interpret the provisions in question. Although 
treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which is not meant to 
be only applied between the states parties to it but also by the state party in relation 
to natural persons residing within its jurisdiction, should be drafted as precisely as 
possible, it is characteristic of the European Convention on Human Rights to use 
general formulations that are applicable to various types of cases where the individual 
circumstances of the case are different. On the one hand, such formulations allow 
flexibility in the interpretation of the Convention, to take into account changes in 
society and legal thinking, but on the other hand, they are a challenge for the courts 
interpreting them. In establishing the meaning of a treaty provision, a court may resort 
to different principles and methods of interpretation as in respect of any provisions 
of law, such as historical interpretation (on the basis of “travaux préparatoires”), literal 
interpretation, teleological interpretation and/or contextual interpretation. One should 
remember, however, that the Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights 
do not contain provisions on the acceptable sources of law or the rules or principles 
of interpretation. Therefore those have become established through the case law. The 
Court has resorted, on the one hand, to the general principles of interpretation of 
international treaties and, on the other hand, to the general principles of interpreta-
tion of law as recognised by the States parties. It is observed in the foregoing that the 
States parties have, however, agreed on a great degree of independence for the Court 
in the Convention.
As regards the interpretation of international treaties applicable to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the guiding principles are those found in the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
provide for the general rules and supplementary means of interpretation of treaty 
provisions. According to Article 31(1),
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention further defines ‘context’ as follows:
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
relating to the treaty.
In respect of the European Convention on Human Rights, context in the light of the 
foregoing provisions would include the text of the Convention and additional Protocol 
No. 1, as well as subsequent additional protocols which are considered to constitute 
an integral part of the Convention upon their ratification by the parties. In the light 
of theories of discourse analysis, the provisions of Article 31, paragraph 2, appear to 
coincide with the idea of internal context. As regards external elements, Article 31, 
paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention further provides as follows:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.
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Those provisions would, in terms of discourse analysis, fall within the concept of 
external elements. The parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have 
not concluded any specific agreements regarding its interpretation, but have agreed 
through the provisions of the Convention on the establishment of the European Court 
of Human Rights. According to Article 32, paragraph 1, of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, “the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which 
are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34 and 47”454. Thus, Article 32, paragraph 
1, of the European Convention on Human Rights constitutes an agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty within the meaning of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. As regards the main principles of interpretation 
under the Vienna Convention, including the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context, and the object and purpose of the treaty, the European 
Court of Human Rights has referred to those principles on several occasions455. The 
Court has also, on occasion, been confronted with the question of applicability of other 
international conventions, referred to in Article 31, paragraph 3 subparagraph (c), of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such as the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea.456 It is perhaps more common, however, for the Court to 
refer to other human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. In the case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom, among others, the Court also took a 
position on the applicability of general principles of international law.457 As is pointed 
out by Ost & van de Kerchove, the development of the Court’s doctrine of interpreta-
tion began already with its first judgment in the Lawless case, although in their view 
454 The articles referred to provide for inter-state applications, individual applications and advisory 
opinions. Under Article 32, paragraph 2, “in the event of dispute as to whether the Court has 
jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”. Thus, the role given to the European Court of Human Rights 
is rather independent.
455 The Court has stated this, among others, in the case of Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 
21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, §§ 29 and 30, thus already before the entry into force of the 
Vienna Convention. The Court has referred to the Vienna Convention e.g. in the cases of James 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A No. 98, § 64, Lithgow 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A No. 102 § 117, and Cruz 
Varas and Others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A No. 201, § 100, and Saadi v. 
the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 January 2008, §§ 61 and 62. In the latter 
case, the Court explicitly stated that “in ascertaining the Convention meaning of this phrase, it 
will, as always, be guided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” 
(§ 61).
456 See Medvedyev v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 March 2010, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2010.
457 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 29 January 2008, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2008, § 62. In the Court’s words, “the Court must also take into account any 
relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting 
Parties”.
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the first clear statement of the doctrine can be found in the Golder judgment.458 The 
foregoing would give reason to state that the case law constitutes an external element 
of argumentation. However, it is argued in this thesis that it should rather be treated 
as an internal element of argumentation.
The aforementioned main rule in Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention 
is useful where the authentic texts of the treaty do not contain divergences, or where 
the divergences are insignificant for the outcome of the reading of the treaty provi-
sions. However, as is pointed out by Hakapää, although the language used should mean 
what is stated, it may sometimes be difficult to establish the ordinary meaning of the 
expressions used in the treaty459. Also, the way in which expressions are understood in 
different legal systems may differ even significantly. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties further allows a special meaning to be given to a treaty provision. Ac-
cording to Article 31, paragraph 4:
A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended.
That provision is interesting in the light of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in that the Court interprets the meaning of the Convention provisions 
rather independently. Although it is not that clear what the parties have intended 
in respect of special meanings to be given to terms used in the Convention, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights appears to resort to that possibility. If the Court’s 
interpretative practice was to be criticised for one reason or another, its practice of 
giving Convention provisions an independent or autonomous meaning could be a 
source of criticism, although the jurisdiction given to the Court in Article 32 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is extensive and, when understood in the 
widest possible sense, should be considered to cover the possibility in Article 31, 
paragraph 4, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even if not criticised, 
the idea of independent or autonomous meaning is an element creating challenges 
for the national legal systems. That element of interpretation is addressed in more 
detail in section 3.4.10 below.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides for further rules of 
interpretation. According to Article 32 of the Convention:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
458 Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p. 253, refers to Lawless v. Ireland, judgment of 1 July 1961, Series 
A no. 3, and Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18.
459 Hakapää 2008, p. 31.
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confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Those options are even more clearly external elements of justification than those 
provided for in Article 31, paragraph 3. When looking into the wording of Article 
32, one may note that although it mentions specifically the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, it is not exhaustive but provides for flex-
ibility in treaty interpretation. In terms of discourse analysis, that calls for resorting to 
subjective elements of interpretation. The European Court of Human Rights has also 
used the flexibility allowed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in treaty 
interpretation. For example, in the so-called Belgian language dispute, the European 
Court of Human Rights not only underlined the need to read both language versions 
together, but also resorted to supplementary means of interpretation as, although 
the general objective and purpose of Article 14 of the Convention was to prohibit 
discrimination, it does not require to forbid any difference in treatment that would 
lead to an absurd result. Thus, the Court declined an extensive interpretation of the 
provision.460 In addition, the Court referred to the need to read Article 14 in the light 
of other relevant provisions, i.e. in that case Article 2 of Protocol 1461. On occasion, 
the Court may decline to take the provisions of Article 14 into account, in case it has 
found a breach of another substantive provision of the Convention, in which case it 
 
460 Case ”relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium (Application 
no 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64) judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A 
No. 6, § 10, reads as follows: “In spite of the very general wording of the French version (“sans 
distinction aucune”), Article 14 (art. 14) does not forbid every difference in treatment in the ex-
ercise of the rights and freedoms recognised. This version must be read in the light of the more 
restrictive text of the English version (“without discrimination”). In addition, and in particular, 
one would reach absurd results were one to give Article 14 (art. 14) an interpretation as wide as 
that which the French version seems to imply. One would, in effect, be led to judge as contrary to 
the Convention every one of the many legal or administrative provisions which do not secure to 
everyone complete equality of treatment in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised. 
The competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which, 
on account of differences inherent therein, call for different legal solutions; moreover, certain legal 
inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities. The extensive interpretation mentioned above 
cannot consequently be accepted.”
461 Ibid. § 11. This approach has been confirmed e.g. in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May1985 (Plenary), A94, § 71.
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resorts to a more restrictive interpretation462. However, the interpretation of provisions 
of law or a treaty is a continuous process in which it may be difficult to strictly separate 
the various rules of interpretation, but in the same way as in discourse analysis, both 
objective and subjective elements of interpretation interact. According to Germer, the 
drafters of the Vienna Convention did not even intend to draw a strict line between 
the authentic elements of interpretation in Article 31 and the supplementary means 
of interpretation in Article 32 but intended them to operate in a single combined pro-
cess. Furthermore, the supplementary means of interpretation may be used to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.463 As is explained below in 
more detail, the European Court of Human Rights has also developed a practice of 
combining the various rules and principles of interpretation, despite that the emphasis 
may be given to an individual rule.
The Vienna Convention also provides for special rules of interpretation of treaties 
authenticated in two or more languages, which is thus of relevance for the interpreta-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights. According to Article 33:
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties 
agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the 
text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty 
so provides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each 
authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when 
a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall 
be adopted.
The foregoing provisions mean that the European Convention on Human Rights is 
equally authentic in both English and French, and those language versions are presumed 
to have the same meaning. On the one hand, given that only two language versions are 
462 See e.g. Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A No. 45, § 67, 
and Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32 , § 30.
463 Germer 1970, p. 419.
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authentic, there are potentially not so many significant discrepancies between the two 
language versions that would give reason to systematically compare them, which pre-
sumption is confirmed by that the Court only seldom needs to resort to comparing the 
language versions although it has on occasion done so. On the other hand, comparison 
between language versions may be a supporting element of interpretation of the Con-
vention provision in case of doubt, even if there are not as such discrepancies between 
them. It is also worth reminding that the plurilingual nature of a treaty should not be 
over-emphasised. As is observed by Germer, among other authorities, the problems of 
interpretation that are related to plurilingual treaties are not essentially different from 
those arising from treaties with only one authentic text. A judge interpreting a treaty 
must always look for the meaning which the parties intended to give to the terms of 
the treaty.464 For the purposes of reconciling the divergent language versions, Hardy 
makes a distinction between several methods available: mere comparison of texts, ref-
erence to the context, reference to documentary evidence of how the discrepancy has 
occurred, if available, and reference to preparatory work465. It may be presumed that 
these methods are in practice applied together, and the European Court of Human 
Rights has on occasion resorted to comparison and references to the context. Hardy 
further suggests other methods of conciliating authentic language versions, of which 
perhaps reference to the original language version is the most convincing one.466 The 
European Court of Human Rights has not taken a position on which language version 
would be the original one, but has treated them on an equal footing. The reference to 
the original language version would indeed be particularly useful in the case of treaties 
which have more than two authentic language versions. 
It is recalled again that there are only two authentic language versions to be com-
pared, and the problem of predictability of interpretation does not relate so much to 
divergence between them but rather to other elements relating to the interpretation 
of the Convention. Thus, the principles in Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties should not be emphasised despite that the Court has on occasion 
resorted to comparing the two language versions. It is not surprising that the Court 
has resorted to a larger extent to other means of interpretation instead of comparison. 
However, in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, the parties to 
the Convention have delegated the power of interpretation to the European Court 
of Human Rights whose interpretations are binding on the States, and the Court has 
developed additional rules and principles of interpretation. The aforementioned prin-
ciples set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply to the European 
Convention on Human Rights as general principles interpretation, which constitute 
464 Germer 1970, p. 425 and 426.
465 For details, see Hardy 1962, p. 82-98.
466 For details, see Hardy 1962, p. 98-106.
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the basis for developing the language of the Convention and for the transition of the 
legal culture of protecting human rights both at the European and at the national 
level. In the following, an analysis is made of how the European Court of Human 
Rights has applied those principles and the additional rules and principles developed 
for interpreting the Convention in its case law, in an effort to assess to what extent 
the meaning of the Convention provisions has evolved and what type of a transition 
of the legal culture has taken place.
3.4  Principles of interpretation of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the light of case law
An examination of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows 
that, although the principles set out Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may 
serve as the starting point of interpretation of the Convention, the Court in reality 
applies a hybrid approach to interpretation, which appears to be rather a combina-
tion of the said principles and general principles of interpretation of law. In the view 
of White & Ovey, the general principles of the Vienna Convention must be applied 
with caution. This is due to two reasons, in particular: first, the interpretation of the 
Convention is subject to international adjudication instead of taking place between 
the parties to the Convention and, second, in any interpretation of the Convention, 
attention should be paid to its specific object and purpose, which is to protect citizens 
from interference from State authorities.467 This view appears to be supported by 
Matscher.468 Matscher points out that the Vienna Convention remains silent on the 
relation between static or historical interpretation and evolutive or dynamic interpreta-
tion, but clearly refers to the wording and object and purpose469. Thus, the principles 
of evolutive and dynamic interpretation have been developed by the Court itself. It 
appears that it is the same types of problems of interpretation, that have been faced by 
national legal systems, which have also lead to the development of the methods and 
criteria of interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights.470 Senden draws 
 
467 White & Ovey 2010, p. 66, 71 and 72. See also Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p. 261 and 262. 
The latter observe that although the references to the Vienna Convention are not frequent, they 
are well established (constante).
468 Matscher 1998, p. 20. Matscher observes that the Vienna Convention does not draw a distinction 
between such treaties as create rules applied to individuals and those that only create rights and 
obligations between the parties to the treaty.
469 Matscher 1998, p.19.
470 This is the conclusion of Frowein (2005(1), p. 6).
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a distinction between methods of interpretation and principles of interpretation.471 
For the purpose of this study, no such a distinction is drawn but they are all treated 
as rules or principles of interpretation.
Particularly in the early years of the application of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, some of its provisions have given rise to confusion in the courts of States 
parties to the Convention. Most of the problems faced were not so much questions of 
wording or meaning, but rather related to the scope of application of the Convention, 
although there are also cases where the underlying problem has been at least partly 
of a linguistic nature, most notably under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 
Today, there are less such conceptual problems as there is already abundant case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights where the Court has taken a stand in respect 
of those treaty provisions which have given rise to differing interpretations. However, 
it appears that the Court has continued to expand the scope of the rights protected, 
particularly through the application of the principle of dynamic or evolutive interpreta-
tion, which continues to present challenges for the national jurisdictions. In the follow-
ing, the individual principles of interpretation as developed by the Court are assessed 
in the light of its case law. At the same time, an assessment is made whether signs of 
transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights may 
be detected in the application of those principles, trough the Court’s discourse. It is 
observed in the foregoing that such signs can be identified at least to some extent on 
the basis of an overview of the case law as a whole.
3.4.1  Ordinary meaning or literal interpretation
As stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty shall be interpreted 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose. In a strict sense, that means literal interpretation of 
the text. The European Court of Human Rights has on occasion referred to the ordinary 
meaning of words when interpreting the provisions of the Convention, although not 
always so obviously and literal interpretation has not always been the decisive method. 
Ost & van de Kerchove, among others, consider that the approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights to literal interpretation has varied from case to case, being 
sometimes the decisive principle of interpretation but remaining on occasion in the 
background as the Court has given more weight to other factors such as the spirit of 
471 Senden 2011, p. 390. In the view of Senden, an interpretation method is a technique that clarifies 
which substantive argument has been used in order to support a specific reasoning and which 
helps the judge to objectify its reasoning. An interpretative principle serves as an objective or aim 
that can be taken into account when interpreting a provision with the help of an interpretation 
method. (Ibid.) However, The European Court of Human Rights does not appear to clearly 
distinguish methods and principles from one another, but rather refers to the various principles 
by using specific denominations.
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the Convention.472 The Court is, nevertheless, bound by the text of the Convention in 
that it could hardly “write” new rights into the Convention.473 The Court has referred 
to the ordinary meaning of words in various cases, using also other expressions such 
as “sufficiently clear”, “normal”, “evident” and “natural”.
In the case of Johnston and Others v. Ireland, for example, the Court explicitly referred 
to the wording of Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention in assessing 
whether the “right to marry” under Article 12 could be understood as including the 
“right to divorce”. In the Court’s words, ”in order to determine whether the applicants 
can derive a right to divorce from Article 12, the Court will seek to ascertain the or-
dinary meaning to be given to the terms of this provision in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. Further, “the Court agrees with the Commission that 
the ordinary meaning of the words “right to marry” is clear, in the sense that they cover 
the formation of marital relationship but not their dissolution. […]”474. In that case, 
the interpretative situation was relatively simple. The wording of Article 12 does not 
explicitly refer to the right to divorce. Instead, the provision may raise other questions 
in the light of national law. The provision speaks of the right of men and women and 
limits the right to marry by linking it to national laws governing the exercise of that 
right. The scope of the provision has proven to be particularly problematic with regard 
to the right of transsexuals to marry someone of the sex opposite to their re-assigned 
gender. In the case of Rees v. the United Kingdom, the Court stated as follows:
In the Court’s opinion, the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 (art. 12) refers 
to the traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex. This appears 
also from the wording of the Article which makes it clear that Article 12 (art. 12) is 
mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the family.
Furthermore, Article 12 (art. 12) lays down that the exercise of this right shall be 
subject to the national laws of the Contracting States. The limitations thereby intro-
duced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the 
472 Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p. 263 and 264.
473 Grewe points out that in this respect, national courts interpreting constitutions have more flex-
ibility than the European Court of Human Rights. For example in Germany, judges have shown 
some willingness to recognise rights not explicitly spelled out in the Constitution. (Grewe 1998, 
p. 227)
474 In the Court’s words, ”in order to determine whether the applicants can derive a right to divorce 
from Article 12, the Court will seek to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of this provision in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Further, “the Court 
agrees with the Commission that the ordinary meaning of the words “right to marry” is clear, in 
the sense that they cover the formation of marital relationship but not their dissolution. […]” 
Johnston and Others v. Ireland, plenary judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A 112, §§ 51 and 
52.
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very essence of the right is impaired. However, the legal impediment in the United 
Kingdom on the marriage of persons who are not of the opposite biological sex cannot 
be said to have an effect of this kind.475
That strictly literal interpretation has been confirmed in later case law476. Consider-
ing the strongly affirmative nature of that reasoning, it is persuasive as such and gives 
the reader legal foreseeability. However, some developments in the legal situation and 
interpretation have taken place since the Rees and Cossey judgments. In the case of 
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, the Court stated as follows:
It is true that the first sentence refers in express terms to the right of a man and woman 
to marry. The Court is not persuaded that at the date of this case it can still be assumed 
that these terms must refer to a determination of gender by purely biological criteria 
(as held by Ormrod J. in the case of Corbett v. Corbett, paragraph 21 above). There 
have been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the 
Convention as well as dramatic changes brought about by developments in medicine 
and science in the field of transsexuality. The Court has found above, under Article 8 
of the Convention, that a test of congruent biological factors can no longer be decisive 
in denying legal recognition to the change of gender of a post-operative transsexual. 
There are other important factors – the acceptance of the condition of gender identity 
disorder by the medical professions and health authorities within Contracting States, 
the provision of treatment including surgery to assimilate the individual as closely 
as possible to the gender in which they perceive that they properly belong and the as-
sumption by the transsexual of the social role of the assigned gender. […] 477
In this fragment of discourse, the Court uses general practical reasoning to convince 
the audience of a changed situation, meriting a different interpretation of the Con-
vention provisions. The relevant linguistic elements include expressions such as “not 
persuaded that at the date of this case it can still be assumed”, “there have been major 
social changes” and “dramatic changes brought about developments in medicine”. Thus, 
475 Rees v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A 106, §§ 49 and 50.
476 See Cossey v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A 184, §§ 44 to 46. 
The Court further stated that “although some Contracting States would now regard as valid a 
marriage between a person in Miss Cossey’s situation and a man, the developments which have 
occurred to date (see paragraph 40 above) cannot be said to evidence any general abandonment 
of the traditional concept of marriage. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider that 
it is open to it to take a new approach to the interpretation of Article 12 (art. 12) on the point at 
issue.” (§ 46) Thus, the Court remained with the strict interpretation of Article 12 even though 
there had been developments in the legal conceptions in the States parties to the Convention. 
477 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions 2002-VI, § 100.
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the principle of ordinary meaning, together with context, may not as such be fruit-
ful for the purpose of analysing possible transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights particularly where the conceptions in the different legal systems 
as to the meaning of the term are rather similar, but it is necessary to resort to a wider 
context and external elements of argumentation, even sources of other sciences. How-
ever, when read together with the national laws relating to the exercise of the right, 
there could be evolution of the legal situation changing the meaning. The transition 
of the legal culture in such cases would take place more on the basis of national leg-
islation than through the interpretation of the Convention. As regards possible right 
of persons of the same sex to marry, according to national laws, the Court has not for 
the time being gone as far as reading the Convention provision to guarantee such a 
positive obligation for the States, and it would go beyond the wording of the provision. 
However, it would be interesting to see how the Court would interpret it in situation 
where national laws permitted it. The situation would, however, then be rather linked 
to other means of interpretation.
Matscher points out that insofar as the Convention contains ordinary terminology, 
it is not problematic to interpret the provisions rather freely, in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of words. However, the situation is different with regard to legal 
terminology. He raises the question of whether such terminology should be interpreted 
in accordance with the meaning it is given in the national legal system concerned, or in 
national legal systems collectively, or whether it should be interpreted autonomously.478 
An example of legal terminology would be, for example, the concept of “possessions” 
in Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which may raise questions such as the personal 
or material scope of the concept479. In such cases, a literal interpretation may always 
not be sufficient to decide the exact meaning of the provision but other principles of 
interpretation may be called for, such as the margin of appreciation. The Court may also 
be faced with the weighing of conflicting interests, which may be given priority even 
if a strict interpretation of the first part of the provision – “No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions” – is accepted as such. For example, in the case of Lithgow and Others 
v. the United Kingdom, the interpretation of the provision in the light of the ordinary 
meaning of words was more complicated, and while sharing the applicants’ view as 
to the grammatical meaning of the provision to some extent, the Court did not agree 
478 Matscher 1998, p. 26.
479 See e.g. Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A 31, in which the Court decided 
whether illegitimate children could enjoy less extensive rights than legitimate ones under national 
laws, and Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A 52, in which 
the Court considered a variety of intangible assets as belonging to the concept of possessions, as 
well as Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A 159, in which the 
Court found that even a licence to serve alcoholic beverages fell within the concept as one of the 
principal conditions for carrying on business.
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in all respects but resorted to the travaux préparatoires as a supplementary means of 
interpretation as mentioned in the foregoing.480 The Court accorded the Government 
a wide margin of appreciation in determining when a deprivation of possessions should 
occur. Thus, the more the Court departs from literal interpretation and gives room for 
other principles of interpretation, the more there is transition of legal culture taking 
place. The supplementary means of interpretation are treated below.
3.4.2  Context
As regards the additional criterion of context in Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, there are different types of context that may be 
identified, including the other provisions of the article in question, other articles of 
the Convention, the Convention as a whole including its Protocols, as well as other 
international instruments or even case law of other judicial bodies.481 It appears from 
the foregoing reference to the protection of possessions, for example, how the Court 
takes into account other provisions of the same article when interpreting the situation. 
In the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, for example, 
the Court has referred to other articles of the Convention as follows:
“ According to the Court’s established case-law, Article 14 (art. 14) complements 
the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has 
no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the 
application of Article 14 (art. 14) does not necessarily presuppose a breach of 
those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be no room 
for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more 
of the latter [...]”
It did not find a violation of Article 8 taken alone, but considered that there had been 
discrimination in that case and thus found a violation of Article 14 taken together with 
 
480 Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, plenary judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A 102, §§ 114 
to 119. The case concerned the interpretation of Article 1(1) of Protocol 1, the second sentence 
of which reads “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
There was no disagreement on the meaning of the words “no one”, but the scope and contents of 
the general principles of international law was put into question. The Court found, with support 
from the preparatory work, that they were only meant to cover non-nationals and did not apply 
to the taking of property from the State’s own nationals, whereas nationals would be covered by 
the provisions of national law.
481 Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p.271.
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Article 8.482 One of the most typical cases where two Convention articles are indeed 
applied together are those of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention, as 
that provision cannot be applied alone. According to White & Ovey, however, the 
question of context has most often become relevant in the case of interpretation of 
some provisions of the additional Protocols, which have not been entirely ratified by 
the State party concerned.483 In the case of Maaouia v. France, the Court used a con-
text encompassing Article 6 and Protocol No. 7, to establish the meaning of “criminal 
charge” and thus the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, as follows:
The Court points out that the provisions of the Convention must be construed in the 
light of the entire Convention system, including the Protocols. In that connection, the 
Court notes that Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, an instrument that was adopted on 22 
November 1984 and which France has ratified, contains procedural guarantees ap-
plicable to the expulsion of aliens. In addition, the Court observes that the preamble 
to that instrument refers to the need to take “further steps to ensure the collective 
enforcement of certain rights and freedoms by means of the Convention ...”. Taken 
together, those provisions show that the States were aware that Article 6 § 1 did not 
apply to procedures for the expulsion of aliens and wished to take special measures in 
that sphere. […] 484
Thus, the Court excluded from the scope of criminal charge aspects that were regu-
lated by other explicit provisions in Protocol No. 7. In the same judgment, the Court 
also took into account a wider context, paying attention to the fact that, in general, 
such orders were not classified as criminal within the member States of the Council 
of Europe485. The Court may also refer to the context in looser terms, as for example 
in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy in which the Court stated that “without losing sight 
of the general context of the case, the Court recalls that, in proceedings originating 
in an individual application, it has to confine its attention, as far as possible, to the 
issues raised by the concrete case before it”486. In that piece of discourse, the Court 
482 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A 94, 
§§ 71 and 83. In the case of Rasmussen v. Denmark, the Court applied Article 14 together with 
Articles 6 and 8, but found no violation (judgment of 28 November 1984, Series A 87, §§ 32 to 
34 and 42. 
483 See White & Ovey 2010, p. 70.
484 Maaouia v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2000-X , § 36. The case concerned the classification of exclusion orders as preventive 
measures for the purpose of immigration control. 
485 The Court noted that ”the domestic legal order’s characterisation of a penalty cannot, by itself, be 
decisive for determining whether or not the penalty is criminal in nature. Other factors, notably 
the nature of the penalty concerned, have to be taken into account. (Ibid. § 39)
486 Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, § 88.
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does not specify whether it refers to the internal context or a wider external context. 
However, the Court has on occasion underlined the importance of adopting an exten-
sive approach to the context of interpretation. The European Court of Human Rights 
has explicitly stated that “the Court must have regard to the fact that the context of 
the provision is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human rights and 
that the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to 
promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”.487 Thus, 
in terms of discourse analysis, the Court refers to the concept of internal context, 
covering both the text of the Convention and its Protocols, but adopting as wide an 
approach as possible.
As for the concept of external context, Article 31, paragraph 3 subparagraph (a), of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has no relevance for the interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, but under subparagraph (b), there 
shall be taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation. As noted in the foregoing, that subparagraph has a connection to the 
doctrine of precedents applied by the European Court of Human Rights, which is 
a rather flexible one. The Court has expressed its doctrine of precedents as follows: 
“While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in 
the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should 
not depart, without cogent reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases. Since 
the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the 
Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and 
respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. It 
is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner 
which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure 
by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it 
a bar to reform or improvement.”488 The Court’s doctrine of precedents has perhaps 
more in common with the Scandinavian and German legal systems than it has with 
the English legal system as the latter’s doctrine of precedents is a more formal and 
stricter one. The Court has also suggested that this approach to the changing condi-
487 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 January 2008, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2008, § 62. In the Court’s words, “The Court must have regard to the fact 
that the context of the provision is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human rights 
and that the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote 
internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”.
488 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2002-IV, § 68. See also earlier judgments in the cases of Cossey v. United Kingdom, judgment of 
27 September 1990, Series A 184, § 35, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A 
31, § 41, and Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, § 95.
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tions should also apply with regard to domestic legal orders489. It must be underlined, 
however, that an overall analysis of the Court’s discourse in its judgments indicates 
that the Court’s case law has become such an essential part of the Court’s interpreta-
tion practice, serving often as the starting point. Therefore, although in terms of the 
Vienna Convention it might belong to the concept of external context, it should rather 
be treated as an internal element of justification and argumentation.
As regards Article 31, paragraph 3 subparagraph (c), of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, referring most clearly to external context in terms of discourse 
analysis, it is observed already in the foregoing that the Court has also, on occasion, 
been confronted with the question of applicability of other international conventions 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and with the applicability of general principles of international 
law. It is somewhat questionable whether that wider context would rather fit in the 
framework of supplementary means of interpretation. In the light of the judgment of 
Saadi v. the United Kingdom, the Court itself seems to draw a distinction between other 
provisions of international law and supplementary means of interpretation, however, 
stating as follows:
[…] The Court must also take into account any relevant rules and principles of inter-
national law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties […]. Recourse 
may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
works to the Convention, either to confirm a meaning determined in accordance with 
the above steps, or to establish the meaning where it would otherwise be ambiguous, 
obscure or manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32 of the Vienna Convention).490
In any case, in terms of discourse analysis, references to contexts other than the text 
itself constitute external elements of argumentation. Other provisions of international 
law may also be a demonstration of the transition of legal culture in the States parties 
to the European Convention on Human Rights. In such cases, the references to a wider 
context and external elements of argumentation are linked with the transition of legal 
culture. For example, in the case of Christine Goodwin, the European Court of Human 
Rights paid attention to the development of the right to marry within the European 
Union as a whole, as follows: “[…] The Court would also note that Article 9 of the 
recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union departs, no 
doubt deliberately, from the wording of Article 12 of the Convention in removing the 
489 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2002-IV, § 69. In that case, the Court even resorted to an extensive analysis of national case law.
490 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 January 2008, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2008, § 62.
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reference to men and women.”491 The Court does not necessarily give decisive weight 
to the developments among a smaller group of nations, but depending on the State 
against which the application has been made, it may be of even great relevance in the 
interpretation of the legal situation at hand.
3.4.3  Object and purpose of the Convention
Although according to Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the starting point for interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the 
provision, the object and purpose of the Convention has to be kept in mind in line 
with that Article. The object and purpose are often referred to as teleological inter-
pretation. Reliance on the object and purpose allows more flexibility of interpretation 
than strictly literal interpretation. On occasion, the European Court of Human Rights 
refers explicitly to the object and purpose of the treaty using the wording of the Vienna 
Convention, as explained in connection with the aforementioned case of Johnston and 
Others v. Ireland, as follows: ”in order to determine whether the applicants can derive 
a right to divorce from Article 12, the Court will seek to ascertain the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of this provision in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.492 Or the Court may use a looser expression such as the followng: 
“Given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that 
is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not 
that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by 
the Parties.”493 In such cases it appears clearly from the Court’s discourse that it has 
paid attention to the object and purpose of the treaty, but one has to remember that 
it most often does so even if not referring to it explicitly. The latter expression of the 
Court’s discourse even indicates that the object and purpose of the treaty may alleviate 
the principle of literal interpretation so as to allow room for a transition of the legal 
culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, given that the intention 
of the Parties was to ensure effective collective enforcement of those rights and to go 
even further than at the international level.
White & Ovey point out that the object and purpose of the Convention have perhaps 
played the most influential role in the adjudication of the European Court of Human 
Rights, although the Court has not applied any hierarchical approach to the different 
means of interpretation but rather sees the interpretation as a single complex opera-
tion.494 When looking at the style of reasoning in the Court’s judgments as a whole, 
491 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2002-VI, § 100.
492 Johnston and Others v. Ireland, plenary judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A 112, §§ 51 and 
52.
493 Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 7, § 8.
494 White & Ovey 2010, p. 65. (Golder, § 30)
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this approach entails a larger amount of general practical argumentation than in the 
Finnish traditions, for example. Reference to object and purpose, if not supported by 
convincing legal arguments, would have the potential of weakening persuasiveness and 
foreseeability, depending on how consistently the object and purpose is interpreted in a 
similar manner. It is also the view of Ost & van Kerchove that teleological interpretation 
is the dominating method applied by the Court495 although the Court’s approach to 
the different rules and principles is generally rather flexible. As pointed out by Frowein, 
going beyond the mere wording of the Convention, the teleological interpretation 
represents the strongest form of legal protection.496 Senden, however, has criticised the 
European Court of Human Rights by stating that within the case law of the Court, 
the object and purpose of a particular treaty provision are not always substantiated, nor 
is it always explained how the object and purpose have been established497 although 
she admits that there are many signs of teleological interpretation in the Court’s case 
law498. That observation is correct, but one must bear in mind that the Court has on 
several occasions underlined the living nature of the Convention, perhaps intention-
ally deviating from the strict concept of object and purpose of the Convention499. It is 
interesting to note that the Court only seldom refers to the travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention when referring to the object and purpose, although the most usual means 
of establishing the intention of the legislator in Finland, for example, is to resort to the 
preparatory work. The Court has rather adopted a wide concept of object and purpose, 
of which the other rules and principles of interpretation developed by the Court itself 
constitute an extension. Thus, the wide approach to the object and purpose is a means 
of interpretation that could leave more room for transition of legal culture, but it also 
entails more subjective elements of interpretation than mere wording of the provision, 
and in the light of the Court’s case law the linguistic elements attesting transition are 
often lacking when the Court refers to object and purpose. One must also remember 
495 Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p.295.
496 Frowein 2005(1), p. 5.
497 Senden 2011, p. 392.
498 Senden 2011, p. 392. Senden uses the concepts of micro-teleological interpretation and meta-tele-
ological interpretation: micro-teleological interpretation refers to a method whereby the object and 
purpose of a provision or a treaty are used to justify an interpretative conclusion; meta-teleological 
interpretation is a concept referring to the phenomenon that certain interpretative principles are 
based on an understanding of the object and purpose of the treaty system as a whole (Ibid. p. 
391).
499 This view appears to be shared by Lavapuro who points out that the general principles of inter-
pretation do not as such directly define the contents of individual rights, but rather the judicial 
approach of the European Court of Human Rights to human rights provisions (Lavapuro 2011, 
p. 470). Thus, the Court commits itself to effective implementation of certain principles expressing 
the rights of the individual even in changing conditions, basing itself on two abstract criteria: 
the nature of the Convention as an international law instrument and its special character as an 
agreement on the collective enforcement of human rights (Ibid.).
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that some aspects of reasoning often remain behind “closed doors” even in national 
case law, which makes the discourse analysis a challenge.
3.4.4  Supplementary means of interpretation
Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supplementary 
means of interpretation are resorted to when the interpretation under the main rules 
leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure or where it leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. The preparatory work of the treaty are mentioned specifically 
as such supplementary means, in addition to the circumstances of its conclusion. As 
regards the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, travaux préparatoires 
have been referred to on occasion explicitly with reference to Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention. For example, in the James and Others case, the Court reasoned exception-
ally profoundly on the need to consult the preparatory work:
Confronted with a text whose interpretation has given rise to such disagreement, 
the Court considers it proper to have recourse to the travaux préparatoires as a sup-
plementary means of interpretation (see Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties).
Examination of the travaux préparatoires reveals that the express reference to a right 
to compensation contained in earlier drafts of Article 1 (P1-1) was excluded, notably 
in the face of opposition on the part of the United Kingdom and other States. The 
mention of the general principles of international law was subsequently included and 
was the subject of several statements to the effect that they protected only foreigners. 
Thus, when the German Government stated that they could accept the text provided 
that it was explicitly recognised that those principles involved the obligation to pay 
compensation in the event of expropriation, the Swedish delegation pointed out that 
those principles only applied to relations between a State and non-nationals. And it 
was then agreed, at the request of the German and Belgian delegations, that “the general 
principles of international law, in their present connotation, entailed the obligation 
to pay compensation to non-nationals in cases of expropriation” (emphasis added).
Above all, in their Resolution (52) 1 of 19 March 1952 approving the text of the 
Protocol and opening it for signature, the Committee of Ministers expressly stated 
that, “as regards Article 1 (P1-1), the general principles of international law in their 
present connotation entail the obligation to pay compensation to non-nationals in 
cases of expropriation” (emphasis added). Having regard to the negotiating history as 
a whole, the Court considers that this Resolution must be taken as a clear indication 
that the reference to the general principles of international law was not intended to 
extend to nationals.
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The travaux préparatoires accordingly do not support the interpretation for which the 
applicants contended.500
An analysis of the foregoing fragment of discourse discloses that the Court placed 
considerable weight on the intention of the parties in the light of the travaux prépara-
toires. The reference to them may also be made less extensively. In the case of Johnston 
and Others v. Ireland, the Court referred to the travaux préparatoires to seek further 
support for the interpretation that the protection of the right to marry under Article 
12 intentionally excludes the right to divorce, as follows:
[…] Moreover, the foregoing interpretation of Article 12 (art. 12) is consistent with 
its object and purpose as revealed by the travaux préparatoires. The text of Article 12 
(art. 12) was based on that of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, paragraph 1 of which reads:
“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or reli-
gion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights 
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”501
This is an example of those provisions where intentional derogation has been made 
from the international instrument serving as the model for the Convention (“dissolu-
tion” has been excluded), but the first phrase in the foregoing fragment of discourse 
indicates that the travaux préparatoires were merely used to support the interpretation 
already made by the Court. On occasion, the Court may also explicitly note that there 
is no need to consult the preparatory work to establish the meaning of the provision. In 
the Lawless case, the Court found, approving the Commission’s line of reasoning, that 
there was no need to resort to the preparatory work when the wording of the provi-
sion was sufficiently clear.502 The Court, however, only seldom refers to the “travaux 
préparatoires” of the Convention to support the general rules of interpretation under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties503. The approach of the European Court 
 
500 James and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A 98, § 64.
501 Johnston and Others v. Ireland, plenary judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A 112, § 52.
502 Lawless v. Ireland, judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A 3, § 11. The Commission considered that 
it was not permissible to do so, finding that this was a well-established rule concerning the in-
terpretation of international treaties. In support of its reasoning, the Commission had, however, 
resorted to the preparatory work and to a comparison of the two authentic language versions of 
the Convention, noting that no support for the Government’s submissions was received from 
the preparatory work. See also White & Ovey 2010, p. 66 and 67.
503 See Matscher 1998, p. 19.
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of Justice to preparatory work in respect of the founding Treaties seems to be rather 
similar in that they are only seldom referred to.504
As Danelius observes, there is a good reason for the European Court of Human 
Rights not to refer to the preparatory work. It is characteristic of the European Court 
of Human Rights to apply a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the Convention, 
taking into account the development of society and changes in legal thinking in the 
States parties505, and in view of the nature of the Convention as a living instrument506. 
There is some truth in that statement. It is unclear, in the light of the preparatory work 
of the Convention whether the parties have intended to go as far as the Court has gone. 
However, in the light of the preamble to the Convention and its preparatory work there 
has been a clear intention to go further at the European level, when compared with the 
international instruments, and the responsibility for interpretation has intentionally 
been transferred to the European Court of Human Rights. A considerable part of the 
provisions refer to national laws, and nor are those static.
There are also other supplementary means of interpretation available, although it 
may be difficult to say whether they should rather be included in the concept of con-
text. For example, in assessing whether the situation in a certain State is in compliance 
with the provisions of the Convention, the Court may compare it with the situation 
in other States parties to the Convention. For example, in the case of Vogt v. Germany, 
the Court assessed the requirement of political loyalty imposed on civil servants, by 
comparing its existence with other States as well as other parts of Germany as follows:
[…] Another relevant consideration is that at the material time a similarly strict duty 
of loyalty does not seem to have been imposed in any other member State of the Council 
of Europe, whilst even within Germany the duty was not construed and implemented 
in the same manner throughout the country; a considerable number of Länder did not 
consider activities such as are in issue here incompatible with that duty. 507
In that fragment of discourse, the Court uses external elements of argumentation 
in negative linguistic terms, stating that something does not exist in the light of ex-
ternal sources of argumentation. Such negative linguistic statement has also been used 
for example in the case of Maaouia v. France, when determining whether exclusion 
orders should be classified as criminal law sanctions within the meaning of Article 
 
504 Arnull 1998, p. 120 and 121.
505 Danelius 2012, p. 50.
506 See e.g. the judgments in the cases of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, 
Series A 26, § 31, and Matthews v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 18 February 
1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, § 39.
507 Vogt v. Germany, Grand Chamber judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A 323, § 59.
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5, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in which the Court sought further support for its 
interpretation by reasoning as follows:
On that subject, the Court notes that, in general, exclusion orders are not classified as 
criminal within the member States of the Council of Europe. Such orders, which in 
most States may also be made by the administrative authorities, constitute a special 
preventive measure for the purposes of immigration control and do not concern the 
determination of a criminal charge against the applicant for the purposes of Article 6 
§ 1. The fact that they are imposed in the context of criminal proceedings cannot alter 
their essentially preventive nature. It follows that proceedings for rescission of such 
measures cannot be regarded as being in the criminal sphere either […] 508
Thus, in that case, the Court carried out comparison between the criminal law 
systems and legislations of the member States. An analysis of the discourse reveals 
that although it is apparent from the text that the Court has resorted to comparison, 
it is difficult to analyse how exactly the comparison has taken place on the basis of the 
foregoing two fragments of discourse. According to Pellonpää & al., comparison be-
tween different legal systems by the Court is not always systematic509, which statement 
finds support in case law. Comparison may also take place between the two language 
versions of the Convention, in accordance with the special rules in Article 33 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For example, in the case of Wemhoff v. 
Germany, the Court reasoned as follows:
The Court cannot accept this restrictive interpretation. It is true that the English text 
of the Convention allows such an interpretation. The word “trial”, which appears there 
on two occasions, refers to the whole of the proceedings before the court, not just their 
beginning; the words “entitled to trial” are not necessarily to be equated with “entitled 
to be brought to trial”, although in the context “pending trial” seems to require release 
before the trial considered as a whole, that is, before its opening.
But while the English text permits two interpretations the French version, which is 
of equal authority, allows only one. According to it the obligation to release an accused 
person within a reasonable time continues until that person has been “jugée”, that is, 
until the day of the judgment that terminates the trial. Moreover, he must be released 
 
508 See Maaouia v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2000-X , § 39. Vogt v. Germany, Grand Chamber judgment of 26 September 1995, 
Series A 323, § 59,
509 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 293.
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“pendant la procédure”, a very broad expression which indubitably covers both the 
trial and the investigation.
Thus confronted with two versions of a treaty which are equally authentic but not 
exactly the same, the Court must, following established international law precedents, 
interpret them in a way that will reconcile them as far as possible. […].510
Thus, the Court used the method of reconciliation between the language versions 
as referred to in the Vienna Convention. Comparison between language versions is 
not usual, and has mainly taken place in some early case law. Whereas the comparison 
between the two language versions of the Convention represents an internal element 
of argumentation, relating to the narrower concept of context, the comparison of 
developments in the States parties represents a wider context, an external perspective 
of argumentation in the same way as other international instruments or provisions of 
international law. Senden, on the one hand, has presented some criticism concerning 
the use of comparison by the Court, finding that there is obscurity in how the Court has 
reached a conclusion on the existence of consensus or common tradition in some cases, 
whereas in others it has not found enough support for its existence.511 The analysis made 
of the foregoing fragments of discourse appears to support at least to some extent that 
criticism. Senden has, on the other hand, considered that although it might be desirable 
to see more transparent and revealing interpretative conclusions in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, it often means a more substantive approach, which 
could in turn result in resistance from states that do not agree with such a substantive 
approach.512 Kiikeri considers the comparative method used by the European Court of 
Human Rights more pluralistic than the one applied by the European Court of Justice, 
demonstrating a variety of comparative interpretations to the same subject. Nevertheless, 
he also points out that the European Court of Human Rights tends to rather use the 
comparative method in support of conservative views. Thus, the comparative method 
has, in the view of Kiikeri, only seldom been used by the Court to justify a change in 
legal interpretation. The comparative method is closely related to those situations where 
the Court has afforded the respondent State a wide margin of appreciation, i.e. has 
decided that the national authorities are in a better position to assess the situation.513 
That statement also finds support from an overview of the Court’s case law as a whole. 
However, there are also examples of such judgments in which comparison indicates 
510 Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 7, §§ 7 and 8.
511 Senden 2011, p. 395.
512 Senden 2011, p. 403. Thus, her main conclusion has been that it is difficult to suggest any concrete 
improvements to be made, given the complicated multilevel context in which the Court operates 
(Ibid.).
513 Kiikeri 2001, p. 185-187.
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changes in the legal culture, for example in the aforementioned cases under Article 8. 
The case of Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom illustrates that kind of a situation:
[…] There have been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adop-
tion of the Convention as well as dramatic changes brought about by developments in 
medicine and science in the field of transsexuality. The Court has found above, under 
Article 8 of the Convention, that a test of congruent biological factors can no longer be 
decisive in denying legal recognition to the change of gender of a post-operative trans-
sexual. There are other important factors – the acceptance of the condition of gender 
identity disorder by the medical professions and health authorities within Contracting 
States, the provision of treatment including surgery to assimilate the individual as 
closely as possible to the gender in which they perceive that they properly belong and 
the assumption by the transsexual of the social role of the assigned gender. The Court 
would also note that Article 9 of the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union departs, no doubt deliberately, from the wording of Article 12 
of the Convention in removing the reference to men and women […] 514
In the light of that judgment, the Court has resorted to both comparing social 
changes, developments of medicine and science and changes of legislation, as well as 
developments in other international instruments, to support its finding that the right 
to marriage between men and women should today be considered to also belong to 
such couples in which one of the spouses has a reassigned gender, thus extending the 
scope of the provision. That kind of expanding discourse further has links with certain 
other principles of interpretation, such as the principle of effective protection. The 
comparative method has the potential of demonstrating transition of the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, although the Court has perhaps 
resorted to it less than it could. Thus, on the basis of an analysis of the comparative 
elements alone, it would be difficult to draw definitive conclusions.
3.4.5 Margin of appreciation
The principle of “margin of appreciation” is a concept which is not based on the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Furthermore, it is not men-
tioned in the text of the European Convention on Human Rights. Like the principle 
of autonomous meaning, it is something that has appeared in the European control 
mechanism through the case law of the Court, and is traditionally foreign to most 
national legal systems. In brief, the essential elements of the doctrine, that the Court 
still refers to today, may be outlined as follows:
514 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2002-VI, § 100.
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[…] Certainly, the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to 
limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very 
nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and in 
place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals […]. 
In laying down such regulation, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation. Whilst the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s require-
ments rests with the Court, it is no part of the Court’s function to substitute for the 
assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of what might be the best 
policy in this field […]
Nonetheless, the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left to the 
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is im-
paired […]. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 
1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.515
 
The margin of appreciation is often linked with the principle of proportionality 
as can be seen in the quotation above. In essence, the principle means that the right 
protected by the Convention is not an absolute one, but may be subject to reasonable 
and proportionate restrictions. In certain situations, the national authorities are better 
placed to assess whether restrictions are necessary. The principle of margin of apprecia-
tion is closely related to the restrictions allowed in respect of the protection afforded 
by the provisions of the Convention. According to the Convention, any restrictions 
must be based on law and they must be necessary in democratic society. Insofar as 
the necessity in democratic society is concerned, the Court has often stated that there 
must be a pressing social need for the restriction. For example:
[…] The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), 
implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in 
hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying 
it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give 
the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression 
as protected by Article 10 (art. 10). […] 516; and
515 See Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A 93, § 57.
516 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 2), judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A 217, § 50. 
See also Tammer v. Estonia, judgment of 6 February 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2001-I, § 60.
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By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, 
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to 
give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the “necessity” 
of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them. The Court notes at this juncture 
that, whilst the adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 
10-2), is not synonymous with “indispensable” (cf., in Articles 2 para. 2 (art. 2-2) 
and 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), the words “absolutely necessary” and “strictly necessary” 
and, in Article 15 para. 1 (art. 15-1), the phrase “to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation”), neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 
“admissible”, “ordinary” (cf. Article 4 para. 3) (art. 4-3), “useful” (cf. the French text 
of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) (P1-1), “reasonable” (cf. Articles 
5 para. 3 and 6 para. 1) (art. 5-3, art. 6-1) or “desirable”. Nevertheless, it is for the 
national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social 
need implied by the notion of “necessity” in this context.
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to the Contracting States a margin 
of appreciation. […] 517
Thus, as the foregoing fragment of discourse indicates, the Court has also explained 
in detail what is meant by “pressing social need”, implying that restrictions on the free-
dom of expression are to be avoided and limited to the strictly necessary. Even under 
national constitutional law, rights are not considered absolute in the sense that they 
could not be restricted under any circumstances. In constitutional law, a distinction 
is drawn between restriction or limitation of rights and a temporary derogation from 
the protection afforded518. The Finnish Constitution, for example, does not contain any 
general limitation or derogation clause but the possibility of derogation is provided 
for in various fundamental rights provisions such as the provision on the freedom of 
expression.519
According to Yourow, however, the margin of appreciation doctrine emerged first 
through cases in which States parties were considered to have the right to deroga-
tion from the Convention in a situation of a public emergency which threatens the 
life of nation520. In his view, the origins of the doctrine are already in the Lawless case 
concerning preventive detention of a member of the Irish Republican Army, in which 
the Court reasoned with detailed description of facts as follows:
517 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A 24, § 48.
518 See Ojanen 2001, p. 65.
519 For more detailed analysis concerning the possibilities of limiting fundamental rights under the 
Constitution, see Ojanen 2001, p. 67-75.
520 Yourow 1996, p. 15.
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Whereas, in the general context of Article 15 (art. 15) of the Convention, the natural 
and customary meaning of the words “other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation” is sufficiently clear; whereas they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or 
emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised 
life of the community of which the State is composed; whereas, having thus established 
the natural and customary meaning of this conception, the Court must determine 
whether the facts and circumstances which led the Irish Government to make their 
Proclamation of 5th July 1957 come within this conception; […]
Whereas, despite the gravity of the situation, the Government had succeeded, by using 
means available under ordinary legislation, in keeping public institutions functioning 
more or less normally, […];
Whereas, in conclusion, the Irish Government were justified in declaring that there 
was a public emergency in the Republic of Ireland threatening the life of the nation 
and were hence entitled, applying the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 1 (art. 
15-1), of Convention for the purposes for which those provisions were made, to take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the Convention.521 
An analysis of the Court’s discourse indicates, however, that it indeed is a descrip-
tion of a typical situation to which the principle of margin of discretion or appreciation 
relates, but the principle itself is difficult to identify. The Court describes the situation 
in detail, but does not clearly state that it is for the national authorities to assess what is 
strictly required by the situation. When looking at the linguistic elements of discourse, 
the words “the Irish Government were justified” are a simple conclusion on the basis of 
facts. The Court has later expressed itself in clearer terms, starting with the concept of 
“discretion”. Still in the case of Klass and Others v. Germany, also pertaining to national 
security, the Court refers clearly to the principle by using the term “discretion”, as follows:
As concerns the fixing of the conditions under which the system of surveillance is to be 
operated, the Court points out that the domestic legislature enjoys a certain discretion. 
It is certainly not for the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authori-
ties any other assessment of what might be the best policy in this field (cf., mutatis 
mutandis, the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 
12, pp. 45-46, para. 93, and the Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 
18, pp. 21-22, para. 45; cf., for Article 10 para. 2, the Engel and others judgment of 
8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 41-42, para. 100, and the Handyside judgment of 
7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 22, para. 48).
521 Lawless v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 1 July 1961, Series A 3, §§ 28 to 30.
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Nevertheless, the Court stresses that this does not mean that the Contracting States 
enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret 
surveillance. […] 522
The above fragment of discourse also clearly indicates the role of national authorities. 
As appears from the cases of Sunday Times and Handyside cited in the foregoing, the 
term “discretion was later replaced with the French concept “margin of appreciation” 
despite that it is foreign to the English language and legal system523.
While the application of the doctrine was rather rare at the beginning, since the 
Belgian language dispute524 it has gradually started to gain wider application, apart 
from national security, in other types of cases involving important national interests 
such as public morals, the common idea being that in these types of cases the national 
authorities are considered to be better placed to assess the requirements of the situation 
than an international judicial body which is geographically and sometimes in terms 
of time distant from the events involving a restriction of rights525. Thus, the doctrine 
highlights the subsidiary role given to the Convention in such cases, and is admittedly 
a controversial one particularly for the reason that it is applied differently depending 
on the degree of discretion allowed to the state varying according to the context526. 
Letsas criticises the Court for controversy surrounding the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation, which in his view has been caused by a failure to distinguish between 
what he calls the substantive concept of the doctrine and the structural concept of the 
doctrine. In his view, the substantive concept is most clearly related to the limitation 
clauses in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. The structural concept is essentially 
522 Klass and Others v. Germany, plenary judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A 28, § 49.
523 According to Yourow, the origins of the margin of appreciation doctrine can be found in the 
classical martial law doctrine and in the jurisprudence of the French Conseil d’Etat and other 
equivalent continental institutions, reviewing the legality of administrative action and discretion. 
The term itself has existed in the French legal system as such (marge d’appréciation) but the Ger-
man system contains some comparable concepts (see Yourow 1996, p. 14). Yourow names the 
German principles of Beurteilungsspielraum, Ermessensfehler, Ermessensspielraum, Ermssensmisbrauch, 
Ermessensüberscheitung, and unbekannte/ unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe as being close concepts to that 
of margin of appreciation.
524 Case ”relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium (Application 
n° 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/62; 1994/62; 2126/62), judgment of 23 July 1968. That case 
shows that the term “discretion” was in fact introduced by the Commission (see section A, § 4).
525 Yourow 1996, p. 21. Such other types of cases include e.g. freedom of expression cases under 
Article 10 (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A 24, § 
47, and Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A 30, §§ 58 and 
59, in which the term “margin of appreciation” is already used), cases concerning the lawfulness 
of detention under Article 5 (see Weeks v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series 
A 114, § 50), and cases concerning the right to respect for private and family life under Article 
8 (see Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A 45, § 52).
526 Harris & al. 2014, p. 16 and 17.
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related to the expression according to which national authorities are better placed to 
assess what is required by the situation.527 In this respect, Letsas further criticises the 
Court for rather taking the moralistic preferences of the majority of states (European 
consensus) as being synonymous with the idea of public morals, instead of leaving it 
for the national authorities to assess what the moralistic preferences of the majority 
are. According to him, the original idea (as reflected in the aforementioned Handyside 
and Sunday Times judgments) was that requirements of morals vary from place to place 
and from time to time and state authorities are better placed to define and apply these 
requirements “by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces 
of their countries”.528 It is indeed true, in the light of the Court’s case law, that it is 
sometimes unclear on what basis the Court makes its finding as regards reference to 
public morals, but on the other hand, some commentators have called for even stronger 
emphasis on the concept of European consensus by means of comparison, which is 
for the purposes of this chapter analysed as a separate standard of interpretation (see 
section 3.4.6 below). However, I would not find the absence of a clear distinction 
between the different aspects of the margin of appreciation called for by Letsas that 
problematic. Instead, there could even be a risk of a state getting away with a clear 
problem in legislation where the Court did not seek to find some common ground for 
assessment of public morals.
Harris & al. even warn about the risk that as a result of the application of the margin 
of appreciation a state’s law or conduct might even escape condemnation529. In the light 
of the analysis of case law in section 4.5 below, I would not find that a huge concern for 
the Finnish legal system. It is in fact rather seldom that national jurisdictions invoke 
the doctrine to merely state that there is no interference with rights. In my view, the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation as such is not that well suitable for being applied 
at the national level, as it is more a means of shifting the responsibility for the assess-
ment of the situation to the national authorities. Rather, in the case of Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions, they resolve the cases relating to derogation clauses by assessing what is 
in fact required by the situation and what are the acceptable limits of interference. This 
does not mean that there would be no protection of fundamental or human rights, but 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions have aimed at ensuring the minimum protection even 
in cases such as national security balanced against the right to privacy. Thus, although 
national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in the field of national security, 
for example, it does not mean that the applicants should be deprived of access to judicial 
assessment of whether the interference with the right to private life has remained within 
the acceptable limits. In case such a deprivation takes place, it could give reason to take 
527 Letsas 2007, p.81, 85, 90 and 91.
528 Letsas 2007, p. 121.
529 Harris & al. 2014, p. 11.
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the case to the European Court of Human Rights under the procedural provisions of 
the Convention, particularly Article 13 but also other procedural safeguards based on 
the substantive Convention rights530. As observed by Brems, particularly in those cases 
were the domestic margin of appreciation is wide, procedural scrutiny by the European 
Court of Human Rights functions as a check on state discretion, although this scrutiny is 
not limited to the situations of a wide margin of appreciation531. This makes it important 
to pay attention to the reasoning in the national judgments.
Nevertheless, considering that the principle of margin of appreciation is not based 
on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and it is only seldom known in 
a national legal system, its application has the potential of creating challenges at the 
national level or it may be easily applied in situation where it is perhaps not the best 
option for the interpretation of the Convention article. In this respect, it is particularly 
the area of restrictions based on public morals under Articles 8 and 10 that may prove 
challenging532. This has probably been the most usual source of confusion and is closely 
related to the principle of dynamic or evolutive interpretation explained in section 
3.4.9 below. The application of the principle of margin of appreciation is presumably 
easiest for those legal systems, where it is traditionally known. However, an overview 
of the national case law of those legal systems indicates that the principle is not usu-
ally referred to in connection with the application of the Convention or the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. As regards those legal systems, where it is 
more usual to have detailed references to case law, one may note that the term margin 
of appreciation has not existed in the legal language of the English legal system, nor 
in those of the Nordic legal systems, but in the same way as in the German legal sys-
tem, close concepts can be found. For example, in the Finnish legal system, the terms 
“harkinta” and “harkintavalta” could be used, and the closest Swedish equivalent would 
be “prövning”. Perhaps that explains that in some national case law in Finland, the 
concept of margin of appreciation has been referred to as a justification for derogations 
from the Convention right, as explained in section 4.5 below.
530 For an overview, see Brems 2013, The procedural obligations under substantive provisions, such 
as Articles 8 and 10, may be both positive and negative obligations on states, although this 
distinction is not always that clear. At any rate, it may be necessary for the Court to verify the 
quality of domestic legislation from the point of view of whether it affords sufficient procedural 
protection against arbitrary interference (p. 139), and the absence of such safeguards could even 
result in a violation of the substantive right under the Convention article in question for the 
reason that the right cannot be effectively enjoyed without effective procedures (p. 147).
531 Brems 2013, p. 160. In the view of Brems, a finding of deficient procedural safeguards should 
automatically lead to a narrow margin of appreciation, leaving less room for domestic authorities 
to restrict human rights.
532 This is also named by Letsas who refers to the idea that in those cases where there is no uniform 
conception of public morals in Europe, the national authorities are better placed to assess the 
local values. (Letsas 2007, p. 91)
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When compared with the principles of autonomous meaning and effectiveness, the 
principle of margin of appreciation has been more beneficial for the respondent Gov-
ernments, and it indeed may work to the opposite direction instead of strengthening 
the protection of fundamental rights and human rights, if not applied with caution. 
In the cases where the margin of appreciation has been referred to, some problems of 
linguistic interpretation have also arisen. On the basis of an analysis of the fragments 
of discourse cited in the foregoing, one may note that in general, there are hardly 
any signs of a transition of legal culture linked with the application of the principle 
of margin of appreciation. Rather, that principle is a sign of a situation where there 
is little room for strengthening the legal protection. Should there be indications of 
change, they are usually based on developments in the national legislation. In general, 
the style of reasoning in connection with references to the margin of appreciation is 
rather brief and mechanic when compared with those judgments where the Court 
resorts to expanding the scope of Convention rights. Further, the general practical or 
moral argumentation is not always particularly convincing, although legal arguments 
as such are persuasive.
3.4.6  European standard or European consensus
One principle limiting the application of the principle of margin of appreciation is 
that of a European standard, which may also appear in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights with different linguistic expressions, including “European 
consensus”, “common ground” or “common conceptions”, although the Court may be 
criticised for having sometimes an inconsistent approach to its use533. The margin of 
appreciation left for the national authorities is smaller in cases where the Court con-
siders a common European standard to exist. This has often been the case in respect 
of the freedom of expression, for example, and the Court has been able to assess the 
necessity of restrictions independently.534 For example, in the case of Sunday Times, the 
Court has stated the main principles of the freedom of expression, constituting clearly 
established common ground in the States parties to the Convention and entailing a 
narrow margin of appreciation, as follows:
[…] Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society; subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as 
a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Freedom of 
expression, as enshrined in Article 10 (art. 10), is subject to a number of exceptions 
 
533 See notes 511 and 569. 
534 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 306 and 307, Matscher 1998, p. 34 and 35.
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which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions 
must be convincingly established. […] 535
Thus, although the wording does not clearly refer to a common European standard, 
it is considered to exist in those cases where the restrictions on the enjoyment of the 
right in question must be interpreted narrowly. Instead, the Court often refers explicitly 
to a European standard, European consensus or common conception or ground in 
negative terms, i.e. by stating where it is not possible to find that it exists. That is often 
the case in respect of the protection of morals or the freedom of religion, as appears 
from the foregoing section on the margin of appreciation. For example, in the case of 
Handyside, the Court reasoned as follows:
[…] In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contract-
ing States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective 
laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, 
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of 
opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as 
well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them. […] 536
Further, in the case of Otto Preminger Institut, the Court stated that
As in the case of “morals” it is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform 
conception of the significance of religion in society (see the Müller and Others v. 
Switzerland judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 20, para. 30, and p. 22, 
para. 35); even within a single country such conceptions may vary. For that reason it 
is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible 
interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such expression 
is directed against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of appreciation is 
therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of 
the necessity of such interference.537
535 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A 30, § 50.
536 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A 24, § 48.
537 See e.g. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, judgment of 20 September1994, Series A 295-A, § 
50. See also Müller and Others v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A 133, §§ 30 and 
35,and Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series 
A 276, §35.
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In those fragments of discourse, the Court expresses the situation in negative terms, 
i.e. a European standard does not exist. Thus, by way of drawing an e contrario conclu-
sion from the above fragments of discourse, a European standard of protection typically 
exists in such cases where there is less room for changing the provisions of law and they 
remain rather static. The Court may also use different types of wordings when referring 
to the European standard or a uniform European conception, for example as follows:
As to legal developments in this area, the Court has examined the comparative study 
which has been submitted by Liberty (see paragraph 35 above). However, the Court is 
not fully satisfied that the legislative trends outlined by amicus suffice to establish the 
existence of any common European approach to the problems created by the recognition 
in law of post-operative gender status. In particular, the survey does not indicate that 
there is as yet any common approach as to how to address the repercussions which the 
legal recognition of a change of sex may entail for other areas of law such as marriage, 
filiation, privacy or data protection, or the circumstances in which a transsexual may 
be compelled by law to reveal his or her pre-operative gender.538; or
[…] These observations are particularly relevant here. Several States have, through 
legislation or by means of legal interpretation or by administrative practice, given 
transsexuals the option of changing their personal status to fit their newly-gained 
identity. They have, however, made this option subject to conditions of varying strict-
ness and retained a number of express reservations (for example, as to previously 
incurred obligations). In other States, such an option does not - or does not yet - exist. 
It would therefore be true to say that there is at present little common ground between 
the Contracting States in this area and that, generally speaking, the law appears to be 
in a transitional stage. Accordingly, this is an area in which the Contracting Parties 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. […] 539
Although the linguistic expression is slightly different, an analysis of the Court’s dis-
course indicates that there is no difference in the way in which it is used. The European 
standard, which is closely connected with the margin of appreciation, may sometimes be 
difficult for individual States to conceive. National courts and authorities seldom make 
such an extensive comparison between standards of the protection of rights in differ-
ent states that it would affect their own decision-making. The concept of a European 
standard, as a guiding principle concerning the interpretation of the Convention, is 
also based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, the 
538 Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 
of judgments and decisions 1998-V, § 57.
539 Rees v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A 106, § 37.
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Court’s opinion on various issues seems to have changed along with time, although in 
some cases slowly. For example, in early cases concerning the rights of homosexuals and 
transsexuals the Court did not find a common European standard to exist, but afforded 
the States a wide margin of appreciation. However, since 2002, the Court has been more 
willing to recognise that there is an emerging change in the legal situation the change 
of sex, for example, should result in certain legal effects that need to be recognised.540 
Such evolving interpretation by the Court may create some challenges of application of 
the Convention at the national level, which may be resolved by resorting increasingly 
to principles of interpretation applied by the European Court of Human Rights. In 
any case, the application of the principle of European standard leaves some room for 
strengthening the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, and 
the fragments of discourse analysed in the foregoing indicate that it is often linked to 
signs of transition of legal culture, although it is applied together with other principles 
of interpretation. The relevant linguistic elements may include expressions such as “legal 
developments”, “legislative trends” or “transitional stage” as well as simple statements of 
fact and law. However, the other relevant principles of interpretation, particularly the 
principle of dynamic interpretation and principle of autonomous meaning, are more 
clearly those that allow considerable transition of the legal culture.
3.4.7  Principle of proportionality 
Apart from the European standard, the margin of appreciation is restricted by the 
principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is most evident in those 
situations where the Convention expressly allows restrictions upon a right541, but it is 
present in any case law of the European Court of Human Rights and should not be 
unknown in national legal systems542. Raitio observes that in Finland the principle has 
been known at least since the 16th century543. The principle of proportionality is present, 
in particular, in those fragments of discourse where the Court assesses whether the 
restrictions on the enjoyment of the right in question are proportionate and justified 
and where it needs to balance conflicting rights against one another. Cases concerning 
freedom of expression typically involve its balancing against other conflicting interests, 
for example the right to privacy or the protection of morals. In those cases, for example, 
the Court has expressed the principle of proportionality in essence as follows:
In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must look at the impugned in-
terference in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the remarks held 
540 See Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions 2002-VI, § 85.
541 Harris & al. 2014, p. 13.
542 Matscher 1998, p. 37.
543 Raitio 2005, p. 357.
198 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
against the applicant and the context in which he made them. In particular, it must 
determine whether the interference in issue was “proportionate to the legitimate aims 
pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it 
are “relevant and sufficient” […] In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the 
national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based themselves on an acceptable 
assessment of the relevant facts […].544
In that fragment of discourse, the expression used for referring to the principle of 
proportionality is very clear (“whether the interference in issue was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued”). On occasion, the linguistic expression used may be less 
clear. For example, the Court has reasoned as follows on the need to reconcile the 
conflicting rights:
Nevertheless, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) does not give the Contracting States an 
unlimited power of appreciation. The Court, which, with the Commission, is respon-
sible for ensuring the observance of those States’ engagements (Article 19) (art. 19), is 
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” or “penalty” is reconcilable 
with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (art. 10). The domestic margin of 
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision 
concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its “necessity”; it covers not only 
the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an independ-
ent court. In this respect, the Court refers to Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention 
(“decision or ... measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority”) as well as 
to its own case-law (Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 
41-42, para. 100).545
In that fragment of discourse, the expression “whether [...] is reconcilable with” in-
directly refers to the principle of proportionality and the need to carry out a balancing 
exercise. In the protection of morals, again, the national authorities enjoy a relatively 
wide margin of appreciation, but it is not unlimited. The principle of proportional-
ity is of importance particularly for the press in their task of informing the public 
of matters of general importance. The right to the freedom of expression is subject 
to restrictions, but the Court has stated on numerous occasions that “the exceptions 
set out in Article 10 § 2, […] must […] be construed strictly […and the] need for 
544 Tammer v. Estonia, judgment of 6 February 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-I, 
§ 61.
545 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A 24, § 49.
 | 1993. Second phase of transition of the legal culture – development of the meaning of the Convention under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
any restrictions must be established convincingly”546, which narrows the scope of the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the State. Thus, the Court has held, for example, 
that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as such than as 
regards a private individual547. The Court set such limits in its case law by excluding 
from the freedom of expressions for example insults without being considerations of 
general importance548 or information of an intimate nature549. Nor are direct threats 
considered acceptable by the Court550. 
The principle of proportionality is present even in those cases involving the protec-
tion of the rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which do not involve the freedom 
of expression as a conflicting interest, but rather the interests of society. For example, 
in the case of K. and T. v. Finland, the Court stated concerning the application of the 
principle of proportionality as follows:
[…] The reasons relied on by the national authorities were relevant but, in the 
Court’s view, not sufficient to justify the serious intervention in the family life of the 
applicants. Even having regard to the national authorities’ margin of appreciation, 
the Court considers that the making of the emergency care order in respect of J. and 
the methods used in implementing that decision were disproportionate in their effects 
on the applicants’ potential for enjoying a family life with their new-born child as 
from her birth. This being so, whilst there may have been a “necessity” to take some 
precautionary measures to protect the child J., the interference in the applicants’ family 
life entailed in the emergency care order made in respect of J. cannot be regarded as 
having been “necessary” in a democratic society.551
The above fragment of discourse indicates that, when applying the principle of pro-
portionality, the Court carefully assesses the restrictions imposed on the enjoyment of 
the right to private life against the need of society to protect the child, by examining 
to what extent the measures were necessary and what their impact was in view of the 
aim. Thus, the principle of proportionality is closely related to the idea of necessity in 
democratic society. In other words, the restrictions imposed must not go further than 
what is necessary in democratic society and they must be proportionate to the legitimate 
546 See e.g. Tammer v. Estonia, judgment of 6 February 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2001-I, § 59. See also Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A 103, § 41, and Nilsen 
and Johnsen v. Norway, Grand Chamber judgment of 25 November 1999, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1999-VIII, § 43.
547 Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A 103.
548 Tammer v. Estonia, judgment of 6 February 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-I.
549 Ruusunen v. Finland, judgment of 14 January 2014 (Appl. No. 73579/10).
550 Delfi AS v. Estonia, judgment of 10 October 2013 (Appl. No. 64569/09).
551 K. and T. v. Finland, judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VII, 
§ 168.
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aim pursued. Thus, the Court needs to assess the seriousness of the violation of the 
protected right in the light of the importance of the need for the restriction. However, 
as is pointed out by Pellonpää & al., the necessity in democratic society is also assessed 
in the light of the historical and other circumstances of the State concerned. He raises 
the question of whether this might lead to different interpretations of rights in respect 
of different States parties to the Convention552. This might also create confusion con-
cerning the interpretation of the Convention in the long run, considering that national 
courts and authorities today increasingly follow the Court’s case law. It is difficult to 
say to what extent such different results in respect of different States exist, but in the 
assessment of Pellonpää & al., they are relatively rare553. In the same way as some of 
the aforementioned principles, the principle of proportionality leaves some room for 
strengthening the protection of fundamental rights and human rights, being a principle 
limiting the measures that the national authorities may take in restricting rights. How-
ever, the fragments of discourse of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the 
application of the principle of proportionality appears, do not show much signs of a 
transition of the legal culture as such. Thus, it is not among those principles that allow 
for the most considerable transition of the legal culture, but it rather ensures through 
its application that the protection remains at a high European level. When assessing 
the judicial style in connection with the application of the principle of proportionality, 
one may note that the general practical reasoning supplementing the legal arguments 
appears to be profound and thus rather persuasive. Given the rather static nature of 
the high standard of protection, the principle of proportionality and the relevant legal 
argumentation and general practical argumentation in the European case law should 
be rather easy for the Finnish supreme jurisdictions to adopt. Although it does not 
show strong elements of transition of the legal culture at the European level, except 
perhaps over a longer period of time, the principle of proportionality may be used at 
the national level to strengthen the standards of protection.
3.4.8 Principle of effectiveness and positive obligations
The principle of effectiveness is closely related to that of autonomous meaning. Accord-
ing to the words of the Court, the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that 
are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective554. The Court has 
further stated that “in interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special 
character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
552 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 310.
553 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 310.
554 Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A 32, § 24. See also the Case “relating to 
Certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium (so-called 
“Belgian linguistic case”), judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A 6, §§ 3 and 4.
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freedoms”555. Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the 
protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and 
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective556. The Convention leaves the 
national authorities a considerable margin of appreciation in deciding how to guarantee 
the protection of the rights set out in the Convention, but the persons protected by the 
Convention must be able to effectively enjoy those rights. As appears from the forego-
ing, the Court has accepted, among others, a wide margin of appreciation in respect of 
the legitimate aim of protecting national security, but even in those cases there must 
exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.557 The principle of effectiveness 
is an underlying principle, which is related to the possibilities of de facto applying and 
enforcing all the Convention rights, and it has become an essential part of the Court’s 
case law. Thus, for example, in the case of Airey, the Court further reasoned as follows:
[…] It must therefore be ascertained whether Mrs. Airey’s appearance before the High 
Court without the assistance of a lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether 
she would be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily.
[…] It seems certain to the Court that the applicant would be at a disadvantage if 
her husband were represented by a lawyer and she were not. Quite apart from this 
eventuality, it is not realistic, in the Court’s opinion, to suppose that, in litigation of 
this nature, the applicant could effectively conduct her own case, despite the assistance 
which, as was stressed by the Government, the judge affords to parties acting in person.
In Ireland, a decree of judicial separation is not obtainable in a District Court, where 
the procedure is relatively simple, but only in the High Court. A specialist in Irish 
family law, Mr. Alan J. Shatter, regards the High Court as the least accessible court not 
only because “fees payable for representation before it are very high” but also by reason 
of the fact that “the procedure for instituting proceedings ... is complex particularly in 
the case of those proceedings which must be commenced by a petition”, such as those for 
separation (Family Law in the Republic of Ireland, Dublin 1977, p. 21).
Furthermore, litigation of this kind, in addition to involving complicated points of 
law, necessitates proof of adultery, unnatural practices or, as in the present case, cru-
elty; to establish the facts, expert evidence may have to be tendered and witnesses may 
have to be found, called and examined. What is more, marital disputes often entail 
555 Ireland v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A 25, p. 90, § 239.
556 Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A 37, p. 16, § 33. Soering v. the United Kingdom, 
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A 161, § 87.
557 See Leander v. Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A 116, §§ 59 and 60. See also Klass 
and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A 28, §§ 49and 50.
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an emotional involvement that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity 
required by advocacy in court.
For these reasons, the Court considers it most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s 
position (see paragraph 8 above) can effectively present his or her own case. […]
The Court concludes from the foregoing that the possibility to appear in person before 
the High Court does not provide the applicant with an effective right of access and, 
hence, that it also does not constitute a domestic remedy whose use is demanded by 
Article 26 (art. 26) (see paragraph 19 (b) above).558
Thus, under the principle of effectiveness, the Court has widened the meaning of 
certain concepts used in the Convention, e.g. the meaning of “legal assistance” in Ar-
ticle 6, paragraph 3 subparagraph (c). In above fragment of discourse, the expansion of 
the scope is rather difficult to detect, as it is arrives at the conclusion on the basis of a 
series of separate arguments. The Court has found that in certain civil cases, the State 
may be under an obligation to provide legal assistance free of charge even though the 
Convention explicitly imposes this obligation only in respect of criminal law cases.559As 
suggested by the above fragment of discourse, the principle of effectiveness is also related 
to the requirement of Article 13 of the Convention that the applicants must have had an 
effective remedy available in the national legal system, to be able to enjoy the protection 
of rights guaranteed by the Convention. As observed by Danelius, it is not required 
that the effective remedy must be a court, but even administrative remedies may be 
sufficient to fulfil the criteria set out in Article 13. However, it is not enough to have a 
formal remedy available, but the applicants must have de facto access to the remedy to 
have their case examined, with reasonable prospects of success560. There are also other 
criteria set out by the Court, such as a decision within a reasonable time, which can 
also be effectively enforced.561 It is further required, however, that the applicant has an 
arguable claim, for Article 13 on effective remedies to become applicable562. Nor does 
the result of the proceedings have to be favourable for the applicant, but an arguable 
claim is sufficient to fulfil the requirements563. The principle of effectiveness is, in the 
light of the foregoing citations of the Court’s discourse, among those that provide most 
potential for strengthening the protection of fundamental rights and human rights to 
the extent of constituting a transition of legal culture. Another such principle is the 
558 Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A 32, § 24.
559 Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A 32, §§ 24 to 26.
560 See Danelius 2012, p. 506.
561 Danelius 2012, p. 508.
562 See Frowein & Peukert 2009, p. 392.
563 Frowein & Peukert 2009, p. 393.
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principle of positive obligations. In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights 
has assessed in certain situations, whether the national authorities not only have the 
obligation to ensure peaceful enjoyment of the rights protected by the Convention, 
but also to take active steps in guaranteeing those rights. Typical situations involving 
the principle of positive obligations include the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture. For example, in the case of L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, the Court assessed 
the existence of a positive obligation to protect life as follows:
The applicant complained in addition that the respondent State’s failure to warn and 
advise her parents or monitor her health prior to her diagnosis with leukaemia in 
October 1970 had given rise to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
In this connection, the Court considers that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins 
the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also 
to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction […] It 
has not been suggested that the respondent State intentionally sought to deprive the 
applicant of her life. The Court’s task is, therefore, to determine whether, given the 
circumstances of the case, the State did all that could have been required of it to prevent 
the applicant’s life from being avoidably put at risk.564
In the above fragment of discourse, the idea that the national authorities are under an 
obligation to take active steps to protect life is clearly expressed and derived from Article 
2 itself. The signs of transition of the legal culture are, however, difficult to detect. That 
element is rather based on the entire judgment as a communicative event, and a series 
of judgments to that direction impose an obligation on the respondent State to take 
legislative or other measures to strengthen protection at the national level. The principle 
of positive obligations is interesting from a linguistic point of view particularly in those 
cases where it is difficult to derive from the wording of the provision in question. For 
example, in the case of Aksoy v. Turkey, although the principle is inherent in the Court’s 
discourse, it is less expressed in less explicit terms in the following fragment of discourse:
The nature of the right safeguarded under Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3) has 
implications for Article 13 (art. 13). Given the fundamental importance of the pro-
hibition of torture (see paragraph 62 above) and the especially vulnerable position of 
torture victims, Article 13 (art. 13) imposes, without prejudice to any other remedy 
available under the domestic system, an obligation on States to carry out a thorough 
and effective investigation of incidents of torture.
564 L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of judgments and decisions 
1998-III, § 36.
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Accordingly, as regards Article 13 (art. 13), where an individual has an arguable claim 
that he has been tortured by agents of the State, the notion of an “effective remedy” 
entails, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough 
and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible and including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory 
procedure. It is true that no express provision exists in the Convention such as can 
be found in Article 12 of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which imposes a duty 
to proceed to a “prompt and impartial” investigation whenever there is a reasonable 
ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed. However, in the Court’s 
view, such a requirement is implicit in the notion of an “effective remedy” under 
Article 13 (art. 13) (see, mutatis mutandis, the Soering judgment cited at paragraph 
62 above, pp. 34-35, para. 88).565
Thus, the Court has derived the positive obligation to carry out investigations in 
respect of the allegation of torture, prohibited by Article 3, in the light of Article 13 
and by resorting to the provisions of the International Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Torture. Quite a few Articles of the Convention have been formulated so that 
they prohibit States from interfering with certain rights. It has, nevertheless, been 
established in the Court’s case law that all these provisions may also entail a positive 
obligation on the States to ensure that the persons residing in their territories also de 
facto can enjoy the protected rights, also vis-à-vis other private individuals. Such a 
positive obligation may take e.g. the form of legislation.566 Thus, it has a link with the 
principle of effectiveness. Along with time, the principle of positive obligations is well 
established today. However, in the same way as the principle of effectiveness, there are 
indications of transition of legal culture tied with the application of the principle of 
positive obligations, although the linguistic signs may not always be that apparent as 
for example in the case of the principle of autonomous meaning.
3.4.9 Dynamic or evolutive interpretation
In strict terms, the principle of object and purpose of the treaty suggests that the Con-
vention should be interpreted in a manner that reflects the intention of the parties as 
regards the aim. Thus, it would not allow changes in society to be taken into account. 
One of the situations in which such a traditional approach, linked with the principle of 
literal interpretation, is the right to marriage under Article 12. In the case of Johnston 
and Others v. Ireland cited in section 3.4.4 above, that right was considered to belong 
565 Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of judgments and decisions 1996-VI, 
§ 98.
566 Danelius 2012, p. 53 and 54.
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to couples representing the opposite sexes, and the right to divorce was not considered 
to be included. However, for example, in the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the reference to men and women have been explicitly excluded from 
the relevant provision, which gives reason to suggest that there have been develop-
ments in some States parties to the Convention. Thus, it raises the question of whether 
such developments in society should be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
Convention. The principle of dynamic interpretation entails that changes in social or 
political attitudes should be taken into account. The Court has repeatedly underlined 
that the Convention must be interpreted as a living instrument567. For example, in the 
case of Tyrer, the Court reasoned as follows:
[…] The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as the 
Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. 
In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and 
commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council 
of Europe in this field. Indeed, the Attorney-General for the Isle of Man mentioned 
that, for many years, the provisions of Manx legislation concerning judicial corporal 
punishment had been under review.568
The above fragment of discourse represents the most usual way in which the Court 
refers to the essence of the principle, in that the Convention is interpreted by the Court 
according to the prevailing standards and conditions in the member States as a whole. 
However, the wording of the judgment in this particular case has also raised criticism 
for not clearly explaining how the concept of “living instrument” actually resulted in 
the specific way of deciding the case, without a reference to national legislations or 
comparative study of judicial corporal punishment it remained unclear why the Court 
considered the abolition of such a punishment to constitute a commonly accepted 
standard569. Letsas refers to the case of Marckx570, in which there is an important dif-
ference when compared with the Tyrer judgment in that the Court explicitly referred 
to two international conventions to demonstrate the existence of a commonly accepted 
standard.571 There may be also other types of discourse which indirectly refer to the 
567 See e.g. the judgments in the cases of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, 
Series A 26, § 31, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objection), Grand Chamber judgment of 23 
March 1995, Series A 310, § 71, and Matthews v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment 
of 18 February 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, § 39.
568 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A 26, § 31.
569 Letsas 2007, p. 76.
570 Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A 31.
571 Letsas 2007, p. 77. Letsas finds that in this judgment, the concept of “living instrument” refers 
in particular to evolving European attitudes and beliefs instead of some specific legislation to be 
found in the majority of States parties.
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same principle, although the Court does not explicitly use the term “living instrument”, 
but refers to prevailing conditions or emerging consensus. For example, in the case of 
Christine Goodwin, the Court reasoned as follows:
Already at the time of the Sheffield and Horsham case, there was an emerging consensus 
within Contracting States in the Council of Europe on providing legal recognition 
following gender re-assignment (see § 35 of that judgment). The latest survey submitted 
by Liberty in the present case shows a continuing international trend towards legal 
recognition (see paragraphs 55-56 above). […]
[…] The Court accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common 
European approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to 
the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not 
only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new 
sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.572 
In that fragment of discourse, the expressions “emerging consensus” and “a continu-
ing international trend towards legal recognition” are linguistic elements indicating 
ongoing transition of the legal protection of the right in question. The Court may 
also apply the principle that the Convention is interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions with reference to the provisions of national law, particularly in those cases 
where the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, and in the absence 
of a common European standard, for example in the case of Hämäläinen as follows:
In the absence of a European consensus and taking into account that the case at stake 
undoubtedly raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the Court considers that the margin 
of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must still be a wide one. […]
Turning now to the domestic system, the Court finds that Finnish domestic law cur-
rently provides the applicant with several options. […] Contrary to the situation 
in some other countries, in Finland a pre-existing marriage cannot be unilaterally 
annulled or dissolved by the domestic authorities. Accordingly, nothing prevents the 
applicant from continuing her marriage.573
572 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2002-VI, §§ 84 and 85.
573 Hämäläinen v. Finland , Grand Chamber judgment of 16 July 2014 (Appl. No. 37359/09), §§ 
75 and 76.
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Those fragments of discourse under Article 8 of the Convention indicate that 
the principle of interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument is indeed 
well-established in the case law, but there are several linguistic means of expressing 
the principle. In the above fragment of discourse in the Hämäläinen judgment, the 
transition of the legal culture is expressed more indirectly than in the preceding frag-
ment of discourse taken from the Christine Goodwin judgment, as the Court refers 
to the situation in some other countries. The Court thus recognised the nature of the 
Convention as a living instrument, but found that in some situations the domestic 
authorities still enjoy a wide margin of appreciation and was not prepared to go as 
far as recognising the right to same-sex marriage. On the one hand, the dynamic or 
evolutive interpretation may create challenges for the national jurisdictions applying 
the Convention and the Court’s case law, as it may potentially reduce foreseaability of 
judgments. On the other hand, it would be difficult to determine the precise scope of 
the right in great detail in a single judgment but it may need to be developed through 
a series of judgments, as it would be impossible to foresee all the consequences or 
possible occasions for its application. Thus, some development is inevitable. Nor is the 
concept as well known to national legal systems as the principles based on the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are. The dynamic or evolutive interpretation, as a 
very far-reaching form of teleological interpretation, is indeed often named as a spe-
cific method of interpretation instead of or in addition to teleological interpretation574. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that teleological interpretation should be rather 
well known in national legal systems, although in some legal systems it is given more 
weight than in others and in some States it might at least partly derive particularly 
from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Different names could 
be given to the principle that the national courts apply, depending on the context. For 
example, in the field of criminal law, certain fundamental principles may play a role 
in addition to the wording of the law, e.g. the principle of the benefit of doubt, has a 
close connection with teleological interpretation575.
Matscher prefers to speak of evolutive interpretation instead of dynamic one as, in 
his view, society and consequently the legislator can be dynamic, but not a judge. The 
task of a judge is to interpret the rules within the meaning they have been given ac-
cording to the ideological and social conceptions of the given moment.576 As observed 
by Harris & al., when applying the principle of dynamic interpretation, the Court must 
574 For details, see Ost & van de Kerchove 1989, p. 295-300, who use the French term l ’interpréta-
tion évolutive. Letsas, in turn, observes that a careful reading of the “living instrument” approach 
reveals that it is a reiteration of the Court’s principle of autonomous meaning. (Letsas 2007, p. 
79) These two have indeed a lot in common.
575 For more detailed analysis concerning the application of teleological interpretation at the national 
level, see e.g. Frände 2008, p. 544-552.
576 Matscher 1998, p. 25.
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assess whether a change in the policy of the law has achieved a sufficiently wide accept-
ance in European states to make it possible to expand the meaning of the Convention 
right577. However, as is pointed out by White & Ovey, the Convention cannot be 
interpreted so widely as to include completely new rights into the Convention, as this 
could hardly be considered to have been the original meaning of the parties, and nor 
cannot it be interpreted so as to extend the jurisdictional basis of the Convention.578 
That also limits the application of dynamic interpretation to those cases where the 
wording of the Convention provision is flexible enough. Although it may have seemed 
that the Court has rather been interested in evolution towards the moral truth instead 
of finding a common European consensus, particularly in early case law579, the Court 
in principle applies the principle of living instrument in both types of situations580. 
The principle of dynamic or evolutive interpretation is most clearly a principle that is 
applied in those fragments of discourse and judgments that represent changes in the 
case law and thus transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and 
human rights.
Sometimes, although rarely, the Court has been criticised for being too conserva-
tive. In the view of Orakhelashvili, the Court has in two rather recent judgments 
adopted too restrictive an interpretation of the provisions of the Convention, failing 
to accord due importance to the nature of the European Convention as an instru-
ment of public order establishing obligations of an objective nature. Orakhelashvili 
even suggests that the Court feels free to pick and choose between different methods 
of interpretation as if there were no order or hierarchy between these methods.581 
However, when analysing the case law of the Court as a whole, it rather seems that the 
Court aims at combining methods, which has also been the intention of the drafters 
of the Vienna Convention. It also appears that signs of transition of the legal culture 
577 Harris & al. 2014, p. 9. In the view of Harris & al., the Court has generally been cautious and 
has preferred to follow state practice rather than adopt a new approach.
578 White & Ovey 2010, p. 72. Despite this, they suggest that some commentators have observed 
a new approach to the interpretation of the Convention, which extends the evolutive approach 
by seeking to integrate interpretation of the civil and political rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights, thereby limiting the division between the Convention and the European Social 
Charter. (Ibid. p. 75 and 76) See also Harris & al. 2014, p. 9.
579 Letsas 2007, p. 79.
580 Mowbray 2013, p. 26-35. Mowbray provides examples of both cases in which there is evolution 
in social relationships (moral conceptions) and cases in which there are clearly changes in human 
rights standards.
581 Orakhelashvili 2003, p. 567. The judgments referred to are Bankovic, Stojanovic, Stoimenovski, 
Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom, Grand Chamber decision as to the admissibility of 12 December 2001 (Appl. 
No. 52207/99), and Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 November 2001 (Appl. No. 
35763/97).
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often appear together with the application of several principles of interpretation, 
instead of one, although it is possible to identify signs of such transition even in the 
case of individual principles. Apart from the principle of dynamic interpretation, the 
principle of autonomous meaning represents a principle that clearly demonstrates 
signs of transition of the legal culture.
3.4.10 Autonomous meaning
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to ordinary meaning, which 
is the main principle of interpretation of individual terms or concepts, and to special 
meaning that may be given to a term or concept. The principle of autonomous meaning 
differs from those principles, but is closer to the idea of special meaning. The princi-
ple of autonomous meaning developed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
its case law is particularly interesting from a linguistic point of view, given that it is 
clearly attached to the meaning of words. The principle of autonomous meaning is 
first explained in general, with reference to views expressed by scholars, followed by 
a more detailed analysis of the Court’s discourse in the light of case studies based on 
selected provisions of the Convention. The principle of autonomous meaning has raised 
considerable interest among scholars, particularly as it has expanded the meaning of the 
Convention provisions. Its application may be justified, but it may also raise concerns 
and criticism. With this principle, the Court means that certain concepts used in the 
Convention do not necessarily have the same meaning as the concepts used in national 
legal systems. The European Court of Human Rights has resorted to the principle of 
autonomous meaning to guarantee a European standard for the protection of human 
rights, which is enhanced by giving those concepts an independent meaning, and has 
done so particularly with regard to certain concepts under Articles 5, 6 and 7. In the 
Court’s words, the principle of autonomous interpretation may be summarised for 
example in respect of the concept of a “penalty” in Article 7582 as follows:
 
The concept of a “penalty” in this provision is, like the notions of “civil rights and obliga-
tions” and “criminal charge” in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), an autonomous Convention 
concept. […] To render the protection offered by Article 7 (art. 7) effective, the Court 
must remain free to go behind appearances and assess for itself whether a particular 
measure amounts in substance to a “penalty” within the meaning of this provision […].
The wording of Article 7 para. 1 (art. 7-1), second sentence, indicates that the starting-
point in any assessment of the existence of a penalty is whether the measure in question 
is imposed following conviction for a “criminal offence”. Other factors that may be taken 
into account as relevant in this connection are the nature and purpose of the measure 
582 Article7 falls outside the present study in other respects.
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in question; its characterisation under national law; the procedures involved in the 
making and implementation of the measure; and its severity.583
Thus, the above fragment of discourse shows that for a measure to be characterised 
as a penalty, it is relevant to go beyond the word and examine the nature and purpose 
of the measure, apart from its characterisation under national law. The application of 
the principle of autonomous meaning is justified in that it makes it possible to avoid 
differences of application arising from differences of terminology.584 It is so particularly 
because, as pointed out by Sudre, the Court has resorted to it in such situations where 
there has been an objection by a State party to the application of a right guaranteed by 
the Convention, invoking a definition given to a concept in the national legal system 
of that State. The Court has used the principle of autonomous meaning to overrule 
such an objection. Thus, the Court has refused to consider the national definition as a 
decisive one when resorting to the principle.585 In the view of Letsas, the Court origi-
nally made use of this principle particularly to counter the possibility of circumventing 
the Convention guarantees586. Matscher supports this conclusion and points out that 
the intention of the Parties has not been to give a Convention provision a meaning 
that would be specific to a single State party, but there must be an intended meaning 
corresponding to the common intention of the Parties. Therefore, and because of the 
law creating-nature of the Convention, autonomous interpretation is well justified.587 
Insofar as the protection of human rights is concerned, it is important to ensure the 
full enjoyment of rights by all subjects covered by the Convention. Pellonpää & al. 
indeed point out that this principle underlines the nature of the Convention as an 
instrument enhancing the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, which 
are part of the common heritage of the States parties, instead of creating reciprocal 
rights for States.588 One may note that the principle of autonomous interpretation 
also helps avoid situations where the terminology applied within a particular legal 
system would be placed in a more advantageous position than others, although the 
Convention inevitably contains terminology that may be said to be more familiar to 
those legal systems that have the advantage of having English or French as the official 
language of legislation.
However, according to the Preamble to the Convention, its provisions derive from 
the common traditions of the States parties. Thus, on the one hand, Sudre raises the 
583 Welch v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 9 February 1995, Series A 307-A, §§ 27 and 28.
584 See White & Ovey 2010, p. 69. See also Sudre 1998, p. 94 and 95, and Letsas 2007, p. 41, 42 and 
49.
585 Sudre 1998, p. 101 and 102.
586 Letsas 2007, p. 42.
587 Matscher 1998, p. 29.
588 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 287.
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question of whether there is place for entirely autonomous interpretation as it might be 
foreign to the national courts and authorities, and might thereby reduce the legitimacy 
of the interpretation589. Matcher shares some of that criticism and has warned of the 
danger of going beyond the law’s boundaries590. On the other hand, there are situations 
where the Court explicitly refers to the national legal orders, particularly in the case 
of lawful detention under Article 5591. The most legitimate source of criticism would 
perhaps be, however, that the principle of autonomous meaning and interpretation 
probably deviates from what the authors of the Convention had in mind. Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether it is consistent with the principles set out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, despite that the Court has been given considerable 
independence in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Considering that certain concepts in the Convention have been given a meaning 
independent from those they may have been given in the national legal systems, such 
concepts have the potential of creating problems in the application of the Conven-
tion at the national level and may even lead to a large number of applications against 
the State before the European Court of Human Rights. The practice of resorting to 
autonomous interpretation may de facto have the potential of reducing foreseeability 
of the Court’s judgments, even if this did not amount to illegitimate judicial discretion. 
However, as is pointed out by Frände, it is important that the legally correct solution 
is applied instead of the foreseeable one592, bearing in mind that the legally correct 
meaning of a concept used in the Convention may even significantly differ from the 
one used in the national legal system593. When read in accordance with the literal 
meaning of words, the wording of a provision might not lead to the desired result. At 
any rate, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties underlines the importance of 
bearing the object and purpose of the treaty in mind when interpreting it, which has 
also been paid attention to by the European Court of Human Rights.
To derive the autonomous concepts developed by the Court from its case law is 
not necessarily easy, although in the doctrine, various lists have been suggested594. In 
the view of Sudre, the differing lists only constitute further proof of that the Court 
589 Sudre 1998, p. 120.
590 Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A 73. Dissenting opinion of Judge 
Matcher. See also Letsas 2007, p. 48 and 49. Letsas observes that if true, such a danger would 
entail a risk of illegitimate judicial discretion by going beyond what is accepted in domestic 
law.
591 Matscher 1998, p. 28.
592 Frände 2008, p. 551.
593 Letsas 2007, p. 52. Further, in such a situation, there is usually divergence in the way in which 
different legal systems classify the concept and understand it. (Ibid. p. 53)
594 Letsas identifies those of criminal charge, civil rights and obligations, possessions, association, 
victim, civil servant, lawful detention, and home (Letsas 2007, p. 42 and 43).
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has not adopted a very consistent approach to the concept of autonomous meaning.595 
The principle applied by the European Court of Human Rights is best highlighted by 
certain provisions of the Convention that have given rise to problems of interpreta-
tion, containing vague or imprecise concepts. Such concepts indeed call for efforts to 
harmonise the interpretation of the relevant provisions, although it may be difficult to 
identify precise limits596. In the following, the development of the Court’s discourse 
and the transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human 
rights are assessed in the light of case studies relating to Article 6, paragraph 1, and 
Article 5, paragraph 1, in respect of which it is relatively easy to identify autonomous 
concepts. The case law under Articles 6 and 5 has developed considerably as a result of 
the great number of judgments and, according to Yourow, as a result of that case law, 
there is already an impressive consensus in the law and practice of States parties to the 
Convention and the national legislation relating to due process has gradually become 
more uniform than e.g. family law597. Nevertheless, the extensive case law under the 
aforementioned articles demonstrate that there have been problems in the national 
legal systems, and those provisions have also produced some of the most interesting 
problems of interpretation from a linguistic point of view. Thus, those provisions also 
serve as a useful basis for assessing transition of the legal culture through the Court’s 
case law. Furthermore, in the case of those provisions the Court has perhaps most 
considerably extended the scope of application of the Convention. In general, it may 
also be observed that the style of argumentation in the case of both dynamic interpre-
tation and autonomous meaning include a considerable amount of general practical 
reasoning, which may entail the risk of weakening foreseeability of the case law and 
reducing the persuasiveness of the discourse. Despite that, it appears that the principle 
of autonomous meaning does not appear to have imposed major problems for the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions. Instead, the reception of argumentation in connection 
with the principle of dynamic interpretation has provided more challenges. On the 
basis of the relevant case law, one may note that the linguistic means of referring to 
the autonomous meaning is rather consistent, and is as such a sign of transition of the 
legal culture, but the best way of detecting it is to see how the Court has expanded 
the scope of the Convention provision in question to cover new situations. The focus 
of the analysis of case law under Article 6, paragraph 1, is on the application of the 
principle of autonomous meaning, but the analysis will inevitably entail references to 
other principles and methods of interpretation. Insofar as Article 5, paragraph 1, is 
595 For details, see Sudre 1998, p. 96-98. Sudre identifies only seven concepts that he would count 
as autonomous ones : arrestation, droits et obligations de caractère civil, matière pénale, témoins, ac-
cusation, peine, biens. This list differs only slightly from the more recent one identified by Letsas.
596 Letsas 2007, p. 49. According to Letsas, this is particularly because of the differences as to how 
the various legal systems understand and qualify these concepts.
597 See Yourow 1996, p. 186 and 187.
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concerned, the analysis will focus on the aspect of extending the applicability of the 
right by other means.
3.4.10.1 Case study: Article 6, paragraph 1 – “civil rights and obligations”
Article 6, paragraph 1, constitutes perhaps the best known example of those provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights that have not only produced a large 
number of violations in most States parties, mainly due to structural problems in the 
legal system (length of proceedings), but have also generated problems of interpreta-
tion. More precisely, it is the concept of “civil rights and obligations” that has been 
particularly problematic.598 According to Article 6, paragraph 1,
“in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time”.
In the other authentic language version of the Convention, French, the expression 
is slightly different, as the text speaks of “droits et obligations de caractère civile”, but in 
practice the meaning is the same.
The term of “civil rights” in the European Convention on Human Rights could be 
considered as meaning something similar as the same term used in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as the types of rights protected by the Con-
vention are more or less the same as those covered by the Covenant, although there 
are differences. First, the concept of civil rights is to be distinguished from economic 
and social rights599. Second, the concept has in principle been considered to be distinct 
from that of political rights600. The European Court of Human Rights has, however, 
somewhat refined these distinctions as explained below. The text of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights does not itself clarify what is meant by “civil rights”. Nor 
does the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly do so, although 
in the light of its preamble, the concept of “civil and political rights” is linked with the 
idea of civil and political freedom (civil liberties). In this context, it is interesting to 
note that in the Finnish translation of the Covenant, “civil rights” has been translated 
as “kansalaisoikeudet”, which could be reversely translated into English as “citizen’s 
rights” which is also a rather wide concept and is perhaps somewhat misleading. As 
598 Karapuu 1999, p. 175 and 176. For more details, see e.g. Danelius 2012, p. 51 and 163, concerning 
problems in Sweden, and White & Ovey 2010, p. 247-253, for a general overview of cases under 
the concept of civil rights and obligations.
599 These rights are protected at the international level by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and at the European level by the European Social Charter (revised, 
1996, ETS 163).
600 Pierre-Bloch v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI.
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in respect of many other provisions of the Convention, the Court has developed the 
interpretation of the provision through its case law and has given the concept a rather 
wide meaning or, in terms used by the Court, an autonomous meaning without it being 
dependent on its classification under national law601. This principle has been reiterated 
in numerous subsequent judgments in the discourse of which the essential elements 
of the autonomous meaning can be identified:
The Court reiterates that, according to the principles enunciated in its case-law […] it 
has first to ascertain whether there was a dispute (contestation) over a “right” which 
can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The 
dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a 
right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the 
proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question.602
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not aimed at creating new substantive rights without 
a legal basis in the Contracting State, but at providing procedural protection of rights 
already recognised in domestic law.603 
The term “right” must nevertheless be given an autonomous interpretation under 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.604
Thus, although not dependent on national law, there must be a dispute over a right 
which has its basis in national law and which is already recognised in domestic law. 
Further, not only the existence of a right is decisive, but also the scope and manner of 
its exercise and the result of the proceedings must be decisive for the right. It has not 
been particularly problematic for the Court to determine the various situations between 
private parties, regulated by private law, that fall within the scope of Article 6, including 
e.g. the law of contract, succession law, family law, employment law and property law. 
However, as Harris & al. point out, it is more challenging as regards the regulation 
of the relations between private persons and the state605. In the light of the Court’s 
case law, one way of defining the limits of Article 6, paragraph 1, could be by means 
of assessing what should be excluded from its scope of application. In the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the concept of civil rights is only used in Article 6, 
paragraph 1, and on the basis of the text of the Convention alone, it would be difficult 
601 König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A 27, § 88. See also Engel and Others v. the 
Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A 22.
602 Zander v. Sweden, judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A 279-B, § 22
603 W. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A 121-A, § 73.
604 Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, judgment of 27 July 2005 (Appl. No. 33538/96), § 48.
605 See Harris & al. 2014, p. 380.
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to establish the types of rights meant by the concept. One may attempt to define civil 
rights by first identifying those rights that could be classified as political rights – one 
may consider that the remaining ones are meant to be civil rights. The Court has held 
in the Pierre-Bloch judgment that the right to stand for election to national parliament, 
for example, does not fall within the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1, as it was a political 
right instead of a civil one606. An examination of the text of the Covenant reveals that 
only the rights related to the conduct of public affairs and elections, protected by Article 
25, are expressly political rights, although there are certain rights closely related to the 
exercise of these rights, such as the right to hold opinions and freedom of association 
(Articles 19 and 22). The latter rights can also be found in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Articles 9 and 11), whereas the rights relating to political life and 
elections are not expressly mentioned in the Convention. This would give reason to 
suggest that the meaning of civil rights is probably intended to be wider. Indeed, this 
has been confirmed by the Court’s case law, and the Court has held that the exercise 
of the freedom of assembly and association would fall outside the scope to the extent 
it is related to political purposes607. In other cases, they could fall within the scope of 
Article 6, paragraph 1. However, normally the freedom of expression cases would enjoy 
protection under Article 10 and the freedom of association cases would fall within 
the scope of Article 11 unless the dispute in question concerns e.g. access to court. In 
the view of Letsas, the freedom of association has in the light of the Chassagnou and 
Others case already developed to the level of an autonomous concept in itself, which 
further strengthens the protection of the freedom of expression608. The impact of the 
wide interpretation of the freedom of association can already be seen in Finnish case 
law, as explained in section 4.5 below.
The European Court of Human Rights has, on occasion, excluded some rights other 
than political rights from the scope of application of Article 6, paragraph 1, such as 
cases concerning national security and immigration and asylum. In the case of Maaouia, 
for example, the Court reasoned as follows:
606 Pierre-Bloch v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-
VI, §§ 50-52.
607 See AB Kurt Kellermann v. Sweden, judgment of 26 October 2004 (Appl. No. 41579/98) concerning 
the freedom of association.
608 Chassagnou and Others v. France, judgment of 29 April 1999, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 1999-III, § 100. In the Court’s words, “Freedom of thought and opinion and freedom of 
expression, guaranteed by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention respectively, would thus be of very 
limited scope if they were not accompanied by a guarantee of being able to share one’s beliefs or 
ideas in community with others, particularly through associations of individuals having the same 
beliefs, ideas or interests. The term “association” therefore possesses an autonomous meaning; the 
classification in national law has only relative value and constitutes no more than a starting-point.” 
See Letsas 2007, p.47.
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The Court therefore considers that by adopting Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 containing 
guarantees specifically concerning proceedings for the expulsion of aliens the States 
clearly intimated their intention not to include such proceedings within the scope of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the proceedings for the rescis-
sion of the exclusion order, which form the subject matter of the present case, do not 
concern the determination of a “civil right” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1. The fact 
that the exclusion order incidentally had major repercussions on the applicant’s pri-
vate and family life or on his prospects of employment cannot suffice to bring those 
proceedings within the scope of civil rights protected by Article 6 § 1 of the Conven-
tion (see, mutatis mutandis, the Neigel v. France judgment of 17 March 1997, 
Reports 1997-II, pp. 410-11, §§ 43-44, and the Maillard v. France judgment of 
9 June 1998, Reports 1998-III, pp. 1303-04, §§ 39-41).609
That conclusion may have a connection to the fact that the Court has also in general 
afforded States a wide margin of appreciation in cases relating to immigration. That 
approach has been confirmed in later case law610 and is consistently applied in Finnish 
case law as explained in section 4.5 below.
The situation is not, however, that easy as is demonstrated by various examples of 
the Court’s case law concerning the interpretation of Article 6, paragraph 1. In respect 
of the concept of “civil rights” in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention, it was clear 
that there were considerable differences in the way of classifying different types of rights 
in the different legal systems, most notably between the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
systems, and that it was not possible to found the interpretation of the concept of “civil 
rights” on a commonly accepted distinction between private and public law. Therefore, 
the European Court of Human Rights chose to give the concept a meaning that was 
generally applicable irrespective of differences between legal systems. Thus, given that 
it was hard to find a common denominator, the Court applied a negative approach to 
the development of an autonomous meaning. The Court has typically examined the 
concept of civil rights in the context of assessing whether Article 6, paragraph 1, is 
applicable to the case at hand. Thus, in the argumentation of the Court, there is a link 
between the autonomous meaning and the applicability of the right in question. As 
pointed out by Sudre, the applicability of the right is in fact the very essence of the 
609 Maaouia v. France, judgment of 5 October 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-X, 
§§ 37 and 38.
610 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Grand Chamber judgment of 4 February 2005, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2005-I, § 82, in which the Court applied the approach adopted in the 
Maaouia judgment, excluding the deportation of aliens from the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1.
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process of giving a concept an autonomous meaning611. However, the applicability of 
the right does not in all cases involve a concept with an autonomous meaning, but 
the Court rather extends the applicability of the right, including a certain concept, to 
cover a wider range of activities by means of dynamic interpretation612. The Court has 
elaborated on the meaning of the “civil rights” on numerous occasions, and has taken 
a position on what types of rights should be included within the scope of Article 6, 
paragraph 1. The question of whether it has relevance in administrative proceedings 
has been important particularly for those States that draw a distinction between private 
and public law, including Finland. The first case of significance is considered to be 
the judgment given in the case of Ringeisen v. Austria, in which the Court stated that
[...] For Article 6, paragraph (1) (art. 6-1), to be applicable to a case (“contestation”) 
it is not necessary that both parties to the proceedings should be private persons, which 
is the view of the majority of the Commission and of the Government. The wording of 
Article 6, paragraph (1) (art. 6-1), is far wider; the French expression “contestations 
sur (des) droits et obligations de caractère civil” covers all proceedings the result of 
which is decisive for private rights and obligations. The English text “determination 
of ... civil rights and obligations”, confirms this interpretation.
The character of the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, 
commercial, administrative law, etc.) and that of the authority which is invested with 
jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court, administrative body, etc.) are therefore of 
little consequence.613
Thus, for the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, it is not decisive how a particular 
right is classified under national law. This does not mean that national law would not 
play any role, but it means that the material contents of the right in national law are 
more important than its classification. In the light of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, there can be “civil rights and obligations” at stake, for exam-
ple, in various cases of proceedings between a private person and the state in the fields 
of administrative law (such as expropriation or confiscation, and fishing rights)614 and 
611 See Sudre 1998, p. 103 and 104. See also Harris & al. 2014, p. 379 and 380.
612 Harris & al. 2014, p. 387. As pointed out by Harris & al., the wide meaning results partly from 
the extensive interpretation given to the word “determination”, but also partly from the Court’s 
dynamic understanding of what amounts to a right for the purposes of Article 6.
613 Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A 13, § 94. See also König v. Germany, 
judgment of 28 June 1986, Series A 27, § 89.
614 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A 52, § 83, and Posti 
and Rahko v. Finland, judgment of 24 September 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2002-VII, §§ 50-58. In the Posti and Rahko judgment, the Court set as a decisive criterion the 
direct effect of limitations on fishing on the applicant’s livelihood.
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claims for damages against the state e.g. on the basis of seizure of property615, even where 
the basis of the claim is of a public law nature, and the right to engage in commercial 
activity or to practise a profession616. What appears to be decisive is whether there are 
pecuniary consequences for the private person concerned, although it is not alone a suf-
ficient criterion617. It is interesting to note that, although economic and social rights fall 
outside the scope of the Convention as such, the Court has considered that it may be 
difficult to draw a distinction between civil rights and employment and social rights618, 
and that in those cases where the private law aspects of the social security rights con-
cerned are more dominating than the public law aspects, Article 6, paragraph 1, may 
apply619. Instead, for example in the field of taxation, the Court has found the public 
law relationship to be more dominating620. One of the most recent problems relating 
to the meaning of ”civil rights”, and in respect of which there have been differing views 
in States parties, has been whether and to what extent civil servants should be afforded 
protection under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. In this respect, the case of 
Pellegrin v. France621 has been a landmark case. Before the Pellegrin judgment the Court 
had held that disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service 
of civil servants were as a general rule outside the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1. That 
general principle of exclusion had however been limited and clarified in a number of 
judgments. In the Pellegrin judgment, the Court reasoned as follows:
The Court accordingly considers that it is important, with a view to applying Article 6 
§ 1, to establish an autonomous interpretation of the term “civil service” which would 
make it possible to afford equal treatment to public servants performing equivalent or 
615 Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 5 May 1995, Series A 316-A.
616 König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1986, Series A 27. Benthem v. the Netherlands, judgment 
of 23 October 1985, Series A 97. Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment of 7 July 1989, 
Series A 159. Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 1997-II, and Kingsley v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002. 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-IV.
617 Editions Périscope v. France, judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A 234-B, §§ 39 and 40, and 
Ferrazzini v. Italy, Grand Chamber judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2001-VII, § 25.
618 In Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A 32, § 26, the Court observed that 
“whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them 
have implications of economic and social nature” and that “… there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention”.
619 Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 July 1987, Series A 124-A, § 40, and Deumeland v. 
Germany, judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A 100, § 74.
620 Ferrazzini v. Italy, Grand Chamber judgment of 12 July 2001, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2001-VII, §§ 29 and 30.
621 Pellegrin v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 December 1999. Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1999-VIII.
 | 2193. Second phase of transition of the legal culture – development of the meaning of the Convention under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
similar duties in the States Parties to the Convention, irrespective of the domestic system 
of employment and, in particular, whatever the nature of the legal relation between the 
official and the administrative authority (whether stipulated in a contract or governed 
by statutory and regulatory conditions of service). In addition, this interpretation must 
take into account the disadvantages engendered by the Court’s existing case-law […].
To that end, in order to determine the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to public servants, 
whether established or employed under contract, the Court considers that it should adopt 
a functional criterion based on the nature of the employee’s duties and responsibilities. 
In so doing, it must adopt a restrictive interpretation, in accordance with the object and 
purpose of the Convention, of the exceptions to the safeguards afforded by Article 6 § 1.622
The Court thus created an even new autonomous concept, that of “civil service”, 
and restricted the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, with reference to the nature 
of functions of the officials. The Court thereby also set limits on the interpretation of 
the concept. The Court further ruled that “the only disputes excluded from the scope 
of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention are those which are raised by public 
servants whose duties typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as 
the latter is acting as the depositary of public authority responsible for protecting the 
general interests of the State or other public authorities. A manifest example of such 
activities is provided by the armed forces and the police.”623 According to the Court 
itself, Pellegrin constitutes a first step away from the previous principle of inapplicabil-
ity of Article 6 to the civil service, towards partial applicability. In a further case, Vilho 
Eskelinen, the Court has already recognised a need to develop the case law further.624 In 
the Court’s view, where national law allows a dispute with a civil servant to be brought 
before a court, the rights at issue are deemed to be “civil”. If a domestic system bars 
access to a court, the Court will verify that the dispute is indeed such as to justify the 
application of the exception to the guarantees of Article 6. If it does not, then there is 
no issue and Article 6 § 1 will apply.625 In the view of Lemmens, although the Court 
622 Pellegrin v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1999-VIII, §§ 63 and 64.
623 Pellegrin v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 December 1999, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1999-VIII § 66.
624 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 19 April 2007, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2007-II, §§ 43 to 64.
625 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 19 April 2007, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2007-II, §§ 61 and 62. The Court found that there can in principle be 
no justification for the exclusion from the guarantees of Article 6 of ordinary labour disputes, 
such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements, on the basis of the special 
nature of relationship between the particular civil servant and the State in question. There will, 
in effect, be a presumption that Article 6 applies.
220 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
limited its reasoning to only apply to the situation of civil servants, this new approach 
reduces the importance of the nature of the right as the factor to determine whether 
the right is a civil one or not. In his view, it opens the door for the application of the 
new approach even outside civil servants and their employers.626 The Court has already 
extended the scope of application of Article 6, paragraph 1, to apply first to the right 
of access to higher education and later to the right of access to primary education627, 
which constitutes another recent example of extension of scope. At any rate, the case 
of Vilho Eskelinen does extend the application of Article 6 from partial applicability, 
as stated in the Pellegrin judgment, to full applicability where the civil servants have 
access to court.
However, in the light of Article 6, paragraph 1, it is not sufficient that the case 
concerns a civil right or obligation, but there must also be a dispute (contestation). Thus, 
in the case of Benthem, the Court has reasoned as follows:
The principles that emerge from the Court’s case-law include the following:
(a) Conformity with the spirit of the Convention requires that the word “contestation” 
(dispute) should not be “construed too technically” and should be “given a substantive 
rather than a formal meaning” […].
(b) The “contestation” (dispute) may relate not only to “the actual existence of a ... right” 
but also to its scope or the manner in which it may be exercised […]. It may concern 
both “questions of fact” and “questions of law” […].
(c) The “contestation” (dispute) must be genuine and of a serious nature […].
(d) […] “the ... expression ‘contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de caractère 
civil ’ [disputes over civil rights and obligations] covers all proceedings the result of 
which is decisive for [such] rights and obligations” […]. 628
In conclusion, it is easy to identify linguistically those cases where the Court has 
resorted to developing the concept of civil rights, and the Court in most cases explicitly 
refers to the principle of autonomous meaning. Particularly in the field of administrative 
626 Lemmens 2013, p. 298 and 299. Lemmens bases his view on a more recent case concerning 
educational rights, although the Court did not refer to the case of Vilho Eskelinen, suggesting 
that the development of the case law in this respect has not ended yet.
627 See Emine Araç v. Turkey, judgment of 23 September 2008, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2008, §§ 24 and 25, and Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, Grand Chamber judgment of 16 March 
2010, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2010, §§ 106 and 107.
628 Benthem v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A 97, § 32.
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law, including provisions of law on “civil service”, one may identify a clear transition 
of a legal culture of protecting the rights of civil servants, through the expansion of 
the concept of “civil rights”. It also appears that the Court has given a rather wide 
meaning to the concept of “dispute”, which is relevant for the interpretation of the 
provision. It has sometimes been suggested629 that in the process of giving a concept 
an autonomous meaning, the Court in fact seeks a common denominator, i.e. derives 
the meaning from the common legal traditions of the States parties, which necessarily 
involves comparison, and in the absence of such a common denominator, the Court 
gives the concept an autonomous meaning. However, Sudre points out that it is not so 
evident from the judgments of the Court how the common denominator is determined, 
although it seems clear that the Court is reluctant to reduce the common denominator 
to a level below what is desirable to guarantee the effective protection of the right in 
question. Sudre further observes that in the case of some concepts, such as the concept 
of civil rights and obligations, it would be difficult to establish a common denominator 
as the concept does not exist in the legal systems of all the States parties.630 Would its 
existence in only some legal systems be sufficient to determine that there is a common 
denominator? Letsas also draws attention to the challenges imposed by this semantic 
aspect of the principle of autonomous meaning, suggesting that the European Court 
of Human Rights appears to be willing indirectly to review national legislation, the 
emphasis being put on the domestic use of the concept631. The seeking of autonomous 
meaning through such review may entail risks. At any rate, one should perhaps adopt 
a rather critical approach to this aspect of the autonomous meaning.
I would rather suggest that it is more usual for the Court of Human Rights to 
resort to further specifying the concept of civil rights by other means, particularly by 
means of expanding the scope of application of Article 6, paragraph 1. On occasion, 
elements of comparison can be identified in connection with the examination of the 
scope of application. The fragments of discourse analysed indicate that the transition 
of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights relates to such 
concepts that are not particularly restrictive, but may allow differing interpretations in 
different States parties to the Convention. The expansion of the scope of application 
of Article 6, paragraph 1, in such a manner has the potential of creating challenges 
in the national jurisdictions. Whether that has created problems in the Finnish legal 
system, and whether it has resulted in an equivalent transition in Finland, is analysed 
629 E.g. Sudre (1998), see notes below.
630 Sudre 1998, p. 123 and 124.
631 Letsas 2007, p. 43-46. Letsas identifies four aspects with the human rights violations based on 
autonomous concepts: the fallibility of national classifications, directing by the applicant of her 
challenge against these domestic classifications, supporting of the challenge by arguments about 
what really should count as an instance of the relevant legal concept in broader terms, and the 
interdependence of the ECHR concepts and domestic legislation.
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in section 4.5 below. At any rate, Article 6, paragraph 1, and the interpretation given to 
the concept of civil rights constitutes a clear example of such provisions under which 
the legal culture at the national level has begun to evolve. 
3.4.10.2 Case study: Article 6, paragraph 1 – “criminal charge”
Another example of concepts with an autonomous meaning can also be found in Article 
6, paragraph 1, that of “criminal charge”.632 As in respect of “civil rights and obligations”, 
the Convention does not define this concept either, but it has acquired its substantive 
meaning through the Court’s case law. The Court has rather early drawn a distinction 
between criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, meaning that the latter 
fall outside the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1. However, in line with the reasoning 
in respect of the concept of “civil rights”, the Court has found that for the purpose of 
deciding whether a determination of “criminal charge” is at hand, the classification 
under domestic law is not decisive, although it plays a role. In respect of the distinction 
drawn between criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, the case of Engel 
and Others v. the Netherlands is considered to be a landmark case633. In that case, while 
acknowledging the States’ right to draw a distinction between criminal proceedings 
and disciplinary proceedings but noting that this should be subject to conditions so 
that the object and purpose of the Convention is not put at risk, the Court outlined 
the criteria for the existence of a criminal charge as follows:
In this connection, it is first necessary to know whether the provision(s) defining the 
offence belong, according to the legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law, 
disciplinary law or both concurrently. This however provides no more than a starting 
point. The indications so afforded have only a formal and relative value and must be 
examined in the light of the common denominator of the respective legislation of the 
various Contracting States.
The very nature of the offence is a factor of greater import. When a serviceman finds 
himself accused of an act or an omission allegedly contravening a legal rule governing 
the operation of armed forces, the State may in principle employ against him discipli-
nary law rather than criminal law. […]
However, supervision by the Court does not stop here. Such supervision would gener-
632 For a detailed analysis of case law relating to this concept, see e.g. Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 546-
555. Danelius 2012, p. 163-170. Frowein & Peukert 2009, p. 158-166. White & Ovey 2010, p. 
243-247.
633 Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, plenary judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A 22, §§ 80 to 85. 
For comments on the significance of the case, see Frowein & Peukert 2009, p. 159, Danelius 
2012, p. 164 and 165, and Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 547.
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ally prove to be illusory if it did not also take into consideration the degree of severity 
of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. In a society subscribing to the 
rule of law, there belong to the “criminal” sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be 
imposed as a punishment, except those which by their nature, duration or manner of 
execution cannot be appreciably detrimental. The seriousness of what is at stake, the 
traditions f the Contracting States and the importance attached by the Convention to 
respect for the physical liberty of the person all require that this should be so. […] 634
On these premises, the Court reasoned that the choice of disciplinary proceedings 
under the Dutch law was justified, but that they also fell within the scope of criminal 
law. However, the potential severity of the sentences was decisive for the determination 
that the applicants were entitled to the guarantees of Article 6, paragraph 1. In that 
particular case, the Court explicitly referred to the common denominator of the legisla-
tions of Contracting States but did not elaborate in great detail on how the common 
denominator was sought.635 However, the Ravnsborg case provided further guidance. 
Whereas in the Weber case, the sanction was found to be criminal in nature for the 
reason that it applied to the whole population instead of just parties to the proceedings, 
in the Ravnsborg case the applicant was found guilty of misconduct in court but the 
sanction was only found to be closer to a disciplinary one than a criminal one, taking 
into account the severity of the sanction636. A rather complex analysis has on occasion 
been necessary in drawing a distinction between disciplinary sanctions and criminal 
law sanctions, e.g. in cases concerning prisoners found guilty of misconduct in prison. 
The Court has also considered that disciplinary sanctions for prisoners serving their 
sentences may be so severe that they fall within the scope of Article 6, paragraph 1.637 
Apart from disciplinary proceedings, there are other types of regulatory proceedings 
in which it may be challenging to decide whether they fall within the criminal sphere 
of Article 6, paragraph 1, such as sanctions imposed on violations of traffic regula-
634 Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, plenary judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A 22, § 82.
635 The Court also paid attention to the nature and the degree of severity of the penalty in the case of 
Weber v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A 177, §§ 33 and 34, in which the Court 
found the “criminal realm” of Article 6 § 1 to be applicable. A contrary conclusion was reached in 
Pierre-Bloch v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI, § 59, concerning electoral 
legislation.
636 Weber v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 177, § 33. Ravnsborg v. Sweden, 
judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A 283-B, §§ 34 and 35.
637 See Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A 80, § 72, and 
Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 9 October 2003, Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions 2003-X, § 129. The Court further specified, on the one hand, that 
the extreme gravity of the offence may be indicative of its criminal nature. On the other hand, 
that does not conversely mean that the minor nature of an offence can, of itself, take it outside 
the ambit of Article 6. (Ezeh and Connors judgment, § 104)
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tions. In the light of the purpose of the Convention and the autonomous nature of 
the concept of “criminal charge”, the Court has given three criteria to be applied in 
determining whether an offence qualifies as “criminal”: the legal classification of the 
offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the nature and degree of severity 
of the possible penalty:
The Convention is not opposed to States, in the performance of their task as guardians 
of the public interest, both creating or maintaining a distinction between different 
categories of offences for the purposes of their domestic law and drawing the dividing 
line, but it does not follow that the classification thus made by the States is decisive 
for the purposes of the Convention.
[…] if the Contracting States were able at their discretion, by classifying an offence 
as “regulatory” instead of criminal, to exclude the operation of the fundamental clauses 
of Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7), the application of these provisions would be sub-
ordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might lead to results 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. 
Having thus reaffirmed the “autonomy” of the notion of “criminal” as conceived of under 
Article 6 (art. 6), what the Court must determine is whether or not the “regulatory 
offence” committed by the applicant was a “criminal” one within the meaning of that 
Article (art. 6). For this purpose, the Court will rely on the criteria adopted in the 
above-mentioned Engel and others judgment [...]. The first matter to be ascertained 
is whether or not the text defining the offence in issue belongs, according to the legal 
system of the respondent State, to criminal law; next, the nature of the offence and, 
finally, the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked 
incurring must be examined, having regard to the object and purpose of Article 6 (art. 
6), to the ordinary meaning of the terms of that Article (art. 6) and to the laws of the 
Contracting States.638
Thus, in this case, the Court has sought to find a common denominator by refer-
ring to the national classifications and has thus applied a more positive approach to 
the development of an autonomous meaning than in the case of civil rights, and this 
is also identifiable linguistically in numerous cases. The Court has further specified in 
the case of Janosevic, rejecting the first criterion i.e. the classification under domestic 
law, that the criteria are alternative and not cumulative, although the Court has also 
found that a cumulative approach is not excluded:
638 Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A 73, §§ 49 and 50.
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It is therefore necessary to examine the surcharges in the light of the second and third 
criteria mentioned above. These criteria are alternative and not cumulative: for Article 
6 to apply by virtue of the words “criminal charge”, it suffices that the offence in ques-
tion should by its nature be “criminal” from the point of view of the Convention, or 
should have made the person concerned liable to a sanction which, by its nature and 
degree of severity, belongs in general to the “criminal” sphere. This does not exclude that 
a cumulative approach may be adopted where the separate analysis of each criterion 
does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a “criminal 
charge” […].639 
Thus, although the Court has referred to national classification, it has aimed at 
including those sanctions that are by virtue of their severity to be considered criminal 
irrespective of how they have been named by the national legal systems. In the case 
of Janosevic v. Sweden the Court found that even fines that could not be converted 
into a prison sentence, if the amount was substantial, were to be considered criminal 
in nature, whereas in the aforementioned Weber case the possibility of converting the 
fines into a prison sentence contributed to the severity and criminal nature of the 
sanction640. Already earlier, apart from certain types of disciplinary proceedings, the 
Court has also considered certain proceedings under taxation laws, for example, to be 
equivalent to criminal law proceedings, which has created problems of interpretation 
in some legal systems, such as in the Janosevic case. Depending on the legal system, 
the questions of taxation would fall either within public (administrative) law or private 
law, the latter being the case mainly in common law systems. For example, in France, 
a distinction has been drawn between tax deception (”manoeuvre frauduleuse”) and 
tax evasion (“soustraction frauduleuse”), of which only the latter has been considered 
to constitute a criminal offence. In the case of Bendenoun v. France, the Court took a 
position on whether a tax surcharge constituted a criminal sanction for the purposes of 
Article 6, paragraph 1. Again, the Court recognised that the surcharges were imposed 
under the General Tax Code, but noted that the Code imposed penalties that were 
essentially intended as a punishment to deter reoffending, and were imposed under a 
general rule, whose purpose is both deterrent and punitive, and the surcharges were 
very substantial, and therefore found them to be “criminal” within the meaning of 
639 Janosevic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002, Reports of judgments and decisions 2002-VII, § 
67.
640 Janosevic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002, Reports of judgments and decisions 2002-VII, § 
67. Weber v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A 177, § 34. For a more recent case, 
see e.g. Jussila v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 23 November 2006, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2006-XIV, §§ 30 and 31, and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 
2009, Reports of judgments and decisions 2009, § 53.
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Article 6, paragraph 1.641 In contrast, in the case of Benham v. the United Kingdom, 
the Court agreed with the Government in that under English law, the proceedings 
in question are regarded as civil rather than criminal in nature. However, the Court 
noted that the law concerning liability to pay community charge and the procedure 
upon non-payment was of general application to all citizens, and that the proceedings 
in question were brought by a public authority under statutory powers of enforcement. 
In addition, the proceedings had some punitive elements. The Court further paid 
attention to the relatively severe maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment 
and to the fact that the applicant was ordered to be detained for thirty days, and 
concluded that the applicant was charged with a criminal offence for the purposes of 
Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 3.642 The principles applied in the Bendenoun have later 
been confirmed in Swedish and Finnish cases643, and as explained in more detail in 
4.5 below, have had an impact on the development of national case law. The Court 
has further developed the case law as regards the concept of criminal charge in rela-
tion to the application of the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 4 of Protocol 
No 7, confirming that administrative sanctions may be criminal in nature and that 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or 
trial of a second “offence” in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are 
substantially the same644. In the same way as in respect of the autonomous nature of 
641 Bendenoun v. France, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A 284, § 47. Similar conclusion has 
been made e.g. in the case of Janosevic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002, Reports of judgments 
and decisions 2002-VII. In that case, the Government had paid attention to the Bendenoun v. 
France judgment, but denied the punitive and deterring purpose of the tax surcharge. The applicant, 
in turn, contested this and pointed out that the tax surcharges had replaced earlier criminal-law 
procedures and had therefore earlier been classified as criminal penalties. The Court agreed with 
the applicant and considered the surcharges to fall within the concept of “criminal charge”. (§§ 
61 to 63, § 71) See also Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002 
(Appl. No. 36985/97), §§ 76 to 82.
642 Benham v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, § 
56.
643 Similar conclusion has been made e.g. in the case of Janosevic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 
2002, Reports of judgments and decisions 2002-VII. In that case, the Government had paid at-
tention to the Bendenoun v. France judgment, but denied the punitive and deterring purpose of 
the tax surcharge. The applicant, in turn, contested this and pointed out that the tax surcharges 
had replaced earlier criminal-law procedures and had therefore earlier been classified as criminal 
penalties. The Court agreed with the applicant and considered the surcharges to fall within the 
concept of “criminal charge”. (§§ 61 to 63, § 71) See also Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. 
Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002 (Appl. No. 36985/97), §§ 76 to 82, Jussila v. Finland, Grand 
Chamber judgment of 23 November 2006, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-XIV, §§ 
37 and 38, and Ruotsalainen v. Finland, judgment of 16 June 2009 (Appl. No. 13079/03), §§ 45 
and 46. In the cases of Jussila and Ruotsalainen, the decisive criterion was that the purpose of the 
punishment was to deter re-offending.
644 For a recent case, see Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, Reports of 
judgments and decisions 2009,§ 82.
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criminal charge, the Court has observed on several occasions that the legal character-
isation of the procedure under national law cannot be the sole criterion of relevance 
for the applicability of the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 4 § 1 of Protocol 
No. 7. Otherwise, the application of this provision would be left to the discretion 
of the Contracting States to a degree that might lead to results incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention, and the nature of the offence of “minor 
disorderly acts”, together with the severity of the penalty, may be such as to bring the 
applicant’s conviction on 4 January 2002 within the ambit of “penal procedure” for the 
purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7645. Further, what is relevant is whether a prior 
acquittal or conviction has, upon the commencement of new proceedings, acquired 
the force of res judicata646. Particularly the cases of Jussila and Ruotsalainen as well as 
that of Sergey Zolotukhin cited here have also had a major impact on the case law of 
the Finnish supreme jurisdictions.
The concept of “criminal charge” has also come up in other contexts, such as in 
relation to the length of proceedings. In early case law concerning the length of 
proceedings, the Court still applied a rather restrictive approach to the expression 
“in the determination of … any criminal charge”, stating that “the period to be taken 
into consideration for verifying whether this provision has been observed necessarily 
begins with the day on which a person is charged, for otherwise it would not be pos-
sible to determine the charge, as this word is understood within the meaning of the 
Convention”. As for the final point, the Court stated that “Article 6(1) … indicates as 
the final point, the judgment determining the charge; this may be a decision given by 
an appeal court when such a court pronounces upon the merits of the charge.”647 The 
Court has reiterated this in later case law, stating that the determination of a criminal 
charge is considered to cover “the whole of the proceedings in issue, including ap-
peal proceedings and the determination of sentence”.648 In the event of conviction, 
there is no “determination” of any criminal charge, within the meaning of Article 6, 
paragraph 1, as long as the sentence is not definitively fixed649. Thus, this suggests that 
645 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, Reports of judgments and decisions 
2009, §§ 53 and 57.
646 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009, Reports of judgments and decisions 
2009, § 83.
647 Neumeister v. Austria, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 17, §§ 18 and 19.
648 T. v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 16 December 1999 (Appl. No. 24724/94), 
§ 108. In that case, the Court needed to assess whether the tariff-setting procedure in respect of 
young offenders under English law amounted to a sentencing exercise. It was contested by the 
Government that asserted that the fixing of the tariff was merely an aspect of the administration 
of sentence already imposed by the Court. The Court did not agree with this contention. (§§ 
107 to 110) See also a similar case of V. v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 16 
December 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-IX, §§ 108 to 111.
649 Eckle v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A 51, § 77.
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Article 6, paragraph 1, does not apply to proceedings which take place after the final 
determination of sentence, such as review of sentence after the decision has become 
final. Furthermore, for example extradition proceedings are considered to fall outside 
the concept of “criminal charge” and Article 6, paragraph 1, although the existence of 
a violation of the Convention may need to be assessed in the light of other provisions, 
such as Article 3 in the case of Soering v. the United Kingdom650. However, through 
later case law, the Court has extended the scope of the provision in other respects. In 
distinction from most national legal systems, the Court has considered that “even if 
the primary purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal matters are concerned, is to ensure 
a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal charge”, it does not 
follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial proceedings”651. In the context 
of assessing the reasonableness of the length of criminal proceedings, the Court has in 
its case law expanded the interpretation concept of “charge”. For example, in the case 
of Eckle v. Germany, the Court stated as follows:
In criminal matters, the “reasonable time” referred to in Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) 
begins to run as soon as a person is “charged”; this may occur on a date prior to the 
case coming before the trial court […], such as the date of arrest, the date when the 
person concerned was officially notified that he would be prosecuted or the date when 
preliminary investigations were opened […]. “Charge”, for the purposes of Article 6 
par. 1 (art. 6-1), may be defined as “the official notification given to an individual by 
the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence”, a 
definition that also corresponds to the test whether “the situation of the [suspect] has 
been substantially affected” […].652
Thus, what is decisive is that the proceedings involve a determination of sentence, 
and the suspect has become substantially affected by the proceedings, which also takes 
into account the differences in the legal systems. This principle has been confirmed in 
later case law, such as in the Yankov and Others case653 in which the period was consid-
ered to begin when the applicants were formally questioned by the police. The Court 
appears to have adopted a wide interpretation of the expression “in the determination 
650 Soering v. the United Kingdom, plenary judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A 161.
651 Brennan v the United Kingdom, judgment of 16 October 2001, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2001-X, § 45.
652 Eckle v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A 51, § 73. See also Deweer v. Belgium, judg-
ment of 27 February 1980, Series A 35, §§ 42 and 46. This expansion of the concept of “criminal 
charge” began to develop already with the judgment of Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 
1968, Series A 7. (See § 19 of the judgment.)
653 Yankov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 23 September 2010 (Appl. No. 4570/05), § 23.
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of criminal charge”654. The concept of “criminal charge” exists in all the legal systems 
subject to the present study, but the meaning that has been given to ”criminal charge” 
in the Court’s case law appears to be a more extensive one and certainly differs from 
the definitions that would be given to the concept in the national legal systems. It 
appears that all the five States have encountered some problems with regard to the 
interpretation of the concept, particularly in respect of the difference drawn between 
disciplinary proceedings and criminal ones, on the one hand, and between tax procedures 
and criminal proceedings, on the other (see section 4.2). Violations have on occasion 
been found despite that the national courts have resorted to an even extensive analysis 
of the Court’s case law, such as Swedish courts. The technique applied by the Court in 
arriving at an autonomous meaning in the case of “criminal charge” is different from 
that of “civil rights”, placing more emphasis on a positive approach to finding a common 
denominator between the legal systems. In the same way as in respect of the concept 
of “civil rights and obligation”, the examined fragments of the Court’s discourse with 
regard to the concept of “criminal charge” provide signs of a clear transition of the legal 
culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, towards strengthened and 
more extensive protection.
3.4.10.3 Case study: Article 5, paragraph 1 – “liberty and security of person” and 
“arrest and detention”
In addition to Article 6 of the Convention, Article 5 is an example of those provisions 
of the Convention that have had the most significant effects on the national legal 
systems of States parties. According to Frowein, this is particularly the case in respect 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5655. However, it is particularly paragraph 1 thereof 
that has produced problems of interpretation, namely with regard to the concepts of 
“liberty and security of person” and “arrest and detention”, and under which the Court 
has resorted to the principle of autonomous interpretation. According to Article 5, 
paragraph 1 of the Convention,
“everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law:
a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
654 This is also the view of Lemmens, for example, who nevertheless points out that not all decisions 
taken within the criminal sphere of Article 6 would qualify as criminal sanctions. Those falling 
outside include, in particular, precautionary or preventive measures. (Lemmens 2013, p. 300) 
However, measures such as preventive detention may entail protection of rights under other 
provisions of the Convention, particularly Article 5.
655 Frowein 2005(1), p. 3.
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b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law;
c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bring-
ing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority;
e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f ) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthor-
ised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation or extradition.”
Although the concept of deprivation of liberty has attained its autonomous mean-
ing through the case law under Article 5, paragraph 1, its meaning began to develop 
as of the early cases under Article 5, paragraph 3, which concerned the practice of 
prolonged periods of detention while awaiting trial or re-trial656. For example, in the 
case of Stögmüller v. Austria, the Court reasoned as follows:
[…] It is true that paragraph (1) (c) (art. 5-1-c) authorises arrest or detention for the 
purpose of bringing “before the competent legal authority” on the mere grounds of the 
existence of “reasonable suspicion” that the person arrested “has committed an offence” 
and it is clear that the persistence of such suspicions is a condition sine qua non for the 
validity of the continued detention of the person concerned, without its being neces-
sary to go into the point whether detention maintained in spite of the disappearance 
of the suspicions on which the arrest was grounded violates Article 5 (1) (art. 5-1) or 
Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) or these two provisions read together.
Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) clearly implies, however, that the persistence of suspicion does 
not suffice to justify, after a certain lapse of time, the prolongation of the detention. 
That paragraph stipulates that the detention must not exceed a reasonable time. 4. Nor 
does the Court accept the distinction proposed by the Austrian Government between 
656 Cases in which a violation was found included Neumeister v. Austria, judgment of 27 June 1968, 
Series A 8, Stögmüller v. Austria, judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A 9, while no viola-
tion was found in Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 7, and Matznetter v. 
Austria, judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A 10. See also Yourow 1996, p 25.
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the length of the detention and the grounds for the detention, which latter, in the 
Government’s view must be assessed in relation to Article 5 (1) (c) (art. 5-1-c) alone 
and are irrelevant to the concept of the “reasonableness” of the length of the detention 
within the meaning of paragraph (3) of the same Article (art. 5-3). […] 657
Thus, while not providing a clear definition of lawful arrest or detention or depri-
vation of liberty in a criminal law case, the Court paid attention to what threshold is 
sufficient to make it lawful. Further, the Court provided clarification for the temporal 
definition of detention as well as to the concept of conviction in Article 5, paragraph 
1 subparagraph (a) in the case of Wemhoff as follows:
 It remains to ascertain whether the end of the period of detention with which Article 
5 (3) (art. 5-3) is concerned is the day on which a conviction becomes final or simply 
that on which the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance.
The Court finds for the latter interpretation.
One consideration has appeared to it as decisive, namely that a person convicted at 
first instance, whether or not he has been detained up to this moment, is in the posi-
tion provided for by Article 5 (1) (a) (art. 5-1-a) which authorises deprivation of 
liberty “after conviction”. This last phrase cannot be interpreted as being restricted 
to the case of a final conviction, for this would exclude the arrest at the hearing of 
convicted persons who appeared for trial while still at liberty, whatever remedies are 
still open to them. […] 658
When analysing the above fragments of discourse from the early judgments of the 
Court, one may note that the Court sometimes derives meanings for the concepts 
included in the Convention from the general principles of law, such as criminal law, 
even through implicit reference. That is confirmed by a further example, in which the 
Court explicitly refers to national law. As regards the criterion of “lawfulness” in Article 
5, paragraph 1, the Court has observed that
The main issue to be determined is whether the disputed detention was “lawful”, 
including whether it was in accordance with “a procedure prescribed by law”. The 
Convention here refers essentially to national law and establishes the need to apply its 
rules, but it also requires that any measure depriving the individual of his liberty must 
be compatible with the purpose of Article 5 (art. 5), namely to protect the individual 
657 Stögmüller v. Austria, judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A 9, § 4.
658 Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 7, § 9.
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from arbitrariness […]. What is at stake here is not only the “right to liberty” but also 
the “right to security of person”.659
Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, the Convention refers essentially to 
national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and proce-
dural rules of national law. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a 
legal basis in domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be 
compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Conven-
tion. […] 660
Thus, it appears that in respect of the interpretation of Article 5, paragraph 1, the 
Court more easily puts emphasis on the contents of national law than in respect of 
Article 6, paragraph 1. What is meant by lawful detention after conviction, within 
the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1 subparagraph (a) is relatively clear. It must take 
place after a conviction by a competent court. However, the Court has clarified what 
is meant with “conviction” for the purposes of Article 5, paragraph 1 as follows:
[…] In the Court’s opinion, comparison of Article 5 par. 1 (a) (art. 5-1-a) with 
Articles 6 par. 2 and 7 par. 1 (art. 6-2, art. 7-1) shows that for Convention purposes 
there cannot be a “condamnation” (in the English text: “conviction”) unless it has been 
established in accordance with the law that there has been an offence - either criminal 
or, if appropriate, disciplinary […]. Moreover, to use “conviction” for a preventive 
or security measure would be consonant neither with the principle of narrow inter-
pretation to be observed in this area […] nor with the fact that that word implies a 
finding of guilt. […].661
Thus, the Court has found that the provision of Article 5, paragraph 1 subparagraph 
(a) has to be interpreted narrowly. In other situations, it would be necessary to examine 
whether they fall within the scope of the remaining subparagraphs. The Court has 
further noted that mere compliance with national law is not conclusive of whether 
the deprivation of liberty complies with the requirements of Article 5, paragraph 1. 
In the Court’s words, “the Court’s case-law indicates that it may be necessary to look 
beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the 
659 Bozano v. France, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A 111, § 54. See also Stafford v. the 
United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2002-IV, § 63.
660 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2002-IV, § 63.
661 Guzzardi v. Italy, plenary judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, § 100.
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situation”662. Insofar as subparagraph (a) is concerned, for example, the Court has further 
reasoned that “[…] the Court has to consider whether there [is] a sufficient connection, 
for the purposes of Article 5 (art. 5), between the […] decision and the deprivation of 
liberty at issue.663 However, this provision has raised questions of interpretation, par-
ticularly with regard to continued detention in the case of probation/ release on parole. 
The Court has found that where there is a sufficient causal connection between the 
original judgment and a later deprivation of liberty or recall to prison, even the latter 
may fulfill the requirements of Article 5, paragraph 1 subparagraph (a)664.
“Although it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to 
interpret and apply domestic law, under Article 5 § 1 failure to comply with domestic 
law entails a breach of the Convention and the Court can and should therefore re-
view whether this law has been complied with”.665 In the Bozano v. France judgment 
(paragraph 54), the Court further observed that “what is at stake … is not only “the 
right to liberty” but also the “right to security of person””. It is in particular the ele-
ment of “security of person” that provides protection against arbitrariness, i.e. Article 
5, paragraph 1 “enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty”.666 
In the Bozano judgment, the Court also noted that “the difference between deprivation 
662 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A 50, § 38.
663 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A 50, § 39. Stafford v. the United 
Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2002-IV, § 64.
664 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2002-IV, §§ 62 and 81. In this particular case, the Court found no sufficient causal 
connection between the applicant’s continued detention after the expiry of the fixed term sentence 
for fraud, and his original mandatory life sentence imposed upon him for murder, and found that 
there was no power under domestic law to impose indefinite detention on him to prevent future 
non-violent offending. A different situation was at hand in Weeks case, in which the discretionary 
life sentence was an indeterminate sentence expressly based on considerations of his dangerous-
ness to society, factors which were susceptible by their very nature to change with the passage of 
time. On that basis his recall, in the light of concerns about his unstable, disturbed and aggressive 
behaviour, could not be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable in terms of the objectives of the 
sentence imposed on him and there was a sufficient connection for the purposes of Article 5 § 
1(a) between his conviction and recall to prison. (Weeks v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 
March 1987, Series A 114, §§ 46 to 51.) See also Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 408 and 409.
665 Mooren v. Germany, Grand Chamber judgment of 9 July 2009, § 73. “The Court must moreo-
ver ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the 
general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court stresses that, where 
deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal 
certainty be satisfied.” In this respect, the Court also referred to the need to ensure a sufficient 
quality of the law, i.e. “it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, 
in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness”. (§ 76)
666 Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, 
§ 76.
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of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and 
not one of nature or substance”667. Pellonpää & al. note that the expression “security 
of person” has not been given an independent meaning in the Court’s case law, but it 
has mainly been linked with the “deprivation of liberty” although in some situations 
there may be a positive obligation for the State to ensure the security of a person668. 
The clearest effort to define the deprivation of liberty can be found for example in the 
case of Engel and Others, in which the Court reasoned as follows:
In proclaiming the “right to liberty”, paragraph 1 of Article 5 (art. 5-1) is contemplat-
ing individual liberty in its classic sense, that is to say the physical liberty of the person. 
Its aim is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary 
fashion. As pointed out by the Government and the Commission, it does not concern 
mere restrictions upon liberty of movement (Article 2 of Protocol no. 4) (P4-2). This 
is clear both from the use of the terms “deprived of his liberty”, “arrest” and “detention”, 
which appear also in paragraphs 2 to 5, and from a comparison between Article 5 (art. 
5) and the other normative provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.
In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the 
meaning of Article 5 (art. 5), the starting point must be his concrete situation. Mili-
tary service, as encountered in the Contracting States, does not on its own in any way 
constitute a deprivation of liberty under the Convention, since it is expressly sanctioned 
in Article 4 para. 3 (b) (art. 4-3-b). In addition, rather wide limitations upon the 
freedom of movement of the members of the armed forces are entailed by reason of the 
specific demands of military service so that the normal restrictions accompanying it 
do not come within the ambit of Article 5 (art. 5) either.669
Thus, the Court has not given the concept of “deprivation of liberty” or those of 
“arrest or detention” very precise limits, but has aimed at defining their scope through 
certain rather loose criteria established through case law. In this analysis, the Court 
has apparently examined the ordinary meaning of the terms “deprivation of liberty”, 
“arrest” and “detention”, and has also interpreted the provision in the light of the in-
ternal context of the Convention. In the judgment issued in the case of Guzzardi v. 
Italy, for example, the Court has further noted that
667 Bozano v. France, judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A 111, § 93.
668 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 393. In this respect, Pellonpää & al. further observe that the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee has given the expression a somewhat wider meaning in the 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and has considered 
that the right to the security of person may also be attached to situations other than those of 
deprivation of liberty. (Ibid. footnote 249)
669 Engel v. the Netherlands, plenary judgment of 8 June 1986, Series A 22, §§ 58 and 59.
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[…] Deprivation of liberty may, however, take numerous other forms. Their variety is 
being increased by developments in legal standards and in attitudes; and the Conven-
tion is to be interpreted in the light of the notions currently prevailing in democratic 
States […].670
The Court has thus, by reference to the “notions currently prevailing”, implicitly 
referred to the need to compare the different contents given to the concept in different 
legal systems. The fragment of discourse also suggests that there is room for transition 
of the legal culture of protecting the right under Article 5, paragraph 1. The reference 
to the increase of variety through developments in legal standards and attitudes leaves 
room for dynamic interpretation, and thus the concept of “deprivation of liberty” has 
been given a relatively autonomous meaning. Thus, although the Court has referred to 
the notions prevailing in the national legal systems as regards the interpretation of the 
concepts of “arrest and detention”, the Court has expanded the interpretation of Article 
5, paragraph 1, by giving a rather autonomous meaning the more general concept of 
“deprivation of liberty” and has included in it such cases that would perhaps not tradi-
tionally be included in the concepts of “arrest and detention” in the national legal system.
Apart from what is normally understood by arrest and detention, for criminal law 
purposes, a deprivation of liberty may be at hand in other situations too. In the case 
of Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, for example, the Court found that detention 
as a result a refusal “to be bound over not to breach the peace”, despite that “breach 
of the peace” was not classified as a criminal offence under English law, was to be 
considered deprivation of liberty, and the breach of the peace must be considered an 
“offence” within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1, bearing in mind the nature of 
the proceedings in question and the penalty at stake.671 The Court has included in the 
concept of “deprivation of liberty” for example the placement of persons of unsound 
mind in psychiatric institutions672, as well as placement under supervision with an 
obligation to reside on a small island673.
670 Guzzardi v. Italy, plenary judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, §95. 
671 Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1998-VII, §§ 46 to 50 and 66 to 70.
672 See e.g. Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A 33, § 39, in which 
the Court specified the conditions for such placement by stating that “except in emergency cases, 
the individual concerned should not be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown 
to be of “unsound mind”. The very nature of what has to be established before the competent 
national authority – that is, a true mental disorder – calls for objective medical expertise. Further, 
the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. What is 
more, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.”
673 Guzzardi v. Italy, plenary judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39. A comparable situation 
was at hand in the cases of M. v. Germany, judgment of 17 December 2009 (Appl. No. 19359/04), 
and Haidn v. Germany, judgment of 13 January 2011 (Appl. No. 6587/04).
236 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
In the Guzzardi judgment which concerned special supervision with a view to 
preventing the commission of offences, the Court noted that “special supervision 
accompanied by an order for compulsory residence in a specified district does not of 
itself come within the scope of Article 5. However, the Court continued by stating that 
“it does not follow that “deprivation of liberty” may never result from the manner of 
implementation of such a measure”. In finding that the situation involved a deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1, the Court paid attention to that 
the applicant had had few opportunities for social contacts, the restrictions on move-
ment were rather strict, the applicant was liable to punishment by “arrest” if he failed 
to comply with his obligations, and more than sixteen months had elapsed between 
his arrival on the island and his departure from another district on the mainland. Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that “it is admittedly not possible to speak of “deprivation 
of liberty” on the strength of any of these factors taken individually, but cumulatively 
and in combination they certainly raise an issue of categorisation from the view point 
of Article 5”.674 Similarly, in the case of Amuur v. France, where the applicants had been 
refused entry into the French territory and were held in the airport’s transit zone for 
twenty days, the Court paid attention to the particular circumstances. Whereas order to 
stay in the transit zone would not automatically entail deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1, but rather a restriction on liberty, the Court found 
that the applicants’ possibility to freely leave the zone to any other country was rather 
theoretical.675 In both those cases the Court examined the concrete situation instead of 
limiting the analysis to strictly legal criteria, and thus resorted to an external context 
of argumentation, in line with its reasoning in the afore-cited Engel judgment. In the 
latter judgment, the Court reasoned that the obligation of conscripts to stay within a 
restricted area of the military base is normally not considered inappropriate, but where 
their liberty is restricted to such an extent that the restrictions are significantly more 
severe than in other European States, the restrictions may amount to deprivation of 
liberty.676
Another interesting case in which the Court assessed the situation relating to a 
restricted area is that of Medvedyev v. France. In particular, the Court needed to take 
position as to the applicability of Article 5, paragraph 1, on board a ship outside the 
French territory. On the grounds that the French warship had left the French harbour 
on a particular request by the French authorities to intercept the ship registered in 
Cambodia, and the latter was under de facto command of the French naval forces 
674 Guzzardi v. Italy, plenary judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, §§ 94 and 95.
675 Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, §§ 
43, 48 and 49.
676 Engel v. the Netherlands, plenary judgment of 8 June 1986, Series A 22, § 59. For the scope of 
application of Article 5 § 1, see also Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 392-396, and White & Ovey 2010, 
p. 210-212.
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during the interception continuously until their trial in France, the Court found the 
Convention to apply as an exception to the territoriality principle set out in Article 
1 of the Convention. As for the applicability of Article 5, paragraph 1, to the case 
the Court recognised, in line with the Amuur and Engel judgments referred to in the 
foregoing, that the applicants were already in a place where their freedom of move-
ment was restricted as such, but found that the situation amounted to a deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1, throughout the voyage as the 
ship’s course was imposed by the French forces.677
“Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f ) of Article 5, paragraph 1, contain an exhaustive list of 
permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no depriva-
tion of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of the grounds”.678 For example, 
in the case of A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, concerning deportation and deten-
tion pending the implementation of the deportation which constituted a derogation 
in time of public emergency (threat of terrorist acts) under section 14 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention, the Court found that 
the Government had made too wide an interpretation of the exceptions allowed to the 
exhaustive list, and did thus not strike a balance between the State’s interests against 
those of the detainee.679
It is suggested that in respect of Article 5, paragraph 1, the Court has more generally 
resorted to expanding the meaning by using legal and contextual criteria instead of 
creating to the concepts an autonomous meaning in the same sense as in respect of the 
concepts of “civil rights” and “criminal charge” under Article 6, paragraph 1, although 
it has attempted to give the concepts of “conviction” and “detention” an independent 
meaning. This is also visible in the reasoning of the Court in its judgments referred to 
in the foregoing. In the case of Article 5, paragraph 1, the creation of an autonomous 
677 Medvedyev v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 March 2010, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2010, §§ 66, 67, 74 and 75. In this particular case, the Court also assessed the appli-
cability of other rules of international law, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, to which both France and Cambodia were parties, and two other conventions to which only 
France was a party.
678 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 January 2008, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2008, § 43.
679 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 February 2009, Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions 2009, § 171. The Court further assessed whether the Government 
could validly derogate from its obligations under Article 5 § 1 by invoking a public emergency 
pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention. The Court recognised the wide margin of appreciation 
allowed for States in this respect and agreed with the House of Lords in that there was a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation. (§§ 173 to 181) The Court noted, nevertheless, that 
“it is ultimately for the Court to rule whether the measures were “strictly required”. The Court 
found that the derogating measures wee disproportionate in that they discriminated unjustifiably 
between nationals and non-nationals, and found also a violation on this ground in respect of the 
majority of the applicants. (§§ 182 to 190)
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meaning is rather linked with the more general concept of “deprivation of liberty” than 
the terms used in the text of the provision, and is thus not as easy to identify as in re-
spect of the concepts referred to in Article 6, paragraph 1. The Court has also explicitly 
referred to the interpretation of the provisions of Article 5 in accordance with national 
law. As regards the seeking of a common denominator, Sudre is of the view that the 
Court has rather been willing to give the problematic concepts a useful meaning than a 
common meaning680. This is perhaps easiest to see in those cases of discourse in which 
the Court resorts to applying contextual criteria instead of purely legal ones. At any 
rate, the Court’s discourse under both Article 6, paragraph 1, and Article 5, paragraph 
1, have an equal potential of leading to considerable transition of the legal culture of 
protecting the rights set out in those provisions. There are, however, other situations 
which are interesting to look at for the purposes of further analysing the receptiveness 
of national legal systems and courts to the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Apart from the principle of autonomous meaning, the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of margin of appreciation are interesting from that 
perspective. Those will be looked into from a national perspective in section 4.5 con-
cerning the Finnish judiciary. Before advancing to the assessment of those aspects, a 
future challenge for the European Court of Human Rights is analysed below.
680 Sudre 1998, p. 127.
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4.  Third phase of transition of the legal culture – 
development through national case law 
4.1  Receptiveness of national legal systems to the case law and 
argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights
The third phase of transition of the legal culture in the protection of human rights or 
fundamental rights takes place at the national level, under the impact of the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights on national case law and legal culture. Such 
a transition may take place both in the general practice of applying human rights or 
fundamental rights provisions, including both international and national ones, and in 
the way in which the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights is de 
facto adopted. The transition of legal culture is affected not only by the preparedness of 
the legal system to adopt international rules and way of reasoning of an international 
judicial body, but also by other more subjective factors. Thus, before moving on to assess 
the third phase of transition in Finland in detail, it is necessary to analyse the technical 
and legal preparedness of the legal system to apply the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights and new principles of interpretation of law. The transition of the 
legal culture may be fast in those cases where the legal system is already technically 
prepared to adopt such new elements, but even in those cases the development may 
be slow due to other factors such as deep-rooted traditions of writing judgments and 
legal reasoning, or simply by general reluctance to apply international sources of law. 
Some legal systems, in which the way of legal reasoning is closer to that of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, may be faster in adopting the new elements, although 
general conclusions may be difficult to make.
As regards the transition of the Finnish legal culture, which is the main focus of 
this study, one may presume in the light of studies already made that the protection of 
human rights and fundamental rights has been considerably strengthened since the 
1980s. That development started already prior to Finland’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as the national jurisdictions increasingly began to apply 
other international human rights conventions, but upon accession to the European 
Convention the practice became more frequent. However, the practice of referring to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has developed at a slower pace. 
It may be concluded that such a practice has developed and the Finnish judiciary (the 
supreme jurisdictions) is frequently referring to the case law, but it still remains rather 
technical. One may observe in some judgments more profound analysis of the Court’s 
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case law, but mostly the reasoning of the supreme jurisdictions still appears to be very 
different in nature.
In the following section, the technical preparedness of the Finnish legal system to 
adopt the case law and argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights is 
analysed in the light of the legal and technical settings, i.e. the relationship between 
the national legal system and international law as well as the legal system and judiciary 
in general, in comparison with the selected other States parties to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. This constitutes the foundation for the transition of legal 
culture. Furthermore, an assessment is made of whether the aforementioned concepts 
with an autonomous meaning have created conceptual problems in those States par-
ties. Finally, in section 5, an analysis is made of the complaints made against Finland 
before the European Court of Human Rights and of the way in which the national 
supreme jurisdictions have de facto applied the European Convention and the case 
law under it. Conclusions concerning the third phase of transition of the legal culture 
are made on the basis of that analysis.
4.1.1 General criteria for receptiveness
There are various types of technical criteria that need to be met by the legal system in 
order for it to be able to apply the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
case law under it. First, the Convention has to be part of applicable law at the national 
level. In the foregoing analysis of the first phase of transition of the legal culture, it is 
concluded that the Convention has become part of applicable law in the selected legal 
systems, although at different paces and by different means. It is further reminded that 
there are various means of making the national application of the Convention more 
effective, most importantly its incorporation into national law. Although it is not re-
quired in all legal systems covered by the present study, it has proven that the national 
jurisdictions have been more active in applying the Convention where there are clear 
national provisions to that effect. It may be sufficient, however, that the Convention 
has merely been made of national law by means of in blanco implementing act.
Second, an effective application of the Convention and for a correct understanding 
of its provisions, it is not sufficient to apply the Convention, but it is necessary for the 
courts to also be able to apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
as a source of law. It is presumed that it is also more efficient in those cases where it 
is accepted as a binding source of law. By meeting that criterion, it is possible for the 
national legal system and judiciary to be receptive to the case law and thereby to the 
second phase of transition of the legal culture. Furthermore, going a step further, an 
efficient application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights means that 
the national judiciary is also receptive to the argumentation of the Court. An efficient 
application of that case law means that the application is not mechanic, but that it also 
involves understanding and application of the principles of interpretation adhering to 
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the European case law. That would in turn require that even other sources of law are 
accepted and applied by the national courts, apart from case law. Also, the language 
used in the Convention may create problems in the event that there are differences in 
the manner in which the concepts used in the Convention are understood. In the fol-
lowing, an analysis is made of the technical preparedness of the selected legal systems 
to adhere to the required sources of law and the principles of interpretation applied 
by the European Court of Human Rights, and of whether the selected autonomous 
concepts have imposed problems for those legal systems.
A reserved approach to case law as a source of law, particularly in statutory law sys-
tems, could entail problems for the judiciary in taking the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights duly into account. The case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights constitutes an essential tool in the interpretation of the Convention 
and in fact, it is particularly through case law that its provisions become effective. This 
tool would be particularly useful for national courts and its use should be encouraged. 
As is observed by Kiikeri, it is through national court decisions that the objectives of 
the Convention can in fact be achieved681. Kiikeri draws attention to the distinction 
between the legal system of the European Union and the system of protection of human 
rights created by the European Convention on Human Rights. Whereas the Member 
States of the European Union seem to have accepted the supremacy of Union law over 
their national legislation682 – in the fields falling within Union competence – as a fact 
and the European Court of Justice enjoys an autonomous position in the interpretation 
of Union law, this is not necessarily the case in respect of human rights law and the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In the view of Kiikeri, which can 
be concurred with, national courts and the European Court of Human Rights may 
both interpret the provisions of the Convention, although neither the Convention 
nor the Court has imposed an obligation for national courts to apply and interpret 
the Convention, nor to take the Court’s case law into account as a source of law. The 
European Court of Human Rights has, in any case, final say in determining whether 
the Convention provisions have been interpreted correctly. However, as is correctly 
pointed out by Kiikeri, the interpretation carried out by the Court is interpretation a 
posteriori, meaning that the possible violation of the Convention has already taken place. 
681 Kiikeri 2001, p. 71.
682 For example in Finland, there have appeared to be no major difficulties in national courts insofar 
as the supremacy of Union law is concerned. Since the early years of membership in the Union, 
the problems that have emerged have mainly been related to the questions of direct effect and the 
effect of Union law on the interpretation of national law ( Jääskinen 1999, p. 416. Kanninen 2003, 
p. 1263). The founding members of the European Communities did, however, face some problems 
in the early years with the principles of supremacy and direct effect as these principles were still 
new, whereas for later members such as Finland, the principles were already well established at 
the moment of accession (see Kanninen 2003, p. 1253 and 1254).
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Its task of interpretation is dependent on the filing of a complaint by an individual 
who considers that his rights have been violated.683 Thus, the national courts have no 
possibility to file a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of 
the Convention in the same way as they have in respect of the interpretation of Union 
law. In fact, the ex post facto nature of the system of interpretation of the Convention 
by the European Court of Human Rights speaks in favour of recognition of its case 
law as a source of law by national courts, in order to prevent future violations of the 
Convention. As explained in more detail in section 4.5 below, the Convention and 
the relevant case law have also been accepted as sources of law in Finland since its 
implementation into the national legal system. What is more interesting, however, is 
the way in which it has been accepted and applied. One of the underlying arguments in 
this study is that instead of just taking the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights as such, particularly the national supreme jurisdictions should aim more at a 
real dialogue with the Court. A dialogue should be called for as that would also help to 
address violations of human rights more effectively at the national level, at the earliest 
possible stage, and thereby to reduce the workload of the European Court of Human 
Rights. A real dialogue also would contribute to a better harmonisation of the legal 
systems, which in turn would assist in the reception of the international case law. A 
dialogue has been found to exist by scholars in a variety of other legal systems already, 
although to a varying degree684. In the analysis made in section 4.5 below, the possible 
existence of signs of a dialogue in the discourse of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions is 
assessed. This study focuses on the signs of transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights independently of the parallel transition of the 
application of EU law and the relevant case law. I would nevertheless suggest that today, 
the systems of protecting fundamental rights by the European Court of Justice and by 
the European Court of Human Rights can no longer be treated in isolation from one 
another (see the conclusions on future prospects in section 5.4 below).
4.1.2  Applicability of the Court’s case law as a source of law
International law, including customary law, international treaties and case law of in-
ternational judicial bodies, has today a significant impact on national jurisdictions. As 
appears from section 2.6.1 above, all those elements are essential sources of interna-
tional law. Frowein observes that national legal systems are dependent on international 
law, and rules of international law are increasingly applicable by domestic courts. This 
is the case, among others, in respect of the provisions of international human rights 
conventions.685 By this, Frowein apparently means that an increasing part of national 
683 For a detailed analysis, see Kiikeri 2001, p. 69-77.
684 See the conclusions made by Gerards and Fleuren, (Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 364-366).
685 Frowein 1996, p. 85 and 86.
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law derives from the provisions of international law. However, it is through the national 
legal systems that the international law develops, and hence there is constant interac-
tion between the two legal orders. International law acquires its meaning where it is 
effectively applied not only among the parties to international agreements, but also by 
national jurisdictions. As regards international human rights law, it is in particular the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights 
that have influenced the national legal systems covered by the present study considerably, 
not only through the Court’s own case law but also through national courts, although 
there are differences between States parties to the Convention in the application of 
the principles developed by the European Court.686 One has to remember, however, 
that this does not necessarily take place in isolation from other applicable human 
rights instruments, including national constitutions. As for the relationship between 
international conventions on human rights and the provisions on fundamental rights in 
national constitutions, the first mentioned essentially define the minimum standard of 
protection to which states parties have consented to. Such a minimum standard should, 
nevertheless, not prevent states from affording a higher level of protection. In addition, 
international conventions have a harmonising effect on the protection of fundamental 
rights.687 This applies to all the States and legal systems covered by the present study.
An underlying presumption is that any judicial decision-making is based on law, and 
any judgment must be based on acceptable sources of law.688 Insofar as the sources of 
law used for the purposes of interpretation are concerned, the primary source of law 
is most often written law, particularly where the legal system in question is based on 
statutory law (legislation). The formal status of statutory law as a source of law is based 
on the understanding that provisions of law are binding and they are to be applied as 
the basis for a judgment, where those provisions of law are applicable to the case689. This 
may be said to also apply to common law systems, although the binding rules are to be 
found in those parts of prior judgments that are considered to constitute precedents 
as briefly explained below690. Of the legal systems included in this study, this concerns 
to some extent all but particularly the French, German, Finnish and Swedish legal 
systems (hereinafter referred to together as “statutory law systems”). The differences 
between the approaches of legal systems to the admissible sources of law are perhaps 
the most striking between common law systems and statutory law systems, i.e. in the 
present case between the English legal system, on the one hand, and the other four 
legal systems, on the other. In the English legal system, written law has traditionally 
686 Frowein 1996, p. 89.
687 PeVM 25/1994 vp, p. 170. See also Lavapuro 2010, p. 169-171.
688 Klami 1997, p. 155.
689 Nuotio 2004, p. 1271.
690 See e.g. Byrd 1997, p. 3 and 4. This indeed is the most striking difference in the general approach 
to different sources of law.
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meant earlier case law. This tradition is still clearly visible and the system of precedence 
is the element on which the legal system is mainly based. In general, even in a legal 
system underlining the role of statutory law, case law may be recognised as a source 
of law, but it is generally considered to be a supplementary one691. As is observed by 
Lauzière, among others, common law judges rather seek rules and principles of law 
from case law, based on repetitive cases, whereas civil law judges rely on legislation as 
the primary source of rules and principles of law692. However, one may note that the 
English legal system has in some respects moved towards a statutory system, largely 
because of European influence. According to Slapper & Kelly, statutory law is already 
considered the predominant method of law-making, including the law of the Euro-
pean Union693. This is not necessarily the case concerning other common law systems.
Case law as a source of law consists of a number of judgments i.e. decisions made 
in individual cases, or more precisely the reasoning behind those decisions, that may 
nevertheless have value as principles. In brief, precedents are those decisions that are 
considered to have at least some authoritative value.694 One may also speak of a norm-
creating nature of judgments.695 As observed by Strömholm, there are some challenges 
relating to the use of precedents. First and foremost, one needs to establish those ele-
ments of the judgment that constitute generally applicable principles. Second, the cases 
need to be identical as to the relevant facts and circumstances, for that those generally 
applicable principles apply to both. Furthermore, each case should be looked at as a 
whole, taking all facts and circumstances into account. Thus, the overall assessment of 
the case might make it necessary to reach a different conclusion.696
Of the legal systems covered by the present study, as a source of comparison, the case 
law has a clearly stronger status in the English legal system than in any of the other 
four systems, which has entailed perhaps more considerable attention to the theories 
of argumentation although, according to Luhmann, the difference between the statu-
tory law and common law systems in this respect should not be overemphasised.697 In 
any case, there is difference in the approach to the application of precedent. According 
691 See Nuotio 2004, p. 1271.
692 See Lauzière 1982, p. 45-47. Although Canada does not fall within the scope of the present study, 
it is interesting to note that the differences existing between the common law system and civil 
law system have imposed challenges particularly in Canada, and not least because of conceptual 
differences. In the Canadian framework, the two systems co-exist and problems have emerged 
both in connection with drafting national legislation that needs to be exist in both English and 
French, and in later interpretation of law particularly for the different role of legislation as a 
source of law.
693 Slapper & Kelly 2003, p. 55 and 56.
694 For details, see Tolonen 2003, p. 119 and 120.
695 Tolonen 2003, p. 120.
696 See Strömholm 1996, p. 502-508.
697 Luhmann 1993, p. 365.
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to Bankowski and MacCormick, the English system of precedent is a relatively strict 
application of precedent even where a precedent is not binding in the narrow sense.698 
According to MacCormick, the binding nature of precedents may vary, both within the 
legal system and between legal systems. Some of the legal systems may apply a doctrine 
of strictly binding precedents, whereas others – particularly mixed legal systems – may 
apply a doctrine of persuasive precedents.699 That approach to the doctrine of precedence 
applied in the English legal system does not apply to the statutory law systems covered 
by the present study. The terminology used in common law, with regard to precedents, is 
rather detailed, whereas e.g. in the Finnish legal system one quite simply may speak of 
the binding or non-binding nature or of the guiding nature of prior case law, although 
the term ‘precedent’ has been taken into use by the Supreme Court700. In the view of 
Bankowski and MacCormick, however, there has been some evolution in the use of 
precedent taking place in the English courts both in the formal practice and in the 
willingness of the higher courts to develop the law.701 Furthermore, changes in interna-
tional environment have lead to increase in the practice of citing decisions taken both 
in the courts of other Commonwealth countries and decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, as well as the European courts.702 Feldman is of the view that in 
the United Kingdom, as a common law system, lawyers have been particularly well 
suited to advance arguments in the light of the developing case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and suggests that this was in fact one of the reasons for why 
so many cases were brought against the United Kingdom.703 However, despite that the 
698 Bankowski and MacCormick 1997, p. 323. In a strict system of precedent, precedent is simply 
any prior decision of any court that bears a legally significant analogy to the case now before a 
court. If the prior decision is of a superior court in the same hierarchy, it will be a binding prec-
edent that must be followed whereas in other cases it will be a persuasive precedent, possibly a 
relevant analogy for decision of the present case; or it may illustrate an important legal dividing 
line between one class of cases and cases of the class now in issue. (Ibid.)
699 As an example of a mixed legal system MacCormick names the Scottish legal system in which 
both main doctrines of precedents are applied. According to him, irrespective of the binding degree 
of the precedent, it is the ratio decidendi that constitutes the binding element of the precedent, as 
opposed to obiter dicta that are other statements of opinion on the law, which go beyond those 
necessary for deciding the case. Thus, ratio decidendi refer to the specific rules or principles of law 
that have governed the decision whose ratio they are.For more detailed explanation of the use 
of precedents in the English legal system, see MacCormick 2010, p. 141-161. See also Tolonen 
2003, p. 128, Slapper & Kelly 2003, p. 83-85, and Manchester & Salter 2006, p. 4.
700 Instead, the Supreme Administrative Court still speaks of decisions published in the Yearbook, 
which perhaps characterises the traditional difference between the administration of justice in 
civil law cases, on the one hand, and administrative law cases, on the other hand.
701 The main procedural evolution in the application of precedent in recent years has been the deci-
sion of the House of Lords to change the practice by which it regarded itself as bound by its own 
decisions. See Bankowski and MacCormick 1997, p. 348.
702 Bankowski and MacCormick 1997, p. 351 and 352.
703 Feldman 2003 p. 438.
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English legal system is in principle well prepared to apply case law, it took a long time 
before the English courts began to apply the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. Upon the enactment of the Human Rights Act that case law has become 
increasingly important as a source of law and its impact pursuant to the application 
of the Human Rights Act has been extensive704. This might be explained by the rather 
strict approach to precedents. Today, there are already examples of even detailed and 
elaborated references to that case law made by the United Kingdom Supreme Court.
In the four statutory law systems, the focus of the legal argumentation on the 
contents of legislation and on literal interpretation of law is clearly visible, and case 
law is given importance to varying degrees. In brief, they may be considered either 
to constitute precedents or they are only given value as guiding principles, i.e. they 
may rather be considered to produce guidelines for future adjudication, or they are 
understood to have a status somewhere between the two extremes705. When compared 
with the English legal system, the approach of the French legal system to precedent 
differs perhaps more than of the other statutory law systems. According to Troper and 
Grzegorczyk, in the French legal language, the word ‘precedent’ never means a binding 
decision, because courts are never bound by precedents706. Thus, in France, the status 
of legislation as a source of law appears to be the strongest of all the legal systems 
covered by the present study, and case law is seldom referred to although there is a 
recent legislative change that may gradually lead to a stronger role of prior case law707. 
The courts are in principle only bound to apply the provisions of statutory law as a 
source of law, although particularly the preparatory work of legislation are widely used 
to assist interpretation. The French courts have also been slow to apply the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, although today, they do apply that case law as 
a standard source of law particularly where France has been a party to the case and the 
cases are of relevance for the French legal system708. However, when compared with 
the other selected legal systems, the references made to that case law are even today 
704 This is the view of Masterman (2014, p. 318).
705 See e.g. Aarnio 1997, p. 49 and 50.
706 In a strong sense, precedent refers to a decision of a higher court, not as a legal, but as an authori-
tative argument, implying that this decision, without being binding, ought to be followed by the 
lower court. In a weak sense, precedent refers to a decision in a similar case by any court, even 
by a lower one, which could serve as a positive or negative model. See Troper and Grzegorczyk 
1997, p. 111.
707 The relevant institutional change was introduced by a statute of 15 May 1991 (Article L 151-1 
et s. du code de l’organisation judiciaire). Upon that change, any judge in the judicial system of 
courts can ask the Court of Cassation for advice on the interpretation of a statute on a new and 
difficult legal issue arising frequently, although that advice is not legally binding (See Troper and 
Grzegorczyk 1997, p. 111).
708 See Lageot 2014, p. 169. According to Lageot, the administrative courts have traditionally shown 
more reluctance towards the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
than general courts of law.
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extremely brief and more technical, which can perhaps be explained by the traditional 
judicial style of court decisions.
In Germany, courts are not generally bound by precedents but they may play an im-
portant role in the courts’ reasoning and in legal literature. According to Alexy & Dreier, 
the only case of formal bindingness concerns precedents of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, which are strictly binding on all courts and authorities709. This view is supported 
by Kommers, according to whom an obligation to apply precedents exists particularly 
in respect of constitutional law.710 According to Alexy and Dreier, the relative overall 
role of precedent in the decision making of courts depends on which other authoritative 
materials are relevant. If the case can be decided according to the wording of a statute, 
precedent will play no or nearly no role.711 Thus, it appears that in the same way as in 
Scandinavia, a difference is made between such sources of law as must be taken into 
account and those that should be taken into account, precedents falling within the 
latter category712. In Germany, legislation is a compulsory source of law in the same 
way as in the other statutory law systems covered by the present study, whereas others 
are admissible and used to a varying degree. However, as explained in section 3.2.3, the 
reasoning in German judgments is profound and a variety of sources of law is usually 
referred to. What is particularly interesting to note is the strong position of opinions 
of scholars, due to historical reasons, which appears to be a unique character of the 
German legal system, even when compared with the English legal system in which the 
sources of argumentation are multiple. In the view of Kommers, it is particularly in the 
interpretation of the Constitution (Basic Law) where academic writings carry at least 
as much weight as precedents713. As appears from the foregoing, an overview of the 
case law of the Federal Constitutional Court indicates that even today, the provisions 
of the national Basic Law and of the Convention play a stronger role than the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. That may be largely explained by the limits 
of the constitutional complaints. However, as a result of national case law of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, whenever the provisions of the Convention are applicable, 
also the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights has to be applied 
709 Alexy & Dreier 1997, p. 26. According to Alexy and Dreier, however, it is not a common practice 
to categorize different precedents according to their bindingness. Rather, it is discussed how 
strong the binding force of precedents is in general, or if there is any binding force at all. (Ibid.) 
However, in legal doctrine the binding force of precedent is highly contested (Alexy and Dreier 
1997, p. 31).
710 Kommers 2006, p. 192.
711 See Alexy and Dreier 1997, p. 24.
712 Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 91 and 92.
713 Kommers 2006, p. 193. According to Kommers, the Court relies heavily on treatises and commen-
taries of established legal professionals. This is largely due for historical reasons as in Germany, 
in the same way as in other code law countries, enacted law has traditionally been produced by 
legal scholars, historians and theorists.
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to the case in question. In the same way as in the French legal system, however, those 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights that directly concern Germany 
tend to be of more importance. Despite this, the role of all relevant judgments of the 
Court serve as means of providing guidance for the application and interpretation 
of the Convention.714 Thus, although not systematic and only on occasion detailed, 
however, there are increasingly references made to that case law.
In Sweden, earlier case law has not been a widely recognised source of law in the 
interpretation of law, although in the past twenty or thirty years previous cases have 
increasingly been resorted to. According to Strömholm, this recent development is 
largely due to a reform of procedural law. Nevertheless, still in the second half of the 
1990s there was no consistent or uniform practice of applying earlier case law, nor 
had any particular methods been developed to do so. In the view of Strömholm, one 
could not speak of genuine use of case law as a source of law. For this, in his view, there 
should be generally accepted and consistently applied methods and the courts should 
also respect those methods with regard to the use of case law. Strömholm notes that 
these do not exist in Sweden.715 In Sweden, a ‘precedent’ refers to a published decision 
(reported in the NJA), the reason of which is mainly to guide future decision making by 
the courts.716 The same largely has largely applied to Finland, and important judgments 
of the supreme jurisdictions have been considered to have some value as precedents. 
Particularly the cases published by the supreme jurisdictions themselves in their year-
books are considered to have a guiding impact on later adjudication by lower courts. 
Even in Sweden, the case law applied as a source of law is mainly that developed by 
the highest court instances. Strömholm makes a distinction between cases the binding 
nature of which is relative and those of which it is absolute, the latter mainly relating 
to the common law systems.717 
The distinction drawn by Strömholm appears to coincide with that made by 
MacCormick. One may note that today, at least the Supreme Court of Sweden has 
begun to increasingly apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
as a source of law, and the supreme jurisdictions in general have an important role in 
the interpretation of new case law of the European Court of Human Rights and in 
the evaluation of its impact on the Swedish legal system718. In the same way as in the 
714 Klein 2014, p. 203 and 204.
715 For details, see Strömholm 1996, p. 498-500.
716 According to Bergholtz and Peczenik, this takes place in three ways: according to justice, utility 
and as a contribution to a coherent and well-designed body of law, utility probably being the 
strongest drive behind the rationale. See Bergholtz and Peczenik 1997, p. 297. Although not strictly 
binding, precedents are regularly followed by Swedish courts, and the actual role of precedents 
has constantly increased. (Ibid. p. 299)
717 Strömholm 1996, p. 505.
718 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 276.
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other legal systems analysed for the purposes of this research, the Swedish courts also 
pay particular attention to those cases where Sweden has been the respondent state, 
although also other judgments are resorted to719. Still in the 1990s, this appeared to be 
rare despite that examples of references to that case law can be found. Those references 
were, nevertheless, rather brief and in the light of them, it is hard to say whether the 
cases were in fact analysed.720 From the past few years, one may already find examples 
of Supreme Court cases where the court has even resorted to a detailed analysis of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In a case concerning the extradition 
of a suspect to Rwanda, for example, the Supreme Court consulted already several cases 
of the European Court of Human Rights and made a rather detailed analysis of the 
situation in the light of that case law. In that particular case, the Convention provisions 
had been invoked already by the defendant, but despite that the analysis made by the 
Supreme Court is remarkable.721 An even more extensive consultation of the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights can be found e.g. in a later case concerning 
the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.722 
When compared with the same types of precedents of the Finnish supreme jurisdic-
tions, one may note that the style of argumentation has some similarities.
As regards case law, the situation in Finland is largely similar with Germany and 
Sweden in that the legal system traditionally underlines the importance of legislation 
as the main source of law. The law does not provide for the relevance of case law, but 
it is an acceptable and authoritative source of law723. As observed in the foregoing, 
the case law that has mainly been applied as an authoritative source of law is that of 
the supreme jurisdictions. Although they have traditionally not been considered to 
constitute precedents, they are today frequently resorted to and constitute de facto 
719 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 277.
720 See e.g. the judgments of the Supreme Court of Sweden NJA 1991, p. 512, and NJA 2008, p. 868. 
Despite the more than fifteen years’ time between these two judgments, no significant difference 
can be observed in the technique of reference.
721 NJA 2009, p. 280. In this case, the Supreme Court also consulted a number of other foreign 
materials, such as reports on the conditions prevailing in Rwanda, including reports made by non-
governmental organisations, and decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
the Ministry of Justice of Finland and the High Court of Justice in London. The Supreme Court 
assessed whether extradition, in the light of the conditions in the judicial system in Rwanda, 
would be in conflict with Article 6 of the Convention, finding that there was some uncertainty 
particularly as regards the possibility to have witnesses heard (equality of arms) but that there 
was no obstacle to extradition.
722 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Sweden NJA 2010, p. 168. The Supreme Court included 
sixteen cases of the European Court of Human Rights, one case of the European Court of Justice 
and seven national cases in the list of case law used as a source of law.
723 See e.g. Aarnio 1997(2), p. 79 and 80. The concept ‘precedent’ has a special position in the Finnish 
system of application of law. The case law of the supreme jurisdictions guide the administration 
of justice of lower courts but the lower courts of justice are not legally bound by it.
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precedents, and the lower courts of law follow the developments, including any changes 
of view that the supreme jurisdictions explicitly present in new precedents. The su-
preme jurisdictions themselves also refer to their prior case law and it appears that in 
case there is reason to deviate from prior precedents, the reasons are explicitly stated. 
Although the Finnish legislation does not provide for the status of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in the same way as for example the rather recent 
provisions of English law, the Convention provides for a binding control mechanism, 
and the Finnish authorities – as well as the authorities of any State Party – is today 
under an obligation to take the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
into account. This has also been recognised by the supreme jurisdictions as shown in 
section 4.5 below.
In the view of Koskelo, the appearance of the international elements in the legal 
system has de facto made it necessary to expand the concept of sources of law. Both 
the membership of the European Union and the accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights have entailed an increasing role of case law as a source of law 
in national courts, whereas earlier the Finnish jurisprudence has largely focused on the 
provisions of legislation.724 Insofar as the relevance of human rights and fundamental 
rights are concerned, she points out, like Ojanen725, that one should mainly speak of a 
strong impact on the interpretation of law, which in some cases may be entirely based 
on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Koskelo refers to a precedent 
of the Supreme Court (KKO 2009:80) concerning a request for reversal of judgment, in 
which the court confirmed the significance of the Strasbourg case law.726 The Supreme 
Court reiterated, referring to earlier case law727, that the European Convention on 
Human Rights was applicable law in Finland and even that its incorrect application 
could constitute a ground for reversal of judgment. In such a case, the interpretations 
given by the European Court of Human Rights after the original national judgment 
would be taken into account.728 Today, the case law of the European Court of Hu-
724 Koskelo 2010, p. 27 and 33.
725 Ojanen 2005, p.1216. Ojanen speaks of the ”strong binding nature” of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
726 Koskelo 2010, p. 33 and 34.
727 KKO:1998:33 and KKO:2008:24.
728 KKO:2009:80, paragraph 7. The earlier cases of reversal of judgment related to judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights concerning those particular judgments, whereas in 
KKO:2009:80, the Supreme Court took into account even judgments given by the Strasbourg 
court in other cases. The Supreme Court found that although the original judgment of the Su-
preme Court did not appear to be in conflict with the then case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, at the time of re-hearing the later developments of case law gave reason to find 
that there was a conflict between the original judgment and later interpretations of the Court 
(paragraph 36).
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man Rights is accepted even as a binding source of law729, and in the same way as in 
Sweden, it is increasingly applied by the supreme jurisdictions, and there are already 
many examples of such judgments in which the references to that case law are rather 
detailed. Thus, the criterion of the applicability of the case law as a source of law in 
the courts is met. Whether there is preparedness to go further and also receive the 
argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights, to strengthen the third phase 
of transition of the legal culture, it is necessary to have an even more flexible approach 
to permissible sources of law.
4.1.3  Applicability of other sources of law
The increasing international elements, particularly the Union law and the European 
human rights law, present in the legal systems subject to this study have affected them 
in various ways. They have not only affected the way in which the legal system is under-
stood and how sources of law are looked at, but also the legal reasoning to some extent. 
In particular, it has become necessary for national courts to take foreign sources into 
account in adjudication. This is inevitable insofar as the Union law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and relevant case law are concerned, but as Smits points 
out, it would be desirable to also look into the case law of other States, applying the 
relevant provisions of European law, although this has been done to a lesser extent730. 
A more flexible approach to the use of sources of law also makes it easier for national 
courts to adapt themselves to the judicial discourse and use of principles of interpreta-
tion by the European Court of Human Rights. When compared with one another, it 
appears that the German legal system applies the most flexible approach to different 
sources of law than the others, although particularly in Finland and Sweden there has 
been some move towards a wider approach to sources of law other than legislation and 
case law. It also appears that particularly in those judgments of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court that have links with the protection of fundamental rights, a greater 
variety of sources of law are used, although that Court still relies strongly on its own 
prior precedents as well as to prior case law of other English courts. It seems that of 
the legal systems covered by the present study, in the light of an overview of national 
case law and doctrine, the French jurisdictions are the most reluctant ones in applying 
a flexible approach to different sources of law. Although the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, for example, is today cited as an applicable source of law, 
the references to sources of law other than legislation and case law are extremely rare 
when compared with the other legal systems.
In those cases where sources other than legislation or case law are applied, the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions tend to refer to general principles of law supplementing 
729 See KKO:1996:80 and KKO:2009:80, for example.
730 For details, see Smits 2004, p. 234-236.
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legal argumentation. In particular, they have traditionally represented legal standards 
for which support must be provided by sources of law. The same has applied to the so-
called “contextual arguments” (reelle hensyn), which are a peculiarity of the Scandinavian 
legal systems and which rather supplement the information provided by sources of 
law. They are of particular importance in teleological interpretation of law.731 Similarly, 
in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the contextual 
arguments appear to play a role particularly in those situations where the Court resorts 
to the principles of evolutive or dynamic interpretation, European standard, margin of 
appreciation and autonomous meaning.
However, today, references to principles of law and contextual arguments appear to 
be increasing and scholars also increasingly recognise all such authoritative grounds that 
may be invoked in the resolution of a case as sources of law, although they divide the 
sources of law into three categories depending on their binding nature732. As an example 
of contextual arguments that should in some situations be given high importance despite 
the existing provisions of law one may name human rights and fundamental rights733. 
More frequent references to principles of law, including principles of interpretation of 
law, and contextual arguments would bring the argumentation of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions closer to that of the European Court of Human Rights. The advantage 
with a certain flexibility of interpretation of law is that it makes it possible to take into 
account the development of society and new legal situations. That also increases the 
preparedness of national jurisdictions to adapt themselves to the approach chosen to 
different sources of law by the European Court of Human Rights, which is a flexible 
one, particularly the tendency to treat the Convention as a living instrument.
Legal principles, as part of legal culture, play an important role in the identifica-
tion and systematisation of legal situations, entailing interaction between the surface 
structures (rules) and deep structures of law (legal culture). Further, a human rights 
friendly systematisation of legal rules helps to maintain the internal coherence of the 
legal order.734 That opinion fits well together with the observations presented by Alexy 
concerning the activities of courts in supplementing legal arguments with general 
731 Tuori 2000, p. 175 and 197.
732 See in particular Nuotio 2004, Karhu 2003, p. 803, p. 1269, Aarnio 1989, p. 217, and Peczenik 
1988, p. 239. Peczenik nevertheless makes a distinction between sources of law that are so bind-
ing that they shall (skall) be taken into account (in Sweden only the law), those that have such a 
significant authoritative status that they are close to binding (must (bör) be taken into account), 
and those that may be taken into account (p. 240-245).
733 Karhu 2003, p. 803 and 804.
734 Karhu 2003, p. 805. Tuori also speaks of surface structures and deep structures of law. The deep 
structures represent the common ideas of law, which may be shared by different legal systems, 
whereas the surface structures are the expressions of those ideas and change more rapidly than 
the deep structures (for details, see Tuori 2000, p. 171-178 and 202-212).
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practical arguments, to fill in a rationality gap735. One may note that any systematisa-
tion of legal rules helps to maintain the internal coherence of the legal order in that 
today, various sectors of legislation are interdependent and changes in one piece of law 
may have implications on several others. An effort to aim at systematisation of legal 
rules and principles in fact appears to apply to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Although some scholars have criticised the Court for unpredictability 
in its approach to the interpretation of the Convention, such critical views – in the 
view of Lavapuro – often fail to actually study the case law, which would allow to see 
that it is legally structured and rather systematic, and a certain predictability may be 
observed.736 When looking into the way in which the Court reasons, advancing from 
main principles to exceptions and to the facts of the concrete case indeed increases the 
consistency of case law, which is also reflected in national case law. However, as regards 
the change of legal culture, the situation is more complicated than a mere change of 
legal rules or case law. It is important to note that the surface structure of law, i.e. the 
way a piece of legislation is written or the way in which the court reasons, does not tell 
the entire truth about the legal culture. Even a change of case law does not necessarily 
reflect the more profound conditions of society i.e. how the law is understood. The 
surface structure of law changes more rapidly than the deep structures. Thus, despite 
that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights changes, it does not neces-
sarily mean that it is rapidly adopted by the national jurisdictions.
At any rate, the applicability of a wider range of sources of law than earlier appears to 
find support from both scholars and case law. One may assert that those legal systems 
that have adopted a flexible approach to the admissible sources of law for the purposes 
of interpretation should be more open to the rather open approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights to sources of law. In this respect, one would assume that the 
German legal system should be particularly well equipped to recognise and apply the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and this even seems to have been 
the case. One would assume so also in respect of the English legal system for the 
reason that the role of national case law is traditionally strong, and there is reason to 
believe that it should not be a particularly hard task for domestic courts to even apply 
foreign case law, at least in theory. However, it is to be borne in mind that in assessing 
the receptiveness of the legal system to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, including the principles and arguments set out therein, the approach to sources 
of law is not sufficient, but what is equally or even more important is the way in which 
those sources of law are treated, i.e. the methods and principles of interpretation of law. 
These two elements are inter-dependent. In the following, the analysis is continued 
with reference to such methods and principles.
735 See note 35.
736 Lavapuro 2010, p. 117.
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4.1.4  Principles of interpretation of the Court and national  
approaches to the interpretation of law
4.1.4.1 General aspects
As explained in the foregoing, the European Court of Human Rights applies the 
general principles of interpretation of international treaties when applying the Con-
vention, with certain additional principles developed in the Court’s case law. This is 
not necessarily the case in all States parties to the Convention, and there might be 
even considerable differences in the principles of interpretation used. National legal 
systems may have different approaches to the applicable sources of law, they may put 
emphasis on different methods of interpretation and they may have adopted different 
techniques of interpreting law, which may not only differ from one another, but they 
may also be different from those applied by international courts, although in both 
cases the methods of interpretation could be roughly divided into those underlining 
the intention of the legislator and those focusing on the literal meaning of the piece of 
legislation737. According to the first-mentioned view, judges should not interpret law 
as they believe it should be read but the way the legislator intended it to be read, and 
whenever the text of the piece of legislation is not clear, the judges should look into the 
legislative history to establish what the legislator really intended.738 However, insofar 
as the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, this approach does not hold 
entirely as the Court appears to have a rather modern approach to the establishment 
of the meaning of the Convention provisions. The Court does refer to the purpose of 
the Convention, but as explained in the foregoing, seldom with reference to the pre-
paratory work as the Convention is rather interpreted as a living instrument. A similar 
approach may have to be adopted for the interpretation of such statutes that have been 
drafted a long time ago and no longer meet the requirements of developments that 
have taken place in society739. That takes place only seldom in Finland, but it is possible 
as shown in the analysis of the national case law. Thus, the analysis of the classical 
methods of interpretation applied by the supreme jurisdictions is of relevance for the 
reason that despite the emergence of new sources of law, in which a different approach 
to the interpretation of law has been adopted, the national jurisdictions still appear to 
737 See Lindroos-Hovinheimo 2011, p. 279, who refers to the works of an early Finnish scholar, 
Frans Oskar Lilius, already making this division and noting that the historical school of thought 
focused rather on the intention of the legislator. The literal meaning has perhaps been the focus 
in later decades as the principle of legalism gained ground.
738 Dworkin 1986, p. 314 and 315. Dworkin calls this ”the speaker’s meaning” of law. A judge who 
accepts this meaning would usually present his conclusions as statements of the meaning of the 
statute itself. (Ibid. p. 315)
739 See Dworkin 1986, p. 348.
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dominantly apply the classical methods. The purpose of this thesis is not to go into a 
profound analysis of those methods but for the purposes of analysing the discourse of 
the supreme jurisdictions as it was at the time of Finland’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, that discussion constitutes an essential background to 
see how they interact or possible merge with the methods of interpretation developed 
by the European Court of Human Rights. At the time of Finland’s accession, the clas-
sical methods were the dominating ones and are still visible in the national case law.
Furthermore, theories of interpretation or principles or techniques of interpretation 
may bear different names, both within one legal system and in different legal systems, 
as proposed by legal scholars. The division into common law countries and statutory 
law countries, referred to in the foregoing, also plays a role in the interpretation of law. 
Although that division is rather typical in comparative research and the results of such 
research are today rather common knowledge, some of those elements are pertinent for 
the purposes of the present study. In the legal systems covered by the present study, the 
rough division into the two major groups of countries is visible both in the approach 
of the legal system to the sources of law and in the principles and techniques applied 
to interpret those sources, although there are some characteristics that rather belong 
to a particular legal system. That has also changed since Finland’s accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The legal systems in Europe have gradually 
moved closer to one another as regards interpretation of law, which is largely due to 
supranational elements in the legal systems.
The interpretation of a text is an essential part of judicial reasoning, having as its 
objective not only to find the meaning of the piece of text, but also to assess its effects740. 
The elements in common to be taken into account in any interpretation of law include, 
in particular, the literal meaning and the objective and purpose of the text as well as 
the context, i.e. those principles that can also be found in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. As 
pointed out by Luhmann, the way in which a piece of legislation or an international 
agreement is read usually depends on the particular context in which it is applied. 
What is also common for any interpretation of law is its aim to determine how it 
should be read, by means of a set of arguments used to justify the correct reading.741 
Furthermore, as is observed by Alexy & Dreier, there is some uncertainty caused by 
740 Gémar 1995, p. 11. This is to say that whatever the method of interpretation is, be it in com-
mon law or civil law systems, the meaning of the text is always at play, which entails necessary 
the meaning of words. However, the lawyers of all cultures have always aimed at reducing, to a 
minimum, errors of law that might have serious consequences. (Ibid. p. 159-160)
741 See Luhmann 1993, p. 364. According to Van Hoecke, the context plays a key role in the at-
tachment of a particular meaning, exerting a fundamental influence on the meaning of words, 
sentences or texts. Such a context may be explicit or implicit, linguistic or non-linguistic, written 
or spoken, or legal or non-legal. (Van Hoecke 2002, p. 137)
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the openness of statutory interpretation, due to the application of various methods of 
interpretation, which may lead to different outcomes.742 This can be seen in any legal 
system, but it is particularly typical of judgments of the House of Lords in the English 
legal system, as they consist of separate opinions of the justices. Also, as Gémar points 
out, there are other factors affecting the logical reasoning, depending on the place and 
other circumstances.743 Thus, the background of the person interpreting the legal text 
also plays a role, increasing the presence of subjective elements of interpretation. All 
these elements can be said to apply to any interpretation of law.
Šarčević suggests that national courts tend to resort to the principles and methods of 
interpretation of national law even when applying international agreements, particularly 
in such States where incorporation of international agreements is required by the legal 
system for them to become applicable law. She mentions the United Kingdom as an 
example744 but this would also apply to the other States subject to the present study, 
except for France. Indeed, incorporation may place the implementing legislative act 
at the same level with any other piece of legislation with the same hierarchical status 
in the legal system in question, which in turn may result in the application of similar 
methods of interpretation with those of the international agreement. Whatever the 
method of interpretation resorted to in domestic courts is, however, the interpretation 
is also affected by other factors.
The methods of interpretation of treaties, as given account of in the foregoing, have 
some peculiarities, which are largely based on the fact that treaties are products of 
negotiations that may sometimes be long and cumbersome, leading to a result that is 
a compromise representing the views of an even large number of negotiating parties. 
However, those methods of interpretation also share some elements in common with 
the methods and principles applied to the interpretation of law and contracts. What 
characterises both the interpretation of treaties and the interpretation of private or 
administrative law contracts, to distinguish them from legislation, is a stronger focus on 
the intention of the parties, whereas legislation is a product of parliamentary procedures 
and what is to be established is the intention of the legislator. The search for the mean-
ing of a treaty provision, where interpretation is required, is thus about establishing the 
meaning intended to be given to the provision by the parties that represent a variety of 
742 See Alexy &Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 77.
743 Gémar 1995, p. 160 and 161. He draws a distinction between the historical, comparative, analytical, 
sociological and philosophical (ethical) perspectives that in his view are present, subconsciously 
or implicitly, in most forms of interpretation of texts.
744 Šarčević 2000, p. 218. Her view appears to be supported by Viljanen (V-P) concerning Finland. 
In his view, as the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, have 
been implemented by means of an ordinary Act of Parliament, the normal rules of interpreta-
tion of law (such as the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis) would apply. In addition, the 
principle of human rights friendly interpretation of law applies in the application of law. However, 
he admits that a change is taking place in the application of the principle of lex posterior.
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legal systems and cultures. Van Hoecke draws a distinction between the subjective and 
objective meaning. In addition to the subjective and objective elements of meaning, Van 
Hoecke has also drawn attention to the distinction between the sender-meaning and 
the receiver-meaning that have a close link with the subjective and objective elements 
of meaning and interpretation. The meaning that the author of a piece of legislation 
or an agreement has intended to give to the text is not necessarily the same as the 
interpretation of the text by the receiver.745
The aforementioned observations of Van Hoecke are interesting when put in the 
context of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court may 
be said to apply a method of establishing the objective intention of parties as it only 
seldom refers e.g. to preparatory work that might help establish the real intention of 
parties. Search for the real intention of parties may be more visible in early case law, 
but the further the Court has gone in interpreting the Convention, the clearer it has 
become that it is assessing the meaning of the Convention provisions as an external 
observer. One must remember that this is also part of what the parties originally 
intended as they decided to vest the competence of interpreting the Convention in a 
special judicial body. Nevertheless, the transfer of competence does not exclude the 
application of the Convention at the national level. To the contrary, national courts are 
faced with questions of application and interpretation without first having the pos-
sibility to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Human Rights. 
As for the distinction between the sender-meaning and receiver-meaning of the text, 
there are two aspects to be taken into account. First, the text of the Convention was 
drafted by the representatives of the contracting parties who had a certain meaning in 
mind when establishing the wording of the Convention. Thus, the contracting parties 
constitute the first-hand sender of the meaning, whereas the Court is a receiver of the 
text. Second, as a result of the transfer of competence in the interpretation of the text, 
the Court has assumed the role of a sender of the meaning and the contracting parties 
are in turn a receiver of the interpretations given by the Court to the provisions of the 
Convention. Consequently, the roles have changed and today, what is relevant is how 
the national authorities and courts receive and understand the meanings given to the 
Convention provisions. In this respect, there have been and can emerge differences 
between the various legal systems involved. Considering that Germany has had rela-
tively few problems in the application of the Convention at the national level, when 
compared with France and the United Kingdom, the rather open attitude of the legal 
system towards interpreting law and international treaties, including preparedness to 
745 Van Hoecke 2002, p. 136. Apart from the sender-meaning and the receiver-meaning, Van Hoecke 
also mentions the concept of prima facie meaning which means the meaning attributed to the text 
by the reader at first sight. He points out that the prima facie meaning is usually rather clear when 
the text of the law is clear, but that this does not necessarily mean that the sender-meaning and 
the receiver-meaning are the same. (Ibid. p. 136 and 137)
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search for the objective intention of the legislator or the parties, may be one factor 
explaining it, albeit not the only one.
The approach to the sources of law further affects the techniques and methods of 
legal reasoning. According to Smits, courts in statutory law countries have shown more 
preparedness to apply a wider range of methods in the interpretation of legislation, 
whereas courts in common law systems have rather relied on literal interpretation – 
due to the supremacy of common law, statutes have been interpreted as restrictively 
as possible in order to establish the plain meaning of the statute. The traditionally 
central role of legislation and thus the existence of abstract legal rules in statutory law 
countries has entailed a rather formal deductive way of reasoning by courts, whereby 
the rule is set out first, as provided for by the legislation, followed by the establishment 
of the facts of the case and resulting in a logical outcome of the application of the rule 
to the concrete case (deduction). According to Smits, this is clearly visible e.g. in the 
case law of the French Cour de Cassation. In contrast, the common law traditions of 
legal reasoning highlight the relevance of case law, although the distinction between 
the two legal traditions has become less clear in recent times as e.g. the English legal 
system today relies increasingly on statutory law. Further, there are differences between 
statutory law systems as well. Although both in the French and the German legal 
systems legislation is typically rather exhaustive, which has resulted in rather scarce 
legal reasoning in judgments, German courts tend to provide more detailed reasons 
for their judgments, referring extensively to case law and doctrine. The French courts, 
particularly Cour de Cassation, have traditionally avoided very detailed reasoning.746
4.1.4.2 Interpretation of legislation – comparative observations
Within the common law system covered by the present study, i.e. the English legal 
system, there appears to exist a wide range of names given to interpretative techniques 
and rules. A classical distinction is made between there rules of statutory interpreta-
tion: the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule747 although denominations 
equivalent to those used in continental legal systems are also used748. The essential 
contents of the literal meaning rule are that the judge is to consider what the law actu-
746 For details, see Smits 2004, p. 230-234. Hart suggests that courts would typically rely on the 
provisions of legislation in plain (clear) cases, whereas interpretation is needed in those cases 
where it is not clear whether the provisions of law apply or not (so-called fact cases). The canons 
of interpretation cannot entirely remove the uncertainties – Hart calls this situation as the open-
texture of law. (Hart 1994 (1997) p. 126 and 128) This would presumably be the case particularly 
in civil law systems, where precedents would indeed be constituted by the latter cases, whereas 
common law systems have traditionally applied a different approach.
747 For details, see Slapper & Kelly 2003, p. 174-179. See also Bennion 2009, p. 79 and 80.
748 Bankowski and MacCormick use the distinction between linguistic, systemic and teleological 
(or evaluative) interpretative arguments (Bankowski and MacCormick 1991(1998), p. 364). For 
details, see Ibid. p. 365-373.
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ally says instead of assessing what it might mean. When compared with the methods 
of interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights one might assume that the 
emphasis in the English legal system on a rather literal interpretation of law might be 
a factor decreasing the preparedness of the national courts to apply and adopt the way 
of reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights.
Apart from teleological-evolutive arguments advocated by MacCormick749, the dif-
ferent methods cited by English scholars are not in favour of an evolutive approach. 
However, as a common law system, the English legal system has longer traditions of 
applying case law as a source of law, and common law has been given priority over a 
long period of time. Thus, one would presume that it is precisely the national practice 
of applying case law that would make the English legal system particularly apt to 
adopt the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. The style of writ-
ing judgments in England is, however, very different and as observed in the foregoing, 
the doctrine applied to precedents is considerably stricter than that of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, the aforementioned views of scholars sug-
gest that at least in principle, the elements of argumentation used by the European 
Court of Human Rights also exist in the English legal system. One may note that the 
number of violation found against the United Kingdom by the European Court of 
Human Rights, and there have been problems faced by the legal system. However, it 
is observed in the foregoing that the English courts have increasingly begun to apply 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The technique of applying it 
is still somewhat different.
In the French legal system, the concise style of judicial decisions makes it difficult 
to assess the use of particular methods of interpretation by courts. The statement of 
reasons normally includes a quotation from the provisions of law and sometimes an 
interpretation thereof. However, according to Troper & al., courts do not usually define 
an issue of gap-filling nor issue a clear interpretation but content themselves to assert 
that the words of the statute have a certain meaning, referring possibly to the plain 
meaning or on occasion to the preparatory work or the purpose of the statute.750 That 
observation is confirmed by an overview of the case law of Cour de Cassation. Literal 
interpretation appears to be clearly the one favoured by French courts, which also 
underlines the relevance of linguistic arguments, but on occasion courts supplement 
them with genetic, systemic or purposive interpretation. Only in rare cases may courts 
openly disregard linguistic arguments, with a view to formulating a new rule (contra 
749 For a detailed analysis, see MacCormick 2010, p. 124-137. The argumentation of MacCormick 
is essentially based on the understanding that linguistic arguments are always liable to, and often 
require, supplementation by recourse to other arguments. In the case of legal argumentation, these 
other arguments are concerned with matching the interpreted text to the legal context (legal 
system) (see Bankowski and MacCormick 1991(1998), p. 366).
750 Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 197.
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legem).751 The focus on literal interpretation appears to be an element in common 
with the English legal system. The strong emphasis on literal interpretation of law 
until recent times and rather strict rules of applying provisions of law may be a factor 
explaining the relatively slow development in France in applying the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights as a source of law, including the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, in the same way as in the English legal system 
where the incorporation of the Convention took place at a late moment. However, 
the increasing references to the Convention in national case law and the tendency in 
France to move towards teleological interpretation of law may be presumed to increase 
the preparedness of the legal system to adopt the reasoning of the European Court 
of Human Rights.
The German classification of methods of interpretation is rather close to the 
Scandinavian one. In the German legal system, the focus of general courts of law ap-
pears to be on literary interpretation (Wortlaut, philologische Auslegung, grammatische 
Auslegung)752, which is distinguished from logical interpretation. As mentioned in the 
foregoing, literal interpretation has also been the dominating method of interpretation 
in the English and French legal systems. Further, Alexy & Dreier draw a distinction 
between genetic and historical interpretation753. Apart from the systematic and tele-
ological interpretation, also referred to by most Scandinavian scholars, Alexy & Dreier 
specifically mention comparative interpretation as a separate method754. The systematic 
interpretation focusing on the context of the Convention as a whole has been adopted 
also by the European Court of Human Rights, and the German practice of constitu-
tional interpretation appears to be close to it. Insofar as teleological interpretation is 
concerned, the German courts appear to apply it with prudence in the same way as 
courts in the Scandinavian legal systems although, according to Kommers, it does enjoy 
significant support particularly by the Constitutional Court755. In general, it appears 
751 Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 190 and 191.
752 Alexy and Dreier call the principle of literal interpretation that of semiotic interpretation. See 
Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 82.
753 Genetic interpretation refers to the intention of the legislator, and historical interpretation refers 
to the investigation into the history of concepts, doctrines and institutions as distinguished from 
the intention. Alexy and Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 85-87.
754 Insofar as the teleological method is concerned, they further divide it into subjective and objective 
methods (see Alexy and Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 87-89). Kommers names four methods of judicial 
reasoning commonly used in any interpretation of law i.e. historical, grammatical, systematic and 
teleological methods, but goes further in identifying modes of judicial review that in his view 
reflect the Constitutional Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Basic Law, including 
textual (literal), structural (systematic) and teleological interpretation, but also mentions drafting 
history, proportionality and practical concordance (praktische Konkordanz) as well as certain other 
features of interpretation. (Kommers 2006, p. 196. For details of the named modes of judicial 
review, see p. 197-206.)
755 Kommers 2006, p. 200.
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that the methods of interpretation applied by the German judiciary are largely similar 
with those applied by the European Court of Human Rights, although the terms used 
are not always the same.
The Scandinavian traditions of theory of interpretation of law appear to use concepts 
that differ from those used in the common law traditions but share some features 
with the German and French legal systems, being statutory law systems, although 
the principle of literal interpretation is shared by all of them. However, according to 
Peczenik and Bergholz, there are also some elements of common law in the Swedish 
legal system, having also impact on the interpretation of law756.
Peczenik draws a distinction between literary (linguistic), systemic and logical 
(functional), interpretation of law, on the one hand, and between reductive, restrictive, 
extensive and analogical interpretation, on the other, as well as teleological interpreta-
tion.757 Strömholm adds to these the concepts of subjective and objective interpretation, 
of which the aforementioned methods are subcategories, the systematic and teleological 
methods representing objective methods of interpretation.758 The classifications made by 
Peczenik and Strömholm are very detailed, which makes it difficult to compare them 
with common law traditions. This might be partly explained by the different nature of the 
legal system. Literary and systematic interpretation as well as teleological interpretation 
seem to coincide with those named by MacCormick, whereas particularly the categories 
of reductive, restrictive, extensive and analogical arguments rather appear to be ways of 
reasoning that MacCormick speaks of in a different context. However, the classifications 
of Peczenik and Strömholm have similarities with the German ones, although they ap-
pear to be even more detailed. Although the Swedish legal system, in the same way as 
Scandinavian legal systems in general, seems to have borrowed the main methods and 
principles of interpretation of law from the Germanic legal traditions, it seems that the 
practice of interpretation of law, nevertheless, differs more from that of the European 
Court of Human Rights than the German practice does, particularly as regards the 
German Constitutional Court. Furthermore, in principle the hierarchical status given 
to the Convention in the Swedish legal system has the potential of creating problems.
The Finnish legal system has been rather legalistic, where statutory law has tradition-
ally played a strong role although, according to Aarnio, in recent times there has been 
756 See Peczenik and Bergholz 1991 (1998), p. 311. The Anglo-American influence is nevertheless 
rather limited.
757 For details, see Peczenik 1990, p. 179-207. In his classification, teleological interpretation appears 
to constitute part of functional interpretation (see Peczenik and Bergholz 1991(1998), p. 316). 
See also Strömholm 1996, p. 436-438 and 447-456, and Aarnio 1991 (1998), p. 132-142. In this 
writing, Aarnio speaks of linguistic (semantic or syntactical) arguments, systemic arguments 
(intention/purpose, systemic interpretation, customary law, precedents, comparative arguments, 
historical arguments, legal-dogmatic arguments, analogy/e contrario ), as well as teleological and 
evaluative arguments.
758 For details, see Strömholm 1996, p. 453-456.
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a shift towards a more flexible approach. The observations presented in the foregoing 
concerning the Swedish methods of interpretation of law largely apply to the Finnish 
legal system. The Finnish and Swedish legal systems are in many respects similar or 
even identical, and therefore even the methods and techniques of interpretation of 
law have similarities. However, Aarnio mentions one particular difference. In Finland, 
the higher courts do not refer to the intention and purpose of the statute as often as 
is done in Sweden.759 Although this is sometimes done, particularly with the help of 
preparatory work, it is more widely recognised that if semantic and structural inter-
pretation fails, the task of the interpreter is to determine the site of the norm within 
the system of norms. In practice this means that the decision is based on the legal 
system or on the fundamental principles of the appropriate part of the legal system.760 
Those observations can be confirmed on the basis of an overview of the case law of 
the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. 
When looking into the methods of interpretation of law, there are elements that 
appear to have been borrowed from foreign legal systems, particularly the Swedish and 
German ones. This may also partly explain the rather flexible approach to the use of 
precedents. However, there are certain differences, particularly more frequent reliance 
on structural or teleological interpretation, which may make the German legal system 
more prepared to adopt the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights. Despite 
the increasing reference to the European Convention and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights as sources of law, the increased application of human rights 
does not appear to have changed the general approach to the principles of interpretation 
of law. New types of methods of interpretation usually occur in the context of refer-
ring to the fundamental rights or human rights provisions. As regards the principles 
of interpretation applied by the European Court of Human Rights, however, not all 
of them are still visible in national case law. Although some scholars have called for 
increased application of other sources of law, particularly general principles of law, those 
are still today less visible in the case law of the supreme jurisdictions as is elaborated 
on in more detail in section 4.5 below. However, some transition appears to be taking 
place. In principle, there should not be any major problem, from a theoretical point of 
view, to develop the approach to the sources of law and principles of interpretation of 
law to an even more flexible one.
4.1.4.3 Interpretation of constitutional rights – comparative observations
Insofar as the interpretation of constitutional law provisions and fundamental rights 
provisions are concerned, one may note that in those legal systems where a written 
constitution exists, the constitution usually contains at least some provisions on funda-
759 Aarnio 1991 (1998), p. 135.
760 Aarnio 1991 (1998), p. 137.
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mental rights. Grewe points out, however, that constitutions only seldom provide for 
specific rules on their interpretation, which affords a rather large degree of flexibility761. 
Thus, a rather similar approach could be adopted with regard to the interpretation of 
national constitutions as with regard to the interpretation of the Convention. This is 
the general approach chosen in Finland, as shown in the analysis of the case law of 
the supreme jurisdictions in section 5 below. 
In the English legal system, the interpretation of constitutional rights is a rather 
recent aspect of the interpretation of law for the reason that there were no constitutional 
or other statutory provisions on fundamental rights until the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act of 1998. The new provisions, enhancing the application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, have also had an impact on the interpretation of law 
despite that in general the same types of principles of interpretation are applied as 
in respect of any application and interpretation of law. First, the provisions of other 
legislation must be read in conformity with the Convention rights and, second, the 
Human Rights Act has enhanced the application of the teleological method of inter-
pretation of law (see section 2.6.2.1 above). This can be said to be an important change 
in a legal system that has traditionally relied strongly on literal interpretation of law. 
However, more time is needed to assess in which manner the principle of teleological 
method has in fact been applied and whether it has been applied in the same way as it 
is applied by the European Court of Human Rights. At any rate, in the view of Master-
man, the Human Rights Act has resulted in that the national courts have responded 
to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against the United Kingdom 
by modifying their approach to the relevant domestic law. However, although the 
courts have this possibility, it has not replaced the common law doctrine of precedent, 
but domestic courts are still formally bound by applicable domestic precedents even if 
they are inconsistent with the Convention until replaced by a new precedent. Effective 
application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is also restricted 
by internal constitutional limitations as domestic courts cannot impose amendments 
to legislation found incompatible with the Convention.762 Despite the limits set by the 
national legal system, there appears to be already some form of interaction between 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights763. 
Thus, the overview of the case law of the Supreme Court made for the purpose of 
this research as well as the works of scholars appear to confirm a conclusion that the 
culture of interpreting fundamental rights in the English legal system has undergone 
761 Grewe 1998, p. 200.
762 Masterman 2014, p. 320 and 321.
763 See, in particular, Masterman 2014, p. 323. According to Masterman, the English courts even 
have adopted a restrictive approach to the application of the principle of margin of appreciation, 
and have instead placed an emphasis on the nature of the Convention as a living instrument. 
(Ibid. p. 324)
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a significant transition, which has increased the receptiveness of the legal system to 
the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights.
Insofar as constitutional law in France is concerned, Troper & al. mention certain 
special aspects worth mentioning. In their view, the distinction between constitutional 
and non-constitutional principles and values is far from clear. As reasons for this they 
mention, first, that the preamble of the present Constitution refers to the Declaration 
of Human Rights and to the preamble to the 1946 constitution. The latter text men-
tions “fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic”. By virtue of 
this, all general principles can be considered constitutional, even when they have been 
first established by an ordinary statute and when that statute does not explicitly so 
state. Second, courts do use principles and values, which can be intellectually related 
to a constitutional text, such as the Declaration of Human Rights, but courts often 
do so without referring to the text.764 As regards the interpretation of constitutional 
rights in the French legal system, Troper & al. suggest that teleological interpretation is 
mainly applied by the Conseil constitutionnel when reviewing the conformity of statutes 
to the Constitution.765 According to Grewe, this also appears to be the case in respect 
of the interpretation of the constitutional provisions themselves, although she speaks 
of evolutive interpretation. According to her, the tendency is rather towards seeking 
the objective intention of the text instead of the subjective intention of the legislator, 
and the preparatory work is seldom referred to although it has on occasion been done 
by the Conseil constitutionnel.766
The tendency towards evolutive interpretation may be at least partly explained by 
the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights.767 Indeed, the French courts have in the past 
years rather carefully followed judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
issued against France, including their legal effects, and sometimes those judgments 
have resulted in changes of interpretation of national law and even changes of judicial 
764 Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 205.
765 Troper & al. 1991 (1998), p. 193. It is to be borne in mind that the task of the Conseil constitu-
tionnel is limited to the interpretation of the conformity of statutes with the Constitution, but 
including any legal text referred to it. In doing this, the Conseil constitutionnel needs to assess 
the conflicting interpretations by parliament, the petitioners and, eventually, the Conseil consti-
tutionnel itself. (Rousseau 2007, p.36) In the view of Rousseau, constitutional judges guarantee 
that meaning has been derived from a constitutional provision in accordance with a procedure 
calling for deliberations from those players. However, in the complex production of meanings, 
the constitutional court is only one of the players. In his view, the choice of one meaning is never 
final, an interpretation can evolve and new rights can be recognised (Ibid. p. 38, 39 and 43). This 
view is in line with the principle of evolutive interpretation applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights.
766 Grewe 1998, p. 204 and 205.
767 Grewe 1998, p. 206.
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techniques768. In France, however, a dialogue or interaction between the European 
Court of Human Rights and national courts is perhaps difficult to identify. In the 
view of Grewe, one may at most speak of marginal influence of the European Court 
on national case law.769 More recently, French courts have increasingly resorted to 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning other respondent 
states, but there are some limits to their applicability as guidance for interpretation 
imposed by the national legal system770. Further, in the light of an overview of French 
judgments made for the purposes of this research, the rather mechanic references to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights make it difficult to identify the 
way in which that case law has de facto been applied, although there may be examples 
of cases where national judges resort to reasoning close to evolutive interpretation and 
even the existence of some degree of dialogue is mentioned771. It appears to be rare, 
however, and in the light of the overview of recent French judgments, most of them 
appear apply rather traditional methods of interpretation, which is also admitted by 
Lageot772. It is also to be noted that the number of judgments by the European Court 
concerning inadequate reasoning of judgments in France, for example, is relatively high. 
The references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have increased 
but this has not affected the style of French judgments considerably.
In the German legal system, there are no major differences as regards the methods 
of interpretation of law in general and those applied for the interpretation of consti-
tutional rights. It seems that the Federal Constitutional Court has, however, applied a 
rather dynamic method of interpretation of the constitution. Heun shares the view of 
Kommers in that the Constitutional Court has been more creative in the interpretation 
of constitutional law than other courts of law have been in the interpretation of civil 
and criminal law, in particular, which is explained by the nature of constitutional law. 
According to Heun, constitutional law can be characterised as vague and responsive, 
and such an openness leaves the Constitutional Court considerable flexibility in the 
interpretation of the constitution. Thus, although the Constitutional Court applies 
the normal methods and rules of interpretation of law, they have not restricted it but 
it has shown more willingness to resort to teleological interpretation and to seek the 
768 Lageot 2014, p. 170-173.
769 Grewe 1998, p. 212.
770 See Lageot 2014, p. 174 and 176-178. A particular obstacle is that the French courts are not 
competent to impose amendments to national legislation (Ibid. p. 177), which is a feature in 
common with the English legal system.
771 Lageot is of a somewhat different view, finding that the ordinary courts dealing with criminal and 
civil law cases apply the standards of the European Court of Human Rights in much the same 
way as the Court itself does. Lageot bases her view largely on the application of the principle of 
proportionality, and in her view, the margin of appreciation is hardly ever applied. (Lageot 2014, 
p. 178-180)
772 Lageot 2014, p. 180 and 181.
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objective intention of the Constitution instead of the subjective or real intention of the 
legislator.773 Furthermore, in the same way as the European Court of Human Rights 
has developed the meaning of the Convention provisions through teleological inter-
pretation, a corresponding phenomenon may, in the view of Grewe, be observed in the 
interpretation of constitutional law provisions774. Such a progressive development is 
the more visible the further the court departs from the literal interpretation of provi-
sions, in favour of the spirit of those provisions.775 It may be noted that such an open 
interpretation is particularly fit in the context of human rights and fundamental rights, 
and the Constitutional Court has also further developed the meaning of fundamental 
rights provisions and extended their application from what was probably originally 
intended by the legislator776, similarly as has been done by the European Court of 
Human Rights with regard to the Convention provisions. 
Klein finds, however, that instead of using the denominations given by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to the various standards and methods of interpretation, 
the national courts rather interpret the Convention in the way the European Court 
of Human Rights has done777, which appears to be a feature shared with the French 
judiciary. Although the terms used are not always the same, similar principles seem 
to exist in the German legal system, including the margin of appreciation and the 
principle of proportionality.778 Without going into details about the other principles 
773 Kommers 2006, p. 200. Heun 2011, p. 6, 7 and 181. Heun further notes that within the tele-
ological method, practically all kinds of arguments are possible, including political, economic 
or ethical considerations. In his view, this leaves an almost unlimited latitude to the interpreter, 
although the wording of the text (Wortlaut) is considered to constitute the borderline. (Ibid. p. 
181) Kommers explains the different approach to the interpretation of the Basic Law by that the 
state is not regarded as the source of fundamental rights, as the core of individual freedom and 
human dignity is considered anterior to the state. In his view, inalienable rights, justice, values, 
and other such notions arguably present in the Basic Law militate against the methodology of 
legal positivism, which together with Begfriffsjurisprudenz have been traditionally prevailing 
elements in the interpretation of law in Germany. (Kommers 1989, p. 46 and 47.)
774 Grewe 1998, p. 221. According to Grewe, this development takes place by means of an adaptation 
of the Constitution or a general conception of fundamental rights. Such adaptation may also be 
done by supplementing the national provisions with the international law. (p. 221 and 222) See 
also Klein 2014, p. 210, according to whom teleological interpretation today is widely recognised 
and applied.
775 Grewe 1998, p. 223.
776 See Heun 2011, p. 192 and 193. Fundamental rights have traditionally been understood as values, 
but the Constitutional Court has given up this concept and rather refers to fundamental rights 
as objective principles without, nevertheless, changing the normative effects of the original value 
concept. (Ibid. p. 199)
777 Klein 2014, p. 210. Klein also admits that it is difficult to identify from the wording of the national 
judgments whether the courts apply standards developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights or those developed by the Federal Constitutional Court.
778 Kommers 2006, p. 201 and 202.
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mentioned by Kommers, it is interesting to note that the principle of interpretation in 
conformity with the Constitution (verfassungskonforme Auslegung) is one of the princi-
ples applied779, and its counterpart exists in the Finnish legal system. When compared 
with the English and French legal systems, the German technique of interpreting law 
appears to be closer to that of the European Court of Human Rights, and in the light 
of the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, there are already examples of rather 
advanced references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In the 
view of Klein, the references are more developed in those cases where the judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights directly concerns Germany, in which case the 
conclusions better fit the German legal system. In such cases, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has aimed at carefully following and adapting the principles to national 
cases in the specific field of law.780
The better preparedness at the national level to also interpret constitutional provi-
sions on fundamental rights in a manner which is closer to its European counterpart, 
including an effective national control mechanism, may largely explain the low num-
ber of violations found against Germany by the European Court of Human Rights, 
particularly in the light of the size of German population. The German judiciary has 
been more prepared for an open approach to the interpretation of fundamental rights 
than the English and French ones. In Germany, particularly the Federal Constitutional 
Court seems to have entered into a successful dialogue with the European Court of 
Human Rights781. As an example of interaction between the courts, Grewe names the 
discussion on horizontal effects of the Convention, i.e. its effects on relations between 
individuals. In the German legal system, such effects (Drittwirkung) have been subject 
to a rather lively discussion.782 This, in turn, might be explained by the strong status of 
the Federal Constitutional Court. Although the interpretation of fundamental rights 
provisions may be open to value-judgments, the control exercised by the Constitutional 
Court appears to be accepted not only as a possibility but as a requirement.783
There are no particular methods in the Swedish legal system concerning the inter-
pretation of fundamental rights provisions of law, but the provisions on the control of 
constitutionality of legislation play a role in that provisions of ordinary law may need 
to be set aside in case of conflict with the constitutional provisions on fundamental 
rights. The Swedish practice of the control of constitutionality of legislation is somewhat 
similar with that of Finland in that the courts only have the possibility of refraining 
from the application of such provisions of ordinary law as are in conflict with the 
constitution. However, under the provisions of the constitution (Regeringsform/ RF 
779 Kommers 2006, p. 204.
780 See Klein 2014, p. 207.
781 See e.g. Klein 2014, p. 214.
782 See Grewe 1998, p. 220, and Klein 2014, p. 208 and 209.
783 See e.g. Alexy 2004, p. 367.
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11:14), the conflict must be apparent (uppenbar). This strict requirement has, accord-
ing to Nergelius, been subject to criticism.784 In the view of Cameron and Bull, it is 
difficult to assess whether the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has 
had an impact and to what extent to the constitutionality review, but despite the rather 
incoherent picture, there are some examples where the national supreme jurisdictions 
have refined their approach to the assessment of constitutionality of national legisla-
tion785. Insofar as the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned, it has been 
implemented at the level of ordinary law. Thus, in the same way as in Finland, question 
might arise as to what should be done in case the provisions of the Convention are 
found to be in conflict with the constitution. According to RF 2:23, no legislation may 
be enacted in violation of the Convention. However, Nergelius points out that the RF 
11:14 applies even in the case of the Convention. Thus, a strict interpretation of the 
principle of apparent conflict would mean that the Swedish courts should apply the 
Convention with some caution.786 In a way, the principle is favourable to the application 
of the Convention as its provisions would be set aside only in the case of an apparent 
conflict. However, there might be a risk of an apparent conflict. In a judgment issued 
by the Swedish Supreme Court, it has been suggested that the Convention should, 
due to its special character, be given special importance in the interpretation of law 
(HD Ds 1993:90, p. 204). Nergelius points out, in a somewhat criticising tone, that the 
preparatory work for the implementation of the Convention does not clearly enough 
indicate what kind of a status the Convention should be given in the interpretation 
of law.787 The preparatory work merely refers to the normal rules of interpretation of 
law as well as to the principle of interpretation in conformity with the Convention, 
leaving a considerable margin of discretion to courts.788 
However, in the special character of the Convention, protecting the same types of 
rights as the Constitutions do, appears to have been recognised in the Swedish legal 
system and thereby the Convention has been afforded a semi-constitutional status. Nor 
784 Nergelius 1996, p. 675 and 676. The source of criticism has mainly been that there may be various 
situations where the provisions of law are in conflict with the constitution, and it may be difficult 
to define what is considered an apparent conflict. Furthermore, Nergelius quite legitimately points 
out that citizens should also be able to trust that the provisions of the Constitution do apply.
785 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 278-283. They name as a particular example that of taxation and the 
principle of ne bis in idem, where the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has lead 
to a reassessment of national legislation in the same way as in Finland. In the case of Sweden, 
the national jurisdictions found the applicable Swedish law to be unconstitutional. (Ibid. p. 281) 
Those judgments have also been analysed for the purposes of this research.
786 Nergelius 1996, p. 683.
787 Nergelius 1996, p. 684.
788 Holmberg & Stjernquist 2000, p. 52. Holmberg & Stjernquist nevertheless suggest that the 
incorporation of the Convention might lead to increasing resort to the teleological method of 
interpretation of law (Ibid.).
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has the official status of the Convention at the level of ordinary law created problems 
of application. Furthermore, the Swedish legal system appears to follow a principle 
of human rights friendly interpretation of law in the same way as the German legal 
system (and the Finnish one) does. The Swedish legal system has also welcomed the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, although there are differences be-
tween the Swedish methods of interpretation of law and those of the European Court 
of Human Rights. As regards response to violations found by the European Court of 
Human Rights against Sweden, the national jurisdictions may decide to reinterpret 
law on appeal, reopen the case or order damages789. The possibility of reinterpreting law 
opens the way for developing the methods of interpretation. However, it appears that 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has not had any major impact, 
when assessing the judiciary as a whole, on the way in which national judgments are 
reasoned, and the traditional methods of interpretation are still given slight preference 
over the principles teleological and evolutive interpretation790. At any rate, the national 
technique of interpreting fundamental rights and human rights provisions has, in the 
light of the case law of the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) assessed for 
the purposes of this research, become closer to that of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and there are already examples of cases with rather detailed discourse. In 
a way, the traditional methods of reasoning coexist with some fragments of discourse 
containing more detailed argumentation, particularly those parts of the judgments 
with references to the European case law.
Until late 1970s, Finnish courts were reluctant to apply the provisions on fundamen-
tal rights of the Constitution Act when deciding cases – neither as directly applicable 
rules nor as a means of interpretation.791 However, a shift towards a more welcoming 
attitude towards fundamental rights has been observed.792 Ojanen identifies four ways 
in which fundamental rights can be observed to affect the argumentation of national 
courts today, the first one of which is particularly the influence on the interpretation 
of other provisions of law. Second, the courts may directly apply the fundamental 
rights provisions as grounds for their decisions. Third, under section 106 of the Con-
stitution, the courts have a possibility, although a limited one, to give precedence for 
789 Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 283.
790 This is the assessment of Cameron and Bull who find that this is due to the dominant role given 
to the travaux préparatoires of legislation (Cameron and Bull 2014, p. 279).
791 See e.g. Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 794.
792 Viljanen (V-P) 1990, p. 203. Saraviita observes that a further reason for the reluctance to apply 
fundamental rights provisions as a basis for the judgment by courts was that before the enact-
ment of the new Constitution in 1999, the courts were not considered competent to assess the 
constitutionality of laws. Section 106 of the new Constitution provides for the obligation imposed 
on courts to refrain from applying such provisions of ordinary laws as they find to be in conflict 
with the Constitution. However, this conflict needs to be apparent. (Saraviita 1999, p. 890 and 
891)
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the fundamental rights provisions over the provisions of ordinary law. Fourth, under 
section 107, the courts may not apply such provisions of law as are in conflict with the 
Constitution.793 Saraviita is, however, of the opinion that the rule on the fundamental 
rights friendly interpretation is a more significant tool for courts to ensure the protection 
of fundamental and human rights than sections 106 and 107 of the Constitution.794
As the direct application of fundamental rights and human rights provisions by 
national courts has increased, also the question of the harmonisation of interpretation 
of the two sets of rights has become pertinent. Until the fundamental rights reform 
of the Constitution, Finnish courts and authorities applied a doctrine under which 
they had been treated rather separately from the application and interpretation of 
international human rights conventions795 although there were some signs of changes 
in culture already before the reform. It appears from the judgments of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions that both sets of rights are referred to in the same fragments of 
discourse. Further, apart from some cases in which specific methods developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights are named, no particular methods of interpreting 
constitutional rights can be identified that would be different from those of interpret-
ing other provisions of law. This may partly explain the rather early references to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, despite that they were mechanic, as there 
was need to seek guidance in the lack of national traditions of directly applying fun-
damental rights provisions or human rights provisions. In the same way as in Swedish 
judgments, the traditional methods of interpretation appear to coexist with those of 
interpreting the Convention, the latter rather appearing in the context of references 
to the Convention and the European case law.
The search for a solution within a wider context of the legal system is in common 
793 For details, see Ojanen 2001, p. 83-86.
794 Saraviita 1999, p. 893. Should the application of law before a court allow several interpretations 
of the provision concerned, the court should choose the interpretation that best guarantees the 
fundamental right to be protected. (Ibid.) However, Saraviita also questions the possibility the 
Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament to impose binding rules of interpretation, such 
as the principle of fundamental rights friendly interpretation, on courts of law in view of the 
independence and impartiality of the latter. (Ibid.)
795 PeVL 12/1982 vp. According to the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, international 
conventions binding on Finland could not as such supplement or clarify the provisions of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the contents of such conventions could not be used as a basis for the 
interpretation of the Constitution. According to Viljanen (V-P), this interpretation of the Con-
stitutional Law Committee was based on the differences between the contents of the two sets 
of provisions, on the differences in the possibilities of national governmental bodies to affect the 
application and interpretation of international human rights provisions at the international level, 
and on the fact that derogations could be enacted to the national fundamental rights provisions 
by a special Act of Parliament enacted through the constitutional legislative procedure whereas 
derogating from international human rights provisions would have always entailed a breach of 
international obligations. (Viljanen (V-P) 1996, p. 792)
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with the German approach to the interpretation of constitutional provisions within 
the framework of the entire constitution, and that of the European Court of Human 
Rights to the interpretation of individual rights in the light of the Convention as a 
whole. However, sticking to the legal system alone is potentially too limited, and the 
Swedish practice of resorting more often to the intention and purpose of the statute 
may be a wiser approach. This factor may be one of those explaining why the number 
of applications against Finland before the European Court of Human Rights has 
been larger than that against Sweden, but most certainly not the only one. However, 
in principle, a more flexible approach should be possible for the Finnish judiciary in 
the same way as for the German Constitutional Court. Some changes have emerged 
in the field of interpreting law together with constitutional law, particularly as regards 
the provisions on fundamental rights. The most significant changes are a result of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
4.2  Autonomous meaning – conceptual problems
A general comparison between the English and French authentic texts of the Conven-
tion and the German, Swedish and Finnish translations thereof would give reason to 
conclude that no major linguistic or conceptual problems should arise in the application 
of the Convention in the legal systems covered by the present study. This presumption 
can be confirmed on the basis of an overall analysis of the case law of the Finnish su-
preme jurisdictions. The same seems to apply to the other legal systems, but no defini-
tive conclusions can be made on the basis of the small selection of judgments analysed 
and because of the mainly brief reasoning concerning the contents of the Convention. 
Furthermore, as was noted in the foregoing, the practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights of giving an autonomous meaning to some concepts of the Conven-
tion, particularly that of expanding its interpretation in the light of the Convention as 
a living instrument, could be one factor explaining the problems that a national legal 
system may face in its receptiveness to the case law and argumentation of the Court.
The science of law is largely dominated by concepts although their role in the science 
has changed from what it was during the era of “Begriffsjurisprudenz” at the beginning 
of the 20th century. Despite theoretical changes, even the core of modern legal science is 
the systematisation, classification and definition of concepts.796 Concepts are not neutral 
but carry a cultural burden and may create different images with different users and 
recipients. They also have a historical connection. In brief, concepts are born at a given 
moment, in given society and for a given purpose. The context in which concepts are 
used should also be taken into account. They may have different meanings depending on 
796 Letto-Vanamo 2008, p. 1127.
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the context, and may also depend on the time and the place.797 However, as is pointed 
out by Mattila, the difference between “concept” and “term” should be kept in mind, 
although many lawyers use them synonymously. Strictly speaking, “concept” means an 
abstract idea or an entity of elements characterising something, whereas “term” is the 
name given to that concept, or its appearance.798 To simplify, a concept is expressed with 
a term. Some linguists speak of the surface structure and deep structure of language, 
which has a close connection with the idea. First, it is worth noting that terms may 
have one or several meanings799. Pfersmann notes that interpretation, as an analysis 
of meaning, cannot do more than provide for the entire range of those meanings.800 
Insofar as concepts are concerned, they may be either internally or externally identical, 
or internally or externally different. In the view of Schneider, a more important division 
for the application of law is, however, into comparable and incomparable concepts. For 
contrasting situations, Schneider divides concepts into four groups.801 However, from 
a linguistic point of view, and for the comparability of different language versions of a 
piece of legislation or a treaty, that division is not a particularly relevant one. As regards 
the European Court of Human Rights, one may note in the light of the foregoing 
analysis of the principles of interpretation used by the Court that it does on occasion 
refer to the differences in meaning between the terminology used in the English and 
French versions of the Convention, but it is more usual for the Court to resort to a 
more profound analysis of the meaning of a certain concept. In doing that, the Court 
on occasion carries out comparison between the legislations of States parties to the 
Convention, but it is more frequent for the Court to analyse the level of protection 
than conceptual differences between different legal systems. Such differences may 
have relevance for the national jurisdictions applying the Convention, particularly as 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights should be applied in a uniform 
and consistent manner. However, conceptual differences should not be overemphasised 
either, given that the legal systems and languages also have common roots in Roman 
law and in the Latin language, for example, which have a harmonising effect even today.
A linguistic comparison starts with the examination of terms or surface structures of 
the language. This should still be relatively easy. Bearing in mind the principle of one 
treaty, what is more relevant for the conveyance of meaning of the different language 
797 Ruuskanen 2006, p. 47.
798 See Mattila 1999, p. 107. See also Schneider 1991, p. 41.
799 See in more detail e.g. Schneider 1991, p. 41-43.
800 Pfersmann 2010, p. 244. Interpretation, in turn, is either true or false, i.e. it either correctly or 
incorrectly establishes the range of meaning. Furthermore, interpretation is a set of propositions 
linked through logical operations. Through interpretation, one can also define the range of semantic 
indeterminacy and vagueness of legal prescriptions. (Ibid. p. 245)
801 Schneider 1991, p. 40 and 41. In the words of Schneider, “Es gibt vier Gegensätze: kontraditorisch, 
konträr, privativ und relativ.“
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versions of a treaty is, however, whether the correspondence between the term and the 
concept is the same in each language version of the treaty. Thus, the concept behind the 
term should be the same802. The same question arises in the comparison of the concepts 
of different legal systems. The same concept may be expressed with different terms 
not only within one language but also among different languages or different legal 
systems. The fact that the term appears to be different in different language versions or 
languages does not necessarily mean that the concept referred to would be different. 
Where the same concept nevertheless exists in the two legal systems concerned, there 
should at least in principle be a term (or expression) to express it. Difficulties arise where 
a certain legal concept is specific to a single legal system and the other legal language, 
into which it should be translated, does not have a term to convey the same meaning.
German scholars sometimes speak of the openness of law, meaning that there may 
be certain linguistic or systemic factors that leave room for interpretation or even give 
rise to problems of interpretation. Pfersmann notes that the degree of indeterminacy 
and vagueness of norm formulations in natural language is an open question, i.e. it 
is a matter of scientific semantic investigation.803 Alexy & Dreier suggest that each 
piece of legislation and each application of law confronts the language of law, and 
thus confronts three different types of problems: ambiguity, vagueness and evaluative 
openness. According to Alexy & Dreier, a word is ambiguous when it has a different 
meaning in different contexts, whereas a concept is vague when there are some subjects 
that indubitably fall within its scope, some subjects that indubitably do not fall within 
its scope, and a third class of subjects that cannot be said to belong to one or the other 
with certainty. With evaluative openness Alexy & Dreier refer to expressions, such 
as good faith (Treu und Glauben), denoting concepts that have but little descriptive 
meaning over and above their evaluative component. In their view, it is the task of the 
judiciary to fill in the descriptive meaning that matches the evaluative component.804
Bearing in mind that any legal concept has its historical and cultural background805, 
one may note that despite common roots in Roman law and Latin language, within 
the European legal systems, the greatest conceptual differences can perhaps be found 
between the common law system (English legal system) and the Roman-Germanic 
802 The problem of congruency is also something that legal translators are constantly confronted 
with, and the translator should aim at a result that is the same as the desired result of the source 
text. The success or failure depends on whether the translator has managed to predict how the 
courts would later interpret the translation. (See Šarčević 2000, p. 229)
803 Pfersmann 2010, p. 244. Pfersmann reasons that in certain cases the formulation may be so precise 
that only one interpretation is possible, but in general norm formulations are designed so as to 
allow several interpretations i.e. a range of indeterminacy and vagueness.
804 Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 74 and 75. Dworkin also refers to ambiguity and vagueness of 
words as usual reasons for the unclarity of a statute. The use of abstract words, for example, may 
also create problems. (Dworkin 1986, p. 351)
805 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & al. 2006, p. 31.
274 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
legal systems as a group. According to Mattila, the development of the common law 
system rather independently in the Middle Ages resulted in considerable differences 
in concepts when compared with those of Roman-Germanic law, particularly with 
regard to the basic concepts of precedence and the law of property.806 As explained 
in the foregoing, it is explained by the different degrees of reception of Roman law. 
The fact that the authentic language versions of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights derive their terminology from such legal languages and systems in which 
significant conceptual differences appear, might potentially create a risk of translation 
problems and differences between the language versions. At the outset, in the French 
language version of the Convention, the terminology used seems to be largely similar 
to the terms used in the English version. This is natural, considering that the legal 
terms and also other vocabulary in these two languages are often of the same origin. 
It also makes translation from one language into another easier than in the case of 
languages having only little in common. However, it should also be borne in mind 
that a term may be misleading807. The same term may exist in two languages, but have 
a different meaning i.e. express a different legal concept. Such a phenomenon is not 
rare between the English and French languages. Furthermore, the term, expression 
or concept may have a wider or narrower meaning in one language than another. The 
European Court of Human Rights has stated for example in the foregoing cited case 
of Wemhoff as follows:
The Court cannot accept this restrictive interpretation. It is true that the English text 
of the Convention allows such an interpretation. The word “trial”, which appears there 
on two occasions, refers to the whole of the proceedings before the court, not just their 
beginning; the words “entitled to trial” are not necessarily to be equated with “entitled 
to be brought to trial”, although in the context “pending trial” seems to require release 
before the trial considered as a whole, that is, before its opening.
But while the English text permits two interpretations the French version, which is 
of equal authority, allows only one. According to it the obligation to release an accused 
person within a reasonable time continues until that person has been “jugée”, that is, 
until the day of the judgment that terminates the trial. Moreover, he must be released 
“pendant la procédure”, a very broad expression which indubitably covers both the 
trial and the investigation.808
806 Mattila 1999, p. 108. It is noted in section 4.1.2 above that the English system is stricter than 
the continental ones, which are closer to how precedents are treated by the European Court of 
Human Rights.
807 Mattila 1999, p. 110-112.
808 Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A 7, § 7.
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An examination of the history of the English language reveals that the English 
language has been affected, among others, by French but along with time, the language 
has received influence from other sources and words of the same origin may today 
have a different meaning. In translation theory, such equivalents in another language 
are called “faux amis”. Mattila identifies a third potential problem of terminological 
nature, that of polysemy. This means that one legal term may have different meanings 
which are often interrelated but may sometimes be so far from one another that they 
do not seem to have anything in common.809
A closer examination of a selection of articles reveals various differences between 
the English and French language versions of the Convention. Considering that there 
are certain differences between the two authentic language versions of the Convention, 
which have been co-drafted, there is reason to believe that such differences appear at 
least to the same extent or even to a greater extent in translations of the Convention. 
This should not be surprising given that, as has been observed by Tabory810, even legal 
systems using the same language may employ legal terms differently, despite that these 
terms seem the same at the outset. In the foregoing, certain concepts used in two provi-
sions of the Convention are analysed in the light of the Court’s case law, i.e. Article 5, 
paragraph 1, and Article 6, paragraph 1. Article 5 and Article 6 of the Convention are 
not only the most detailed and essential provisions thereof, but are also those that have 
produced the largest number of cases before the European Court of Human Rights.
An extensive analysis of the Court’s case law indicates that the problems faced by 
States parties to the Convention under the said Articles have been rather systemic 
than conceptual. Perhaps the biggest conceptual problem has been the concept of civil 
rights referred to in Article 6, paragraph 1, which has made it necessary for the Court 
to elaborate on it in detail, looking not only into the linguistic or ordinary meaning 
of the concept but also into the object and purpose of the provision, thus arriving at 
an autonomous meaning. Another concept which has produced a good number of 
challenges for States parties to the Convention is that of criminal charge under the 
same provision. In the following, the aforementioned concepts with an autonomous 
meaning are assessed in the light of eventual problems caused for national legal systems 
and jurisdictions.
4.2.1 Concept of “civil rights”
In the English legal language, civil rights is usually understood as a synonym of civil 
liberties and of fundamental rights, meaning personal or natural rights guaranteed by 
the constitution and constituting restraints on government. As explained in the fore-
going, however, the English legal system has remained without a written constitution 
809 For more details, see Mattila 1999, p. 112-115.
810 Tabory 1980, p. 132.
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despite the early constitutional instruments and present pieces of legislation, which may 
be classified as constitutional law. In the United States, on the other hand, a written 
constitution has existed for a relatively long time. According to Rossini, civil rights 
are generally considered to mean those rights that are enforced by law. In the United 
States, this refers to those rights and privileges that are guaranteed by the Constitution 
or by other statutes. One important aspect is the prohibition on discrimination. In 
those countries that do not have a constitutional guarantee of civil rights, this aspect 
is addressed under the international law concept of human rights.811 In turn, civil lib-
erties refer to the freedom to act within the law as a member of an organized society 
in which public order is maintained and public welfare is protected. In the United 
States, these are understood as political or natural liberties and personal equality as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.812
At the outset, the concept of civil rights does not seem particularly problematic as 
it can easily be translated into other languages, i.e. the same term appears in those 
languages. However, as has been explained in the foregoing, even where the terms or 
the expression in different languages appear to have the same meaning, the appear-
ance may be misleading. There may be differences in the meaning between different 
languages and legal systems, referring to different concepts. Sometimes one term may 
also have several meanings.813 Already the use of the concept in the French language 
poses some problems as the word “civil(e)” has different meanings depending on the 
context. To convey the same meaning in French as the English version of Article 6, 
paragraph 1 has, it would be risky to use a direct translation.
The roots of “droit civil” can be traced back to its Latin origin, “ius civile”. The term 
“ius civile” has different meanings which have partly merged along with history. Ac-
cording to Mattila, in the times of antiquity, the term referred, on the one hand, to 
the classical Roman law (as opposed to ius honorarium) and, on the other hand, to law 
applied to Roman citizens (as opposed to ius gentium). In the Middle Ages and later, 
the term was used to mean Roman law in general but also man-made law as opposed 
to divine or natural law (ius divinum/ ius naturae, ius naturale). The modern meaning 
of “droit civil” is the result of a long development. In common law countries, in legal 
English, the term “civil law” is often used to refer to continental European legal sys-
tems as opposed to common law systems. Thus, when the modern French concept of 
“droit civil” is translated into English, the safest translation would be “private law”.814
Today, the first meaning of the French concept of “droit civil” is to denote the fun-
damental part of private law that provides for rules on persons, family, obligations and 
811 Rossini 1998, p. 7.
812 Rossini 1998, p. 7.
813 For more detailed analysis of terminological problems, see e.g. Mattila 1999, p. 108-115.
814 Mattila 1999, p. 113.
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contracts, and more widely to make a distinction between private law and criminal law 
or public law. The adjective “civil(e)” can also have the meaning equivalent to that of 
the English term used in the Convention, but it would be rather used in the concept 
of “libertés civiles” referring to something belonging to all citizens in their private or 
professional life.815 However, whether the formulation used in the French version of 
Article 6, paragraph 1, “droits et obligations de caractère civile” removes the risk that a 
direct translation would entail, is an interesting question. This construction might be 
the result of an effort to avoid misinterpretation, but to interpret the phrase correctly 
requires a considerable knowledge of the French language. The English and French legal 
systems do not appear to have had major problems regarding the linguistic expression 
used in the Convention, which may be due to the original language status. However, 
particularly the French legal system has produced interesting cases to the European 
Court of Human Rights, referred to in the foregoing816, which have resulted in expansion 
of the scope of the concept of civil rights in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
As regards the other legal systems compared with the Finnish one, the German 
legal system does not appear to have any major problems in interpreting the concept 
of civil rights, despite that the German translation of the expression “civil rights and 
obligations” seems to be an even clearer misinterpretation of the concept of “civil 
rights” than the Swedish version. The German version, “zivilrechtliche Ansprüche und 
Verpflichtungen”, clearly speaks of civil law or private law, as opposed to public law. 
According to the definition of the German term, “Zivilrecht” refers to any norms of 
material or private law817. In principle, it would be possible that the German legal 
system has faced similar problems with those described in the foregoing in respect of 
Sweden, but in that case it would seem in the light of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights those problems have been dealt with at the national level. 
Instead, of all the five legal systems covered by the present study, the Swedish legal 
system appears to have faced most problems in interpreting the concept. The concept 
of “civil rights and obligations” has been translated as such e.g. into Swedish, as “civila 
rättigheter och skyldigheter”. Sometimes a direct or precise translation may indeed be 
the safest way of dealing with a term or concept the contents of which are ambiguous 
or unclear, particularly in cases of treaty provisions that are a result of a political com-
promise. However, sometimes a direct translation may also be a risk. As later proved 
to be the case in respect of Swedish, a precise translation does not always provide the 
correct meaning of the concept. In the Swedish legal language, “civila rättigheter och 
815 Cornu 2003 (Vocabulaire juridique).
816 Those cases include, in particular, Pellegrin v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 8 December 
1999. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VIII, Pierre-Bloch v. France, judgment of 21 
October 1997, Reports 1997-VI, and Maaouia v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 5 October 
2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-X.
817 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch 2002.
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skyldigheter” has a narrower meaning than the English “civil rights and obligations”, 
referring to rights and obligations of a private law nature, in the same way as it would 
have in the Finnish legal language if translated directly.
Choosing a translation the meaning of which is narrower than that of the term 
used in the authentic language version leads to a narrower scope of application of the 
text of the provision. In the case of Sweden, the translation led to courts excluding 
from the scope of application such rights as should have been afforded protection. 
This resulted in a number of violations of the Convention found in cases against 
Sweden in the European Court of Human Rights818, which later made it necessary 
to introduce amendments to national legislation as the Swedish legal system was not 
found to be in conformity with the requirements of the Convention.819 It must be 
remembered, however, that at the time the Swedish translation was made there was 
less case law available than e.g. when the Finnish translation was made820. Thus, the 
persons responsible for the Finnish translation of the Convention had more infor-
mation available as to the meaning of its provisions through the interpretations of 
the Court, as well as through literature, and this information could already be taken 
into account in the translation. In cases of multilateral conventions, the intention of 
drafters is often difficult to establish, due to scarce amount of “travaux préparatoires”, 
and without other sources of interpretation such as international case law, the courts 
are faced with a difficult task. However, according to Danelius, until the 1980s and 
the 1990s, it was also rare for Swedish courts to apply the Convention’s provisions 
directly, which was due to that the Convention was originally not incorporated into 
the Swedish legal order, but this was done as late as in 1995821. According to Pellon-
pää & al., it seems that the Swedish courts have become more active in referring to 
the Convention after its incorporation into the legal order, although it was possible 
to take its provisions into account also earlier - and it was also done particularly as a 
818 These cases include, inter alia, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, 
Series A 52, Pudas v. Sweden, judgment of 27 October 1987, Series A 125-A, Bodén v. Sweden, 
judgment of 27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-B, Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, judgment 
of 7 July 1989, Series A 159, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (No. 1), judgment of 25 October 1989, 
Series A 163, Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A 171-A, 
Mats Jacobsson v. Sweden, judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A 180-A, Skärby v. Sweden, judgment 
of 28 June 1990, Series A 180-B, and Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), judgment of 18 February 1991, 
Series A 192.
819 See Danelius 2012, p. 163 and 171.
820 Sweden became a member State of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949, and the Government 
proposal to ratify the Convention was given to Parliament at the beginning of the 1950s (Proposi-
tion 1951:165), whereas Finland acceded to the Convention forty years later, upon becoming a 
member of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1989.
821 For details, see Danelius 2012, p. 37-40. Until the enactment of the relevant provisions of law, the 
Swedish courts attempted to apply the national legislation in conformity with the requirements 
of the Convention. (Ibid. p. 37)
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result of the relatively frequent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
finding violations.822
Partly due to the knowledge there already was of the case law under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and prior experience of applying the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Finnish translation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights was paid considerable attention to823. An example of 
the profound reflection on the meaning of the Convention’s provisions is the Finnish 
translation of Article 6, paragraph 1. In this translation, the adjective “civil” has been 
omitted, which thus widens the meaning even when compared with the authentic lan-
guage versions. According to Karapuu, however, this solution was not a mistake but has 
been based on careful consideration.824 Apparently, reflection was made on what types 
of rights should be covered by the provision. Translating “civil rights and obligations” as 
such into Finnish would be possible, but it would not sound very natural, and a direct 
translation would also lead to a rather narrow scope of application of the provision. 
Despite that the European Court of Human Rights has widened the meaning of 
“civil rights and obligations” from that derived from the authentic language versions 
of the Convention, the formulation of the Finnish translation goes even beyond that, 
as is observed by Karapuu825. The Finnish translation does not take a position as to 
the nature of rights, but covers any types of rights. Indeed, one way of dealing with 
an ambiguous concept is to translate it so widely that it inevitably covers all the cases 
meant by the original language version. Unlike a direct translation, however, such a 
wide translation may in turn provide too wide a scope of application for the provi-
sion826. Even if it is not a problem for the courts applying the provision, it may be 
misleading to citizens or lawyers resorting to the text of the Convention. However, 
as is pointed out by Karapuu, a wide translation may still be a safer choice than to 
exclude something of the scope of application with the risk of weakening the legal 
protection of citizens.827 For the domestic courts, the wide translation has not usually 
been problem and the courts frequently resort to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, although there are perhaps some differences in the techniques 
applied by different courts828. The need to take the case law into account in the ap-
plication of the Convention’s provisions was also drawn attention to in the opinion 
822 Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 51 and 52.
823 PeVL 2/1990 vp, p. 3 (relating to government proposal HE 22/1990 vp). See also Pellonpää & 
al. 2012, p. 65.
824 Karapuu 1999, pp. 176 and 177.
825 Karapuu 1999, p. 176.
826 For a more detailed analysis between a direct and an interpretative translation, see the author’s 
prior article (Koivu 2008, p.148-151), focusing on the challenges imposed by differing language 
versions for the interpretation of treaties.
827 Karapuu 1999, p. 176 and 177.
828 See Ojanen 2005, pp. 1215-1220. See in more detail Koivu & Mattila 2006, pp. 43-48.
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of the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament concerning the Government 
Bill to implement the Convention829.
The most usual types of cases against Finland before the European Court of Human 
Rights have involved the application of Article 6, paragraph 1. In most cases, however, 
the question at stake has been the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, i.e. the 
question of deciding what is considered to be a reasonable length of proceedings in a 
given case.830 It is also relatively often referred to by the Supreme Court and the Su-
preme Administrative Court in their case law. An examination of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 6, paragraph 1, indicates that 
in respect of Finland, there are only rare cases where the meaning of “civil rights and 
obligations”, as part of the question of the scope of application of Article 6, paragraph 
1, has been the subject of dispute831. However, the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others 
constituted a landmark case continuing the development of case law as regards the 
rights of civil servants. This has in turn lead to a change in the interpretation of law 
by the Supreme Administrative Court. In the light of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, it would seem that the linguistic choice made in the Finnish 
translation has not been particularly problematic, although it must be remembered that 
only a very small part of domestic proceedings later become subject to examination by 
the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, in principle the Finnish judiciary 
should apply the authentic language versions of the Convention, although the Finnish 
and Swedish translations are used as tools particularly when writing the judgments. 
Thus, an incorrect or misleading translation could be a factor explaining incorrect ap-
plication of the Convention, and may even lead to a considerable number of violations 
as happened in Sweden, but in reality it is more important that the Convention provi-
sions are understood and applied correctly. Misleading translations do not necessarily 
constitute a factor for weak receptiveness of the legal system for the argumentation of 
the European Court of Human Rights. When compared with one another, it appears 
that the French and Swedish legal systems have faced more problems with the concept 
of civil rights than the three others, but for different reasons.
4.2.2  Concept of “criminal charge”
Another challenging concept for the application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights has been that of “criminal charge”. It was observed in the foregoing 
case study on Article 6, paragraph 1, that the concept of “criminal charge” or “toute 
accusation en matière pénale” exists in all the legal systems subject to the present study, 
829 PeVL 2/1990 vp, p. 3. See also Pellonpää & al. 2012, p. 65 and 66.
830 Situation as it is in the light of the Court’s database of case law in August 2007. 
831 Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, judgment of 28 July 2005 (Appl. No. 33538/96), and Vilho 
Eskelinen and Others v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 April 2007, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2007-II.
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and linguistically it is not as such exclusively a concept used in the Convention (Ger-
man equivalent being “eine strafrechtliche Angklage”, the Swedish one “en anklagelse för 
brott” and the Finnish one “rikossyyte”). However, in the same way as in respect of the 
concept of civil rights, it was further observed that the meaning that has been given 
to ”criminal charge” in the Court’s case law appears to be more extensive than the 
meaning given to the concept in the national legal systems, as the Court has widened 
the meaning of “charge”:
 […]. “Charge”, for the purposes of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1), may be defined as “the 
official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allega-
tion that he has committed a criminal offence”, a definition that also corresponds to 
the test whether “the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially affected” […].832
One source of problems in the national legal systems may indeed have been produced 
by the rather extensive linguistic interpretation given to the concept by the European 
Court of Human Rights. As observed in the foregoing, the interpretation of the con-
cepts of criminal charge and criminal proceedings has produced a good number of 
cases from all the States parties covered by the present study. One source of problems 
has been a distinction drawn between disciplinary proceedings and criminal ones. 
Such challenges have been faced for example by the English legal system in respect of 
disciplinary proceedings in prisons833. In judgments against Germany, the Court has 
taken a position on the applicability of Article 5, paragraph 1, to sanctions imposed 
under traffic regulations834. Such a problem could also be faced by the Finnish legal 
system. Even Finland has encountered some problems with regard to the interpreta-
tion of the concept, particularly in respect of the difference drawn between disciplinary 
proceedings and criminal ones, but not that many of the cases have been brought to 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
Another source of problems has been a distinction between administrative proceed-
ings and criminal proceedings, particularly in those legal systems where administrative 
law exists as a field of law. Those include almost all of the legal systems covered by 
 
832 Eckle v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A 51, § 73. See also Deweer v. Belgium, judg-
ment of 27 February 1980, Series A 35, §§ 42 and 46. This expansion of the concept of “criminal 
charge” began to develop already with the judgment of Wemhoff v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 
1968, Series A 7. (See § 19 of the judgment.)
833 See Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A 80, and Ezeh 
and Connors v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 9 October 2003, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2003-X.
834 Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A 73. See also Lutz v. Germany, judg-
ment of 25 August 1987, Series A 123.
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the present study, the only exception being the English legal system835. As appears 
from the foregoing, some challenges have indeed been faced by those legal systems. 
According to the ordinary meaning that would be given in the languages of the legal 
systems subject to the present study, “criminal charge” would not include administra-
tive sanctions. The concept of criminal charge has perhaps produced more problems in 
Finland than that of civil right from a conceptual or terminological point of view. The 
reason is the administrative law nature of sanctions applied in taxation procedures. The 
main source of problems has been the possibility of tax increase as an administrative 
sanction in the field of tax law, which may be imposed in addition to a criminal law 
sanction, which has also been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights 
in two cases against Finland836, one of which in the light of the principle of ne bis in 
idem set out in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. The Swedish legal system has been faced 
with a similar problem837. However, it seems that the Finnish and Swedish supreme 
jurisdictions have begun to take the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights already into account in later case law, which should prevent repetitive cases. In 
France, a comparable distinction has been drawn between tax deception (”manoeuvre 
frauduleuse”) and tax evasion (“soustraction frauduleuse”), of which only the latter has 
been considered to constitute a criminal offence.838 Although there are some differ-
ences in the taxation systems, and the Court has applied particularly the criterion 
of severity of the sanction imposed, the essential problem has been more or less the 
same. The European Court of Human Rights found that the imposed penalties were 
essentially intended as punishments, whose purpose is both deterrent and punitive, 
or the surcharges were found to be very substantial, and therefore found them to be 
“criminal” within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1.
As was noted by the Court in the case of Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, however, 
the formal classification of the national provisions as constituting part of criminal or 
disciplinary law, or both, is not decisive although it is the starting point. The nature of 
835 There is case law concerning the English legal system too, but it has involved a different question. 
See Benham v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports 1996-III. 
That judgment concerned the criminal nature of the sentence of imprisonment as a result of a 
failure to pay community charge. Although the sanction was classified as an administrative one 
under national law, the Court found the nature and reasons of the sanction to mean that it was 
criminal in nature.
836 Jussila v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 23 November 2006, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2006-XIV and Ruotsalainen v. Finland, judgment of 16 June 2009 (Appl. No. 13079/03). 
In the latter case, the European Court of Human Rights applied the precedent of Sergey Zolotukhin 
v. Russia (judgment of 10 February 2009), which has been referred to in subsequent cases of the 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.
837 Janosevic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002, Reports of judgments and decisions 2002-VII. See 
also Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002 (Appl. No. 36985/97), 
§§ 76 to 82.
838 Bendenoun v. France, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A 284, § 47.
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the offence is more decisive, as well as the degree of severity of the penalty resulting 
from the offence.839 What has been relevant, in particular, is that the proceedings in 
question have had some punitive elements. The Court has further paid attention to 
the relatively severe maximum penalty and to that the tax increase or surcharges were 
essentially intended as a punishment to deter reoffending, and were imposed under a 
general rule, whose purpose is both deterrent and punitive, and were therefore “crimi-
nal” within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1.840 Thus, the Finnish legal system 
does not appear to have faced more problems with this concept than the other legal 
systems covered by the present study. The problem behind the violations of Article 6, 
paragraph 1, in respect of its criminal law aspect appears to be partly linguistic, given 
that the national legal systems have faced problems in giving to the concept of criminal 
charge as extensive an interpretation as has been given to it by the European Court 
of Human Rights. However, at least in Finland and Sweden, the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights have produced already a good number of national 
judgments where the supreme jurisdictions have developed their technique of referring 
to the European case law, including the Court’s discourse. This aspect is addressed in 
more detail below concerning the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. 
4.2.3  Concepts of “liberty and security of person” and “lawful arrest  
and detention”
Article 5, paragraph 1, has produced a large number of cases from several States parties 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, including the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. As regards Germany, in particular, the number is significant in the light 
of the total number of judgments in which a violation by Germany has been found. 
The most essential concepts in Article 5, paragraph 1, are those of liberty and security 
of person. As for the other language equivalents of the concepts of liberty and security 
of person as such, it is interesting to note that the French version only speaks of “sûreté” 
and the German translation of “Sicherheit” without underlining personal security like the 
English version and the Finnish and Swedish translations (henkilökohtainen turvallisuus/ 
personlig säkerhet). Nevertheless, the Court has not given the concept of liberty and se-
curity of person an independent meaning, but has dealt with it as part of the concept of 
839 Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, plenary judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A 22, § 82.
840 Benham v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, § 
56. Bendenoun v. France, judgment of 24 February 1994, Series A 284, § 47. Janosevic v. Sweden, 
judgment of 23 July 2002, Reports of judgments and decisions 2002-VII, §§ 61 to 63, § 71. 
Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, judgment of 23 July 2002 (Appl. No. 36985/97), 
§§ 76 to 82. Germany has also faced problems rather early with the relationship between the 
concept of criminal charge and the sanctions imposed as a result of road traffic violations (see 
Özturk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A 73, and Lutz v. Germany, judgment 
of 25 August 1987, Series A 123).
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deprivation of liberty841. Thus, the slight difference of wording in the different language 
versions should not produce any major problems, and it has not produced any so far.
The other basic concepts in Article 5, paragraph 1, are those of “lawful arrest and 
detention”. In comparison, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights is structured somewhat differently, as it prohibits subjection to “arbitrary 
arrest or detention”, but the relevant legal terms, “arrest” and “detention” are the same. 
Slight linguistic differences may be noted between the authentic language versions 
and translations subject to the present study, in respect of those concepts. The French 
version of the European Convention on Human Rights speaks of “l ’arrestation et 
… la détention régulières”. The meaning of “régulière” is somewhat different from the 
English concept of “lawful”. The German translation uses various linguistic formula-
tions, required by the specificities of the German language, the essential elements 
being “rechtmässig fastgenommen” and “… festgehalten”, but the meaning seems to be 
equivalent of the English version. The Finnish version also includes the element of 
lawfulness, using the expression “lain nojalla”. What is interesting to note, however, 
is that although “arrest” is translated with one concept, “pidätetään”, the concept of 
“detention” has been given two different translations depending on the context, “van-
gitaan” (imprisoned) and “vapautensa riistetään” (deprived of one’s liberty). As regards 
the equivalent of “imprisonment” used in the Finnish translation, Rossini explains it as 
referring to the punishment of being held in confinement for a certain period of time 
(in a jail or in a prison after sentencing), sentencing meaning the portion of criminal 
proceedings where punishment is decided.842 In comparison, in the earlier translation 
of the Convention, only “vangitaan” was used, which gives reason to suspect that some 
problems of interpretation may have arisen during the period of time between the two 
translations. Such problems could have arisen, for example, in the context of preven-
tive placement of convicts in a mental hospital upon release from prison, which would 
have fallen outside the original translation. Or alternatively, it has been aligned to some 
extent with the Swedish translation, which uses the expression “är arresterad eller på 
annat sätt berövad friheten”. The Swedish expression “berövad friheten” is the equivalent 
of any deprivation of liberty. Thus, although the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1, 
had not produced major problems before the European Court of Human Rights for 
Finland, the potentially emerging problems in the light of the Court’s case law due to 
a too narrow translation were recognised and taken into account in a new translation.
As appears from section 3.4.10.3 above, instead of the concepts of arrest and deten-
tion or deprivation of liberty, the European Court of Human Rights has taken a position 
on the autonomous meaning of certain essential concepts relating to the deprivation 
of liberty. For example, the Court has clarified what is meant with “conviction” for the 
841 This is the view of Pellonpää & al. (2012, p. 393).
842 Rossini 1998, p. 98.
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purposes of Article 5, paragraph 1, by stating that there cannot be a “condamnation” 
(in the English text: “conviction”) unless it has been established in accordance with 
the law that there has been an offence - either criminal or, if appropriate, disciplinary. 
Moreover, to use “conviction” for a preventive or security measure would be consonant 
neither with the principle of narrow interpretation to be observed in this area nor 
with the fact that that word implies a finding of guilt.843 Thus, the Court also refers 
to the determination of the existence of a criminal offence in accordance with the 
law, which refers to national law. Similarly, the Court has outlined the meaning of 
the provisions by taking a position on the concept of “lawfulness” by stating that the 
Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform 
to the substantive and procedural rules of national law.844 The Court has further clar-
ified the meaning of “reasonable” with reference to the reasonableness of the length 
of detention. Considering the definition of the concepts with reference to national 
law, it should not be a major problem for the legal systems to adapt themselves to 
the interpretation of Article 5, paragraph 1. Despite that, it has produced problems 
for some legal systems and those are essentially of a systemic nature, as appears from 
section 3.4.10.3. That concerns particularly the French legal system and the English 
legal system. The problems faced by the French legal system relate in essence to the 
scope of “lawful detention”, for example, refusal of entry into the French territory and 
holding in the airport’s transit zone845 and the applicability of Article 5, paragraph 1, 
on board a ship outside the French territory846. As regards the English legal system, 
the problems have mainly been related to immigration laws847, detention relating to 
the prevention of terrorism848 and confinement in a military base849, but there are 
also cases relating to preventive detention850. Those sectors of law also appear in the 
national case law dealing with the application of the Convention, which gives reason 
to suggest that the national jurisdictions, particularly the Supreme Court, are already 
paying attention to the problems under Article 5, paragraph 1.
843 Guzzardi v. Italy, plenary judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A 39, § 100.
844 Stafford v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 2002-IV, § 63.
845 Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III.
846 Medvedyev v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 March 2010, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2010.
847 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 29 January 2008, Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions 2008.
848 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 February 2009, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2009.
849 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber judgment of 7 July 2011, Reports of judgments 
and decisions 2011.
850 Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1998-VII. See also Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A 93.
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The German legal system has also faced problems with regard to preventive de-
tention. The European Court of Human Rights has found in a series of judgments 
starting on 17 December 2009851, that Germany had violated Article 5, paragraph 1, 
when applying preventive detention. That concept is not a new problem as appears from 
the judgments against the United Kingdom. However, for the German legal system, 
the problems that have emerged before the European Court of Human Rights are of 
a relatively recent nature despite that the national provisions of law had existed for 
a rather long time. With regard to the consequences that may result from a criminal 
offence, the German legal system draws a distinction between the punishment and 
the measures of improvement and security. Whereas a punishment as a criminal law 
sanction may only be imposed upon the establishment of guilt (Schuld), the measures 
of improvement or security may apply regardless of the guilt in case the offender is 
considered to constitute a danger to society or require particular attention852. The 
concept which has proved to be problematic for Germany before the European 
Court of Human Rights, i.e. placement in secure custody (Sicherungsverwahrung), 
falls within the ambit of those security measures that would not necessarily require 
establishment of guilt under the German legal system853. When compared with the 
Finnish and Swedish translations of the concept, the German one should not be 
particularly problematic. Indeed, the rather recent problem that has emerged in the 
German criminal law system seems to be more of a systemic than of a linguistic or 
conceptual nature. The German authorities have already reacted to the problem and a 
judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court854, finding the national provisions on the 
imposition and duration of preventive detention unconstitutional, has lead to changes 
in the national Criminal Code855. As the most recent judgment from November 2013 
indicates, however, there may still be applications which have become pending before 
851 M. v. Germany, judgment of 17 December 2009. That judgment has been followed by a series 
of repetitive judgments, including Haidn v. Germany, judgment of 13 January 2011, Kallweit 
v. Germany, judgment of 13 January 2011, Mautes v. Germany, judgment of 13 January 2011, 
Schummer v. Germany, judgment of 13 January 2011, H.W. v. Germany, judgment of 19 September 
2013, and Glien v. Germany, judgment of 28 November 2013.
852 See Fisher 1997, p. 143.
853 Fisher 1997, p. 143.
854 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2365/09 vom 4.5.2011. The Federal Constitutional Court found that all provisions 
of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and of the Juvenile Court Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz) on the 
imposition and duration of preventive detention were incompatible with the fundamental right 
to liberty under the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Constitutional Court decided the case under 
the provisions of the Basic Law, as the European Convention on Human Rights is hierarchically 
below it, but gave importance to the need to ensure their interpretation in a manner that is open 
to international law (völkerrechtsfreundlich), including the Convention and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
855 Strafgesetzbuch § 66, § 66a and § 66b (BVerfGE v. 4.52011/1003). The amendments have been 
made directly on the basis of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court.
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the enactment of the new provisions, and as there is still no case law under the new 
provisions, it remains to be seen whether the problems have been removed.
Unlike for the other legal systems covered by the present thesis, Article 5, paragraph 
1, does not appear to have been a particularly problematic provision for the Finnish 
and Swedish legal systems. The violations found by the European Court of Human 
Rights still appear to be isolated cases. Questions of interpretation have emerged 
particularly in the determination of the scope of the provision, in the same way as in 
respect of Article 6, paragraph 1. Apart from the cases referred to in the foregoing, 
there are cases in which new problems have emerged in the interpretation of the 
provision. Although Finland has not faced any major problems with the provisions of 
Article 5 so far856, the German example shows that it does not mean that there could 
not emerge new types of problems later. When looking into the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, including a case against Finland857, one could predict 
potential problems in the field of “preventive” detention of persons of unsound mind 
despite the aforementioned change of translation. Although the Finnish legal system 
appears to have been rather receptive to the Court’s case law in the interpretation of 
Article 5, paragraph 1, and has even reacted to it, the Finnish legal system includes 
the possibility of placing released prisoners in a closed institution, where the person 
concerned has been found dangerous because of particularly serious criminal offences 
caused at least partly by mental health disorders, and poses continued risk for society 
because of persisting problems, under certain criteria set out in the law. Furthermore, 
as has been shown by a recent judgment against Finland858, there may be situations 
that are not conceived as arbitrary interferences in the right to liberty and security 
of person by the national authorities, but constitute a violation of privacy. To avoid 
possible problems in complying with the requirements of Article 5, paragraph 1, it is 
important for the competent authorities and particularly the judiciary to be receptive 
to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights.
856 The first case against Finland (out of two so far) was Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 
1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, in which the Court found a violation of 
Article 5 § 1 in that the applicant’s arrest had been unlawful between his placement in military 
hospital and final detention order.
857 X. v. Finland, judgment of 3 July 2012, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2012. The Court 
found, having first reiterated the principles relating to arbitrary deprivation of liberty, that the 
procedure prescribed by national law did not in that case provide adequate safeguards against 
arbitrariness. (See § 171 of the judgment.)
858 Lindström and Mässeli v. Finland, judgment of 14 January 2014 (Appl. No. 24630/10). Although 
the case relates to the limitation of rights of prisoners, the Court examined it under Articles 3 
and 8. The Court found a violation of Article 8 for the reason that there was no proper legal basis 
for restricting the right to privacy by controlling the use of toilet with the means resorted to.
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In conclusion, the Finnish legal system has not faced any major conceptual problems 
with the expressions used in the European Convention on Human Rights, which would 
have been of a linguistic nature, apart from some challenges in the application of the 
concept of criminal charge. It is, however, sometimes difficult to draw a distinction be-
tween linguistic problems and problems of interpretation, as most often they go hand in 
hand, which is shown by the Court’s technique of developing its case law through various 
principles of interpretation, arriving on occasion at an autonomous meaning given to an 
expression or concept used in the Convention. The autonomous meaning, in particular, is 
a source of challenges for States parties to the Convention. The same applies to some of 
its principles of interpretation, particularly that of evolutive interpretation. Nevertheless, 
the problems faced by Finland in compliance with Article 6, paragraph 1, have not been 
essentially problems of interpretation of the meaning of its provisions, but rather systemic 
problems caused by deficiencies in procedural law. At the outset, the cases in which 
Finland has been found to violate the provisions of Article 6, paragraph 1 - on occasion 
read jointly with Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 – or Article 5, paragraph 1, as well as the 
subsequent national case law adapting national interpretation of law to European case 
law indicate that in principle, the national judiciary would be receptive to the language 
of the Convention and the Court’s argumentation insofar as the concepts used therein 
are concerned. The possibility of future problems as a result of new legislation or for 
other unpredictable reasons as in the case of Germany, however, makes it necessary to pay 
attention to the Court’s discourse when deciding cases at the national level in the light 
of the Court’s case law. In the following, an effort will be made to assess whether and to 
what extent the Finnish supreme jurisdictions have actually paid attention to conceptual 
problems or problems of interpretation, among other questions subject to the present 
study. An effort will also be made, in the light of national case law, to see whether the 
concept of criminal charge has remained an isolated concept that has produced chal-
lenges for the Finnish judiciary, or whether there are others in the interpretation of the 
other larger groups of violations, i.e. those under Article 8 and Article 10. 
4.3  Impact of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
on national legal culture
In the foregoing, it is concluded that the Finnish legal system meets the technical 
criteria for receptiveness to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights as sources of law. It is further con-
cluded, however, that the traditionally strong reliance of the Finnish legal system on 
literal interpretation could have the potential of creating problems with regard to the 
receptiveness of the national judiciary to the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights, although other principles of interpretation are accepted and used to 
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some extent. Section 4.5 below focuses on assessing the transition of the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights and human rights through an analysis of the discourse 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. The case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and its impact on national jurisdictions, particularly where the case law has 
lead to legislative amendments, gives reason to conclude that a significant transition of 
the legal culture has taken place through the interpretation of law. However, one must 
bear in mind that the legal culture is a wider concept, and there are also other signs of 
the transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, 
which are particularly visible in national legislation. Some of that legislation has been 
imposed by the European system of protecting human rights. Finland’s accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights has also lead to significant changes in 
procedural law and thus to a rather dramatic change also in the culture of protecting 
fair trial rights. Upon those amendments, it was possible to withdraw the original 
reservations made to the Convention. Although there were still no violations found 
against Finland in cases concerning the impartiality of judges, the Finnish authorities 
paid attention to the lack of national provisions of law on that specific aspect of a fair 
trial. It has been recognised, in particular, in early judgments of the Supreme Court 
in which the Supreme Court assessed the question of impartiality directly in the light 
of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The need to provide for 
explicit rules in national legislation, to supplement the provisions of the Constitu-
tion, was addressed by means of enacting new provisions of law859. It was recognised 
in the legislative proposal that the outdated provisions of law had become even more 
problematic for the reason that the impartiality of judges is assessed also in the light of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and it was therefore necessary to amend 
them to make them better meet present-day requirements.
Thus, the transition of the legal culture in the form of strengthened fair trial rights 
has continued on the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
and in the Finnish legal system that transition began already in the light of case law 
concerning other States parties to the Convention. Furthermore, the repeated judg-
ments against Finland concerning delays in national proceedings finally resulted in 
the enactment of a national act providing for remedies in the case of delays860. That 
enactment is to a large extent based on the recommendation of the European Court 
859 HE 78/2000 vp. The Government proposal takes into account the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
detail in the assessment of the situation.
860 HE 233/2008 vp, introducing amendments to four acts of Parliament, including the Administra-
tive Court Proceedings Act, and enacting a new Act on remedying delays in court proceedings. 
The latter applies to civil and criminal law proceedings. The case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, particularly the repeated judgments against Finland were extensively taken into 
account.
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of Human Rights, which repeatedly has held that the remedies existing under the 
earlier provisions, e.g. in the form of more lenient punishment in criminal proceed-
ings, were not sufficient. The purpose of the new provisions of law was to provide more 
effective legal remedies for delays in proceedings, in the form of a possibility of parties 
to require urgent handling or financial compensation, without having to take the case 
to the European Court of Human Rights. The new remedies were also considered to 
have a preventive effect against delays in proceedings.
There are also other legislative changes based on the recommendations of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, although some of them are partly due to the recom-
mendations made by other international monitoring bodies. In particular, the need to 
carry out an overall revision of the Child Welfare Act was assessed largely on the basis 
of international developments, including the International Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights. The case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights was taken into account in that context, including 
judgments issued against Finland861. A later amendment to mental health legislation 
is directly based on a judgment against Finland, in which the national legislation was 
found to be in violation with the requirements of the Convention862. Thus, despite that 
particular judgment being an isolated one, even an individual judgment may lead to 
rapid changes in legislation in case of a recommendation to that effect by the European 
Court of Human Rights. On occasion, there may be an ongoing public debate despite 
that the European Court of Human Rights has not recommended any changes. In 
the case of protection of transsexuals, for example, there has been an ongoing debate 
in Finland on the need to allow marriage between persons of the same sex, but in 
the case of Hämäläinen v. Finland, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed 
that there was still no European consensus on that particular issue863. However, some 
plans exist to strengthen the rights of transsexuals, with the intention to introduce 
the relevant amendments to Parliament in the autumn of 2014864. Further, Parliament 
adopted in late 2014 amendments to the Marriage Act on the basis of initiative of the 
 
 
861 HE 225/2004 vp, introducing the most urgent amendments to the Child Welfare Act. 
862 HE 199/2013 vp. The European Court of Human Rights gave its judgment in the case of X. v. 
Finland (Appl. No. 34806/04) on 3 July 2012. The Court found the lack of a mechanism against 
arbitrary decisions on involuntary treatment problematic, in that the patient had no possibility to 
have an independent second opinion before the continuation of treatment. Upon the Government 
proposal, the Mental Health Act was amended accordingly through Act No. 438/2014.
863 Hämäläinen v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 16 July 2014 (Appl. No. 37359/09).
864 Working group with mandate until 31 September 2014, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
based on a recommendation of the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe 
(CommDH(2012)27).
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people, allowing same sex marriages865. There are still other amendments that need to 
be discussed by Parliament, particularly amendments to the Adoption Act, and nor 
is the public debate still over. Thus, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights may have both a direct and indirect effect on the national legal culture, on 
occasion together with other international developments. In Finland, the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights has had a significant impact on strengthened 
protection of fundamental rights and human rights, and thus a transition of the legal 
culture under that case law clearly exists and is most clearly seen in court judgments. 
The purpose of micro-comparison through discourse analysis of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions is to refine that conclusion and to assess the signs of transition in their 
judicial discourse. The national case law is analysed in respect of the Finnish legal 
system to assess whether an even further reaching transition of the legal culture of 
protecting fundamental rights and human rights has taken or is taking place, i.e. 
whether the supreme jurisdictions have begun to apply the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights close to the manner in which it is done by that Court itself, 
and whether the national case law has directly strengthened the protection of funda-
mental rights and human rights. Although a change is imposed by legislation, it does 
not necessarily mean a change in the general preparedness and attitudes of courts to 
apply those rights directly, or at least the transition of the legal culture of protecting 
them may take time.
The Finnish legal system has gradually moved towards a more flexible approach to 
the use of a variety of sources of law instead of applying strongly on written legislation, 
and there is an increasing trend to apply the European Convention on Human Rights 
by the national supreme jurisdictions is noted, including references to the European 
Court’s case law. Before the past few years, for example in the Supreme Administrative 
Court, it has been more usual to apply the provisions of the Constitution of Finland or 
other relevant national legislation866, which often afford the same or even higher level 
of protection than those of international conventions. Until about 2005, the Supreme 
Court has perhaps more often than the Supreme Administrative Court applied the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights867 but the situation has 
gradually changed and today both apply them frequently. There have also been other 
865 M 10/2013 vp – KAA 3/2013 vp, initiative for amending the Marriage Act, the Registered 
Partnership Act and the Act on the establishment of post-operative sex. Although the proposed 
amendments to the other two Acts were dismissed, the amendments (156/2015) to the Mar-
riage Act (234/1929) were approved in the second reading on 12 December 2014, and they are 
scheduled to enter into force on 1 March 2017. After the entry into force, marriage will be a 
union between two persons instead of a man and a woman.
866 See e.g. the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland KHO:2004:99 concerning 
the freedom of religion.
867 See Ojanen 2005, p. 1218 and 1219.
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differences between general courts of law and administrative courts. Whereas the 
general courts of law have mainly referred to the fair trial provisions of Article 6 of 
the Convention, the references made by administrative courts cover perhaps a larger 
number of provisions. However, as Ojanen observes, the references made by the Supreme 
Administrative Court have traditionally been more general in nature, or have merely 
mentioned the relevant provision of the Convention, whereas the references made by 
the Supreme Court to the Convention and the case law under it have somewhat earlier 
become rather detailed, although there have also been examples of detailed references 
in the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court.868
According to the legislative proposal for reforming the fundamental rights provisions 
of the Constitution, the international and constitutional systems of protecting rights 
would remain independent and there would still be some differences of interpretation 
despite possible similarities in wording. Despite this, the aim with the reform was to 
bring the two systems closer to one another.869 It is also observed that the Finnish 
judiciary in principle applies the national constitutional provisions on fundamental 
rights and the Convention provisions by applying similar principles of interpretation. 
In the light of the overview of case law for the purposes of the present study, those 
provisions are also often applied simultaneously, which means that in practice, the differ-
ence between the constitutional provisions and international human rights is gradually 
diminishing as they both pursue the same objective. In prior studies made concerning 
the application of fundamental rights and human rights provisions in Finland, it has 
been found that prior to the accession of Finland to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, it was rare to apply international human rights provisions directly by 
the courts, and even explicit reference to the constitutional provisions was rare. That 
may be explained by the traditionally different function of fundamental rights provi-
sions, i.e. they were rather used for the constitutionality control of legislation, as well 
as by the fact that the constitutional provisions were less numerous before the overall 
reform of the fundamental rights provisions that took place around the same time with 
accession to the Convention. They were rather taken into account than applied directly. 
Thus, the underlying presumption in this study is that the impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is huge as regards the direct applicability of human 
rights and fundamental rights provisions, and the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights is constantly applied as a source of law. Furthermore, despite that the 
constitutional system is formally independent of the European system of protecting 
human rights, the European case law has had an impact on the interpretation of the 
constitutional rights. Through discourse analysis in sections 4.5.1.3 and 4.5.2.3 below, 
an attempt is made to see whether there are, however, such significant differences in the 
868 Ojanen 2005, p. 1216 and 1217.
869 HE 309/1993 vp, p. 39 and 40.
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principles of interpretation applied by the national supreme jurisdictions with those 
of the European Court of Human Rights as could potentially create problems for the 
receptiveness of the Finnish legal system to the argumentation of the Court, at least at 
a theoretical level. It must be underlined that legal culture of protecting fundamental 
rights and human rights includes also a variety of factors other than strictly legal ones, 
particularly awareness and general attitudes.
Ojanen is of the view that in general, by 2004, the Finnish courts had already recog-
nised a strong effect for the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.870 An 
overview of the relevant case law suggests that the supreme jurisdictions have, however, 
accepted them as a binding source of law as from the first references to those judg-
ments871. Since 2004, it is even more clearly so. The practice of referring to the case law 
has indeed increased since that time. In the view of Pellonpää, the increased reference 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by the supreme jurisdictions 
in Finland has extended legal protection and has narrowed the traditional line drawn 
between the concepts of fundamental rights and human rights. However, it has been 
considered that the European Convention on Human Rights sets out a minimum 
level of protection, whereas national constitutions may go further and impose stricter 
criteria for the protection of human rights.872 The references made to the case law in 
earlier and later judgments will be compared and looked into in more detail through 
discourse analysis, to see whether there are today similar differences or whether there 
are fewer differences between the two supreme jurisdictions. However, even where the 
court has not directly referred to the provisions of human rights conventions, they may 
have had an indirect effect on decision-making, as general principles of law that could 
be applied even without the existence of an international obligation. Accordingly, inter-
national treaties may have had relevance even if the court decision does not contain any 
explicit reference to it.873 Jääskinen points out that, in comparison with the application 
of EU law, the case law concerning the European Convention on Human Rights is 
essentially different in that, instead of the application of such international provisions 
as result in changes in material national legislation, the application of human rights 
conventions rather guides the application and interpretation of national legislation.874 
As explained in the foregoing, however, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights may result in legislative changes. It is typical of judicial decision-making that 
not everything is explicitly written out in the judgment. There may even be extensive 
870 Ojanen 2005, p. 1216.
871 This view is based on the discourse in the judgments of the supreme jurisdictions, e.g. KKO:1996:80. 
872 Pellonpää 2009(1), p. 108 and 113. In his view, the difference is today minor. Pellonpää has 
studied a number of cases, including KHO 31.12.1999 T 4398, KKO:2003:19, KKO:2005: 73, 
KKO:2005:82, KKO:2005:136, KHO:2007:28, KHO:2007:47, and KHO:2007:49.
873 Karapuu 1999, p. 171.
874 Jääskinen 2001, p. 606.
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research into the contents of human rights provisions and relevant case law – such as 
that of the European Court of Human Rights – in the background.875 However, the 
national judgments are compared to assess whether there have been changes in the 
culture of writing judgments and in the way in which human rights conventions are 
applied and interpreted, to the extent of signifying changes in legal culture.
A traditional technique of interpreting fundamental rights provisions in Finland has 
rather been to take them into account in the context of interpreting other provisions of 
law, instead of applying them directly as a basis for the judgment. As suggested in the 
foregoing, the earlier constitutional provisions on fundamental rights were perhaps not 
even designed for direct application. Taking fundamental rights provisions into account 
in the application of law, as a means of interpretation, could be seen as striking a bal-
ance between the protection of the interests in question (fundamental rights) and the 
objective and purpose of the law the provisions of which are subject to interpretation. 
As is pointed out by Viljanen, “verfassungskonforme Auslegung” must respect the wording 
of the law and must not change the meaning of the law, nor jeopardise the intention of 
the legislator876. That principle, which means respecting conformity with fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution, has gained increasing importance in the case law 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions and other courts of law. It is as such an element 
that may alleviate the problems or differences that there may be between the methods 
or rules of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights and those 
used by the national judiciary. However, the discourse of the supreme jurisdictions is 
looked into to see whether that principle is referred to or if there are other linguistic 
elements indicating its application, as compared with direct references to fundamental 
rights or human rights provisions and relevant case law.
Nevertheless, the influence of constitutional rights norms has far-reaching con-
sequences even on the character of the legal system, of which Alexy draws attention 
to three particularly important ones. First, they affect the contents of ordinary law in 
that they may exclude certain content as constitutionally impossible and, vice versa, 
they may require certain content as constitutionally necessary. The second consequence 
identified by Alexy relates indeed to the balancing of interests. In his view the nature 
of constitutional rights norms as principles implies the necessity of balancing inter-
ests, which does not always lead to the same result. Which result is considered correct 
depends on value-judgments, which renders balancing an open procedure. The third 
consequence, according to Alexy, concerns the nature of such openness. The validity of 
constitutional rights norms means that the legal system is open in respect of morality, 
which is most obvious in respect of certain basic concepts, i.e. dignity, freedom and 
875 See Ojanen 2005, p. 1217. (This paragraph is taken from Koivu & Mattila 2006, p. 43 and 44.)
876 See Viljanen (V-P) 1990, p. 221.
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equality.877 The openness of the interpretation of fundamental or human rights provi-
sions should, nevertheless, not be seen as a problem. As has been shown by the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, it leaves room for taking development 
of society into account. Similarly, some degree of flexibility of a national legal system 
makes it possible for it to better adapt to the needs to pay attention to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Court’s case law. As observed in section 4.5 
below, general practical discourse and moral values also help to fill in gaps in the more 
technical legal discourse. This has a close connection with the principle of human rights 
friendly interpretation of law. However, in the same way as Gerards and Fleuren have 
done878, I would draw a distinction between the application of similar methods and 
standards as have been developed by the European Court of Human Rights, on the 
one hand, and the way in which the national jurisdictions actually think and reason. 
The aim with the final stage of this study is, in particular, to address that question. 
Gerards and Fleuren found in their analysis concerning a selection of legal systems 
that it was in fact rare for national courts to apply methods such as (meta-)teleological 
interpretation, evolutive interpretation or consensus interpretation. Further, although 
according to their analysis the English courts refer to those methods more often than 
the courts in the other legal systems, in their view they do not usually resort to similar 
line of reasoning independently of the concrete precedents of the European Court of 
Human Rights879. This finding is interesting from the point of view of the present study 
as in the light of an overview of judgments of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, 
the practice of referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is 
rather recent.
When looking into the case law of the supreme jurisdictions, the aforementioned 
principle of balancing interests appears to be done, as is also done by the European Court 
of Human Rights. It has a connection with the principle of proportionality. Thus, the 
basic approach to the application of human rights and fundamental rights provisions 
appears to be the same. Furthermore, some of the principles of interpretation of law 
are largely similar. The principle of margin of appreciation, which does not seem to be 
usually referred to by the courts in Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom but 
is on occasion referred to by the French courts880, appears in some judgments of the 
Finnish supreme jurisdictions, particularly the Supreme Administrative Court. That 
is not necessarily a problem in case the principle is not applied in an effort to avoid 
877 Alexy 2004, p.365 and 366.
878 Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 361. Gerards and Fleuren speak of “application” and “deep influence” 
of the Convention. In their comparative analysis, Gerards and Fleuren have studied the examples 
of Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
879 Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 362.
880 Gerards and Fleuren 2014, p. 362. Apart from France, there are also examples of the application 
of the margin of appreciation in Belgium and the Netherlands.
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affording a protection of human rights entirely but the national court carries out a 
proper balancing of rights. The principle of proportionality, which is well known to the 
Finnish legal system, and the practice of seeking solutions within a wider context of the 
legal system and particularly within the framework of the entire constitution should 
make it rather easy to adopt the practice of the European Court of Human Rights 
to interpret individual rights in the light of the Convention as a whole. However, the 
Finnish courts do not appear to resort to the principle of teleological interpretation 
or the object and purpose of the statute to the same extent as the Swedish or German 
courts. That could be a factor decreasing the receptiveness of the national judiciary to 
the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, there are 
principles of interpretation applied by the Court which do not usually appear in the 
case law of the Finnish judiciary, including particularly the principle of effectiveness 
and the principle of autonomous meaning which are foreign to the Finnish legal sys-
tem. Thus, there may be elements in the discourse of the European Court of Human 
Rights that are difficult to receive. That may also affect the way in which the Court’s 
case law is applied by the national judiciary, and could make it rather mechanic. It is 
also characteristic for the Finnish legal system to apply law as it is at a given moment, 
and the dynamic approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the Conven-
tion provisions, to apply it as a living instrument, is not traditionally known in the 
Finnish legal system. The fact that it is particularly those principles of interpretation 
in connection with which the European Court of Human Rights appears to develop 
the law most, that are foreign to the Finnish jurisdictions, makes the transition of the 
legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights challenging. Dis-
course analysis is used to analyse whether and in which manner the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions actually resort to a similar line of reasoning as the European Court of 
Human Rights, i.e. whether is deeper-going transition in the receptiveness of that type 
of argumentation towards a real dialogue between the national jurisdictions and the 
European Court of Human Rights.
There is also a rather significant factor in the Finnish interpretation of law that 
may decrease the receptiveness of the judiciary to the argumentation of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is clearly a court of 
precedents. It very seldom deviates from its earlier case law in similar types of situa-
tions, which is to guarantee uniform application and interpretation of the Convention 
in the different States parties to it. An increased application of case law as a source 
of law could improve receptiveness of the Finnish judiciary to the argumentation of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Finnish judiciary has only rather recently 
begun to adopt a practice of issuing precedents. The Finnish supreme jurisdictions 
issue de facto precedents, and particularly the Supreme Court has become a court of 
precedents, and usually decide similar cases in the same way. Even lower courts tend 
to follow those precedents but strictly speaking they are not bound by them. That also 
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means that there does traditionally not exist the same kind of technique of applying 
earlier case law as that of the European Court of Human Rights. This may also be a 
factor explain the rather mechanic references to the Court’s case law. However, the 
relatively recent change in respect of the culture of applying precedents is interesting 
from the perspective of analysing the change in the legal culture.
An assessment of the theoretical principles of interpretation of law, including con-
stitutional law provisions on fundamental rights, indicates that there are also factors in 
the Finnish legal system and judicial practice that may lead to a weaker receptiveness of 
the legal system to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights when 
compared, for example, with the German judiciary. However, one must bear in mind 
that the German practice of constitutional complaints, for example, may be a stronger 
factor explaining the relatively low number of complaints against Germany, bearing 
in mind also that the decisions of the German Constitutional Court seem to be rather 
convincing and satisfactory from the point of view of the applicants. Before advancing 
to the more detailed analysis of the supreme jurisdictions, an overview is carried out of 
the complaints made against Finland before the European Court of Human Rights to 
see which have been the major problems faced by the legal system, and whether there 
are changes taking place, as the first step of analysing the third phase of transition in 
the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights.
4.4  Complaints against Finland before the European  
Court of Human Rights
For the purpose of analysing the problems faced by Finland in the protection of rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has been analysed in the light of the Court’s statistics as 
on 31 December 2013, including the total number of judgments rendered by the Court 
concerning Finland, particularly judgments finding a violation of the Convention and 
judgments concerning the specific provisions of the Convention subject to the present 
study. Those statistics have been compared with the corresponding figures concerning 
the other selected States. However, in respect of Finland, even some of the most recent 
judgments have been analysed as they also include final Grand Chamber judgments 
and a couple of them appear to demonstrate signs of an emerging interaction between 
national jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights.
The total number of judgments against the United Kingdom was 499, of which a 
violation was found in 297 cases. Of all the five States analysed, this figure constitutes 
the second largest number of judgments. The total number of judgments rendered by 
the Court against France is the biggest of the five States. The total number of judg-
ments was 913, of which a violation was found in 674 cases. The corresponding figures 
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for Germany were 263 judgments and 173 violations. Also, in respect of Germany, 
the numbers of cases concerning fair trial rights881 is significant, which seems to have 
constituted the main problem for all States analysed. There is also a recent problem 
in the German legal system, which raises interesting linguistic questions and which 
falls within the scope of one of the provisions chosen to be analysed, i.e. compliance 
of German provisions of law on preventive detention with the Convention provisions. 
This problem has produced a number of repetitive cases, which might partly explain the 
fact that the number of violations against Germany has significantly increased in the 
past couple of years. Otherwise no major trends of violations were identified. Germany 
also constitutes an interesting example of a State where the number of violations is 
relatively small in relation to the size of the population. It provides an interesting point 
of comparison with Finland that appears to have faced bigger problems considering 
the small size of the population.
Between the date of accession of Finland to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and 31 December 2013, the European Court of Human Rights has issued a total 
of 166 judgments concerning Finland, of which a violation of a Convention provision 
was found in 129 cases. The overwhelming majority of cases concern fair trial rights, of 
which 59 relate to the length of proceedings and 37 other aspects of a fair trial under 
Article 6 of the Convention. Other significant problems faced by Finland in compli-
ance with the Convention provisions included 23 cases under Article 8 (right to the 
protection of private life and family rights) and 18 cases under Article 10 (freedom of 
expression). Thus, it appears that apart from the rather technical problems of the legal 
system in guaranteeing a trial within a reasonable time and certain other procedural 
rights as required by the Convention, Finland has mainly encountered problems in 
certain aspects of ensuring a fair balance between different conflicting public and pri-
vate interests as well as drawing a line between the protection of privacy and freedom 
of expression or freedom of the press. When looking into the cases concerning the 
protection of private life, one may observe that there have been repetitive problems in 
respect of balancing the need to protect minors and the need to ensure access rights 
(custody, emergency and normal care orders, family reunification) which is a feature 
in common for both the private law and administrative law, as well as and coercive 
means (search and seizure).
As regards problems faced by Finland in ensuring the protection of rights under 
Article 6 of the Convention, they have mainly been of a rather technical nature in the 
light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In Finland, the length 
of proceedings has constituted the largest number of violations of the Convention, a 
 
881 The statistics include both the right to a fair trial and length of proceedings.
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large part of which have appeared in criminal proceedings882. One reason behind the 
violations has been lengthy investigations, but it would not be a correct conclusion to 
state that this would be because of an incorrect interpretation of Article 6, paragraph 
1. It rather seems to have been a systemic problem caused by various factors883. Not all 
those factors have been removed, but a national remedy has been enacted to address 
the violations884. That measure supports the finding that the majority of the cases under 
Article 6 have been repetitive in nature. Therefore, the length of proceedings cases are 
not analysed in great detail in sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 below for the reason that the 
transition of the legal culture is rather seen in legislation. It is possible, however, that 
even procedural questions such as the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time 
result in other questions concerning the rights protected under Article 6, even ques-
tions relating to the principle of autonomous meaning (see section 3.4.10.1 above)885. 
Unlike in Sweden, where Article 6 has raised linguistic problems and problems of 
interpretation of the scope of the provision, no corresponding problems have appeared 
in Finland apart from a couple of isolated cases concerning civil servants. However, 
particularly those cases against Finland have lead to changes of interpretation in 
national case law and have also contributed to a series of precedents of the European 
Court of Human Rights under which the scope of Article 6 has been expanded. The 
question of whether such problems have been discussed to a larger extent at the na-
tional level than before the European Court of Human Rights is examined in section 
4.5 below. Nor has Finland faced similar problems of interpretation of Article 5 as 
have appeared in Germany, and the only cases have remained isolated ones. However, 
882 The problem of the length of national criminal proceedings in the light of the case law under the 
European Convention on Human Rights has been subject to study slightly prior to enactment 
of a national legislation on remedies by Spolander, who drew attention to that the majority of 
judgments against Finland concerning length of proceedings had concerned cases of economic 
crime (Spolander 2007, p. 310). According to Spolander, there had been problems both at the 
phases of criminal investigation and prosecution and at the phase of trial, particularly at the 
district court level. (Ibid. p. 312 and 313).
883 Spolander has analysed the various reasons for delays in national proceedings and called for an 
urgent mechanism whereby parties to the proceedings could themselves draw the attention of the 
authorities to the delay and where the violations of Article 6-1 could be remedied by providing 
a reasonable compensation. (Spolander 2007, p. 327 and 328)
884 One must bear in mind, however, that the existence of a national mechanism to remedy does not 
prevent the applicant from taking the case to the European Court of Human Rights in case the 
national court, for one reason or another, refuses to pecuniary or non-pecuniary compensation 
for the delay in national proceedings (see e.g. Metzger v. Germany, judgment of 31 May 2001 
(Appl. No. 37591/97; judgment issued in French), in which case the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
refused to examine the constitutional complaint. A delay had even been observed in the national 
proceedings but not taken into account.)
885 In the view of Lemmens, the most spectacular example of a wide interpretation of Article 6 is 
the case of Golder, in which the Court interpreted Article 6(1) entailing the right to a court, of 
which the right of access to a court is an essential aspect. (Lemmens 2013, p. 301)
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the cases combining Article 5 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and 
relating to the principle of ne bis in idem have lead to changes of interpretation to 
the extent that they have even been applied ex analogi to other types of cases in the 
Supreme Administrative Court. Thus, although procedural issues and fair trial ques-
tions have appeared in a large number of cases both before the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court, the case law under those articles are mainly used for 
the purpose of finding support for the conclusions made in this study under the other 
major groups of cases where Finland has faced problems, i.e. cases under Articles 8 and 
10. For the purpose of micro-comparison through discourse analysis those groups of 
cases are looked into in more detail below. The argumentation of the European Court 
of Human Rights in cases concerning the protection of private and family life and 
the freedom of expression is also interesting in that they represent examples of other 
principles of interpretation applied by the Court, i.e. the principle of margin of ap-
preciation, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of proportionality. Of these, 
the principle of proportionality is well known in Scandinavian legal systems. The other 
two are foreign to the Finnish legal system, but it seems that in the national case law, 
the principle of the margin of appreciation has been referred to on occasion. Those 
groups of cases also constitute a clear demonstration of the transition of legal culture.
The high number of judgments in view of the size of the population makes Finland 
an interesting example for the purposes of this study, particularly when compared 
with Germany and Sweden. The total number of judgments rendered against Sweden 
was 114, of which a violation was found in 51 cases. The figures are rather low when 
compared with Finland, in view of the fact that Sweden’s accession to the Convention 
took place at a much earlier moment. Sweden is also among those States that appear 
to have had the fewest problems in complying with the Convention, which is interest-
ing considering the similarities with the Finnish legal system. Sweden appears to have 
had mainly problems with fair trail rights provisions, which is also the main problem 
for the majority of States parties. The same observations apply to Germany, taking 
also into account the size of the population. The number of violations found in cases 
concerning freedom of expression is significantly lower than in respect of Finland.
It is important to underline that the relatively high number of complaints against 
Finland does not necessarily mean that the national legal system is not prepared to 
apply the Convention rights or the Court’s case law. Those complaints may be a result 
of great awareness among lawyers and their clients about the Convention mechanism. 
However, the high number of violations does indicate that there have been problems 
in the protection of certain rights guaranteed by the Convention, i.e. that there have 
been technical or other problems in the legal system or legal culture. The number of 
complaints concerning the length of proceedings is at least partly explained by the 
lack of national compensation mechanism in respect of lengthy trials until a specific 
Act was adopted to remove that problem, which has attracted victims to seek redress 
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at the European level. Since the adoption of the national provisions of law on such a 
mechanism, the number of complaints under Article 6 is expected to fall significantly. 
The question of redressing the delays in national proceedings under the new provisions 
of law has already been dealt with in a number of cases in the supreme jurisdictions886. 
This does not prevent applicants from taking their cases to the European Court of 
Human Rights, but a successful application would require that the national mechanism 
has not worked for one reason or another. Further, it is interesting to note that another 
group of cases with a high number of violations is that concerning the freedom of 
expression under Article 10. That may also partly be explained by awareness among 
journalists of their rights, but given the nature of those violations, they may also dem-
onstrate a more serious problem in the legal culture. It is particularly interesting in 
view of the strong traditions of the freedom of the press in the Swedish legal system 
as explained in section 2.5.4 above, on which the Finnish legal system is largely based. 
The analysed cases concerning Finland do not indicate any significant legal-linguistic 
problems, when compared e.g. with cases against Sweden. The Court’s judgments appear 
to rather demonstrate problems of different nature such as the scope of application of 
the provisions or signs of a rather weak reception of certain Convention provisions or 
their interpretation at the national level. However, it seems that in Finland the change 
of legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights has taken place 
over a shorter period of time than in the other selected States parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Thus, it is interesting to assess that change of legal 
culture in the light of national case law. In the following, the analysis will be taken a 
step further and the discourse of the national supreme jurisdictions will be analysed to 
see to what extent such a change can be detected in the texts of national judgments.
4.5  Reception of the argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights by the Finnish supreme jurisdictions – analysis of 
the case law
It is observed in the foregoing that the Finnish legal system recognises the status of 
international human rights conventions as applicable sources of law, and their provi-
886 See e.g. KKO:2011:87, KHO:2012:43 and KHO:2014:90 concerning taxation procedures, and 
KHO:2013:20 concerning competition laws. The new mechanisms appear to work effectively. 
In decision KHO:2012:43, for example, the Supreme Administrative Court has used even the 
new act of Parliament on remedying delays as a source of law in the assessment of the reasonable 
compensation, despite that it applies to civil and criminal law proceedings. The Supreme Court 
has also taken a position on the possibility to remedy delays in criminal investigations, in decision 
KKO:2011:38, despite the absence of explicit provisions of law, finding that the enacted provisions 
of law should be interpreted extensively. In that particular case, however, no remedy was awarded.
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sions may be applied directly together with or without applying at the same time those 
of the Constitution. In principle, particularly through the reform of the Constitution 
of Finland, there should be no major problems with regard to the contents of the 
Convention provisions, despite that there are some differences between them and those 
of the Constitution. Section 7 of the Constitution on the right to life, personal liberty 
and integrity is less detailed than Article 5 of the Convention, despite combining the 
provisions of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture) and 5 (right to liberty 
and security). That might create some challenges in the application of the provision 
but in practice, section 7 should cover the same situations as Article 5. Particularly 
administrative deprivations of liberty have been found to fall within the scope of 
section 7 under the impact of the Convention. As regards section 21 providing for 
fair trial rights, its provisions are again less detailed than those of Article 6 of the 
Convention, but that provision has been enacted particularly to meet the require-
ments of Article 6. Since that provision is new, however, the main challenge at the 
national level is to change the legal culture in that, traditionally, the fair trial rights at 
constitutional level are not customary to the Nordic legal systems. Second, challenges 
may be brought about by the development of the scope of Article 6 under the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights through autonomous interpretation. The 
wording of section 10 on the right to privacy of the Finnish Constitution is slightly 
different from that of Article 8 of the Convention, but the essential contents are the 
same. Thus, the wording of that provision should not create major problems. Although 
the freedom of expression as a classical fundamental right is not new, the wording 
of section 12 of the Constitution differs from that of Article 10 in that Article 10 
provides explicitly on the acceptable grounds of derogation and requires that they are 
necessary in democratic society. Instead, the provisions of the Constitution provide 
explicitly for the possibility to enact restrictions to protect children and specify that 
more detailed provisions on the use of the freedom of expression are laid down by 
an Act of Parliament, and those provisions include access to public documents as a 
separate fundamental right887. The difference in wording could partly explain the chal-
lenges imposed by the protection of the freedom of expression before the European 
Court of Human Rights, but most likely there are also more profound reasons.888 The 
general spirit among the judiciary may have been to allow more easily derogations 
than would have been allowed under the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. That may also be explained by the fact that prior to Finland’s accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, it was not customary to apply international 
887 That right is a Scandinavian tradition of transparency, which does not as such create problems in 
the application of the constitutional provisions on the freedom of expression together with those 
of the Convention.
888 For the texts of the relevant provisions, see the Annex.
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human rights conventions nor the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution 
directly by the judiciary, as explained in sections 2.1 and 2.6.2.5 above. This in turn 
means that the culture of protecting fundamental rights by the judiciary was rather 
weak, when compared with the situation today, and has been visible in the national 
case law relating to the freedom of expression.
As explained in the foregoing, Finnish supreme jurisdictions began rather slowly to 
make profound researches into the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
as a source of law. The first references to the case law appeared in the Supreme Court 
around 1994 and in the Supreme Administrative Court around 1999, but more detailed 
references can be found since 2004 and 2007, i.e. somewhat ten years later. The numbers 
of references in the two courts to the European case law, including both references 
to that of the European Court of Justice and that of the European Court of Human 
Rights, started also in general to increase around the same years. An explanation for 
the increase may be found in Lavapuro’s conclusions, where he notes that in a new 
legal environment there is more room for different methods of resolving conflicting 
interpretations, including human rights or fundamental rights friendly interpretation, 
instead of the earlier rather categorical rules and mechanisms. In his view, the more 
flexible methods allow to take the context better into account. He presumes that fun-
damental and human rights will increasingly play a role in the practice of interpretation 
in the domestic courts.889 The traditions of legal interpretation do not, however, always 
tell the entire truth. The analysis in the light of works of scholars in section 4.1.4 
indicates that traditionally, prior to the periods of time before Finland’s accession to 
the Convention, the application of the most usual methods of interpretation in the 
selected legal systems for the purpose of comparison has been rather mechanic, with 
the exception of the English legal system. All of them have also faced challenges with 
the application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Even the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court has only recently begun to resort to more detailed 
argumentation. Thus, it is probable that the constitutional rights traditions as a whole 
play a bigger role in the receptiveness of the national judiciaries to the argumentation 
of the European Court of Human Rights. The traditionally mechanic application of 
rules and methods of interpretation may have slowed down the transition of the legal 
culture in that respect, but does not constitute an obstacle. Not only the more devel-
oped legal environment, but also a stronger willingness to develop the case law is more 
relevant in that respect. Pellonpää is of the view that the case law of the European 
Court of Justice is already seen as part of the natural interaction between the national 
889 Lavapuro 2010, p. 285. This change in the legal environment is related, in particular, to the acces-
sion of Finland to the European Convention on Human Rights, to the reform of the provisions 
of the Constitution on fundamental rights in 1995, and to Finland’s accession to the European 
Union in the same year. See Ibid. p. 9-15.
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and supranational levels of justice. Nor is the role of the European Court of Human 
Rights questioned.890 
Nevertheless, that development has contributed to a stronger role of the judiciary in 
relation to the legislature, while being increasingly dependent on international courts, 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights insofar as the interpretation of 
fundamental rights is concerned.891 Thus, the supreme jurisdictions refer today to the 
European case law rather frequently, and the expanding national cases with references 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights show that the application of 
foreign case law is not a problem for the Finnish judiciary. Thus, the basic criterion for 
the receptiveness of the national legal system to the argumentation of the European 
Court of Human Rights is met today as the supreme jurisdictions appear to find the 
case law to constitute a legitimate and binding source of law. However, the references 
to the case law particularly during the first ten years were rather mechanical and very 
brief, without actually looking into the detailed legal analysis and discourse of the 
Court. Thus, in the absence of transparent argumentation and assessment of the case 
law, there has remained some uncertainty as to what degree the national judiciary has 
been receptive to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights.
It is interesting to note that it was particularly in cases concerning the freedom of 
expression and the protection of privacy where the Supreme Court began to actively 
apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, with a more profound 
analysis of its contents. Thus, those groups of cases are analysed in more detail below. 
They indeed represent cases where it may difficult to balance the conflicting interests, 
and the European case law provides a useful source of law. A new emerging group 
of cases in the Supreme Court appears to be cases concerning tax fraud in relation 
to the principle of ne bis in idem in respect of which also Sweden, for example, has 
faced problems in the European Court of Human Rights. That appears to be a sign of 
adapting national case law to the judgments issued against Finland, which in turn is 
a sign of some form of dialogue between national judiciary and the European Court 
890 Pellonpää 2009(1), p. 105. The case law of the European courts is even regularly referred to in 
national preparation of law. (Ibid. p.105 and 106)
891 Pellonpää 2009(1), p. 118. Pellonpää reminds, however, that the relationship between the national 
judiciary and European courts is characterised by a certain kind of principle of subsidiarity. (Ibid.) 
This principle is indeed visible in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as the 
principle of margin of appreciation, referred to frequently by the Court. The margin of appreciation 
requires profound weighing of conflicting interests by the national courts. The more convincing 
such weighing is, according to Pellonpää, the less legitimate reason the European Court of Human 
Rights has to intervene in the outcome of the national argumentation. (See Pellonpää 2009(1), 
p. 120 and 121) Ervo also points out that the application of the European Convention is a state 
of art (tekniikkalaji). In principle, the national judiciary is free to choose the manner of applying 
the Convention requirements, but it is important to reason the decisions clearly. (Ervo 2009, p. 
249)
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of Human Rights. The published Supreme Administrative Court cases contain fewer 
examples with references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
than those of the Supreme Court, but a research into the non-published cases shows 
that the total number of such cases is larger. Furthermore, the more recent references 
appear to be more profound and analytical in the same way as in the Supreme Court. 
This trend demonstrates that the legal culture in respect of the language of human 
rights law has began to change at least to some extent, but a closer analysis is needed 
to assess the degree of receptiveness of the supreme jurisdictions today to the argu-
mentation of the European Court of Human Rights.
The fact that the process of adapting to the changes brought about by the Convention 
is still not complete has also been recognised in Finland. Koskelo is right in observing 
that in this respect, it is not sufficient that the supreme jurisdictions adapt to those 
changes but it is also necessary for lower courts, particularly courts of appeal, to comply 
with the procedural requirements under the Convention.892 In certain areas, there have 
earlier been apparent difficulties in integrating the Strasbourg case law fully into the 
national case law. Viljanen ( J.) names the interpretation of freedom of expression in 
relation to other conflicting rights as the most problematic example.893 This observation 
is interesting in that today, some ten years later, it appears to be among those areas of 
law in which there are most cases where the Supreme Court refers to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Those cases also have references to both the 
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. It is pointed out by 
Pellonpää that the supreme jurisdictions in Finland have already recognised that fun-
damental rights provisions of the Constitution must be interpreted in the same way 
as the European Court of Human Rights interprets the Convention rights.894 Ervo 
notes that the national courts have also done so.895 Their view is shared by Koskelo, who 
observes that when balancing rights that appear to be in conflict with one another, in 
particular, the courts should resort to an extensive, analytic and profound assessment 
before reaching their conclusions, including analysis of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and calls for open argumentation and reasoning. She also 
suggests that there would be reason to follow the same type of argumentation as the 
892 Koskelo 2010, p. 23.
893 Viljanen ( J.) 2007, p. 310. Viljanen observes, however, that some of the breaches found by the 
European Court of Human Rights have been related to the unforeseeability of the law rather 
than erroneous interpretation of law by national courts. (Ibid.)
894 Pellonpää 2009(1), p. 108.
895 Ervo 2009, p. 252. Ervo is of the view that the responsibility for the development of the contents 
of fundamental and human rights has clearly been left to the Council of Europe and the European 
Court of Human Rights. However, Ervo observes that there is a difference between the Supreme 
Court, which appears to most often refer to the European Convention and the Court’s case law, 
and the Supreme Administrative Court whose case law contains more references to the national 
Constitution. Ibid. p. 252 and 253.
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European Court of Human Rights applies, which in her view is even required by the 
Convention.896 Thus, there are concurrent views on the needs to develop the application 
and interpretation of the European case law by the national courts. On the other hand, 
the European Convention and the Court may also be considered as having restricted 
the national procedural autonomy, but in the view of Pellonpää, this development has 
been in harmony with the traditional principles of the Finnish legal system.897 In the 
discourse analysis in sections 4.5.1.3 and 4.5.2.3 below, efforts are made to see whether 
the supreme jurisdictions have also in practice applied the principles of interpretation 
in the same way as the European Court of Human Rights, and whether it concerns 
all the principles of interpretation.
It is further argued in this thesis that the more national courts adopt a similar 
manner of applying and interpreting prior case law as the European Court of Human 
Rights, the better they are receptive to its argumentation. It is inevitable that the way 
in which the national supreme jurisdictions refer to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights or to foreign case law is limited to certain extent by the rules 
of domestic legislation, domestic case law and the traditional rules of interpretation of 
law. However, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is today generally 
recognised by the supreme jurisdictions themselves as a binding source of law898. In 
the application and interpretation of that law, the principles of interpretation applied 
by the European Court of Human Rights, including the treatment of the Convention 
as a living instrument, should be taken into account. Those help to fill in the rational-
ity gap in fundamental rights and human rights argumentation, by supporting the 
balancing of conflicting interests and the application of value judgments, apart from 
what has traditionally been found to belong to the discretion of the judiciary. Fur-
thermore, international human rights law and particularly the European Convention 
on Human Rights are today part of the national legal culture, and in terms of Glenn 
a lateral (cross-border) legal tradition899 which is gaining an increasing role in the 
interpretation of law. It has already been called for by some Finnish scholars that even 
national constitutional law provisions on fundamental rights should be interpreted 
according to the same principles as the provisions of the European Convention on 
896 Koskelo 2010, p 35 and 36. See also Lavapuro 2011, p. 469, who supports such an opinion.
897 Pellonpää 2009(2), p. 236. Pellonpää underlines that in respect of both the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice one should speak of interaction instead of 
onefold impact. (Ibid. p. 237)
898 In the judgment KKO:1996:80 of the Supreme Court, for example, it is stated that upon Finland’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, the provisions of the Convention and 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights must be taken into account. The strongly 
binding nature of the Convention as a source of law is confirmed in other judgments, for exam-
ple in KKO:2009:80, in which the Supreme Court argues that an incorrect application of the 
Convention may lead to repealing of a final judgment. 
899 See note 29.
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Human Rights. Thus, the case law has been looked into to see whether and to what 
extent the constitutional provisions are referred to in the same connection with the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Further, an effort is also made to see whether the 
European case law is a purely an external perspective of argumentation or whether 
it is already treated partly as an internal one and what type of fragments of discourse 
demonstrate it, including possible subjective elements. That assessment will help in 
the conclusions to be drawn about the general attitude, i.e. the receptiveness, of the 
national judiciary to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Micro-comparison through discourse analysis is used to see whether the case law and 
legal discourse of the European Court of Human Rights can be said to have changed 
the legal culture and thereby the social reality in the legal system. As explained in the 
introductory sections on the research method, the fragments of discourse that are 
looked for include, in particular, references to the Convention and the relevant case 
law, references to the methods and standards of interpretation of the European Court 
of Human Rights and references other possible sources of law, particularly provisions 
of national legislation. Those fragments of discourse are analysed to look for linguistic 
elements indicating how they are treated, and to see if there is an ongoing transition. 
The linguistic elements may, for example, consist of more detailed and complex struc-
tures of sentences, or new concepts or principles, used to supplement legal arguments 
with general practical argumentation.
It is observed in the introduction to this thesis that it is necessary to limit the 
context in which the discourse analysis is made. Therefore, the analysis is mainly car-
ried out in the context of the argumentation of the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court used in the references to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, thus excluding the arguments presented by the lower courts of 
law and the parties. It is restricted to the user for the purpose of analysing the way in 
which the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights has been received 
by the national supreme jurisdictions. However, a wider context is taken into account 
in an effort to see whether the argumentation resorted to by the supreme jurisdictions 
could have external implications900 and whether there can be seen a real change of the 
legal culture. As part of that wider context, an effort is made to assess whether the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights is treated purely as an external or as an 
internal justification (source of law), the underlying presumption being that it is already 
de facto partly an internal one. Further, an assessment is also made to see whether 
the argumentation used by the supreme jurisdictions could contribute to a dialogue 
between the national courts, on the one hand, and between the national judiciary and 
the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, instead of merely applying 
900 See notes 54-56.
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the European case law as a source of law to an increasing extent and more analytically 
than before. That would necessarily require resorting to case law at least partly as an 
internal justification of legal opinions. Similar cases are looked for to compare and to 
support the conclusions.
In the following, the cases of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court are analysed in more detail by comparing their discourse with that of the European 
Court of Human Rights, over a period of time of approximately twenty years starting 
from the first references to the European case law, in order to see whether the micro-
comparison through discourse analysis reveals indications of change in the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights and human rights. As mentioned in the introductory 
sections on the research methods, the approach of critical discourse analysis has been 
adopted as it represents a flexible approach instead of a strictly defined method and is 
designed for analysing, among others, cultural change. However, individual linguistic 
elements of argumentation (discourse) are analysed to carry out micro-comparison. In 
terms of Van Hoecke901, both internal and external perspectives of argumentation are 
analysed. Those coincide both with the ideas of internal and external context presented by 
discourse analysts and with the distinction made by Alexy between external and internal 
justifications of legal opinions. As has been observed by Alexy, legal argumentation is 
limited by statute, precedents and doctrine but that in respect of constitutional rights 
argumentation there is a rationality gap that can be filled in by general practical argumen-
tation902. It is argued in this thesis that the references to precedents in the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights constitute de facto internal justifications instead 
of external ones – unlike in the classification made by Alexy – and the provisions of the 
Convention and precedents are linked by means of various forms of general practical 
argumentation or discourse. As regards the interpretation of fundamental or human 
rights, such practical argumentation may consist of a variety of elements, including 
balancing of conflicting interests and value judgments.
As part of the assessment of the transition of the legal culture of protecting funda-
mental rights and human rights, an effort is made to see whether there exists a dia-
logue between the supreme jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights. 
As regards the Finnish judiciary, Lavapuro suggests that the courts have still not 
introduced any active human rights dialogue, but rather stick to the role of a passive 
listener, and calls for a more active dialogue and interpretation by the courts.903 Ac-
cording to Frowein, in the field of international law, national courts lack the mandate 
they need for developing national law. However, they may play a very important role 
901 See note 32.
902 See notes 34 and 35.
903 Lavapuro 2010, p. 173-175. A more active approach by national courts has in fact been called for 
already by Viljanen ( J.) (2007, p. 315) and Ojanen (2005, p. 1217-1219).
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in the promotion of international law.904 Particularly in the field of human rights, this 
is of utmost importance. Furthermore, although the dynamic approach applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights may impose challenges for national courts, and 
makes it particularly difficult to be receptive to the argumentative style of the Court, 
national courts might contribute more actively to the development of the national 
traditions which, in the end, constitute the common standards looked into by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. Whether one may speak of a real dialogue or some 
weaker form of interaction between courts depends on the legal system, and also on 
the nature of the cases.
Rosas points out that not all situations are examples of judicial dialogue in the narrow 
sense but rather represent a hierarchy of higher and lower courts and thus go beyond 
a willingness to be informed about and eventually be inspired by rulings of foreign 
courts.905 In this respect, there would hardly be any genuine dialogue in those situations 
where the lower courts are bound by the judgments of higher courts, particularly in such 
legal systems as apply a strict system of precedents. In the same way as in respect of the 
European Court of Justice, in the case of the European Court of Human Rights one 
may not speak of a higher court with competence to quash the judgments of national 
courts although in respect of both the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights the national legal systems are bound by their judgments.906 
One may note that because of the system of preliminary rulings, a dialogue between the 
European Court of Justice and national courts is easier to identify than it is in respect of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Concerning the latter, the dialogue takes place 
over a period of time that may vary in length and there are also other factors involved that 
give reason to rather speak of interaction. Such factors include, for example, the margin 
of appreciation that the national courts and authorities have in respect of certain types 
of rights. In those cases there are more differences in the degree of protection afforded 
by different legal systems than in respect of other rights, which makes the identification 
of a dialogue more complicated. However, it is inevitable that there is some degree of 
interaction between the European Court of Human Rights and national courts.
Furthermore, in respect of the interpretation and application of both Union law 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, a dialogue between courts is made 
more complicated – when compared with the interpretation and application of national 
law – by the fact that there are different legal systems and consequently judges with 
considerably different backgrounds involved. As Grewe observes, the judges of the 
European Court of Human Rights represent national legal systems and consequently 
904 Frowein 1996, p.93.
905 Rosas 2007, p. 5. Rosas has studied the judicial dialogue between the European Court of Justice 
and national courts, but his conclusions largely apply to the European Court of Human Rights 
as well.
906 For details, see Rosas 2007, p. 6-8.
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their background has some effect on how the cases are dealt with and, vice versa, the 
European Court’s judgments are implemented at the national level, and at least some 
elements of the case law are absorbed by the legal system concerned907 albeit to dif-
fering extents. This is added by the fact that the Convention is also directly applied by 
national courts, potentially with different results.
4.5.1  Supreme Court
4.5.1.1 Violations found in private law or criminal law proceedings
For the purpose of assessing the receptiveness of the Supreme Court to the argumenta-
tion of the European Court of Human Rights, and the transition of the legal culture in 
that respect, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the civil 
and criminal law sector of the judiciary has been examined in the light of the situation 
in Finland as a whole. When examining the legal system as a whole, one may note that 
the vast majority of cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has found 
a violation of one or more of the Convention provisions have concerned private law 
or criminal law proceedings. Even in the length of proceedings cases under Article 6, 
which has constituted the biggest problem in the Finnish legal system, the majority of 
judgments have been issued in private law or criminal law cases. Thus, when assessing 
the number of complaints and violations found alone, one could assume that there 
has been a problem in the receptiveness to the European Convention provisions and 
the case law under them in ordinary courts of law. As regards problems faced by the 
Finnish courts and other authorities other than the right to a fair trial and the length 
of proceedings under Article 6, the largest groups of cases include those under Articles 
8 and 10. Of the cases concerning freedom of expression, all have their origins in civil 
or criminal law proceedings.
The European Court of Human Rights has issued a judgment against Finland under 
Article 10 in eighteen cases by the end of 2013, according to the Court’s statistics. Since 
then (before 20 August 2014), two more judgments have been issued. Considering that 
there are in total only four cases in which no violation has been found and these are 
the most recent ones, it would seem in the light of those judgments that there could 
be a trend towards better understanding of the Convention provisions in freedom of 
expression cases, but it would be too early to draw a definitive conclusion, consider-
ing also the different natures of those four cases. Furthermore, it as underlined in the 
foregoing, the judgments finding a violation against a certain State does not necessarily 
reflect the situation at the judiciary, but may be a sign of a more profound problem such 
as a problem of legislation or simply that of activity among lawyers. In any case, a lower 
number of violations may be a sign of improved receptiveness to the argumentation of 
907 Grewe 1998, p. 220.
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the European Court of Human Rights in general, given that since 2004, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly begun to refer in detail to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, or it is equally possible that these coincide. Around 2009 to 2011, the 
number of such cases has also increased. Although some scholars have stated that two 
judgments issued against Finland in 2004 and 2005, respectively, lead to a significant 
change in the Finnish judiciary, it would seem that an even more important change 
has taken place between 2009 and 2011. A brief analysis of the freedom of expres-
sion judgments against Finland reveals that they follow the line of argumentation the 
European Court of Human Rights has adopted in other similar cases, without as such 
constituting significant precedents, except for certain judgments that fall within a series 
of precedents. However, for the Finnish judiciary, they are all important judgments in 
that they have also lead to a change in the receptiveness of the Finnish courts to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. They also appear to have contributed 
to a further-reaching change in the legal culture in that respect.
Most cases against Finland concerning freedom of expression have related to the 
freedom of the press908. In the vast majority of cases in which a judgment has been 
issued against Finland in respect of compliance with Article 10, the Supreme Court 
had not granted leave to appeal to the applicant. This fact also supports the assertion 
that the legal culture towards freedom of expression has earlier been rather strict in 
those cases where the lower courts have found the journalists guilty of defamation or 
unlawful distribution of sensitive information. The number of decisions of the Supreme 
Court in freedom of expression cases has increased, and the Supreme Court has also 
increasingly begun to apply the European case law, including some decisions in which 
the limits on the freedom of expression and the acceptable grounds of interference 
in the right to private life have been analysed in more detail than earlier909. It is sug-
gested in the foregoing that this could be partly due to the wording of section 12 of 
the Constitution. As regards judgments issued against Finland finding a violation 
of Article 8, those judgments have related mainly to family law, procedural law and 
rights of prisoners910. In some cases the violations have been produced by investigative 
908 See, for example, Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, judgment of 16 November 2004, Reports 
of judgments and Decisions 2004-X, Selistö v. Finland, judgment of 16 November 2004 (Appl. 
No. 56767/00), Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, judgment of 6 April 2010 (Appl. No. 25576/04), 
Lahtonen v. Finland, judgment of 17 January 2012 (Appl. No. 29576/09), and Reinboth and Others 
v. Finland, judgment of 25 January 2011 (Appl. No. 3086/08).
909 See, in particular, Ruusunen v. Finland, judgment of 14 January 2014 (Appl. No. 73579/10), and 
Ojala and Etukeno Oy v. Finland, judgment of 14 January 2014 (Appl. No. 69939/10), as well as 
KKO:2010:39.
910 See, for example, Grönmark v. Finland, judgment of 12 July 2012 (Appl. No. 17038/04), Backlund 
v. Finland, judgment of 6 July 2010 (Appl. no. 36498/05), Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 
judgment of 27 September 2005 (Appl. No. 50882/99), and Lindström and Mässeli v. Finland, 
judgment of 14 January 2014 (Appl. No. 24630/10).
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authorities. When looking into the case law of the Supreme Court, one may notice 
that there are much fewer precedents in cases concerning the right to private life other 
than those involving at the same time the protection of the freedom of expression.
4.5.1.2 Case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Supreme Court
The case law of the Supreme Court has been looked into for the purpose of identifying 
to what extent the Supreme Court has referred to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights as a source of law and in which types of cases it has mainly done 
so, in view of those groups of cases that have constituted the majority of violations 
found against Finland in the European Court of Human Rights. In the published 
precedents of the Supreme Court, more than 140 cases with references to the case 
law can be found, although not in all of them it has been referred to by the Supreme 
Court itself911. However, the number of cases where it has been applied as a source of 
law by the Supreme Court constitutes a sufficient sample for the purpose of analysing 
the development of the discourse of the Supreme Court and its receptiveness to that 
of the European Court of Human Rights. Given the critical approach to the analysis, 
i.e. the approach focusing on social change, Articles 8 and 10 have been chosen as the 
main object of discourse analysis for the reason that they constitute important groups 
of cases before the European Court of Human Rights for Finland and are interesting 
from the perspective changes in legal culture in that they typically involve profound 
balancing of conflicting private and public interests, in which changes are constantly 
taking place in national case law. Further, those principles of interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights that typically involve assessment of evolution of 
the standard of protection in Europe often appear in cases concerning the protection 
of private life. However, as Article 6 has been the biggest problem for the Finnish 
legal system as a whole, the case law of the Supreme Court under that provision912 is 
looked into to find support for the conclusions made concerning Articles 8 and 10. 
Although that group of cases also provide an example of changes in the legal culture 
in Finland, the problems with Article 6 have been more of a procedural and technical 
nature, and the reasoning in national courts has not been as elaborate as in respect of 
Articles 8 and 10 as a whole. 
911 See e.g. KKO:1999:50 (30.4.1999/1076) in which the Court of Appeal referred to the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, but the Supreme Court merely referred to Articles 5 
and 8 of the Convention as well as to national legislation.
912 See KKO:1994:26, KKO:1995:7, KKO:1995:185, KKO:1996:80, KKO:1997:128, KKO:1997:194, 
KKO:1998:100, KKO:1999:18, KKO:2000:13, KKO:2001:69, KKO:2003:119 (concerning 
both Article 6 and Article 8), KKO:2007:101, KKO:2008:68, KKO:2009:80, KKO:2010:45, 
KKO:2010:46, KKO:2010:82, KKO:2011:27, KKO:2011:104:, KKO:2012:5, KKO:2012:46, and 
KKO:2013:25.
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As regards Articles 8 and 10, the Supreme Court has applied the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in a total of more than 30 cases. Various types of 
cases may arise in relation to the application of Article 8 of the Convention and the 
case law under it, including professional secrecy of lawyers913, coercive means used by the 
police914, family rights915, or detention or imprisonment916. The most cases concerning 
Article 8, however, have at the same time involved issues under Article 10, i.e. the vast 
majority of them have also concerned the freedom of expression917. When examining 
the precedents of the Supreme Court as a whole, one may confirm the conclusion made 
by Lavapuro in that the nature of references to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has gradually changed into more detailed ones. This trend may also be 
observed on the basis of the cases concerning the freedom of expression alone, in which 
the first references to the case law have appeared in 2004 and 2005, whereas they have 
changed into somewhat more profound ones as of 2009 or 2010 when the number of 
references has also begun to increase. It may still be too early to draw any definitive 
conclusions, however, in the light of freedom of expression cases alone, given also the 
relatively small total number of the cases involving the application and interpretation 
of Article 8 taken alone. The cases concerning freedom of expression are among those 
in which the Supreme Court has begun to carry out more profound analyses of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, but when looking into the decisions of 
the Supreme Court as a whole in the past few years, one may note that there are still 
both rather mechanical references and more profound ones.
According to Lavapuro, a clear change in cases concerning freedom of expression 
in the Supreme Court has taken place after its judgment KKO:2001:96, and for ex-
913 KKO:2003:119 (5.2.2003/3010) which concerned the relationship between professional secrecy 
and the prohibition to give a witness statement, and KKO:2006:61 (14.8.2006/1760) which 
concerned the right of a legal counsel to violate his professional secrecy to protect his own rights.
914 KKO:2007:58 (19.6.2007/1336) which concerned the right of the police to use technical record-
ings for the investigation of a criminal offence other than the one for which the permission to 
use technical surveillance had been obtained.
915 KKO:2008:93 (17.10.2008/2250) which concerned the relationship between the right of the 
child to physical integrity and the right of the child and parents to freedom of religion, read 
together with Article 8, and KKO:2012:11 (30.1.2012/158) which concerned the establishment 
of paternity after the expiry of a time limit set by law in relation to the protection of private life 
under Article 8.
916 KKO:2012:81 (2.10.2012/1882) which concerned the right of prisoners to secrecy of official 
correspondence under Article 8, read together with Article 13.
917 KKO:2004:30 (26.3.2004/687), KKO:2005:82 (4.7.2005/1621), KKO:2005:136 
(19.12.2005/3137), KKO:2006:20 (16.3.2006/608), KKO:2009:3 (22.1.2009/31), KKO:2010:39 
(16.6.2010/1296), KKO:2010:88 (9.12.2010/2439), KKO:2011:71 (28.9.2011/2091), 
KKO:2011:72 (30.9.2011/2092), KKO:2011:101 (30.11.2011/2676), KKO:2012:58 
(8.6.2012/1101), KKO:2013:15 (5.3.2013/454), KKO:2013:50 (26.6.2013/1440), KKO:2013:69 
(23.9.2013/1998), KKO:2013:70 (23.9.2013/1999) and KKO:2013:100 (31.12.2013/2722).
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ample in its judgment KKO:2005:136, the reasoning with regard to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights is already more profound918. The same applies 
to judgment KKO:2005:82919, in which the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the 
balancing of conflicting interests of protecting the freedom of expression, on the one 
hand, and the right to private life, on the other hand, is more detailed and profound 
than in judgment KKO:2004:30. This change in the Supreme Court took place after 
the European Court of Human Rights had issued two judgments against Finland, 
finding a violation of Article 10. On the other hand, during the years between 2004 
and 2011, the change has not yet been that dramatic. For example, in its judgment 
KKO:2006:20, the reasoning of the Supreme Court with regard to the application of 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is again less detailed, although 
it seems that the Supreme Court has balanced the conflicting interests.
Although the judgments against Finland in which violation of Article 6 has been 
found constitutes the largest group of cases in the European Court of Human Rights, 
the number of published precedents of the Supreme Court concerning the application 
and interpretation of that Article is surprisingly low (slightly more than 20 judgments). 
It does not differ significantly from those under Articles 8 and 10. As regards the nature 
of the cases under Article 6, paragraph 1, the Supreme Court has most often dealt with 
the question of ne bis in idem in relation to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the question 
of impartiality of judges as well as various questions relating to taking of evidence, 
including the right to abstain from self-incrimination, hearing of parties and coercive 
measures. No judgments appear among the published precedents in respect of Article 
5, paragraph 1. The discourse in the Supreme Court judgments relating to Article 6, 
paragraph 1, is analysed below, to support the findings under Articles 8 and 10.
As a clear change towards more detailed argumentation with regard to references 
to European case law has emerged rather recently, it would be correct to state that 
the legal culture is changing and, given the way in which the Supreme Court has de-
veloped national case law following judgments issued against Finland particularly in 
cases under Article 10, there appears to have developed a better understanding of the 
case law and argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, in the 
light of the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, the national judiciary appears to 
be rather receptive to its argumentation.
As regards the conceptual problems analysed in the foregoing, in section 4.2, the 
Supreme Court has not traditionally been faced with the concepts of civil rights or 
918 Lavapuro 2011, p.474.
919 In this judgment, the Supreme Court found that the publication of information concerning private 
life was not necessary in democratic society, using the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights both as a source of law and as a basis of its reasoning, whereas in the first mentioned case 
the Supreme Court gave priority to the freedom of expression despite reasoning in detail on the 
protection of private life.
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criminal charge under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. In relation to Ar-
ticle 4 of Protocol No. 7, however, the Supreme Court has already taken a position 
to the principle of ne bis in idem in the light of European case law in a number of 
precedents920. In judgments KKO:2010:45 and KKO:2010:46 the Supreme Court 
paid attention to the independent meanings of the concepts of criminal proceedings 
and criminal charge under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as 
well as to the criteria set out by the European Court of Human Rights in the case 
of Engel and Others. The Supreme Court carefully analysed judgments issued against 
Finland by the European Court of Human Rights as well as certain other judgments, 
particularly the judgment given in the case of Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, and ex-
panded the interpretation traditionally given to the concept of criminal charge under 
national law in the light of the principle of ne bis in idem. Thus, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the concept of criminal charge in Article 6, paragraph 1, jointly with the 
provision of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, which is a typical situation. By those deci-
sions, the Supreme Court gave importance to a final decision on tax increase. In a later 
judgment, KKO:2013:59, the Supreme Court further expanded the interpretation as a 
result of the preparatory work of a legislative proposal921 pending in Parliament, with 
reference to the same cases of the European Court of Human Rights, thus changing 
its position as to the meaning to be given to the principle of ne bis in idem. Under the 
new precedent, even a pending case of tax increase, in which a decision has already 
been made, may prevent the imposing of an additional criminal law sanction despite 
that it is not yet final. That change of position illustrates well the difficulties that the 
national legal system may face with the autonomous meaning given by the European 
Court of Human Rights to certain concepts in its case law, particularly where they 
differ considerably from the traditional interpretation given to them in the national 
legal system. Further, although the question has appeared in Finland in connection 
with taxation procedures, it is an indication of that there may be need to further assess 
the system of criminal law sanctions for the reason that there is an emerging body of 
EU legislation providing for administrative sanctions, and administrative sanctions are 
also applied under other existing Finnish legislation.
4.5.1.3 Discourse of the Supreme Court
When comparing the judicial style of the Supreme Court with that of the European 
Court of Human Rights, one may observe that it is considerably different. It is ob-
920 KKO:2013:59, KKO:2012:106, KKO:2012:79, KKO:2012:71, KKO:2011:80, KKO:2010:82, 
KKO:2010:46 and KKO:2010:45. The Supreme Court has also been faced with that princi-
ple e.g. in respect of the relationship between narcotics offences and disciplinary proceedings 
(KKO:2012:46) and in respect of the imposing of liability for damages to the extent that the 
principle prevented prosecution for tax fraud due to an imposed tax increase (KKO:2011:35).
921 PeVL 9/2012 vp.
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served in the foregoing that in the same way as the judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Finnish judgments may include dissenting opinions and those are 
included in the text of the judgment. Furthermore, the judgments of Finnish courts 
include generally a statement of law and facts, although the text may be structured 
somewhat differently. Furthermore, the Supreme Court advances from the statement 
of facts (including arguments of the parties presented before lower courts) to the state-
ment of applicable law and judicial assessment of the situation in the same way as the 
European Court of Human Rights. However, the discourse used in the application 
of sources of law and particularly case law differs from that of the European Court of 
Human Rights in that the latter is traditionally more detailed particularly as regards 
the application of case law, and the principles of interpretation applied can be more 
easily identified. It may be due to the persisting way of writing judgments in Finland, 
based on strongly legalistic traditions, that it is often difficult to say in what manner 
exactly the Finnish Supreme Court has applied the case law to the concrete situation 
at hand, and sometimes even which principle of interpretation has been applied despite 
that it may be identified indirectly. Although the European Court of Human Rights 
has on occasion been criticised for lack of clarity in its reasoning, from the perspective 
of discourse analysis the reasoning in respect of the application of case law appears to 
be more elaborated. Another factor explaining the differences in the way in which case 
law is applied as a source of law may be the lack of strong traditions of precedence in 
Finland, although it is noted that the doctrine of precedents of the European Court of 
Human Rights is closer to the Finnish one than e.g. the English one, being relatively 
flexible. However, considering that the Finnish legal system does not apply such a 
strict system of precedents as the English legal system does, it has potential of adapting 
itself to the judicial style of the European Court of Human Rights. That is also made 
easier by the fact that the Supreme Court has explicitly recognised the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights as a binding source of law922 without drawing a 
distinction between national and European sources of law. The references to case law, 
including both national and international cases, have increased in the past few years 
considerably in the Finnish Supreme Court.
The legalistic traditions can also be seen in the rather strong reliance on applicable 
national legislation. In the earliest cases in which references to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights appear, they were brief in nature. Those cases 
 
922 The binding nature of that case law is most often not stated explicitly, but for example in decisions 
KKO:1996:80, KKO:1997:194, KKO:2009:80 and KKO:2013:100, the Supreme Court uses a 
wording that expresses the binding nature. In judgment KKO:2009:80, paragraph 7, the Supreme 
Court even argues that an incorrect application of the Convention may lead to repealing of a final 
judgment, which makes the Convention a strongly binding source of law.
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concerned Article 6 of the Convention923. Although the Supreme Court often applies 
the European Convention on Human Rights together with the provisions of the 
Finnish Constitution, and even with those of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights924, it may be observed that the argumentation appears to be largely 
based on the provisions of other applicable legislation such as the Criminal Code, as 
an element limiting the discourse. This is often at the expense of the application of 
case law, including that of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it seems that 
the applicable legislation is an element limiting discourse to a larger extent than case 
law, and the provisions of law constitute stronger justifications for the outcome of the 
decision. It seems, however, that there is a shift towards using the applicable case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights increasingly as a factor limiting discourse, 
although the cases in which it has a dominating role are still rare. Furthermore, one 
may note that the change of culture of referring to the European case law has taken 
place relatively fast in the Supreme Court compared with the supreme jurisdictions of 
the selected other States. This could be explained by the fact that at least from 2004, it 
appears to have been used as a stronger internal justification for the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions925. For example in its decision KKO:2004:30, which concerned the freedom 
of expression in the context of publication of a book in relation to the right to restrict 
the freedom of expression to protect the rights of others for the purpose of investigat-
ing aggravated criminal offences, the Supreme Court clearly used the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights as a stronger internal justification926. In that case, 
the Supreme Court argued that although in the reform of fundamental rights provi-
sions of the Constitution, no statements were made of the protection of journalist’s 
923 See KKO:1994:26 relating to the question of hearing of parties, in which two cases are referred 
to as additional elements of argumentation. In this judgment, the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights appears to be used rather as an external justification, when compared with 
other cases. See also KKO:1997:7 concerning cost-free trial, and KKO:1995:185, KKO:1996:80, 
KKO:1997:194 and KKO:1998:100 concerning the impartiality of judges. In all those decisions, 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights appears to have been used already as an 
internal justification for the conclusions, but the argumentation is extremely brief and does not 
disclose in which manner the case law or principles of interpretation have been applied.
924 See for example decision KKO:2010:88 and KKO:2013:100. The practice of referring to both 
the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights is not, however, consistent.
925 In judgments KKO:2003:119 and KKO:2004:30, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is already 
more detailed when compared with earlier ones, for example in judgments KKO:2000:13 and 
KKO:2001:69 the references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights were still 
not that elaborate.
926 The same applies to decisions KKO:2005:82, concerning the dissemination of sensitive information 
in the context of electoral campaign, KKO:2005:136 concerning the protection of the name and 
identity of a convicted person under Article 8 in relation to freedom of expression under Article 
10, and KKO:2006:20 concerning the publication of the name and photograph of a prosecutor’s 
wife in relation to a suspected criminal offence. In all those three decisions, the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights is clearly used as an internal justification of conclusions.
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sources, the European Court of Human Rights has taken a position on that question. 
Thus, the European case law is already clearly part of the internal context in which 
the Supreme Court draws its conclusions, despite that it may be often difficult to say 
in which manner it has been applied to the concrete situation at hand.
In most precedents concerning the freedom of expression in which the Supreme 
Court has given priority to the protection of private life, it has noted that the essential 
criteria of assessment to be applied in balancing the interests of protecting the private life 
and freedom of expression, as set out in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, correspond to those principles that have been included in the provisions of the 
national criminal law prohibiting dissemination of information in violation of the right 
to privacy. In stating so, the Supreme Court has found that the freedom of expression 
does not prevent the application of the provisions of criminal law according to their 
meaning, or that the provisions of criminal law prohibiting unlawful dissemination of 
sensitive information are meant to protect private life within the meaning of Article 
8 of the Convention, which is a rather strong internal justification and statement of 
the limits that the national legislation imposes on argumentation. However, although 
the Supreme Court has used this statement as a justification for finding a violation 
of private life, thus giving it stronger weight than for the freedom of expression, it is 
at the same time a demonstration of the interpretation of law in conformity with the 
constitutional law provisions on fundamental rights and the provisions of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the wording used by the Supreme Court 
shows that today, the legalistic tradition goes hand in hand with the application of the 
principle of human rights friendly interpretation of law.
As regards the principles concerning the application of the Convention provisions 
on the freedom of expression or protection of private life, there are on the one hand 
relatively few examples of profound analysis of the interpretation principles set out in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The references to the princi-
ples of interpretation are, when compared with those in the European case law, rather 
mechanic in the same way as references to the case law in general. For example, in the 
aforementioned decision KKO:2004:30, the Supreme Court stated on which grounds 
the freedom of expression may be restricted on the basis of national law, referring to 
the margin of appreciation that the States have in this respect, but did not elaborate 
on the need to ensure that those restrictions are proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. Thus, it remains unclear whether and in which manner the principle of 
proportionality has been applied. As noted in the foregoing, the margin of apprecia-
tion is a new concept in the judicial discourse, which has appeared as a result of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Also in decisions KKO:2005:82 
and KKO:2005:136, the application of the principle of proportionality appears only 
indirectly from the Court’s discourse, although the reasoning is otherwise profound. 
On those occasions, the Supreme Court has nevertheless underlined that there is no 
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hierarchy between the two competing rights, which suggests that a balancing exercice 
has taken place. On the other hand, there are examples of cases in which the Supreme 
Court has drawn attention to the exceptional nature of restrictions imposed on the 
freedom of expression, noting that it is one of the essential foundations of democratic 
society. It has thus paid attention to the underlying principle of protection of any 
fundamental rights or human rights, repeated in each judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights, that any interference must be restricted to what is necessary 
in democratic society. On occasion, the Supreme Court has even more clearly referred 
to the applicable principle of interpretation, most often the principle of proportional-
ity. For example, in its decision KKO:2009:3, the Supreme Court assessed whether 
the interference in the freedom of expression was to be considered proportionate and 
necessary, thus applying the principle of proportionality as a rule of interpretation, 
and found that there was a compelling need to protect the information. However, the 
approach of the Supreme Court to the principles of interpretation even in that case is 
less analytical than that of the European Court of Human Rights. A research into the 
case law of the Supreme Court also confirms the statement of Lavapuro in that the 
principle of proportionality is rather well established, whereas the other principles of 
interpretation of the Convention are less seldom referred to. It seems that in most cases 
before the Supreme Court, the more essential reasoning leading to the conclusions 
appears to be linked with the application of national law or to the facts of the case, 
instead of the cases of the European Court of Human Rights despite that they are 
used as an internal justification. Although the statement of facts and applicable law as 
such is a demonstration of transparency towards the addressees of the legal discourse, 
the drawing of conclusions could in most cases be more transparent. Thus, the general 
practical discourse supplementing the legal arguments is often lacking, or is very brief.
The first case in which the reasoning of the Supreme Court concerning freedom of 
expression appears to be more profound when compared with earlier cases is its judg-
ment KKO:2010:39, which concerned the freedom of expression of a private individual 
and publishing company in a published book and which was later taken to the European 
Court of Human Rights. In that case, the conflicting interests were assessed in the light 
of the European case law already in lower court instances. Although the references to 
the case law by the Supreme Court were not numerous and very detailed, the Supreme 
Court assessed in detail the relationship between Articles 8 and 10 particularly with 
regard to the necessity of interfering in the freedom of expression, taking into account 
the meaning of the freedom of expression in democratic society in guaranteeing neces-
sary public debate, the limits of the protection of private life of public figures and how 
essentially the published information concerned the core of private life. The Supreme 
Court also specified those parts of the book that in its view constituted a violation of 
the core of private life and paid attention to the proportionate nature of the criminal 
law sanction imposed in view of the seriousness of the violation of private life, thus 
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applying the principle of proportionality. The sentences (as structures of discourse) of 
the Supreme Administrative Court, when carrying out a balancing exercice, appear 
to be more complex than usual. The style of reasoning in some parts of the decision 
has also similarities with that of the European Court of Human Rights, using similar 
concepts and expressions. In this case, the national courts appear to have successfully 
applied the Convention provisions and the relevant case law, as the European Court 
of Human Rights did not later find a violation of the freedom of expression.
Although the aforementioned case presents exceptionally profound reasoning and 
application of principles of interpretation, it has not remained an isolated one. A similar 
type of profound assessment of conflicting private and public interests can be found 
in decision KKO:2010:88, which concerns the freedom of the press and the extent of 
confidentiality of journalists’ sources of information. The Supreme Court paid atten-
tion to the nature of terrorism as an important subject of interest for society, raising 
wide public debate, but found that the right of journalists to the confidentiality of their 
sources did not remove them from an obligation to verify the presented allegations 
from other reliable sources, taking into account the serious nature of the allegations. 
In doing so, the Supreme Court gave priority to the need to allow for the persons 
concerned to defend themselves against the allegations over the freedom of expression. 
Thus, also in this case, the Supreme Court applied the principle of proportionality, 
although its application is less apparent than in the aforementioned case. Similarly, 
in a decision concerning the freedom of expression of journalists in television news 
broadcast, KKO:2013:100, the references to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights are rather detailed and the reasoning of the Supreme Court reveals 
which particular case it has applied when deciding the case at hand, thus bringing the 
references closer to internal justifications of the court’s conclusions. In this particular 
case, the Supreme Court paid attention to the overall impression given by the news 
broadcast in finding a violation of the honour of the persons concerned on the basis 
of a breach of the presumption of innocence, despite that the news broadcast did not 
as such contain significant false allegations, thus applying a wider context than that 
of the contents of the news alone.
In subsequent cases in which the Supreme Court has instead given priority to the 
protection of the freedom of expression of journalists, KKO:2011:71, KKO:2011:72 
and KKO:2011:101, the references to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights are less detailed and the argumentation is less profound. Although the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning concerning what has to be tolerated in respect of issues of interest 
for society is even profound with regard to the application of national provisions of 
law, the judgments would have merited from more detailed analysis of the case law 
and principles of interpretation of the European Convention in response to the earlier 
judgments in which the Supreme Court found a violation of private life. Despite the 
references to the case law, it remains somewhat unclear in which way it has been ap-
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plied. Also in later judgments, KKO:2013:69 and KKO:2013:70, the Supreme Court’s 
argumentation concerning the application of the rules of interpretation of Articles 8 
and 10, despite references to the case law and assessment of the acceptable criteria of 
restricting the freedom of expression, is not very profound and transparent. It seems that 
in those cases where the Supreme Court has given priority to the freedom of expres-
sion, it has more easily resorted to reasoning on the basis of the applicable provisions 
of law instead of analysing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
detail. Thus, there appears to be a difference in the nature of argumentation depending 
on the outcome of the case as regards the freedom of expression of journalists. How-
ever, in all situations, the Supreme Court appears to use the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights as an internal element of argumentation, although in more 
recent cases the argumentation has developed towards a more elaborate one. On the 
one hand, although there is an emerging change in the way in which the Supreme 
Court has analysed the case law and assessed the principles of interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights, it would be incorrect to say that the change in the 
legal culture in that respect is dramatic yet. On the other hand, one might also assert 
that when approving interference in the freedom of expression, it is more important 
to resort to transparent argumentation, which would increase the persuasiveness of 
decisions. In any case, as a whole, the changing style of argumentation towards more 
complex sentence structures, new concepts based on European case law and increas-
ing case references can be observed in the decisions on freedom of expression, which 
conclusion is supported by a few other decisions where the freedom of expression has 
materialised in other types of situations.
In decision KKO:2012:58 which concerns the relationship between the freedom of 
expression and prohibition of incitement against an ethnic group, there are only a few 
specified references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights but the 
argumentation of the Supreme Court is rather profound. In that case, the Supreme 
Court balanced the acceptable limits of criticism on immigration policy against the 
extent of freedom of expression and the necessary limitations thereof. The Supreme 
Court applied the principle of proportionality in paying attention to that the freedom 
of expression may not be interfered with more than what is necessary in view of its 
importance in democratic society, in finding a violation of the freedom of religion in 
respect of certain specified statements. The Supreme Court also applied the principle 
of proportionality to the facts of the case, including the measurement of the sen-
tence imposed. In a case concerning the freedom of expression of private individuals, 
KKO:2013:15, the Supreme Court found that civil servants had to tolerate a certain 
degree of criticism towards their official measures, although they had the right to the 
protection of their honour and guarantees of protection against interference in their 
official duties. In this case, the Supreme Court underlined the right of the parent to 
effective legal remedies for the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of interference in 
322 | Koivu: European Convention on Human Rights and transition of the legal culture
the physical integrity of his child. In doing so, the Supreme Court also paid attention 
to the need of protecting the rights of the child, thus clearly balancing conflicting 
interests and acknowledging that interference may be justified for the purpose of pro-
tecting the rights of others. However, in that decision, the application of the principle 
of proportionality is not as evident as in the aforementioned case. In its precedent 
KKO:2013:50, which essentially concerned the elements of unlawful threatening, 
the Supreme Court found it necessary to take a position on the acceptable limits of 
freedom of expression despite that the elements of crime were not fulfilled. The refer-
ences to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are rather brief, but 
the Supreme Court resorts to balancing the conflicting public and private interests 
and found that where the statements presented on the internet constitute threats, they 
do not enjoy the protection of the freedom of expression. However, the assessment of 
the limits of the freedom of expression is not very profound from the perspective of 
discourse despite that the conclusions appear to be directly drawn from the cited case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has the potential of decreasing 
the persuasiveness of the decision.
Although the references to the European case law in the judgments of the Supreme 
Court have gradually become more detailed, with more complex sentence structures, 
and the Supreme Court has increasingly resorted to more elaborate balancing the con-
flicting rights in the light of the rules of interpretation of the European Convention 
provisions, the nature of argumentation particularly in respect of the analysis of the 
rules of interpretation would still merit from being further developed. In a couple of 
cases, there is already more developed reasoning particularly concerning the principle of 
proportionality, in which the Supreme Court deductively applies the principles stated 
in connection with European case law to the concrete facts of the case at hand. The 
Supreme Court does not very often resort to invoking the margin of appreciation of 
national authorities, for example, and also the other rules of interpretation applied by 
the European Court of Human Rights are less visible in the case law of the Supreme 
Court than the principle of proportionality. The application of the rules of interpretation 
could also be more transparent. For example, in judgment KKO:2013:70, the Supreme 
Court rather appears to derive its conclusions from the assessment of the correctness 
of the statements presented in the writing than from an assessment of the acceptable 
limits on restricting the freedom of expression, without explicitly referring to the need 
to ensure that the restrictions are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and to 
the nature of the violation upon honour.
Furthermore, even cases concerning the application of Article 8, other than those 
involving the freedom of expression as a conflicting interest, confirm that the argu-
mentation in respect of the application of the European case law does not appear 
to be equally profound in all cases. In decisions KKO:2003:119, KKO:2006:61 and 
KKO:2007:58, the argumentation remains at a rather general level despite that the Su-
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preme Court issues important precedents concerning the limits of protection of private 
life, and only in KKO:2003:119 the application of the principle of proportionality is 
apparent. In decision KKO:2008:93, concerning the relationship between the protection 
of private life and the limits on freedom of religion, the Supreme Court carries out a 
rather profound assessment of conflicting interests, but the analysis of the principles 
of interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights under its case law 
is rather scarce although the Supreme Court appears to at least indirectly apply the 
principle of proportionality. In decision KKO:2012:81 rather applied the case law under 
Article 13, when assessing the limits of the protection of private life of prisoners, and 
without resorting to profound analysis of the principles of interpretation applied by 
the European Court of Human Rights. An interesting exception is the Supreme Court 
decision KKO:2012:11 concerning the statute of limitations on the right to require 
establishment of paternity. In that particular decision, the Supreme Court exceptionally 
applies the principle of evolutive interpretation which has been called for by Lavapuro. 
Decision KKO:2012:11 represents also in other respects a rare example of such deci-
sions where the Supreme Court has taken a position on the temporal applicability of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, giving in strong terms priority to the 
interest of protecting the right to private life of the person concerned, at the expense 
of the principle of legal certainty which is strongly established in the Finnish legal 
system. Thus, in that judgment, the Supreme Court appears to follow rather closely the 
ideas presented by the European Court of Human Rights when expressing the core 
of the principle of evolutive interpretation, and the case references are clearly strong 
internal justifications for the Supreme Court’s conclusions. The sentence structures are 
more complex than in most decisions with references to European case law and the 
Supreme Court uses similar expressions. The Supreme Court appears to resort to an 
assessment in a wider context, assessing the meaning of technological development 
(DNA) for identity, and reasons both in the light of its own prior case law and that 
of the European Court of Human Rights in giving priority to the right to private life. 
This approach might also be a result of the judgments issued against Finland by the 
European Court of Human Rights concerning the establishment of paternity. 
The analysis made of the decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the applica-
tion of Article 6 of the Convention confirms the main conclusions made concerning 
the application of Articles 8 and 10. That analysis discloses in the same way that the 
Supreme Court’s discourse has began to develop to a more elaborate one around 2010. 
The earliest judgments referred to in the foregoing included brief rather mechanic 
references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Even when the 
references indicate the cases examined, their application to the concrete facts at hand 
remains less evident. In decision KKO:2001:69, for example, the Supreme Court refers 
to the criteria applied by the European Court of Human Rights concerning objective 
and subjective impartiality of judges, and the Court’s discourse reveals more clearly 
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than earlier in which manner those criteria have been applied to the concrete facts at 
hand. However, the principles of interpretation of law applied by the European Court 
of Human Rights do not clearly appear from the discourse of the Supreme Court, 
which makes it difficult to assess whether its precedents have been applied in the same 
manner. The same applies to decision KKO:2008:68 concerning the taking of evidence, 
in which the Supreme Court refers in detail to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, but the principles of interpretation are not elaborated on. Even in the 
light of later decisions relating to Article 6, it is most often unclear which principles 
of interpretation of law have been applied, although on occasion the application of 
the principle of proportionality appears indirectly from the Court’s discourse. For 
example, in decision KKO:2011:104, the principle of proportionality and the margin 
of appreciation are explicitly referred to, whereas in judgments KKO:2009:80 and 
KKO:2013:25 the principle of proportionality can be detected only indirectly from 
the wording used by the Supreme Court. Most often, the principle applied is not 
mentioned at all. It seems that the application of principles of interpretation of law is 
even less evident in cases under Article 6 than under Articles 8 and 10. Instead, in the 
application of the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7 the Supreme Court has already shown preparedness to relatively comprehensive 
analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and more developed 
argumentation, particularly as regards the analysis of the concept of criminal charge 
and the criteria under which the sentence may be classified as criminal. For example, 
in decisions KKO:2010:45, KKO:2010:46 and KKO:2010:82927, the discourse of the 
Supreme Court with regard to the application of the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is more profound than earlier, and the Supreme Court resorts to a 
wider context than in most cases. The same applies to decision KKO:2011:27 concern-
ing undercover activities, in which the discourse clearly indicates in which manner 
the cases of the European Court of Human Rights have been applied to the facts at 
hand, and to decision, and to later decisions relating to the concept of criminal charge, 
including KKO:2012:46 and KKO:2013:25928. However, the detailed argumentation 
is not consistent yet, which is indicated by decision KKO:2011:104 concerning access 
to court by means of extraordinary appeal, despite that the principles of interpretation 
are mentioned, and KKO2012:5 concerning the right to non-self-incrimination in 
which the criteria based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are 
mentioned but it is difficult to say in which manner exactly they have been applied.
927 All three decisions concern administrative tax increase on the basis of taxation procedures in 
relation to criminal law sanctions based on tax offences.
928 KKO:2012:46 concerns the imposition of a disciplinary sanction as a result of the use of doping 
in relation to the criminal law sanction based on a narcotics offence.
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In conclusion, the best examples of profound argumentation with the exception of 
one case under Article 8 appear in those decisions of the Supreme Court that involve 
the protection of the freedom of expression as a conflicting interest. This is an important 
step in improving the receptiveness of the national judiciary to the argumentation of 
the European Court of Human Rights, given the violations found against Finland, 
and may constitute the first step in opening a dialogue between the European Court 
and the Supreme Court. The European Court of Human Rights has also referred to 
prior cases against Finland in deciding new cases of freedom of expression concerning 
Finland, which confirms that some degree of dialogue has been opened, despite that 
the European Court of Human Rights at the same time refers to the most important 
precedents it has given under Article 10. However, although it appears in the light of 
the case law of the Supreme Court that it is already rather receptive to the argumen-
tation of the European Court of Human Rights, and there is some form of dialogue 
between the two courts, the reasoning and argumentation of the Supreme Court in 
the light of the European case law could still be further developed so as to allow a 
more fruitful dialogue in the protection of the freedom of expression, in line with the 
decision KKO:2010:39. Although in all the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme 
Court it has treated the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as internal 
elements of argumentation, it becomes a stronger element of argumentation where the 
Supreme Court resorts to more elaborate analysis of the principles of interpretation or 
to a clearer application of those principles to the concrete facts of the case at hand. The 
conclusion that the case law is treated as an internal justification for the conclusions 
can be derived from the wording of the fragments of discourse analysed, i.e. from the 
fact that there is no major difference in wording when compared with those fragments 
of discourse in which the Supreme Court applies national law and case law. However, 
a counter-argument could be presented in those cases where the conclusions appear 
to be rather drawn on the basis of applying national law to the concrete situation at 
hand, despite that the European case law has been cited. Thus, a clearer application 
of the principles of interpretation stated on the basis of the European case law to the 
concrete facts, and their use as a basis of conclusions, would also make that case law to a 
larger extent an internal perspective of argumentation – most often, the Supreme Court 
still looks at the case law more as an external observer despite that the wording of the 
fragments of discourse suggests that the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights is already clearly part of the internal context. That observation is supported by 
the finding that the profound argumentation appears to be limited to those decisions 
in which the Supreme Court has found it acceptable to interfere in the protection of 
the freedom of expression of journalists. Also, the change in the discourse concern-
ing other situations involving the protection of private life under Article 8 appears to 
have been slower, and one would still call for more cases of profound argumentation 
in order to develop a real dialogue between the national courts, on the one hand, and 
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between the national judiciary and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other 
hand. The limited application of those principles of interpretation that demonstrate 
most clearly the transition of the legal culture in the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, might be explained by the strong legalistic traditions in which the 
provisions of law limit the discourse. That is also shown by the less frequent resorting 
to a wider context of discourse.
The conclusions made above are supported by those made concerning the applica-
tion of Article 6 by the Supreme Court. In certain judgments, the Supreme Court has 
shown even more developed discourse in the analysis of the principles of interpretation 
of the Convention. On the basis of case law under two Convention articles it is already 
safer to state that there is a change taking place in the Supreme Court in its receptive-
ness to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights, but it is still too 
early to state how definitive and dramatic that change is. In those judgments, also the 
context of discourse is wider, encompassing further-going analysis beyond the limits 
of national law and case law. Apart from the concept of criminal charge in relation to 
the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention and 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, no similar conceptual problems seem to have been faced 
by the Supreme Court. Instead, it appears to have taken some efforts to develop the 
interpretation of concepts of national law in conformity with the Convention provi-
sions, such as the limits of unlawful distribution of sensitive information.
4.5.2  Supreme Administrative Court
4.5.2.1 Violations found in administrative law proceedings
In the same way as in respect of the private law and criminal law proceedings, the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the administrative law 
courts and authorities has been examined in the light of the situation in Finland as 
a whole. One may observe that, when compared with cases in which violations have 
been found in respect of general courts of law, there have been much fewer such cases 
in administrative court proceedings, despite that for example questions under Article 
8 of the Convention are increasingly taken up in administrative court proceedings. 
There are also fewer cases in which delays have been found in national proceedings 
under Article 6. However, this does not necessarily mean that it would be a sign of 
better reception of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. There may 
be other factors explaining it, for example reluctance of the applicants in administra-
tive court proceedings to take their cases further, or the nature of administrative court 
proceedings. Furthermore, the violations found concerning the administrative law sector 
have only rarely been violations that could be attributed to the Supreme Administra-
tive Court. As regards the cases in which violations have been found by the European 
Court of Human Rights, the problems faced in the administrative law sector have, 
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in the majority of cases, concerned the same Convention provisions as in other cases. 
Although one must remember that they are isolated cases, violations have been found 
in compliance with Article 6, paragraph 1, concerning both the length of proceedings 
and errors in the hearing of parties despite or because of the strongly written nature 
of administrative law proceedings.
As was observed in the foregoing, in the light of the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Finland has not that often been faced with the problem of the scope 
of the concept of “civil rights”. However, on those occasions that the concept has been 
touched upon, it has mainly been a problem of administrative law, which is mainly due 
to the linguistic interpretation of the concept in Scandinavian legal systems. Although 
Finland has not faced problems to the same extent as Sweden, there is rather recent 
precedent at the European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court took posi-
tion to the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, to civil servants (wage supplements; 
incorporation of a police district into another one), and found it necessary to develop 
the case law further from its important prior precedent Pellegrin v. France, by assessing 
the so-called functional criterion929. The case of Vilho Eskelinen v. Finland has been 
important for future cases in Finland as it expanded the applicability of Article 6 to 
civil servants. Furthermore, the concept of “criminal charge” also based on Article 6, 
paragraph 1, particularly in relation to the principle of ne bis in idem set out in Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7, has produced a large number of cases at the national level in both 
supreme jurisdictions, two of which have also ended up to the European Court of 
Human Rights. The related cases dealt with by the Supreme Administrative Court are 
examined in more detail below. As regards the concepts of “arrest and detention” and 
“security and liberty of person” under Article 5, paragraph 1, which may on occasion 
materialise even in the administrative law sector particularly as regards the “preventive” 
detention of persons of unsound mind, do not appear to have produced major problems 
in the Supreme Administrative Court.
Furthermore, a number of violations have been found under Article 8 of the Con-
vention, which have mainly related to the protection of minors. The enforcement of 
emergency care orders and related right of access by social welfare authorities appear to 
have created problems. Thus, for the purpose of comparison, it is interesting to analyse 
national case law concerning Article 8 of the Convention to see whether there are 
differences in the way the two supreme jurisdictions treat those cases. Furthermore, in 
the same way as for the Supreme Court, cases concerning Article 8 are more interest-
ing from the perspective of discourse than cases under Article 6. The same applies to 
Article 10, as the cases concerning privacy have also on occasion involved questions of 
freedom of expression. When looking into the case law of the Supreme Administrative 
929 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 19 April 2007, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2007-II, §§ 50 to 64.
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Court, one may note that even in the Supreme Administrative Court the first cases 
in which it has referred to the European case law, have involved the applicability of 
Articles 6 and 8. Although balancing of conflicting interests has been done already at 
the national level in cases concerning the public care of children, such cases have been 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights and violations have been found. It 
demonstrates the difficult task of the national authorities balancing conflicting interests 
in such cases, which has also been recognised by the Supreme Administrative Court.
4.5.2.2  Case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Supreme  
 Administrative Court 
In order to assess the receptiveness of the Supreme Administrative Court to the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, an analysis of its published case law has 
been made. Since the Supreme Administrative Court publishes a smaller proportion of 
its case law than the Supreme Court, verifications were made by carrying out a research 
into its other case law in the Court’s database to find support for the conclusions made. 
The decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court published in its yearbook include 
more than 70 decisions with references to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The total number of decisions with such references in the Court’s database over 
the same period of time (1999-2014) is considerably higher930. Furthermore, the deci-
sions in the Supreme Administrative Court’s database include decisions with different 
types of outcome, where the nature of references to European case law varies. In the light 
of an overall research into the case law in the database, with references to judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights, various observations can be made. Not all 
decisions in favour of the applicant have been published, but such decisions tend to 
include more profound reasoning with respect to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights than others. On occasion, even negative decisions include detailed 
references, particularly where the Supreme Administrative Court considers them to have 
precedential value. Thus, those types of decisions constitute the most fruitful sources 
for the purpose of analysing the discourse of the Supreme Administrative Court. In 
those cases where the Supreme Administrative Court merely upholds the decision of 
the lower court on the same grounds, the Supreme Administrative Court references 
to the European case law are not often very detailed. Also in those cases where the 
Supreme Administrative Court has not agreed with the applicant, or where it rejects 
the appeal, the request for leave to appeal or the application, the Court’s reasoning 
appears to be rather brief even if the Convention provisions or the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights are referred to in the reasoning. 
930 Situation on 20 August 2014. The total number is more than 700 decisions depending on the 
search criteria. However, not all of them are references made by the Supreme Administrative 
Court itself, but are partly references made by lower courts or parties to the proceedings.
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It has not been customary to refer to international case law to the same extent 
before Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
old traditions of writing judgments are still visible in the decisions of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, although some of the more recent decisions include examples 
of very detailed and profound argumentation with reference to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Also in general, the style of reasoning judgments 
in Finland has become more detailed. It is observed in the foregoing that the first 
references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights appeared in the 
Supreme Administrative Court around 1999. The early references were still rather brief, 
mainly indicating the applicable case of the European Court of Human Rights, but 
more detailed references can be found approximately since 2007. In a case concern-
ing the protection of children in 2004 (KHO:2004:121), for example, the reference 
to the European case law was still very brief. The rather mechanic way of referring 
to the European case law appears to persist even in some more recent cases, such as 
KHO:2011:99, in which the Supreme Administrative Court refers to the margin of 
appreciation of national authorities as well as to the principle of best interests of the 
child, but does not elaborate in more detail on the justifications that the European 
Court of Human Rights has given for necessary and proportionate restrictions. 
In the same way as district courts and courts of appeal, administrative courts have 
increasingly started to refer to the Convention and its case law. The research into the 
Supreme Administrative Court’s database supports the conclusion made on the basis 
of the published decisions that the references to the case law of the European Court 
of Rights have significantly increased in the past few years, starting approximately at 
the same time with the more profound references. The Supreme Administrative Court 
may also refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in its reasoning 
despite that the Convention provisions have not been decisive and have not as such 
been used as the legal basis for the Supreme Administrative Court decision931. In some 
cases, the Supreme Administrative Court refers instead or at the same time to another 
international instrument such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, particularly 
in cases involving Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In cases 
KHO:2013:136 and KHO:2010:53, the interests of the child are balanced against the 
freedom of expression under Article 10, and instead of references to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Administrative Court assesses 
the grounds for restricting the freedom of expression in the light of different sources 
of law, including Article 10 of the Convention and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. The principle of the best interests of the child is long established in the legal 
system. Thus, it appears that the Supreme Administrative Court may arrive at similar 
conclusions on the basis of differing sources of law.
931 See e.g. KHO:2012:69 (27.8.2012/2221).
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In the light of the statistics of the Supreme Administrative Court from the past 
few years, cases concerning social welfare and health care as well as immigration cases 
constitute the largest groups of cases. Those fall most typically under the application 
of Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. Decisions in which the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 becomes applicable include 
particularly those concerning child custody932, immigration933, or population register934, 
although the most relevant applicable provisions of the Convention in immigration 
cases are often Articles 3 and 13. The case law under Article 8 has also been touched 
upon in certain cases concerning national security935. National security and the right 
to privacy may also be subject to examination in cases concerning the publicity of of-
ficial documents936. As regards cases concerning personal data protection, the Supreme 
Administrative Court appears to rather refer to European Union law and the case 
law of the ECJ instead of that of the European Court of Human Rights937, which is 
explained by the supranational nature of data protection legislation, although there 
are exceptions938. The technique of referring to those sources of law in such decisions 
does not disclose any major differences from that used in referring to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. On occasion, case law under Article 8 becomes 
relevant in connection with conflicting interests under Article 10939.
932 For example decision 19.09.2000/2302 which contains a rather brief reference to case law and to 
the balancing of different interests, particularly the rights of the child, KHO:2004:121 in which 
the reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is very brief, KHO:2011:99 
which provides for a rather detailed balancing of conflicting interests of the child and the parents, 
referring to the margin of appreciation, as well as decision 22.6.2010/1554. The latter decision, 
which has not been published, includes relatively detailed references to the case law of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights.
933 KHO:2008:91 and KHO:2008:90, as well as decision 23.12.2008/3445, in which the balancing 
of conflicting interests is rather profound.
934 KHO:2009:15. In this case, the analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
is exceptionally detailed.
935 KHO:2007:49, KHO:2007:48 and KHO:2007:47. Those are among the first decisions in which 
the Supreme Administrative Court has resorted to relatively profound reasoning in the light of 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
936 KHO:2003:77. However, in this decision, the reference to the case law is only brief. Decision 
21.5.2010/1212 does not refer to Article 8 but the Supreme Administrative Court balances fair 
trial rights against the right of others to the protection of private life, with brief references to 
European case law concerning Article 6.
937 KHO:2012:55.
938 KHO:2009:82. In this decision, the Supreme Administrative Court resorts to detailed balancing 
of conflicting interests, combining different sources of law.
939 KHO:2009:82. This decision concerns the balancing of the freedom of the press and journalistic 
purpose with the protection of private life, and although the references to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights are brief and the cases have not been identified, the balanc-
ing of the conflicting interests is rather profound. See also decision 18.6.2012/1708, which is a 
repetitive case and is mainly reasoned with a reference to the first-mentioned decision.
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Although the majority of cases concerning freedom of expression are dealt with 
by the Supreme Court, Article 10 becomes applicable in the Supreme Administrative 
Court in certain types of cases, particularly in cases concerning the freedom of the 
press940 and publicity of official documents941, freedom of association942 and the freedom 
of expression of civil servants943. On occasion, the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has become applicable in connection with the protection of the rights 
of the child944. For the reason that the Supreme Administrative Court increasingly 
applies European Union law, the freedom of expression may also materialise through 
that law945. Although the cases under Article 10 are more typical in the Supreme Court, 
those of the Supreme Administrative Court are analysed for the purposes of comparison.
The references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Supreme 
Administrative Court’s case law as a whole, when derived from the Court’s database, 
represent roughly the same types of cases as those published in the Court’s yearbook. No 
significant differences in the nature of reasoning appear to exist in the published decisions 
when compared with the non-published ones. As regards those decisions in which the 
Supreme Administrative Court has concretely reasoned its decisions with reference to 
the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and which fall within the 
940 KHO:2011:22 which concerns an administrative restriction imposed on the contents of a 
television programme. In this case, the Supreme Administrative Court resorts to a profound 
analysis of conflicting interests and weighs the freedom of expression against the prohibition of 
discrimination and harassment.
941 KHO:2004:25. In this decision, the reference to the freedom of expression and the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights is very brief. In decision 7.11.2003/2729 (KHO:2003:77), 
the Supreme Administrative Court gave only little relevance to the aspects of protecting the right 
to private life and the freedom of expression, and the references to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights were only brief, whereas the aspects of state security played a stronger 
role. In cases concerning the publicity of official documents, the freedom of expression may play 
an indirect role without the Supreme Administrative Court explicitly referring to Article 10 
or the case law under it (e.g. KHO:2013:120), or it may be invoked only by the applicant (e.g. 
KHO:2013:120 in which the Supreme Administrative Court gives priority to the right to private 
life).
942 KHO:2014:1. In this decision, the Supreme Administrative Court balances the freedom of as-
sociation with the freedom of expression, including the grounds for restricting those rights in the 
light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with detailed references, although 
the more relevant provision is Article 11 of the Convention.
943 KHO:2011:19. The references to the case law in this decision are relatively brief, but the balancing 
of conflicting interests is profound.
944 KHO:2013:136 and KHO:2010:53, which concern the right of the police to prohibit links to 
websites with child pornographic materials. The Supreme Administrative Court does not as such 
refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights when reasoning its decision, by 
the analysis of grounds for restricting the freedom of expression is detailed and the Supreme 
Administrative Court successfully combines different sources of law.
945 KHO:2012:55. In that case, the freedom of expression is referred to through the case law of the 
ECJ.
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scope of Articles 6, 8 and 10 subject to the present analysis, the Supreme Administrative 
Court’s database contains some useful decisions in addition to those published in the 
yearbook. In general, it appears that the Supreme Administrative Court has most often 
given precedential value to decisions in which the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been used as relevant a source of law, or as a strong internal element 
of argumentation, and in which the reasoning is detailed and profound.
As regards the other provisions referred to in the analysis of the discourse of the 
European Court of Human Rights, one may note that they have been subject to prec-
edents less often (less than 20 judgments). The decisions under Article 6 have most 
often concerned the questions of impartiality of judges and taking of evidence (hearing 
of parties), in the same way as in the Supreme Court, apart from the question of ne 
bis in idem referred to in the foregoing section. In addition, the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court has on occasion taken a position on the question of effective remedies. 
The discourse in the judgments under Article 6 are dealt with below to support the 
findings under Articles 8 and 10.
As regards the autonomous concepts analysed in section 4.2 above, there are only 
two decisions found under Article 5, paragraph 1, concerning the involuntary mental 
health care of a criminal suspect946 but in those decisions there was no need to apply 
the principle of autonomous meaning. As regards the autonomous concepts under 
Article 6, paragraph 1, a research into the case law of the Supreme Administrative 
Court indicates that the question of the scope of application of the concept of civil 
rights has been at dispute at the national level, although very seldom. In its decisions 
KHO:2008:25 (22.4.2008/882), KHO:2011:73 (23.8.2011/2262) and KHO:2012:4 
(24.1.2012/63), the Supreme Administrative Court took a position on the application 
of Article 6, paragraph 1, to civil servants. Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative 
Court has also been faced with the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, in relation 
to the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, in relation to 
taxation procedures. A corresponding interpretation was given to the concept by the 
Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment KHO:2011:41, as has been given by 
946 Decision 4.11.2002/2802, in which the reference is very brief, and decision KHO:2012:75, in 
which the assessment of deprivation of liberty is profound. In that decision, the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court assessed the criterion of lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty in the light 
of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, including the Court’s judgment in the 
case of X. v. Finland. However, among the non-published decisions, there are further examples 
of the application of Article 5 § 1 and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, including decision 10.6.2014/1858. Although there is only loose reference to the case 
law, it has been paid attention to. On occasion, the case law has been referred to by the lower 
administrative court, such as in respect of decision 29.10.2013/3409 and 11.9.2013/2836. In 
those cases, the Supreme Administrative Court did not change the outcome of the decision of 
the administrative court. The total number of cases under Article 5 in which the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights has been referred to, however, remains modest.
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the Supreme Court. Although only one of the relevant decisions concerning taxation 
procedure has been given precedential value, the Supreme Administrative Court has 
also applied the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in a number of 
other decisions, by referring to the principle of ne bis in idem but without elabo-
rating on its application in detail947. In the case KHO:2013:172 (31.10.2013/3424), 
the Supreme Administrative Court took a position on whether the withdrawal of a 
permit to carry firearms is a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6, para-
graph 1. The references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are 
rather brief but the decision is interesting in that the Supreme Administrative Court 
independently assessed the applicable national provisions of law in the light of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights and applied the criteria for the 
application of Article 6, paragraph 1, without identical prior precedents, by drawing 
conclusions from comparable situations in respect of other types of administrative 
authorizations, thus applying a relatively wide context of argumentation. Further, in 
decision KHO:2014:95 (6.6.2014/1790) the Supreme Administrative Court assessed 
the principle of ne bis in idem in respect of the withdrawal of a driver’s licence948. 
Considering the small number of cases in which the selected autonomous concepts 
have been assessed in national case law, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions 
as to whether they have imposed challenges in the adaptation to the transition of the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions. The evolution of those concepts in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights has inevitably lead to some transition 
of the legal culture also at the national level, but as regards the Finnish legal system, 
the evolution was already underway and the most essential precedents had already 
been given by the European Court of Human Rights at the moment of Finland’s 
accession to the Convention. It has had, however, some impact on the interpretation 
of administrative law by means of expanding it.
When assessing the development of the technique of referring to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights by the Supreme Administrative Court as a whole, 
one may note that there is already some degree of transition of the legal culture. That 
conclusion is based on the observation that there is an emerging number of decisions 
947 See e.g. 25.5.2012/1384 concerning temporary withdrawal of a driver’s licence based on repeated 
road traffic offences, in which it was found to be an administrative sanction not based on the 
same facts; 23.1.2013/0296, concerning taxation procedures, in which case the tax increase was 
not found to be based on the same procedure as the criminal law sanction; and 19.9.2011/2660 
concerning value-added tax and tax increase, in which case the procedures were also found to be 
parallel instead of one having lead to a final judgment, which is why the prohibition of ne bis in 
idem did not apply.
948 In decision 4.4.2014/1147, the Supreme Administrative Court merely referred to the reasoning 
of the lower administrative court which held that the withdrawal of an authorisation to serve 
alcoholic drinks was not considered a criminal law sanction, on the basis of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (with reference to the case of Tre Traktörer v. Sweden).
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in which the references are more numerous and more detailed than earlier, although the 
practice is not yet fully established. There are still examples of cases in which the refer-
ences are mechanic. This overall conclusion, nevertheless, indicates that the Supreme 
Administrative Court has undergone already a change in the general receptiveness to 
the European case law as a source of law, and also to the evolution of the standard 
of protection of fundamental rights in that case law. However, in order to assess how 
far reaching that change of the legal culture is, it is necessary to analyse the discourse 
of the Supreme Administrative Court in the relevant parts of judgments addressing 
the European case law. The discourse analysis also makes it possible to assess whether 
there exists a dialogue between the Supreme Administrative Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights in the field of administrative law.
4.5.2.3 Discourse of the Supreme Administrative Court
When comparing the judicial style of the Supreme Administrative Court with that 
of the European Court of Human Rights, the same observation is made as in respect 
of the Supreme Court: it is considerably different. The same observations concerning 
the structure of judgments also apply. Furthermore, the essential difference is also 
similar in that the language used in the application of sources of law and particularly 
case law differs from that of the European Court of Human Rights for the same 
reasons, i.e. the argumentation with regard to precedents is traditionally less detailed. 
In the same way as in the Supreme Court, however, the application of case law has 
considerably increased and the nature of references has gradually become more de-
tailed, despite that there are still examples of rather mechanic references. Thus, the 
approach of the Supreme Administrative Court to precedents appears to be flexible 
in the light of its case law. 
Apart from the old traditions of applying sources of law and reasoning court 
decisions, there may be various explanations to the rather frequent brief references 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, such as the nature of the 
administrative court procedure. Furthermore, due to the strong legalistic traditions of 
the Finnish judiciary, the discourse of the Supreme Administrative Court is limited 
particularly by the provisions of national legislation. On occasion, the references in the 
reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court are brief or it has not referred to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights for the reason that the lower court 
already has reasoned its decision, among others, by referring to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights or even to its case law949. This may be the case even where the 
Supreme Administrative Court changes the outcome of the decision. In such cases, 
the Supreme Administrative Court may have de facto applied the principles set out 
949 See e.g. KHO:2004:14/ 18.2.2004, concerning the disqualification of the president of a local 
committee in relation to the issue of an environmental authorisation.
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in the Convention provisions, but has indirectly referred to those principles without 
explicitly mentioning the relevant provisions and without using the European case law 
as an internal justification for its conclusions but has referred to a wider context in its 
discourse950. In such cases, the judicial reasoning behind the decision with regard to 
the facts of the case may be relatively detailed despite the absence of explicit references 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
However, the persistent brief references to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights do not necessarily mean that the courts have not weighed the different 
conflicting interests, but rather that not everything has been explicitly written out 
in the judgment. Despite this, the more recent judgments indicate more clearly the 
balancing of interests. The same development has been observed in the case law of 
the Supreme Court. However, in the same way as the Supreme Court, resorting to 
profound argumentation is still rather rare and the Supreme Administrative Court has 
often applied the European case law as an external observer, despite that the number 
of judgments with detailed references to the European case law has increased. The 
more detailed references represent examples of using that case law as stronger inter-
nal elements of argumentation. The cases with detailed references to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights often concern the right to private life. This 
could be explained rather by the large amount of cases concerning social welfare and 
immigration or asylum, than by the nature of those cases. However, even the nature 
of the cases may play a role for the reason that they typically involve the balancing 
of conflicting private and public interests, and interferences in the enjoyment of the 
right to private life are strictly restricted both under the Convention and the Finnish 
Constitution. In the same way as the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative 
Court rather often refers to the provisions of the Constitution together with those of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and nor is the practice consistent for the 
Supreme Administrative Court either. Furthermore, it is not that typical for questions 
of protection of fundamental or human rights to arise in other sectors of administrative 
law, although it is possible. Even if they appear, those cases do not appear that often 
in published precedents.
Thus, the nature of balancing of conflicting rights is rather similar to that in cases 
concerning freedom of expression as was explained in respect of decisions of the 
Supreme Court. Where interference is justified, it is important to provide sufficient 
reasons. The judicial style in decisions upholding the decision of a lower court does not 
950 See e.g. 24.1.2014/0175. The wider context consists, among others, of the reasoning of the lower 
administrative court, which pays attention to the strong relevance of family ties between the 
child born in wedlock and the parent, which may be overridden by the public interest only in 
exceptional circumstances. In its reasoning with reference to the facts of the case, the Supreme 
Administrative Court paid attention to both the nature of family ties and the nature and occur-
rence of the criminal offences.
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appear to significantly differ from other decisions. In those cases that have precedential 
value, the discourse is as detailed irrespective of whether the decision of the lower court 
or its outcome is changed. Thus, it appears that where the Supreme Administrative 
Court gives precedential value to a decision by publishing it, it more typically resorts 
to detailed balancing of different interests under the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, irrespective of the outcome of the decision.
For example, as regards decisions of precedential value involving the application 
of Protocol No. 7, Article 4, the Supreme Administrative Court appears to resort to 
more profound reasoning in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights when compared with lower courts, including the Court’s judgments in cases 
brought against Finland. In those decisions, the reasoning of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court is detailed, including the applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1, and the 
Supreme Administrative Court resorts to a relatively wide context of argumentation 
in the same way as the Supreme Court. In that context, the supreme jurisdictions also 
take into account the case law of each other as well as EU law and the case law of the 
ECJ. At the same time, those decisions represent an example of good receptiveness to 
the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights in that the national case 
law has been adapted to better conform to the principles set out in the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, the observations made in cases relating 
to application of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7 are largely the same as those made in respect of the Supreme Court.
As regards the application of Article 8, it appears that the Supreme Administrative 
Court has resorted to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights for the 
purposes of both justifying the need for restricting the enjoyment of rights under 
Article 8, in which cases it has often referred to the margin of appreciation of the 
State, and justifying the enforcement of rights under Article 8. In the latter cases, it 
has on occasion referred to the proportionality of restrictions, but not always. In the 
case of both types of restrictions, the references have in most cases been rather me-
chanic although the wording as such would give reason to conclude that the case law 
has been used as internal justifications for the legal opinion. In the case of mechanic 
references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is difficult to 
assess whether the Supreme Administrative Court has actually used the European 
case law as a tool for interpretation of law, or merely as a source of law. Thus, in the 
same way as in respect of the Supreme Court, the development of national case law 
would merit from somewhat more transparent argumentation, which would make 
the European case law to a larger extent an internal perspective of argumentation. 
However, one conclusion to be made is that the Supreme Administrative Court has 
not found it problematic to use it as a source of law, and in the same way as the Su-
preme Court, it has not drawn a distinction between national and international case 
law as regards the manner of application. In most cases, it seems that the case law of 
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the European Court of Human Rights is treated as a binding source of law and an 
internal element of argumentation951.
The fact that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has been given 
such a strong status from the beginning may explain why the use of that case law has 
increased in Finland more rapidly than in other legal systems, over a shorter period 
of time. The discourse of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, in general, also appear 
to be more detailed in the case references than that of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany and that of the Conseil d’Etat of France, for example. The Swed-
ish supreme jurisdictions appear to have come close to the Finnish ones as regards 
the development of discourse, but relatively recently. Another factor explaining the 
rather rapid development in Finland is the concurrent application of other Euro-
pean sources of law, particularly the law of the European Union, which supports 
the transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights. The Supreme 
Administrative Court has even referred to the principle of margin of appreciation 
which is traditionally foreign to the Finnish legal system. However, as has also been 
observed by Lavapuro, the principle of margin of appreciation is not necessarily a 
recommended principle of interpretation, considering that it is rather a means of 
determining the distribution of competence between the European Court of Human 
Rights and national courts. It may rather be tempting for national courts to refer to it 
as a justification for not assessing the circumstances of the case by means of a proper 
balancing of conflicting interests. Thus, it is not as such a very helpful principle of 
interpretation for the purpose of developing the technique of referring to the Court’s 
case law, unless it is carefully assessed particularly with the principle of proportion-
ality. An increased explicit use of the principle of proportionality, as well as explicit 
balancing of conflicting interests of the different parties, might help developing the 
technique of referring to the European case law. That principle has also increasingly 
been applied by the Supreme Administrative Court, which is as such not a dramatic 
development for the reason that it is an established principle in the Finnish legal 
system. In the same way as in the Supreme Court, it is also rare to apply principles 
of interpretation other than the principle of proportionality, except for the margin of 
951 See e.g. KHO:2007:67/ 5.10.2007, paragraph 26, in which the Supreme Administrative Court 
states that in the application of the national provisions, those of the European Convention on 
Human Rights must also be taken into account, and paragraph 27, in which it continues by 
stating that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights must be taken into account 
in that context. Thus, the Supreme Administrative Court uses a rather strong wording in con-
firming the binding nature of the Convention and the case law under it as sources of law. See 
also KHO:2008:44/12.6.2008. This conclusion is supported by an overview of the Supreme 
Administrative Court’s database. In most cases under Article 8, in which the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights has been referred to, it appears that it has been recognised as 
a binding source and has been treated as internal elements of argumentation. See e.g. decisions 
14.6.2011/1592 and 14.6.2011/1593, decision 29.2.2012/423.
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appreciation. The views presented by Lavapuro concerning the recommended approach 
to the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights by the national 
judiciary may be largely shared even for the purposes of developing argumentation. 
Apart from more frequent use of other principles of interpretation, a more frequent 
resorting to a wider context than mere provisions of law would together develop the 
court’s discourse and argumentation.
As observed in the foregoing, the rather mechanic references to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights do not necessarily mean that there would not be 
even profound assessment behind the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. 
In decision 19.9.2000/2302, which concerns the change of substitute care and family 
reunification, the reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is 
general without specifying the cases. Despite this, the wording of the decision clearly 
indicates that the Supreme Administrative Court has weighed conflicting interests 
in an effort to find a fair balance between those interests. This can be concluded from 
that the Supreme Administrative Court has extended the principles set out in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights to apply, apart from custody orders, to 
substitute care and changes made therein, by underlying the utmost importance of 
the best interests of the child, including the child’s own opinion. Although it is not 
explicitly stated, it reflects an evolutive approach to the application of that case law. 
Further, the Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
are used as equal legal bases for argumentation with national legislation. In decision 
KHO:2003:75, the Supreme Administrative Court refers to a particular judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights but the assessment made by it in the light 
of facts, applicable national law and the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights appears to constitute weighing of all conflicting interests. In this decision, 
the Supreme Administrative Court combines the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
Supreme Administrative Court uses that case law as a ground for restricting the right 
to private life under Article 8 in finding that the family life is not genuine and close 
enough to enjoy protection against interference. The weighing of conflicting interests 
in the light of European case law is less apparent in decision KHO:2004:121, in which 
the Supreme Administrative Court specifies one particular case but does not resort to 
profound argumentation and the principle of proportionality only appears indirectly 
from the Supreme Administrative Court’s discourse, although that particular case is 
used as an internal justification for the judgment. Thus, it remains somewhat unclear 
in which manner the principle of proportionality has been applied. However, the 
particular case of the European Court of Human Rights seems to have played a role 
in determining that the lower administrative court had not adequately assessed the 
possibility of less dramatic interference in the rights protected by Article 8. Also, the 
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discourse of the Supreme Administrative Court clearly indicates the binding nature 
of the Convention952, and apparently a balancing exercise has been done.
In decision 22.6.2010/1554, which concerns restrictions on the right of access, the 
references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are more detailed, 
although the style of argumentation does not significantly differ from the earlier 
decisions. The weighing of different interests is not in all respects transparent despite 
that the references to the European case law appear to be internal justifications953, and 
the principle of proportionality is reflected in the references to that case law in that 
the Supreme Administrative Court pays attention to the best interests of the child 
which may override those of the parents depending on the nature and seriousness 
of the situation. However, the same type of discourse is not used in the assessment 
of the facts of the case. Thus, also in this case, it is difficult to say whether that case 
law is merely a source of law or whether it has been used as a real tool for interpreta-
tion of law, although the binding nature of that case law is clearly stated. In decision 
KHO:2011:99, which also concerns child custody, the references to European case law 
are rather brief, but the weighing of conflicting interests is clearer in that the Supreme 
Administrative Court explicitly pays attention to the temporary nature of child custody 
and to the need to find an appropriate balance between the interests of the child and 
those of the parents, referring to the margin of appreciation but also indirectly to the 
principle of proportionality. Also in this decision particular weight has been given to 
the best interests of the child. In those cases concerning the protection of private life 
under Article 8, there thus appears to be a trend towards more detailed references to 
European case law but it seems, on the one hand, that in child custody cases such as 
the aforementioned one the assessment of the interests of the different parties can be 
clearer detected in the relatively detailed description of facts of the case than through 
a transparent argumentation in relation to the case law of the European Court of 
 
 
952 The Supreme Administrative Court gives special weight to international human rights conventions 
binding on Finland, which have been incorporated into the national legal system, in stating that 
they must be taken into account when deciding on child custody. In some decisions, the cases 
of the European Court of Human Rights are not specified. See e.g. decision 10.6.2005/1428, in 
which it is difficult to say in which manner that case law has been applied, although it appears 
to be recognised as a binding source of law.
953 The Supreme Administrative Court also refers to the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights issued against Finland in child welfare cases, R. v. Finland, judgment of 30 May 2006, 
and H.K. v. Finland, judgment of 26 September 2006. See also decisions 30.7.2010/1754 and 
30.7.2010/1755, referring to the same case law, in respect of which the same type of conclusions 
can be drawn.
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Human Rights954. On the other hand, one must remember that a detailed description 
of facts is also an example of transparent writing of judgments as it clearly tells the ad-
dressees of the judgment which particular circumstances have been taken into account. 
Although similar detailed descriptions are also used in immigration cases, it is easier 
to detect the trend towards more transparent argumentation related to European case 
law in those decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court that concern immigration. 
Such decisions also appear to include more often detailed references to the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, with more complex sentence structures and 
similar concepts and expressions with those of the European Court of Human Rights.
In both decisions on child custody and decisions issued in immigration cases, there 
appears a trend to invoke the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities 
more often than in the decisions of the Supreme Court, but it is perhaps even more 
frequent in immigration cases in which it is also more common to refer to the Euro-
pean case law otherwise in support of restricting rights under Article 8. In respect of 
immigration legislation, the European Court of Human Rights also typically affords 
national authorities a wide margin of appreciation. In decision 7.3.2006/500, the Su-
preme Administrative Court applies the principle according to which Article 8 does 
not guarantee immigrants the right to choose place of residence for the purpose of 
family life. However, the Supreme Administrative Court also refers to the principle 
of proportionality, taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances. Thus, 
although the margin of appreciation is referred to, the conflicting interests are balanced 
against one another. Despite that the reference to the European case law is rather brief, 
the decision clearly indicates that the case law has been used as a relatively strong 
internal element of argumentation in that it constitutes the decisive justification for 
the conclusions.
In a series of decisions relating to state security as a ground justifying interference 
in the protection of private life, the Supreme Administrative Court resorts already to 
a very detailed and profound assessment of acceptable grounds of interference under 
European case law concerning Article 8, combining it with the interpretation of sec-
tion 10 of the Finnish Constitution. Decisions KHO:2007:47, KHO:2007:48 and 
KHO:2007:49 include a detailed analysis of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights with reference to both the principle of proportionality and the margin 
of appreciation, including assessment of what can be considered adequate means of 
ensuring that the interference in the enjoyment of private life is not arbitrary but is 
subject to sufficient judicial control. Those decisions are from a perspective of discourse 
954 This conclusion is supported by an overview of the Supreme Administrative Court’s database. See 
e.g. decision 29.2.2012/423 and decision 22.6.2010/1554, which clearly reveals the application 
of the principle of proportionality in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, and decision, but the main conclusion is made under the provisions of the Child Welfare 
Act. 
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among the first interesting ones in the Supreme Administrative Court in that they 
constitute a clear turn towards using European case law as a strong internal perspective 
of argumentation. For example, in decision KHO:2007:47, the Supreme Administrative 
Court notes that Article 13 of the Convention requires an effective remedy before a 
national authority for everyone whose rights under Article 8 have been violated, and 
that the fact that the Finnish Security Intelligence Service had stored information 
relating to the applicant’s private life without the applicant having a possibility to 
have access to that information constituted an interference with his private life. The 
Supreme Administrative Court examined the criteria for whether such interference 
was necessary in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
in finding that despite the margin of appreciation in assessing what was necessary to 
protect national security the State had to ensure effective guarantees against abuse for 
example in the case of secret surveillance. The Supreme Administrative Court also as-
sessed in the light of the European case law the criteria for effective remedies, paying 
attention to that certain justified restrictions could also be placed on those remedies in 
case of national security but finding that the remedy could not be entirely denied. The 
Supreme Administrative Court derives its conclusions directly from the principles set 
out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, stating that the storing 
of information in a secret police register could be considered justified and necessary to 
protect national security in compliance with Article 8, but that it was also necessary to 
ensure legal protection by means of access to an impartial and objective judicial body 
that has the possibility to examine the lawfulness of the measures taken by the Security 
Intelligence Service with a possibility for both parties to be heard. The discourse of the 
Supreme Administrative Court in the two other cases is largely similar.
Also in decisions 23.12.2008/3443 (KHO:2008:90), 23.12.2008/3444 
(KHO:2008:91) and 23.12.2008/3445 the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights is used as a strong internal element of argumentation, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights is given equal importance with national immigration 
legislation as a source of law. The Supreme Administrative Court resorts to profound 
argumentation in weighing the interests of protecting private life against those of re-
stricting it under Article 3 of the Convention, seeking in explicit words to find a fair 
balance of protecting the conflicting rights. For example, in decision KHO:2008:90, 
concerning the prohibition of expulsion in violation of Article 3 and the grounds of 
restriction of the right to private life under Article 8, the Supreme Administrative 
Court seeks to find a fair balance in the conflicting interests of society and the private 
individual, stressing that any decision on expulsion must be based on strong reasons. 
Thus, in finding that the applicant could be expelled, the Supreme Administrative Court 
reasoned directly on the basis of the criteria set out in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, including the principle of proportionality. The Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court found that the family ties to Finland were not sufficiently strong 
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and there was not sufficient evidence of integration into Finnish society, in view of 
the repeated criminal offences and conditions in the receiving country, and that the 
grounds for expulsion were stronger. The principle of proportionality also appears from 
the Supreme Administrative Court’s statement that the assessment of the danger of 
inhuman treatment in the receiving country must be done in the light of those facts 
that were or should have been known by the State party, and there is a certain minimum 
level of treatment that may be considered inhuman. The assessment of that minimum 
level is proportionate, depending on various factors955. In immigration cases, it is also 
typical to resort to a relatively wide context of argumentation, including for example 
international materials relating to the situation in the country of origin of immigrants.
Despite the aforementioned rather detailed examples of argumentation in the light 
of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the analysed immigration 
cases show that detailed argumentation has still not become an established practice 
although references to the case law have become a frequent source of law. In a num-
ber of further decisions relating to immigration (9.10.2009/2457 – KHO: 2009:86, 
25.3.2010/613 – KHO:2010:17, 25.3.2010/614 – KHO:2010:18, 21.2.2012/343 and 
26.6.2012/1710 – KHO:2012:47), in which the Supreme Administrative Court has 
weighed the best interests of the child against other conflicting interests, the argu-
mentation is less transparent and it is again less clear in which manner the case law 
principles have been applied. It rather appears that the assessment of interests has 
been carried out by applying the principles set out in national immigration legislation. 
Thus, the application of the principle of proportionality rather appears from the word-
ing of the cited provisions of national law. It is stated in the Aliens Act, for example, 
that where the expulsion is based on the criminal activities of the person concerned, 
the seriousness of the criminal act and the harm, damage or danger caused for the 
public safety must be taken into account. That statement of law is again reflected in 
the assessment of the facts of decision 21.2.2012/343, for example, as the Supreme 
Administrative Court pays attention to the repeated nature of the criminal offences. 
In those decisions, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights appears to 
constitute an internal element of argumentation, but a rather weak one compared with 
the provisions of law. These findings are supported by a number of more recent decisions 
(22.5.2013/1747 – KHO:2013:97956, 24.1.2014/175 and 31.1.2014/240). In decision 
24.1.2014/175, for example, the Supreme Administrative Court does not elaborate 
on the principles set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
but refers to the reasoning of the lower administrative court in which it is done. The 
955 See decision 23.12.2008/3445.
956 In this decision, the Supreme Administrative Court carries out, however, a more profound 
analysis of the case law of the European Court of Justice, through the assessment of relevance 
of the Union nationality of a child. Despite this, the most relevant aspect was the assessment of 
the best interests of the child.
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Supreme Administrative Court, however, refers to the same principles in assessing the 
facts of the case. The principle of proportionality is reflected indirectly in the assessment 
of the nature of the criminal activities of the person concerned. On the other hand, in 
decision 6.2.2014/289 (KHO:2014:22) the weighing of conflicting interests can be 
detected rather easily in the Supreme Administrative Court’s argumentation, although 
the references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are rather brief. 
The references indicate the application of the margin of appreciation. Also decisions 
KHO:2014:50 and KHO:2014:51 include several references to the European case law, 
and the weighing of the conflicting interests can be easily seen from the discourse of 
the Supreme Administrative Court, and the principle of proportionality appears to 
have been applied to the concrete facts. 
On occasion, the protection of private life under Article 8 has been weighed against 
the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention in the light of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, although those cases have appeared rather 
late, around the same time when the Supreme Administrative Court has begun to resort 
to more detailed references in general957. The most relevant cases relating to the freedom 
of expression have been published. In decision 23.9.2009/2303 (KHO:2009:82), the 
argumentation is rather profound and the Supreme Administrative Court – on the 
basis of a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice – carefully applied the 
provisions of both the Finnish Constitution and the Convention on the protection 
of private life in relation to the freedom of expression, taking a position explicitly on 
the relationship between those two conflicting rights and using the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights as an additional internal context of discourse. The 
Supreme Administrative Court took into account the need to give a wide interpreta-
tion to the concept of journalism, in accordance with the interpretation given to it by 
the European Court of Justice, but also to the development of technology that made it 
possible to distribute private information more effectively than earlier and to the limited 
grounds of interference in the protection of private life. The Supreme Administrative 
Court also paid attention to whether the distribution of information was only carried 
out to satisfy the curiosity of the public, in which case the protection of the freedom 
of expression is narrower in scope. Thus, in an order to find a fair balance between 
the conflicting rights, the European Court of Justice argued that the protection of 
private life requires that derogations and limitations had to be strictly necessary. The 
argumentation is close to that of the European Court of Human Rights, although it 
 
957 It is interesting to note that the cases under Article 10 in the Supreme Administrative Court 
seem to have appeared around the same time when the Supreme Court has increasingly started 
to reason in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in freedom of 
expression cases.
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is done in the light of the case law of the European Court of Justice958, with relatively 
complex structures of discourse in the case references and using similar concepts and 
expressions as the European Court of Human Rights. The Supreme Administrative 
Court gave more weight to the protection of private life in finding that the open and 
public debate necessary in democratic society or the control of the use of public powers 
and the acceptable criticism did not require a possibility to treat individual personal 
data for the purposes of the Act on the use of freedom of expression (460/2003), 
and thus the freedom of expression did not require such a wide derogation from the 
protection of private life.
The cases concerning freedom of expression in the Supreme Administrative Court 
are not always that clearly related to the conflicting right to the protection of private 
life. In decision 2.9.2010/2023 (KHO:2010:53), the freedom of expression was assessed 
against the right to effective remedy, although the best interests of the child and the 
protection of private life can be observed as aspects to be taken into account, when the 
National Bureau of Investigation had prohibited access to websites containing child 
pornographic materials. However, the Supreme Administrative Court did not assess 
them in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights although 
it was invoked by the applicant, and instead of applying Article 10 of the Convention, 
the Supreme Administrative Court referred to section 12 of the Constitution although 
the National Bureau of Investigation had referred to the Convention provisions. In 
that decision, the Supreme Administrative Court assessed rather the right of the ap-
plicant to appeal against the decision of the National Bureau of Investigation, than 
the right of the National Bureau of Investigation to prohibit access to certain websites 
and thus restrict the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. In-
stead, in decision 3.3.2011/516 (KHO:2011:19), the Supreme Administrative Court 
referred to several cases of the European Court of Human Rights. The case concerned 
the right of civil servants to the freedom of expression in the form of a letter criticis-
ing university directors, assessing whether that criticism was justified and not purely 
based on selfish motives, and the Supreme Administrative Court assessed whether 
the interference in that right in the form of a written warning was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued and whether it was adequately justified in the light of the 
requirements of Article 10. The principle of proportionality appears from the wording 
958 The Supreme Administrative Court applied the case law of both European courts. See also 
decision 18.6.2012/1708 relating to similar questions. In another precedent, 6.7.2012/1896 
(KHO:2012:55), the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is given less relevance, 
mainly through the application of that of the European Court of Justice. Although the Supreme 
Administrative Court pays attention to the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Con-
vention, the decision concerns rather the publicity of wage-related information on civil servants. 
It nevertheless assesses the extent of the freedom of expression and its meaning in democratic 
society against the needs of protecting privacy.
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of the references to case law, and from the assessment of the criterion of whether the 
interference was necessary and proportionate. This decision of the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court includes a rather analytical approach to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, in which it analyses each criterion separately and provides 
thus relatively transparent reasoning, and the European case law is used as a strong 
internal element of argumentation.
A further example of decisions on f reedom of expression, 9.3.2011/588 
(KHO:2011:22), concerns alleged discrimination of the Roma as an ethnic group in a 
television programme and thus the relation between the freedom of the press and the 
prohibition of discrimination on ethnic grounds. Also in this decision, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, despite upholding the decision of the lower administrative court, 
resorts to a profound analysis of applicable legislation, including both the Constitution 
and relevant international conventions as well as EU legislation on discrimination, and 
assessment of the conflicting interests in the light of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights ap-
pears to be a relatively strong internal element of argumentation as the assessment 
of the conflicting interests is largely based directly on the cited judgments. However, 
in some respects the assessment is indirect in that neither the exceptional nature of 
restrictions on the freedom of expression nor the applied principles of interpretation 
are very clearly mentioned in the light of the case law. The Supreme Administrative 
Court rather assesses the scope of the prohibition of discrimination and that of the 
freedom of expression, in stating that the freedom of expression under Article 10 does 
not cover only positive aspects but also information that may be shocking or disturbing, 
and its conclusions are rather based on the assessment of the nature of the television 
programme, despite recognising the responsibilities relating to the use of the freedom 
of expression. In line with European case law, the Supreme Administrative Court 
observed that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary and by its 
inherent features of exaggeration and distortion of reality naturally aims to provoke 
and agitate. Thus, the Supreme Administrative Court did not find the programme to 
be discriminative in nature, and gave priority to the freedom of expression. In decision 
KHO:2014:52, the reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
is again rather weak959. Thus, given that the number of decisions on the freedom of 
expression in the Supreme Administrative Court is rather low, no definite conclusions 
can be made on the basis of them alone, but the aforementioned decisions support 
959 This case concerns the assessment of whether the Security Intelligence Service had the right to 
require prior authorisation for the attendance of one of its officials to the publication of a book 
in which criticism was presented against the Service, and whether such a requirement constituted 
a prohibited interference in the freedom of expression. The Supreme Administrative Court gave, 
however, more weight to the right of the Agency to restrict such activities of its officials as could 
give the wrong impression to the public.
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the overall conclusions made on the trends observed in the decisions of the Supreme 
Administrative Court as a whole.
In two cases, the Supreme Administrative Court has already shown preparedness 
to even more elaborate reasoning in the application of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In decision 3.1.2014/1 (KHO:2014:1) concerning the right 
of association under Article 11 (falling as such outside the scope of the present study) 
which, according to the Supreme Administrative Court, had to be also interpreted 
in the light of case law under Article 10, the Supreme Administrative Court resorts 
to an exceptionally profound assessment of different interests in the assessment of 
whether the right to register an association the purpose of which was to promote 
the legalisation of cannabis, although it is a prohibited narcotic substance, and the 
freedom of expression in those promoting activities were protected under Articles 
11 and 10 of the Convention. Thus, the balanced interests include the freedom of 
expression and freedom of association in the light of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which is used clearly as an internal justification for the legal 
opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court, including the acceptable grounds of 
interference and the need to precisely limit the acceptable restrictions, such as pressing 
social needs, and the need to ensure a functioning democratic society. The Supreme 
Administrative Court thus paid attention to the proportionate nature of the rights 
under Articles 10 and 11, as well as to the margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities in deciding on restrictions. Despite reference to the margin of apprecia-
tion, the outcome of assessment was positive for the applicant. This judgment of the 
Supreme Administrative Court is one of those rare cases of the Finnish judiciary 
in which the principle of evolutive interpretation has been applied. The Supreme 
Administrative Court assessed whether the legal situation in Finland had changed 
so essentially that it could change its interpretation of law from its earlier decision 
KHO 1994 A 8, taking particularly into account the development of the legal culture 
in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Supreme 
Administrative Court thus gave priority to the principle of human rights friendly 
interpretation and evolutive interpretation (expanded and more diverse debate on the 
policy of regulating alcohol and narcotic substances both in Finland and elsewhere 
in Europe) at the expense of legal certainty which is a strongly established principle 
in the Finnish legal culture. In this particular decision, the style of argumentation 
of the Supreme Administrative Court is exceptionally close to that of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In referring to exceptionally wide contextual argumentation, 
it thus shows that despite the different style of writing judgments originally, it is not 
impossible to adapt the style of argumentation closer to that of the European Court 
of Human Rights at the national level.
In an earlier case concerning the change of sex and personal identity code 
(KHO:2009:15), the Supreme Administrative Court has also used the case law of 
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the European Court of Human Rights as a strong internal element of discourse and 
resorted to an exceptionally profound analysis of that case law, including development 
of society in other European states, and the case constitutes another example of using 
European case law as a strong internal justification for the judgment and of resorting 
to an exceptionally wide context of argumentation. The Supreme Administrative Court 
assessed the possible existence of a positive obligation to ensure protection of Article 
8. It refers to several national constitutional provisions and Convention provisions, 
comparing the conflicting interests to be protected under those provisions, and assesses 
the applicability of the European case law to the situation at hand, including the prin-
ciple of proportionality and the question of whether the national legislative solution 
exceeds the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in the light of that case law. 
The Supreme Administrative Court even paid attention to that despite the margin of 
appreciation, it was dealing with questions that were not entirely at the discretion of 
national authorities. Thus, the application of the margin of appreciation is more analyti-
cal than in earlier cases, in the same way as in the aforementioned case KHO:2014:1. 
In these cases, the Supreme Administrative Court clearly assesses whether the national 
authorities have acted within their margin of appreciation when imposing restrictions 
on fundamental rights. It is interesting to note that upon the profound reasoning and 
analysis, the Supreme Administrative Court reached a conclusion that the applicant’s 
rights had not been violated to the extent that the applicant did not have the possibil-
ity to the enjoyment of the right to private life, considering the extent of the right to 
marriage and the existence of the right to register the re-assigned sex, which position 
was upheld even by the European Court of Human Rights960. Although in the light of 
the relatively few cases concerning the administrative law courts it is difficult to draw 
any definitive conclusions, this particular case demonstrates the usefulness of applying 
the European case law more profoundly than by merely stating the applicable cases. It 
shows how the national authorities have reached their conclusion, making the reason-
ing more transparent, which also facilitates the task of the European Court of Human 
Rights and contributes to a constructive dialogue between the Court and the national 
judiciary. It also has the potential of increasing the persuasiveness of judicial decisions.
In the same way as for the Supreme Court, the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights appears to have been mainly used as an internal element of argumenta-
tion in the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, but only in some of them 
it has been used as a strong internal justification for the conclusions. As regards judg-
ments given concerning the application and interpretation of Article 6, paragraph 1, 
of the Convention, a similar trend may be observed in the reasoning of the Supreme 
Administrative Court as in respect of the judgments relating to the protection of private 
life. The more detailed references to the case law of the European Court of Human 
960 Hämäläinen v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 16 July 2014 (Appl. No. 37359/09).
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Rights have appeared around the same time even in cases under Article 6. In the same 
way as in cases under Articles 8 and 10, a research into the database of the Supreme 
Administrative Court indicates that there are considerably more decisions in which 
Article 6 has been applied than the published cases. The non-published decisions also 
mainly relate to same types of questions as the published ones, including impartiality 
of judges and other principles of a fair trial. It appears, however, that the decisions with 
more profound argumentation with regard to the European case law have most often 
been published, whereas in other cases it is more usual to merely state the need to take 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law under it into account, 
in the same way as in respect of Articles 8 and 10, although there are also examples 
of decisions that have nearly identical argumentation with published decisions. In the 
non published decisions, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is also 
given the status of a binding source of law.
The first published cases concern the question of impartiality of proceedings. 
Although the Supreme Administrative Court analyses the subjective and objective 
criteria of impartiality of judges in the light of the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the same way as the Supreme Court, and the binding nature of 
that case law is clearly recognised, the references are rather mechanic961, although for 
example in decision KHO:1999:49 the criteria set out in the European case law are 
used directly as the basis for conclusions. In decision KHO:2006:77, the argumenta-
tion of the Supreme Administrative Court in respect of the criteria of impartiality is 
somewhat more detailed than in the earlier ones, and it refers also to the provisions of 
the Constitution and the statements in the Government proposal for new legislation 
on the disqualification of judges962. However, also in that decision the references to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights remain at general level, and it 
is not clear in which manner the criteria have been applied to the concrete facts of the 
case. The question of impartiality has appeared also in later decisions, such as decision 
23.8.2011/2345 concerning custody and public care of children, in which the question 
has been assessed in the light of the same criteria as in earlier precedents, although 
in less detail. The question of impartiality of judges has appeared rather often in non-
published decisions, in the light of the earlier precedents.
The first decisions under Article 6 of the Convention that include more profound 
assessment of the applicability of Article 6 and the requirements of a fair trial, in the 
light of the criteria set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are 
KHO:2007:67 and KHO:2007:68, concerning taxation procedures. Those cases relate 
to the need of an oral hearing in the case of taxation procedures. The need for an oral 
hearing has also been assessed in decision 31.12.2009/ 3782 in which the Supreme 
961 See judgments KHO:1999:49, KHO:2002:64, KHO:2002:91 and KHO:2003:24.
962 HE 78/2000 vp.
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Administrative Court does not, however, refer to individual judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights under Article 6, but reasons its conclusions on the basis of 
criteria under which there is need under national law and case law to arrange an oral 
hearing963. Nor is the application of principles of interpretation profound, despite that 
the case law is given the status of a binding source of law and an internal element of 
argumentation. Instead, in decision KHO:2007:67 the Supreme Administrative Court 
uses a rather strong wording when confirming the binding nature of that case law and 
uses the case law as a strong internal element of argumentation. However, the discourse 
of the Supreme Administrative Court does not clearly indicate which principles of 
interpretation of law it applies under that case law, although the criteria are relatively 
clearly applied to the concrete situation at hand when compared with earlier cases, 
including derogations. In decisions KHO:2008:25, KHO:2008:44 and KHO:2008:45 
and KHO:2010:27, relating to various aspects of effective legal remedies, the nature of 
argumentation of the Supreme Administrative is less detailed, despite that the binding 
nature of the European case law is clearly recognised964. It remains unclear in which 
manner the principles of interpretation have been applied and the conclusions appear 
to be rather based on the provisions of national legislation. The same applies to deci-
sion KHO:2011:73 concerning the publicity of official documents and access of parties 
to the proceedings to information. Despite the relatively detailed argumentation, the 
conclusions rely largely on national legislation.
In decision KHO:2011:39, concerning the prohibition on appeal against certain 
decisions concerning civil servants, the Supreme Administrative Court assesses the rel-
evance of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case 
law in the interpretation of section 21 of the Constitution. The decision also contains 
detailed references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, on the 
basis of which the Supreme Administrative Court takes a position on the grounds on 
which a dispute concerning civil servants may be excluded from the scope of application 
of Article 6, paragraph 1. When refusing appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court 
argues by means of applying the principle of proportionality that other legal remedies 
provide adequate protection and Article 6 and the European Union law do not provide 
963 As regards the criteria of restricting the right of access under Article 8, the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court refers to two individual judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, but 
even those references are rather mechanic. Also decisions 8.4.2008/ 744 and 14.12.2006/ 3445 
dealing with the need for an oral hearing include only brief references to the case law without 
citing individual cases.
964 In decision KHO:2008:25, however, the Supreme Administrative Court refers to both the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite not 
including detailed references to case law. The Supreme Administrative Court observes that the 
scope of Article 21 of the Constitution is wider than that of Article 6 of the Convention, thus 
expanding the scope of application of the principles set out in that case law and recognizing the 
evolutive interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6.
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further going rights. In that decision, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights constitutes a strong internal element of argumentation. The same applies to 
decision KHO:2011:41 on taxation procedures in which the argumentation becomes 
even more detailed. In that decision, the Supreme Administrative Court uses a similar 
type of argumentation as the Supreme Court with reference to Article 6, paragraph 
1, and Protocol No. 7, Article 4, the Constitution and the European Union law. The 
references to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are exceptionally 
detailed when compared with earlier ones, analysing the changing national practice 
and direct application of that case law to the concrete facts. The Supreme Administra-
tive Court argues that the case law of the European Court of Justice does not provide 
reason to a wider interpretation than that of the European Court of Human rights, 
thus resorting to comparison as a method of interpretation. However, despite the strong 
role given to the European case law, nor does this decision disclose which principles 
of interpretation have otherwise been applied, but the Supreme Administrative Court 
analyses the criteria of applicability of Article 6, paragraph 1. The question of ne bis 
in idem has also been assessed with regard to the prohibition of driving in relation to 
a road traffic offence965, in which case the Supreme Administrative Court reasoned 
in the light of the European case law that it was not considered a sanction based on 
the offence but was an administrative measure based on high speed, and thus based 
on different facts, and in relation to the withdrawal of an authorisation to possess 
weapons966. In the same way as in the Supreme Court, the assessment of the criteria 
under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is rather detailed, and the 
Supreme Administrative Court refers to the principle of autonomous interpretation. 
In decision KHO:2012:4 concerning the effective legal remedies of state civil servants, 
the conclusions of the Supreme Administrative Court appear to rely again more on the 
assessment of facts in the light of national legislation than on the principles set out in 
the European case law, but the Supreme Administrative Court applies the principle 
of human rights friendly interpretation of law and the application of the principle of 
effectiveness is apparent in that the court clearly points out that the Convention is 
not meant to guarantee rights that are theoretical and illusionary, but practical and 
effective, in finding that instituting action before a district court was not a sufficiently 
effective legal remedy, but that the civil servant concerned had the right to appeal 
before a disciplinary board. Thus, the European case law appears to play a role despite 
the stronger reliance on national law.
965 KHO:2014:95. The case concerned aggravated drunken driving and driving without a valid driver’s 
licence.
966 See KHO:2013:172. In that case, the Supreme Administrative Court argued that the withdrawal 
was not a sanction based on a criminal offence but a preventive measure the purpose of which 
was to ensure public safety.
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One may note that in the light of the aforementioned two judgments (KHO:2009:15 
and KHO:2014:1), in particular, the Supreme Administrative Court appears to be 
on the right track towards a more receptive approach to the argumentation of the 
European Court of Human Rights, although there may still be room for improve-
ment in national case law as a whole. Those two judgments also appear to be closer to 
the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights than others, including both 
those of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, 
the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court supports the conclusions made in 
the light of the case law of the Supreme Court. There appears to be a change of legal 
culture taking place as regards the application and interpretation of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, but there is still room for improvement as 
the quality of references to that case law is not that developed in all decisions of the 
Supreme Administrative Court in which such references have been made. In general, 
the Supreme Administrative Court does refer to the Convention provisions or the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in those cases where they are of 
relevance for deciding the case but the nature of the references vary from rather brief 
and mechanic ones to more elaborate ones in which the principles and criteria set 
out in the European case law are carefully assessed. However, the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court seems to have taken a step further towards more elaborate discourse 
and towards wider contextual argumentation which is closer to that of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and which would make it possible to enter into a real a 
dialogue between the national judiciary and the European Court of Human Rights. 
Further, in some respects it appears that the Supreme Administrative Court more 
easily than the Supreme Court resorts to a profound application of the principle of 
proportionality, which appears to be also the principle which is most often applied 
by the Supreme Court but the latter applies it more in an indirect manner. It could, 
on the one hand, be explained by the fact that the majority of cases in the Supreme 
Administrative Court relate to Article 8, which necessarily involves the balancing of 
the protection of private against the needs of democratic society to impose restric-
tions needed to protect the rights of others, but on the other hand, the same concerns 
cases under Article 10. Nevertheless, the cases in the Supreme Court under Article 
10 most often relate to the application of criminal law, and the provisions of criminal 
law necessarily have to be very precise and perhaps leave less room for value judg-
ments, whereas the protection of private life allows more subjective reasoning to fill 
in the rationality gap.
As regards both Article 8 and Article 10, one may detect some degree of transition 
of the legal culture of protecting those rights. In both situations, it appears that the 
supreme jurisdictions have, through national case law, come closer to the approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights in asserting that the restrictions imposed must 
be strictly justified under law. The observations made in respect of judgments relating 
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to Article 6, paragraph 1, support the general findings concerning the development of 
the application of European case law. The trends appear to be similar irrespective of 
whether the application of one of the three articles is analysed in isolation or whether 
all the three are analysed as a whole. One may note that the transition in both supreme 
jurisdictions has been rather rapid over a relatively short period of time. That may be 
explained by the fact that in both jurisdictions, the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been afforded the status of a binding source of law, together with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, from the beginning despite that the Finnish 
legal system traditionally has relied on legislation. In that respect, the change in the legal 
culture should not be overemphasised. Instead, the technique of referring to that case 
law has changed over a period of ten years considerably and particularly some of the 
most recent judgments appear to mark a turn towards a dialogue. Thus, there appears 
to be an ongoing transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights taking 
place. That change can be detected through the foregoing micro-comparison through 
discourse analysis, which indicates that in some decisions the European case law has 
been used as a stronger internal element of argumentation than in others. In those 
cases in which it has been given a particularly strong role, the style of reasoning is more 
elaborate and there are visible signs of transition even within the fragments of discourse. 
When compared with the earliest decisions with references to European case law, the 
more recent ones include more complex sentence structures, concepts, expressions and 
principles of interpretation borrowed from that case law967, and more elaborate applica-
tion of principles of interpretation, particularly the principle of proportionality. Such 
signs can be detected in judgments under all the analysed provisions, Articles 6, 8 and 
10, and the fact that these have gradually increased demonstrate a changing discourse. 
It is argued in this thesis that the changes in discourse reflect a strengthened protection 
of fundamental rights and human rights. Given the variation that there still is in the 
discourse of the supreme jurisdictions, one cannot exclude the fact that the stronger 
cases are largely dependent on the persons handling them. Nevertheless, the change 
in Finland is rapid and the numbers of national judgments with detailed reasoning 
by applying directly the human rights provisions have increased considerably, when 
compared with the period of time twenty years ago. Therefore, it is further argued that 
the transition in discourse reflects a transition of the legal culture. However, it seems 
that signs of constructive dialogue can mainly be seen in such decisions that involve the 
application of the principle of evolutive interpretation and a particularly wide context 
of argumentation. Those two linked together appear to bring the argumentation closer 
967 Those include, in particular, autonomous concepts, expressions such as ”necessary in demo-
cratic society”, ”pressing social need”, ”proportionate to the aim pursued” and ” whether the 
interference was justified”, as well as the principles of ”evolutive interpretation” and ”margin of 
appreciation”.
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to that of the European Court of Human Rights, and they also show preparedness of 
the Supreme Administrative Court towards a stronger transition of the legal culture 
of protecting fundamental rights and human rights.
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5.  Conclusions and recommendations
5.1  Three phases of transition of the legal culture –  
existence of a third phase
The present study is based on an assertion that there are three phases of transition of the 
legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights, where the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights constitutes the key elements. The first phase of transition of the legal culture 
of States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights emerged through 
the drafting of the Convention under the influence of negotiating States having their 
own traditions and cultures which have been brought under a common umbrella. 
Finland did not take part in the negotiations, but became part of this phase of transi-
tion later upon acceding to the Convention in 1990. A large part of the Convention 
was not foreign to the Finnish legal system, given that Finland had already earlier 
implemented the United Nations instruments protecting the same types of rights and 
some fundamental rights were included in the Finnish Constitution. However, the 
European Convention on Human Rights can be said to have influenced the drafting 
of the new provisions of the Constitution on fundamental rights considerably, although 
the debate had been launched somewhat earlier. The international developments in 
the field of protection of human rights created pressure to amend the rather outdated 
fundamental rights provisions. Furthermore, the implementation of the Convention 
together with the revised constitutional provisions increased the direct applicability 
of international human rights and thus strengthened their protection. That is part of 
the transition of the legal culture.
The second phase of transition of the legal culture of the States parties to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights has taken place through the development of the 
language of the Convention in a wide sense, i.e. under the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The States parties have transferred, by the Convention provi-
sions, competence to interpret the Convention rights to this unique control mechanism, 
and the European Court of Human Rights has since its early years gradually developed 
the meaning given to those rights rather independently. That transition has not, however, 
taken place in isolation but the Court has treated the Convention as a living instrument, 
deriving also influence from the legal traditions of the States parties. Thus, the second 
phase of transition of the legal culture is based on some form of interaction between 
different legal cultures through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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The underlying presumption that the transition of the meaning of the Convention 
provisions through the Court’s discourse has taken place rather independently, and 
has changed considerably from what the negotiating States perhaps had originally in 
mind, has been confirmed through the analysis of the Court’s case law and principles 
of interpretation of the Convention.
The third and last phase of transition of the legal culture is, however, what takes place 
at the national level, under the impact of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on national case law and legal culture. First, the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights has the potential of affecting national legislation through its recom-
mendations and, second, it has an impact on the way in which national jurisdictions 
use and interpret of sources of law. The real meaning of the Convention provisions and 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights are determined by the extent to 
which they are de facto applied by the national courts. The underlying presumption of 
this thesis is that the third phase of transition of the national legal culture in Finland 
did not begin with the implementation of the Convention, but somewhat later as the 
national courts began to apply the European case law as a real source of law. However, 
the core argument is that the third phase of transition of the legal culture has begun 
as the Finnish supreme jurisdictions have begun to apply the European case law, and it 
has had a significant impact on the interpretation of sources of law by national courts, 
but it is far from having ended.
However, the transition of the legal culture is affected by various elements. It would 
be incorrect to assert that the transition of the Finnish legal culture in national courts 
under the impact of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has taken 
place independently. Instead, there is an interplay of other factors, particularly other 
international human rights conventions, internationalisation of the legal system in 
general, Finland’s membership of the European Union together with EU legislation and 
the case law of the European Court of Justice, necessary changes in national legislation 
and changes in the general attitude towards international sources of law i.e. increased 
receptiveness to their application and interpretation. In the following, an assessment 
is made of the interplay of those factors, in an effort to analyse the type of impact that 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has had compared with other 
factors. That analysis is made on the basis of the discourse of the national supreme 
jurisdictions, as analysed in the foregoing chapter. In the present thesis, the transition 
of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights has only been 
addressed insofar as the legal framework and case law are concerned. Further research 
would be called for to draw conclusions of the change of legal culture as a whole. The 
transition of the legal culture cannot be complete unless the meaning of fundamental 
rights and human rights is understood by society as a whole, including all government 
authorities and legislative bodies.
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5.1.1  First phase of transition of the legal culture
The assessment of the first phase of transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights begins with an analysis of the constitutional 
traditions of four selected legal systems and elements that they share with the text of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. When analysing the developments of 
national constitutions in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Sweden, and the 
international developments of protecting human rights, one may note that the impact 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the draft International Covenant 
on Human Rights on the European Convention on Human Rights has been the 
greatest. Those two international instruments were used as a model, and a large part 
of the provisions in the draft European Convention on Human Rights were directly 
taken from those instruments although they were subject to modifications based on 
amendments proposed by the negotiating States. The modifications made appear 
from the preparatory work of the Convention. Nor should the impact of individual 
states be over-emphasised for the reason that a large part was based on international 
examples, and compromises were made as regards the final result for the reason that 
the signing of the Convention was found urgent. Nevertheless, some elements can be 
traced back to the historical developments of constitutional rights in certain States 
parties, particularly France.
Although written constitutional texts appeared first in the English-speaking world, 
their contents in respect of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
were rather limited, serving mainly the purpose of guaranteeing the classical basic liber-
ties of the man. Although the English delegation contributed actively to the discussions 
leading to the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights, there are no 
significant English constitutional traditions that would have shaped the text. However, 
at least some indirect influence of those traditions can be identified, particularly as 
regards the fair trial elements – partly through the influence of the United States legal 
system, despite that the most clearly American elements were dropped out from the 
draft Convention. Also, the ideas of the equality and freedoms of thought, association 
and expression as well as the protection of property are all shared values of European 
states, which are visible in the text of the Convention. The French constitutional ideas 
share more in common with those of the modern ideas of protecting human rights, and 
are visible in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Human Rights as well as in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The French constitutional traditions have also played a role in the form of indirect influ-
ence through other legal systems in general. Particularly the provisions of the French 
Declaration of Human Rights and citizen’s rights which can be considered equivalents 
of modern ones on the prohibition of forced labour, the liberty and security of person, 
the principle of no punishment without law, the freedom of religion and thought, the 
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freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly, are among the elements visible in 
the text of the Convention. Some indirect influence of the French system can also be 
said to exist through the participation of other States that have followed the French 
traditions. For example, the constitutions of France and Belgium have considerable 
similarities. One can assert that the impact of the French constitutional traditions on 
the development of the text of the Convention has been considerably stronger than 
those of the other selected States subject to the present study, although not all ele-
ments of the French Declaration ended up in the Convention. One must remember, 
however, to also put the influence exercised by the English and French constitutional 
traditions and legal systems in a historical context. Both the United Kingdom and 
France were among the victors of World War II, and it can be said that in a way, the 
contents of the first international human rights instruments that emerged as a result 
of the atrocities of the war were imposed by the victors of war. A specific international 
convention was also drafted shortly after the European Convention on Human Rights 
to prevent genocide. Thus, the historical developments and particularly the aggravated 
crimes against humanity and other human rights violations during the war made it 
necessary to prevent them from happening again, which is reflected in the texts of 
all the relevant instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights.
There are, however, some elements in common between the Convention and the 
constitutional traditions of the other selected legal systems. When looking at the text 
of the Convention, one may see clear similarities with the text of the German Basic 
Law, which was drafted during the same era. This can also be explained with the role 
played by the victors of war. The purpose of both was also to prevent the atrocities of 
the World War II from taking place again in Europe and the German actions during 
the war were a particular reason for it. The German history between the world wars 
is clearly the strongest reason explaining the efforts to reinforce the protection of hu-
man rights through international and European instruments but despite that, even 
the German constitutional traditions have had some influence as part of the common 
traditions and values. Those values were left aside during the wars. As was explained 
in the foregoing, the existing provisions of the German Basic Law are largely based 
on the basic rights provisions of the Weimar Constitution, which in turn had derived 
influence from the French and American constitutional traditions. Thus, the German 
constitutional traditions can also be said to have an indirect influence on the contents 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, as part of the common western con-
stitutional ideas of protecting human rights. Those ideas have been brought elsewhere 
in Europe through religion and legal science. Furthermore, the German traditions of 
protecting property rights are visible in the first additional protocol to the Convention. 
When looked at from a historical perspective, the Swedish constitutional traditions 
do not appear to have that much in common with the Convention, but the Swedish 
legal system can rather be seen as a great beneficiary of the impact of the Convention. 
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Although there are no significant constitutional traditions in Sweden to the same 
extent as there are in France and Germany, the Swedish ideas and values are visible 
in the text of the Convention. The strongest Nordic traditions include the freedom of 
expression and the relatively strong protection of property rights, which tradition is 
also shared with Germany. Finland shares those traditions. 
In connection with the presentation of the first phase of transition of the legal cul-
ture, it is concluded that the Finnish legal system has undergone significant changes 
as a result of the accession of Finland to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
although the legal culture began to evolve already somewhat earlier upon ratification 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Some of the legislative changes 
were made in connection with the ratification of the Convention, but it was necessary 
to introduce reservations to the Convention upon ratification. Thus, the transition of 
the legal culture as regards the technical requirements in the form of legislation took 
place gradually, continuing after the ratification. Also, it was considered necessary 
to also amend the constitutional law provisions on fundamental rights. That reform 
entered into force a few years after ratification of the Convention, making most of 
the provisions consistent with those of the Convention. As the provisions of the con-
stitution on fundamental rights were harmonised with those of international human 
rights conventions, the language of international human rights law and that of the 
Constitution have considerable similarities, which has facilitated the transition. The 
fact that the Convention has explicitly been made part of the applicable law in Finland 
means that the first and foremost criterion for the receptiveness of the judiciary to the 
Convention principles and to the case law and argumentation of the European Court 
of Human Rights is met. The receptiveness of national jurisdictions to the new source 
of law was made stronger by the reform of the constitutional law provisions, and that 
impact was further strengthened through an overall reform of the Constitution a few 
years later. The debate on the need to reform the Constitution began, however, already 
prior to accession to the Convention, and the national courts had already gradually 
started to apply other international human rights conventions. At the outset, the Finn-
ish legal system should, particularly upon the amendments, be well prepared to adapt 
itself to the new European elements. It also appears that the first phase of transition 
of the legal culture of protecting human rights in the Finnish legal system through 
the European Convention on Human Rights took place without major problems in 
the general attitudes, although the change has taken place gradually. At any rate, the 
simultaneous amendments to the Constitution removed potential problems of conflict 
with the Convention.
Although the traditional division into dualistic and monistic legal systems, as regards 
their relationship with international treaties, may be somewhat outdated, it does play 
a role in the direct applicability and real meaning of human rights provisions. When 
5. Conclusions and recommendations | 359
compared with the English, French and Swedish legal systems, particularly the adoption 
of the practice of applying the European Convention on Human Rights has perhaps 
been even easier, considering also the relatively short period of time over which it has 
taken place. It is explained by the fact that the text of the Convention was made as such 
applicable law in Finland according to the implementing practice applied in Finland, 
whereas those three legal systems did not enact specific implementing legislation. The 
French legal system does not require one, but France ratified the Convention relatively 
late. It appears that the French courts have, even after ratification, been somewhat 
slower in applying the Convention and the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights as sources of law. A deep-going analysis is, however, made difficult by the 
relatively brief style of judgments. In the absence of implementing legislation, the 
English and Swedish courts were for a long time reluctant to apply the provisions of 
the Convention as such. In the light of the study of source materials, it appears that 
there has been a clear change upon the enactment of specific legislation providing for 
the status of the Convention in the legal system. As a result, the English and Swedish 
supreme jurisdictions have gradually begun to apply the Convention and the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights as sources of law.
As regards the German legal system, the situation is different as the enactment of 
the new Basic Law with profound provisions on fundamental rights took place at the 
same time with the drafting of the Convention, and the reasons behind both two are 
largely the same. Thus, the impact of the Convention on the German legal system is 
different in nature. In the light of source materials, it can be concluded that the Ger-
man judiciary, particularly the Federal Constitutional Court, has been more active in 
applying the provisions of the national Constitution which in fact provides for at least 
an equivalent level of protection. The German legal system has faced less problems 
with compliance with the Convention, despite that the Federal Constitutional Court 
has begun to refer to the Convention and European case law in more detailed and 
refined manner relatively late. The Convention system has had an impact in Germany 
too, but it is particularly as a result of the second phase of transition of the legal culture 
i.e. through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has also 
resulted in legislative amendments. Thus, strong constitutional traditions also play an 
important role in the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights.
In Finland, it appears that the national jurisdictions have been faster in adopting 
themselves to the practice of applying international human rights conventions as a 
source of law. That in turn means that the transition of the legal culture upon accession 
to international human rights conventions in Finland is clearer than in the selected 
other legal systems. The first phase of transition of the legal culture was slowed down 
to some extent by the reservation made by Finland upon acceding to the Convention. 
However, even the pressure to withdraw the reservation by means of amending proce-
dural laws was an element influencing the transition of the legal culture of protecting 
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human rights and fundamental rights. The impact of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the first phase of transition of the legal system can be considered 
dramatic, although the overall impact must be analysed in the light of all three phases 
of transition. Particularly impact of the Convention on the new constitutional provi-
sions on fundamental rights and the amendments made to procedural laws, together 
with the impact of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights finding 
a violation under Article 6 of the Convention, have resulted in a considerable change 
not only in formal protection but also in the general attitudes. In that respect, there is 
some overlap between the first and second phases of transition of the legal culture, as 
it is a continuous process from the accession to the Convention with reservations and 
amendments to national legislation to the enactment of a national remedy for delayed 
proceedings. Also, an explicit statement by the Constitutional Law Committee of 
Parliament to the effect that the provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted 
in a similar manner with those of the Convention is a strong element which has af-
fected the national case law.
Thus, the first phase of transition of the legal culture is rather an interplay of the 
impact of the constitutional provisions and that of the Convention provisions. Those 
are difficult to assess separately, even in the light of national case law. It has also been an 
ongoing process starting with the influence of the United Nations instruments on the 
protection of human rights, which had already been applied for a while before Finland’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the constitutional 
rights reform and the European Convention increased the direct applicability of fun-
damental rights and human rights provisions in the national judiciary. Therefore, the 
impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on the first phase of transition 
of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights can be said to 
be considerably stronger than that of other international instruments. Its impact is even 
stronger during the second and third phases of transition. The transition of the legal 
culture is not complete through amending the national legislation, but the Convention 
and other human rights instruments also need to be applied by the courts, including 
the European case law relating to them. The application of the European Convention 
and the relevant case law has increased gradually, and through the second and third 
phases of transition of the legal culture, it has become more detailed and refined.
5.1.2  Second phase of transition of the legal culture
The underlying presumption concerning the second phase of transition of the legal 
culture is confirmed through the analysis of the discourse of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The meaning of the Convention provisions has developed consider-
ably through the Court’s case law. In general, the European Court of Human Rights 
has developed the meaning of the provisions independently, although the influence 
of common legal traditions of the States parties to the Convention is visible in the 
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Court’s discourse. The Court does not always consistently refer to the common tradi-
tions, e.g. by means of comparison, but that influence is evident through the numer-
ous complaints against States parties, which lead to a judgment finding a violation 
of the Convention provisions. Judgments finding a violation have perhaps stronger 
influence on the development of the Convention provisions in that they potentially 
have a stronger impact on the way in which national jurisdictions apply and interpret 
the Convention, as the national authorities are forced to react on the judgment. That 
does not, however, remove the impact that positive judgments have in that they reaf-
firm the intended meaning or provide guidance for unclear situations. Apart from 
the impact of the complaints on the case law and discourse of the European Court of 
Human Rights, there are other factors affecting them, particularly the principles of 
interpretation of international conventions and various sources of law. Furthermore, 
the style of the Court’s discourse derives elements from the legal traditions and legal 
systems that its judges represent. The personal capacities and backgrounds of judges 
play a role in the shaping of the case law. Further, it is determined by the national 
cases that the applicants take to the Court. The fact that the transition of legal culture 
in some groups of cases is stronger than in others is largely dependent on the nature 
of national problems behind them.
As regards the further development of the Convention provisions under the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, one may note that there is a particu-
larly extensive case law from the English and French legal systems, when compared 
with Germany, Sweden and Finland. Given the considerably larger numbers of cases 
from the United Kingdom and France, the judgments issued against those countries 
can be said to have a stronger impact on the development of the interpretation of the 
Convention. In some fields, particularly in the field of liberty and security of person 
and freedom of expression, the English cases have served as important precedents. 
The French case law has significantly contributed to the development of case law 
under other articles, particularly to the development of the concept of civil rights 
under Article 6, paragraph 1. The Finnish legal system can be said to have benefited 
from that case law as the same types of problems would have probably been faced 
without the major issues being resolved in prior case law. Although individual appli-
cations address particular problems of interference with the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention, the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights may later have 
more general importance at the national level. The number of cases from Germany 
and Sweden has been relatively low, although there have been repetitive cases under 
some of the Convention provisions. The Swedish cases have, in particular, contributed 
to the development of the concept of civil rights under Article 6, paragraph 1, and the 
German cases to the concepts of the security and liberty of person under Article 5, 
paragraph 1. Compared with the United Kingdom and France, the share of Finnish 
cases is not huge, but it is large compared with Sweden and Germany, taking into ac-
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count the size of the population. Nevertheless, there are some significant judgments 
issued by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights that can be 
classified among important precedents contributing to the interpretation, particularly 
under Articles 8 and 10, but also Article 6. 
As regards the principles of interpretation, one may note that the general principles 
of interpretation of treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties have 
clearly been the basis for the interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Of those principles, the Court 
has consistently relied on both the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty and the objective and purpose of the Convention. The latter, that entails the 
idea of effective implementation of the rights included in the Convention, is a prin-
ciple of interpretation that has perhaps been the most clearly visible one in the case 
law, and in practice affects all interpretation of the Convention. However, as regards 
the development of the meaning of individual Convention rights, certain principles 
of interpretation can be identified as having stronger influence than others. Various 
signs of change of the legal culture of protecting fundamental rights and human rights 
can be identified in the Court’s discourse through the application of those principles, 
but the clearest ones relate to the principles of effective interpretation, dynamic or 
evolutive interpretation and autonomous interpretation. The principle of effectiveness 
is closely related to that of positive obligations. Those principles are, in the light of the 
Court’s discourse, clearly among those that provide most potential for strengthening 
the protection of fundamental rights and human rights to the extent of constituting 
a transition of legal culture. This is visible e.g. in cases concerning the obligation of 
national authorities to protect the health and life through active measures and in cases 
concerning the obligation of the state to actively prevent torture.
As regards the principles of effectiveness and dynamic interpretation, the Court 
has consistently held that the Convention is a living instrument that needs to be in-
terpreted according to the prevailing conditions at a given moment. The influence of 
those principles can be clearly identified in the interpretation of such provisions that 
typically involve the balancing of conflicting interests or protection of morals in chang-
ing society. The analysis of the Court’s discourse also indicates that in such cases, the 
Court often explicitly refers to the Convention as a living instrument and this may be 
done by means of different linguistic expressions. The development of interpretation can 
be seen particularly clearly in the case law concerning the rights of homosexuals and 
transsexuals, which has been analysed as an example in the present thesis. On the one 
hand, the Court has afforded the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation 
to decide on the issue of marriage. On the other hand, the Court has gone rather far 
in recognising the changes in society, particularly through development of medicine 
and technology, and the need to ensure the enjoyment of private and family life. The 
principle of dynamic or evolutive interpretation is perhaps the clearest example of 
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principles of interpretation that provide signs of transition of the legal culture, given 
the explicit discourse of the Court. Such signs consist of various linguistic expressions. 
The principle of dynamic or evolutive interpretation has had a rather modest impact 
on the Finnish legal system, although in a number of rather recent cases the supreme 
jurisdictions have referred to it, and have recognised the fact that there is a transition 
of legal situation.
However, in most cases the Finnish judiciary appears to apply the principle of 
proportionality which is not as such a very good example of situations involving a 
transition of legal culture. Instead, the legal protection appears to be rather static. In 
the case of the freedom of expression, which has proved to be particularly challenging 
for the Finnish legal system, the balancing of conflicting interests appears to be made 
particularly clearly through the application of the principle of proportionality both in 
European case law and in the national case law. This perhaps explains why the argumen-
tation of the national supreme jurisdictions has begun to develop particularly through 
this group of cases. Although at the European level the principle of proportionality 
alone does not as such very clearly indicate transition of the legal culture, an increasing 
resorting to that principle with careful balancing of interests is already a sign of such 
change at the national level. Apart from freedom of expression cases, other examples 
could be identified from a Finnish perspective where the protection of rights has been 
strengthened as a result of case law, particularly child protection cases. Those cases 
also represent situations where the national courts frequently resort to the balancing 
of conflicting interests. The elements of discourse of the European Court of Human 
Rights appear to be rather consistent when applying the principle of proportionality, 
which perhaps makes it easier for national courts to adopt.
Signs of changes of the legal culture may also be attached to individual terms or 
concepts used in the text of the Convention. In that case, the transition of the legal 
culture is rather seen through the expanding scope of application of the relevant 
provision. The specific concepts analysed include those of civil rights and obligations 
and criminal charge under Article 6, paragraph 1, and those of liberty and security of 
person and lawful arrest or detention under Article 5, paragraph 1. The meaning of 
those concepts has developed through the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights to a considerable extent, and the Court has given them an autonomous meaning 
that differs considerably from what the States parties have perhaps had in mind. The 
expression “autonomous meaning” is also as such an element indicating transition of the 
legal culture. It is also concluded that particularly those provisions and concepts have 
the potential of creating challenges for the national legal systems in the application 
and interpretation of the Convention. It was also concluded that problems have been 
faced with one or more of them by all the five States covered by the present study. As 
regards the Finnish legal systems, the concept of civil rights would have potentially 
been problematic, but due to the late moment of accession to the Convention it was 
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known and bigger problems were avoided. However, challenges have been later faced 
with the concept of criminal charge. This is a problem shared by all the five legal 
systems compared in the present thesis, albeit for differing reasons. In Finland, those 
problems have been related particularly to the possibility of imposing both a criminal 
law sanction and an administrative sanction under taxation procedures. Otherwise, no 
major conceptual problems have emerged although in the light of the problems faced 
by the other legal systems, there could have been potential for similar problems in the 
application of Article 5. Furthermore, not all the principles and rules of interpretation 
developed by the Court are traditionally part of national legal systems or cultures but 
have introduced new perspectives of argumentation. The overall conclusion is that 
the influence of the principles of interpretation of treaties on the development of the 
Court’s discourse and the transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental 
rights and human rights has been strong, perhaps equally strong as that of the problems 
presented in the complaints against States parties. It is clearly stronger than that of 
national traditions on the interpretation of law.
As regards the influence of national legal languages and judicial styles, one may note 
that the judicial style of the European Court of Human Rights has also developed 
rather independently from the national ones. The influence of the French judicial style 
could be clearly seen in the first judgments issued by the European Court of Human 
Rights for the reason that they were written in French, but after a few judgments the 
Court’s style of writing judgments changed dramatically as English gradually became 
the most usual original language of judgments. The style of those subsequent judgments 
cannot be clearly attached to a single legal system, but the Court has rather developed 
its own style of discourse. The system of precedents applied by the European Court 
of Human Rights is perhaps closer to the Nordic and German ones than the English 
one despite that at the national level, precedents as a source of law have the strong-
est status in the English one. Thus, such systems have potentially a stronger impact 
particularly on the use of sources of law and principles of interpretation by the Court, 
also as regards the elements limiting discourse.
The English legal language naturally affects the discourse of the European Court 
of Human Rights by both setting limits as regards the structure and terminology, but 
also giving considerable liberties that are peculiar to the flexible nature of the English 
legal language when compared with the French one. However, the structure of Eng-
lish judgments is considerably different from that of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Further, given that the European Convention on Human Rights is authentic 
in both English and French, the Court has on occasion resorted to comparing them 
and thereby both languages have an impact on the interpretation of the Convention. 
Also, both legal languages have common roots in the Latin language, before they 
started to develop to their own directions. The influence of Roman law and Latin can 
also be seen in the German, Swedish and Finnish legal systems, which is a unifying 
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factor that facilitates the receptiveness to the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. It is also a factor facilitating a uniform interpretation of key concepts 
used in the Convention and case law. However, receptiveness to judicial discourse is 
largely affected by how convincing it is. The more convincing supporting arguments 
a court uses, the better is its reception by the audience. One may note that in general, 
the discourse of the European Court of Human Rights is convincing, and its case law 
has had a significant impact in various legal systems.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its impact on national 
jurisdictions, particularly where the case law has lead to legislative amendments, gives 
reason to conclude that a significant transition of the legal culture has taken place 
through the interpretation of law. Finland’s accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights has lead to significant changes in procedural laws and thus to a rather 
dramatic change also in the culture of protecting fair trial rights. Upon those amend-
ments, it was possible to withdraw the original reservations made to the Convention. 
Although there were still no violations found against Finland in cases concerning 
impartiality of judges, the Supreme Court paid attention to the lack of national provi-
sions of law on that particular aspect of a fair trial. It has been recognised, in particular, 
in early judgments of the Supreme Court in which the Supreme Court assessed the 
question of impartiality directly in the light of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The need to provide for explicit rules in national legislation, to sup-
plement the provisions of the Constitution, was addressed by means of enacting new 
provisions of law968. It was recognised in the proposal to amend the legislation that 
the outdated provisions of law had become even more problematic for the reason that 
the impartiality of judges is assessed also in the light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and it was therefore necessary to amend them to make them better 
meet present-day requirements.
Thus, the transition of the legal culture in the form of strengthened fair trial rights has 
continued on the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and in 
the Finnish legal system that transition began already in the light of case law concerning 
other States parties to the Convention. Furthermore, the repeated judgments against 
Finland concerning delays in national proceedings finally resulted in the enactment 
of a national act providing for remedies in the case of delays969. That enactment is to a 
968 HE 78/2000 vp. The Government proposal takes into account the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
detail in the assessment of the situation.
969 HE 233/2008 vp, introducing amendments to four acts of Parliament, including the Administra-
tive Court Proceedings Act, and enacting a new Act on remedying delays in court proceedings. 
The latter applies to civil and criminal law proceedings. The case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, particularly the repeated judgments against Finland were extensively taken into 
account.
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large extent based on the recommendation of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which repeatedly has held that the remedies existing under the earlier provisions, e.g. 
in the form of less strict punishment in criminal proceedings, were not sufficient. The 
purpose of the amendments was to provide more effective legal remedies in the form 
of a possibility to require urgent handling or financial compensation, without having 
to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The new remedies were also 
considered to have a preventive effect against delays in proceedings.
There are also other legislative changes based on the recommendations of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, as referred to in section 4.3 above, although some of 
them are partly due to the recommendations made by other international monitoring 
bodies. In particular, the need to carry out an overall revision of the Child Welfare 
Act was assessed largely on the basis of international developments, including the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention 
on Human Rights as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Further, a later amendment to mental health legislation is directly based on a judg-
ment against Finland. Furthermore, the more recent debate on the need to amend the 
Marriage Act, which finally lead to a proposal by the people to that effect, as well as 
an ongoing debate on the rights of transsexuals are an example of how the constant 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights may have an indirect effect on the 
transition of the legal culture despite that the Court does not impose any changes. In 
that particular case, also other changes in society and general attitudes have played a 
role, although it is difficult to assess the proportion of the population in favour. Thus, 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights may have both a direct and 
indirect effect on the national legal culture, on occasion together with other interna-
tional developments or development of society in general. In Finland, the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights has had a significant impact on strengthened 
protection of fundamental rights and human rights, and thus a transition of the legal 
culture under that case law clearly exists. As regards the transition of the legal culture 
through national case law, however, it has continued through the third phase of transi-
tion suggested in this thesis.
5.1.3  Third phase of transition of the legal culture
Apart from changes to legislation on the recommendation of the European Court of 
Human Rights, it is possible that the national supreme jurisdictions issue recommenda-
tions to Parliament on amending national legislation in the light of the requirements 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such a change has taken place as 
regards the aforementioned question of impartiality of judges in the light of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 of the Convention. 
Both supreme jurisdictions have drawn attention to the lack of national provisions in 
the Constitution or other legislation, when applying directly the criteria set out in the 
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case law of the European Court of Human Rights. That provides the clearest example 
of a change in the legal culture of protecting fair trial rights on the basis of national 
case law, but it is also an established practice that the supreme jurisdictions provide 
opinions on legislative proposals affecting the judiciary. However, strongest impact 
of the Convention through national judgments is the effects of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the discourse of supreme jurisdictions, i.e. on 
the way in which they apply and interpret the said case law, as well as further impact 
on the protection of the rights of the parties to individual cases.
For the change in the discourse of the national judiciary it is necessary that the na-
tional courts are receptive to the argumentation and discourse of the European Court 
of Human Rights. It is concluded that such receptiveness requires, first, that certain 
general criteria are met. As technical criteria, it is necessary that the Convention is 
part of applicable law at the national level and that the courts are able to apply the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law. It is also neces-
sary that international case law is accepted as a binding source of law in the national 
legal system, for the national courts to be receptive to the language of the Convention, 
particularly for the reason that the European Court of Human Rights has constantly 
developed the meaning of the Convention provisions through the case law. However, 
those two criteria alone are not sufficient, but an efficient application of that case law 
also involves understanding and application of the principles of interpretation used 
by the Court and a general acceptance and internalisation of the Court’s discourse, 
i.e. it must be found authoritative and legitimate. For that to be possible, the language 
used in the Convention and the Court’s case law should not be too foreign, including 
individual concepts, and a certain degree of convincingness is also required from the 
Court’s discourse. Further, even knowledge and skills of individual judges play a role.
It is concluded that the Finnish legal system meets the basic criteria for receiv-
ing and applying international law, including the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Particularly the practice of separately implementing international treaties by 
means of making them directly applicable national law allows the national judiciary 
to apply the Convention provisions in the same way as any other provisions of law. 
Until the 1990s, there were hardly any traditions of applying fundamental rights and 
human rights provisions directly by the courts, but their direct applicability has been 
improved by the reform of the provisions of the Constitution. Although the Finnish 
legal system has traditionally relied on written legislation, it appears from the analysis 
of judgments of the supreme jurisdictions that there are no problems of using prec-
edents as a source of law. The supreme jurisdictions also refer to their own prior case 
law and it appears that in case there is reason to deviate from prior precedents, the 
reasons are explicitly stated. It is worth noting that in strictly formal terms, the judg-
ments of the supreme jurisdictions have not traditionally been considered precedents 
in the same sense as in the English legal system. However, the supreme jurisdictions 
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have themselves given certain judgments precedential value, in which case they have 
been published. Even today, not all judgments are published. As regards judgments 
relating to the application of the case law of European Court of Human Rights, the 
Supreme Court tends to publish most judgments. The situation is somewhat different 
in the Supreme Administrative Court for the reason that the numbers of judgments 
are greater. Despite that, it seems that those judgments that include new types of a 
legal situation or exceptionally profound reasoning with regard to the European case 
law are published.
Traditionally, the references to case law have been rather brief and mechanical, 
and the conclusions of judgments are still rather based on the provisions of national 
legislation more often than on prior case law. This strongly legalistic tradition is still 
visible in the majority of judgments with references to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and also explains that the numbers of such references began 
to increase gradually. The same concerns explicit references to the principles of inter-
pretation applied by the European Court of Human Rights in national judgments. It 
seems that at the same time as the references have increased in number, the national 
supreme jurisdictions have also in general begun to apply a wider range of sources of 
law, including international and national sources as well as principles of interpreta-
tion of law. Today the supreme jurisdictions and also lower ones apply both national 
case law and international case law. However, the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights has clearly been given the status of a binding source of law as of 
the first cases with such references and it is often applied on an equal standing with 
legislation. This might be a factor behind the relatively rapid change of legal culture 
within a rather short time when compared with the other states covered by the present 
thesis, although a general acceptance of the legitimacy of that case law also plays a role. 
However, the application of international case law has become frequent and systematic 
rather late, which is explained by the aforementioned fact that the Finnish judiciary 
has not traditionally applied a practice of precedents. Thus, although the possibility of 
applying case law as a source of law has existed for a long time, international case law 
has become a systematic source of law rather recently. That appears to coincide with 
the emergence of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of 
law. Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court frequently apply it means that in principle, the national judiciary is receptive 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In general, the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights has been recognised as a binding source of law 
and consequently as a clearly internal element of argumentation from the beginning.
There is no major difference in the technique of referring to national precedents 
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. That recognition may be 
the strongest reason explaining why the change in the transition of the legal culture 
with regard to the European case law has taken place more rapidly in Finland than in 
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the selected other legal systems. One should also note that the system of precedents 
applied by the Finnish judiciary is a flexible one, which makes it easier to adapt to new 
sources of law. The general attitude of judges and their knowledge of the Convention 
and the relevant case law play a role. As regards the nature of the references to the 
European case law in general, one may note that there is a rather dramatic change 
between the early rather mechanic references and the more recent references with 
detailed argumentation. A more detailed, profound and refined argumentation is as 
such a sign of a changing legal culture. However, as given account of in section 4.1.3, 
the Court’s discourse i.e. the surface structure of law does not necessarily tell the whole 
truth about the prevailing conditions of society, as it may change more rapidly than 
the deep structures of law i.e. the common ideas of how the law should be understood. 
In such a case, there is still no profound change in the legal culture. On occasion, the 
contrary is possible and the general ideas change more rapidly than the discourse 
(legislation or judgments). That entails a risk that the judgments are not foreseeable.
Furthermore, there do not appear any major conceptual problems with regard to 
the Convention provisions despite the autonomous meaning given to certain concepts 
used in the text of the Convention. The Finnish supreme jurisdictions have on occasion 
referred to those concepts in their judgments, although it is rather rare. In those cases 
where they have been referred to, the judgments include rather detailed references to 
criteria set out in the European case law. However, the autonomous concepts of the 
Convention have had an impact on the Finnish legal culture particularly as regards 
the protection of the rights of civil servants and the principle of ne bis in idem in 
taxation procedures. That transition of culture is still ongoing. The transition started 
already on the basis of prior case law upon accession to the Convention, particularly 
concerning Sweden, which was taken into account even in the Finnish translation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which helped avoid major problems with 
the civil law sphere of Article 6, paragraph 1. However, new concepts have emerged in 
the judgments of the supreme jurisdictions as a result of the European case law, such 
as “autonomous meaning”.
The overall presumption concerning the third phase of transition of the legal cul-
ture can be confirmed. The transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental 
rights and human rights in the Finnish legal system has continued through the ap-
plication of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights by the national 
supreme jurisdictions. The references made by the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have 
considerably increased in the past ten years and in the past few years they have become 
more detailed and analytical. However, it is still not an established practice to system-
atically resort to profound analysis of the case law, but there are still a large number or 
recent examples of rather mechanical or brief references. Furthermore, it is extremely 
rare to resort to such analytical discourse that would be close to that of the European 
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Court of Human Rights. Thus, one may conclude that as regards the recognition of 
the European case law as a binding source of law, the change in the national practice 
was almost immediate. Therefore, the overall impact of that case law on the change of 
legal culture should not be overemphasised in view of the simultaneous appearance of 
more constant references to the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, and 
considering the impact of other forms of internationalisation of the legal system. It 
also seems that the development of the application of the case law of the European 
Court of Justice has taken place at the same time, and approximately at the same pace. 
That case law, particularly due to the system of binding preliminary rulings, can be 
assessed to have had an important impact on the general attitudes of the judiciary. 
Instead, although the more profound change has taken place more slowly, the increasing 
analytical references to the case law and preparedness to develop national application 
and interpretation of law through the discourse of the European Court of Human 
Rights represents an ongoing transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental 
rights and human rights.
The impact of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and perhaps the 
most influential element of transition of the legal culture, is the change it has brought 
about in the general attitudes of the judiciary towards European sources of law and 
international sources in general. The increased references to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and other international sources of law, imposes requirements 
on the judges themselves, including knowledge and profound understanding of those 
sources of law and personal skills to apply them, as well as willingness to apply them in a 
detailed manner. The purpose of this study has also been to carry out the analysis further 
by examining in which way the national courts apply the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, to assess how receptive they are in reality to the argumentation of 
the European Court of Human Rights and to see at what stage of transition of the legal 
culture the Finnish judiciary is. Mere implementation and application is not sufficient 
for a complete transition. It is concluded in the foregoing that not all the principles of 
interpretation of the Convention used by the European Court of Human Rights are 
traditionally used by the Finnish judiciary. However, principles of law are an acceptable 
source of law and they have gradually become an inherent part of the interpretation 
of law. Particularly the principle of proportionality, which is widely established in the 
Nordic legal systems, and the so-called principle of human rights friendly interpretation 
of law have made it possible for the national courts to adapt to the new elements in 
the legal system. However, as has been pointed out by numerous scholars, some of the 
principles or rules of interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, particu-
larly the principle of autonomous meaning and the principle of evolutive or dynamic 
interpretation have the potential of posing problems for national legal systems. An 
analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court 
proves that this is the case also in the Finnish legal system.
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The Finnish supreme jurisdictions do not frequently resort to applying the principles 
of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights, and when they do so, 
the relevant principle is most often the principle of proportionality which has existed 
in the Finnish legal system already earlier. Thus, the traditional methods of interpreta-
tion as explained in section 4.1.4.2 are still visible in the way the supreme jurisdictions 
apply the law. Particularly the Supreme Administrative Court occasionally applies the 
principle of proportionality, often together with the margin of appreciation which is 
foreign to most States parties to the Convention, but it is not necessarily a recommended 
practice or it should be applied with caution. There are extremely rare examples of cases 
where other principles of interpretation have been explicitly applied. Even the principle 
of object and purpose of the Convention (teleological interpretation) is only seldom, 
even less often than in Sweden. Furthermore, the approach of the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions to the application of the principles of interpretation of the Convention 
is, generally, not very analytical. Thus, one conclusion drawn in the present thesis is 
that there is still improvement to be made in the receptiveness of the national judiciary 
to the argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights. There are no major 
problems of interpretation identified in the judgments of the supreme jurisdictions, 
but rather numerous violations found against Finland in cases concerning the freedom 
of expression prove that the balancing of conflicting interests under the Convention 
provisions has been a challenge for national jurisdictions. Those judgments finding a 
violation have had a rather strong impact on the culture of protecting the freedom of 
expression, and in the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court a more detailed 
balancing of interests can already be seen. Those judgments appear to have also had a 
deeper going impact on the nature of discourse of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. 
Equally detailed judgments can be found in other situations involving the protection 
of private life particularly in the Supreme Administrative Court. A similar trend can 
be seen in the decisions of the two supreme jurisdictions on the application of the 
principle of ne bis in idem in the field of taxation procedures. Although the judgments 
against Finland under that principle are rare, they appear to have been well received and 
they have also been applied ex analogi to other similar situations in other fields of law.
Another observation to support the aforementioned conclusion is that the discourse 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, when compared with that of the European Court 
of Human Rights, shows that the treatment of the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights is also in other respects less detailed and analytical. It is sometimes 
difficult to see in which way it has been applied to the concrete situation at hand. Thus, 
an overall conclusion is that the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court have clearly improved their receptiveness to the argumentation of the European 
Court of Human Rights through more frequent resorting to detailed references, but 
the approach to the analysis of that case law is not very transparent. Therefore, it is 
often difficult to state whether it is applied in a coherent manner and by using the 
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same principles as are used by the European Court of Human Rights. The assertion 
made in this thesis is that the national courts are receptive, and there do not appear to 
be major problems in the application of the case law, but the national judiciary is still 
in the process of internalising the style of argumentation or discourse of the European 
Court of Human Rights. It is, nevertheless, found authoritative and legitimate. Thus, 
the third phase of transition of the legal culture in respect of the principles of inter-
pretation of the Convention is still pending.
5.2  Impact of methods of interpretation
Insofar as the methods of interpretation of law are concerned, it is observed in the 
foregoing that all the five legal systems place considerable weight on the principle of 
literal interpretation. The literal interpretation is also clearly visible in the judgments 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions. This has the potential of creating problems 
with regard to the receptiveness of the national judiciary to the argumentation of the 
European Court of Human Rights. It also makes the transition of the legal culture 
of protecting human rights and fundamental rights slower. Alexy & Dreier identify 
three types of problems related to literal interpretation. First, the interplay of technical 
and colloquial terminology may provide problems. Technical terminology means the 
legal language itself, and its use is strictest in the field of criminal law. The use of col-
loquial terminology refers to the ordinary meaning of words. It is interesting to note 
that particular emphasis on the ordinary meaning of words is given in the interpreta-
tion of fundamental rights provisions. Second, Alexy & Dreier recognise that there 
may be a difference in meaning of terms between their use at the time of enactment 
and their use at the moment of interpretation. Third, the most important problem of 
semiotic interpretation is the problem of recognising the limits of the meaning of a 
word.970 Kommers correctly points out that the plain meaning of words is not the same 
as literal meaning.971 When compared with the European Court of Human Rights, 
it may be noted that it has also repeatedly referred to the ordinary meaning of words, 
but as explained in the foregoing, the text of the Convention contains several terms 
in respect of which it does not apply but the Court has given them an autonomous 
meaning. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights treats the Convention 
as a living instrument, which makes the rather static literal interpretation in some 
situations problematic.
Thus, the receptiveness of a national legal system to the argumentation of the 
European Court of Human Rights would appear to be dependent on to what extent 
970 For details, see Alexy & Dreier 1991 (1998), p. 83-85.
971 Kommers 2006, p. 197.
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the national legal system is prepared to apply a flexible approach and a teleological, 
or dynamic, interpretation of law. However, it is observed in section 4.1.4.3 that the 
courts appear to have a more open approach to the interpretation of constitutional 
rights. Despite the differences between private law systems and common law systems 
given account of in the foregoing, they both seem to recognise the possibility of tele-
ological interpretation of law i.e. the principle of the object and purpose of the law in 
cases of unclear wording, albeit the techniques may be different. In the classical sense, 
the purpose of the teleological interpretation of law is to establish the intention of the 
legislator972. In the case of treaties, it is the intention of the drafters i.e. the parties to 
the treaty that is to be established. The European Court of Human Rights has gone 
further than this. Furthermore, as explained by Peczenik among others, according to 
the classical view on the methods of interpretation of law, teleological interpretation 
would be the last resort when no answer is given by the priority methods973. This 
approach seems to have been the dominating one in the Finnish and Swedish legal 
systems as well as in the French one, whereas the German legal system has been more 
receptive to teleological interpretation. According to Strömholm, the traditionally 
careful approach to the teleological method is largely due to the awareness of risks that 
subjective and value-oriented methods entail as in the absence of clear provisions, some 
subjective interpretation is always called for. Thus, priority is rather given to additional 
means of interpretation such as preparatory work.974 The careful approach with regard 
to teleological interpretation may also be explained by the difficulties that there are 
involved in the establishment of the purpose of the provision of law, as explained in 
more detail by Klami. For that reason, in the view of Klami, for example precedents 
would constitute stronger grounds for a certain decision.975
In the case of the European Court of Human Rights, to the contrary, the object 
and purpose of the Convention has been perhaps the most influential principle of 
interpretation and it is particularly the teleological method that appears to play the 
most significant role, although the Court constantly refers back to its own prior case 
law. The European Court of Human Rights techniques that essentially differ from 
those of common law traditions as well as from the Scandinavian ones, despite that 
the English legal system has long traditions of applying case law which is a feature in 
common with the European Court of Human Rights. The other legal systems covered 
by the present study have only gradually increased the application of case law as a source 
of law. The application of the teleological method by the European Court of Human 
Rights imposes a challenge to the judiciaries of the States parties to the Convention. 
972 Peczenik 1990, p. 201.
973 Peczenik 1990, p. 202. See also Strömholm 1996, p. 493, who refers to the teleological method 
as a radical one.
974 For details, see Strömholm 1996, p. 493-497.
975 Klami 1997, p. 153 and 154.
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The German Constitutional Court appears to have applied the most flexible approach 
to the principles of interpretation of law of the national supreme jurisdictions, and it 
may be one factor together with the effective national control mechanism in explain-
ing the relatively low number of violations found against Germany by the European 
Court of Human Rights. Both the English and Finnish courts, particularly the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Finland, appear to be moving 
towards a more flexible approach to the methods of interpretation. In both cases, it 
appears to be the presence of international elements and particularly the European 
Convention on Human Rights that has paved the way for such a move, although the 
process in the two legal systems has been different. In Finland, there is no clear impact 
on situations other than those parts of judgments where the Convention or European 
case law is referred to. In judgments involving the interpretation of fundamental rights 
and human rights, even examples of changing style of discourse may be detected. Thus, 
the present national case law is in a way a combination of traditional legalistic style 
and more open style of constitutional rights argumentation.
The receptiveness of a legal system to the argumentation of the Court is also de-
pendent on factors other than the application of similar methods of interpretation of 
law, going deeper in the roots of the legal system. The discourse analysis of judgments 
of the supreme jurisdictions of Finland indicates, in the same way as in the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, that there are clearer signs of a transition of 
the legal culture in those judgments where they resort to the principle of evolutive or 
dynamic interpretation instead of the principle of proportionality. In other judgments, 
it is rather difficult to identify except over a longer period of time. They rather represent 
a clear demonstration of understanding of the provisions of the Convention as they 
are interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights at the moment of issuing 
the national judgment. Thus, it is concluded that there is an ongoing transition of the 
legal culture but given the limited number of advanced application of a larger variety of 
principles of interpretation, it is still not extremely profound despite the rather strong 
status given to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This could also 
be partly explained by the personal capacities of individual judges.
5.3  Impact of other factors
The aim of the present study has been, first, to assess how the meaning of the provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights has been expanded under the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. Second, the impact of the Convention 
and the legal argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights on the legal 
culture and legal discourse of the supreme jurisdictions in Finland has been assessed, 
as well as its conceptualisation and understanding by the judiciary, in comparison 
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with certain reference states. It has been found that the impact is dramatic and there 
is an ongoing transition of the legal culture, albeit it is still not extremely profound if 
looked at in the light of judicial discourse. However, this has not happened in isolation 
from the other elements. Another factor to be kept in mind, apart from the legal and 
linguistic factors, is the impact of changes in political and social views. The present 
study is limited to the assessment of a transition of the legal culture of protecting 
fundamental rights and human rights within the legal framework and case law, but the 
legal culture as a whole is a wider concept. For the transition of a legal culture to be 
complete, it is necessary that the importance and real meaning of fundamental rights 
and human rights is understood and recognised by other actors of society. Those include, 
in particular, the government authorities applying the provisions of the Constitution 
and international conventions as well as the legislature and the government bodies 
preparing the legislation and official policies. Correct understanding of fundamental 
rights and human rights does not mean that interferences are not possible, but that in 
the preparation of measures constituting lawful interferences, a proper balancing of 
conflicting interests must be made by the authorities responsible for those measures. 
The measures of authorities are, however, subject to judicial control. Thus, the deci-
sions of the supreme jurisdictions reflect the nature of problems that there are in the 
understanding of fundamental rights and human rights in society. Therefore, it is of 
importance to pay attention to the quality of judicial control to ensure legal remedies 
in those situations where the interferences with the enjoyment of protection of rights 
have exceeded the acceptable limits.
For the transition in the human rights culture in Finland to be possible in the 
first place, it was necessary that certain changes took place in political settings – the 
development started as early as with Finland’s accession to the European Free Trade 
Area and European Economic Area. Those changes in the general political atmos-
phere lead to the Europeanisation of the legal system in general, which has been made 
even stronger by Finland’s accession to the European Union. This took place only a 
few years later after the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It is observed in the foregoing that the application of EU law and of the case law of 
the European Court of Justice as sources of law has appeared approximately at the 
same time with the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. When assessing the way in which they have been 
applied, and in some judgments both have been applied simultaneously even to the 
same legal questions, it is difficult to say which case law has had the strongest impact 
on the legal culture in general. In the light of judicial discourse, there is some degree 
of interplay identifiable in the application of the case law of the two European courts. 
However, both sets of case law have relevance in different fields of law, and as regards 
the culture of protecting fundamental rights, it is the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights that has had a dramatic impact despite that there are provisions 
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on fundamental rights in EU law and the European Court of Justice has developed 
their interpretation through its own case law too. Thus, the assertion made by most 
scholars, in all States covered by the present study, is that the increased application 
of the case law of the European Court of Justice goes hand in hand with that of the 
European Court of Human Rights. That is confirmed by the case law of the Finnish 
judiciary. However, in some respects the impact of the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights can be said to be more impressive, although the law of the European 
Union and the case law of the European Court of Justice are more binding with their 
supranational aspects. There are some challenges ahead as the European Union accedes 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, as the two bodies of case law need to 
be reconciled and it is necessary for national courts to be receptive to the argumenta-
tion of both European Courts. However, both European courts already refer to the 
case law of one another, and both sets of case law are applied by the Finnish supreme 
jurisdictions without major problems. That should make the adaptation easier. It is 
presumed that there will be a further transition of legal culture at the European level, 
which should further affect the national one at least to some extent. Some further 
analysis is presented in the following section.
The increased application of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
is also linked with the increased attention paid to human rights and fundamental 
rights in general, including ratification of a good number of international human 
rights instruments and the reform of the Constitution. The transition of the legal 
culture began already with the ratification and increased application of those instru-
ments and particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Already prior to Finland’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
there were examples of references to that Covenant. However, the references to the 
human rights instruments have become more numerous along with the emergence of 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law. Despite that, 
considering that the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution were reformed 
a few years after accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, and that 
the application of the European case law began to increase around that time, it would 
on the one hand be correct to assert that the new constitutional provisions on funda-
mental rights, providing for the same types of rights largely with the same contents, 
gave a strong impetus to apply the European case law. The decisions of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions clearly indicate that it is an established practice to refer to both 
the Constitution and the Convention. On the other hand, the references to human 
rights and fundamental rights provisions have become more detailed and analytical 
in general through the increased references to the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. One must also bear in mind that certain legislative changes have been 
made in Finland to make the protection of fundamental rights stronger, particularly 
as regards fair trial rights.
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It is also necessary for the transition of the legal culture of fundamental rights 
and human rights that there is a change in the general attitudes towards the rules 
and principles set out in the relevant instruments. Considering the developments in 
Finland, one may conclude that there has been a general willingness to apply the new 
sources of law, including the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and a 
dramatic change in that respect has also taken place. However, critical views have on 
occasion been presented and one could also assert that to some extent, that change 
has been forced by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights finding a 
violation of a certain Convention provision. In some fields of law, that is partly true. As 
regards the violations found under Article 6, paragraph 1, concerning fair trial rights 
and particularly those concerning length of proceedings, important legislative changes 
have been forced. However, the problems were recognised and in order to be able to 
accede to the Convention more rapidly, reservations were entered to avoid unnecessary 
violations. Reservations are naturally not recommended, and it proved to be necessary 
to make further legislative changes. Despite that, fair trial rights under the Conven-
tion were also recognised in some situations even without explicit national provisions 
of law and a number of national precedents exist in which the Convention provisions 
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have been applied directly. 
Also, studies made earlier concerning the problems under Article 6 indicate that the 
problems were rather systemic and hard to avoid. Thus, it would be more correct to 
conclude that the change in the general attitude is only partly a result of judgments 
finding a violation against Finland. The judgments have perhaps urged the judiciary 
to exercise a more careful scrutiny over the measures of national authorities, and one 
could say that the increased references to the fundamental rights and human rights 
provisions and the European case law mean that the problems are identified at an ear-
lier stage. The fact that they are identified requires greater awareness in general, which 
has been achieved by means of training, as well as willingness among policy-makers 
to ensure the necessary legal framework for redressing violations at the national level.
When assessing changes in the general attitude towards the protection of funda-
mental rights and human rights, it is more useful to study those cases that represent 
the balancing of conflicting rights against one another, such as decisions concerning 
the interpretation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. In the field of the rights of 
transsexuals and homosexuals, in particular, it should be observed that although the 
Supreme Administrative Court successfully applied and interpreted certain principles 
set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, there appears to have 
been an ongoing change in the legal culture of protecting those rights. That can be 
explained by both an emerging change of the legal culture in other countries and an 
ongoing change in the moral conceptions of the general public. This is demonstrated 
by the recently adopted amendment to the Marriage Act as explained in the forego-
ing. Thus, even recently adopted judgments do not always reflect the changing moral 
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conceptions of society as the supreme jurisdictions are bound by the law, including 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. However, once adopted, the 
new provisions of law may later result in different interpretations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, through the principle of evolutive interpretation of 
conflicting or competing rights. This may even have an impact on later case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
It appears in the light of the analysis of case law that the supreme jurisdictions have 
constantly strengthened the judicial control of violations of fundamental rights and 
human rights, by means of developing the balancing of interests and argumentation. 
The discourse analysis made of such national decisions as involve a profound balancing 
of conflicting rights indicates that there is a deeper going change in the willingness 
to develop the protection of fundamental rights through national case law. Thus, it is 
a sign of receptiveness to dynamic or evolutive interpretation of law compared with 
the traditional reliance on literal interpretation of law and the understanding of law 
as it is written in legislation. So far, the supreme jurisdictions have been criticised for 
not having had recourse to principles of interpretation other than the principle of 
proportionality. That observation is correct as such, but I would assert that even in 
the absence of explicit references to those principles of interpretation, the increased 
analytical references have brought about a change in the attitude to a more flexible ap-
proach to the development of human rights law. That change of attitude may lead to an 
increasing number of references to even other principles of interpretation, particularly 
the principle of dynamic or evolutive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness. 
There are already signs of such references, although those cases still remain isolated 
ones. The few cases, however, demonstrated already preparedness for skilful use of a 
same type of discourse as that of the European Court of Human Rights. In conclusion, 
it appears that the interplay of other factors is an element enhancing the transition 
of the legal culture, whereas an inadequate application of a variety of principles of 
interpretation seems to make the transition slower.
5.4  Future prospects – case law of the European Court of Justice
A further challenge of transition of the legal culture will be faced by both the national 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights upon the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention, although the moment of accession is still uncertain and the 
accession treaty will require ratification not only by the Member States of the Union 
but also by all the parties to the Convention. Although this issue is not addressed in 
this study, there are some questions of interest from the perspective of interpretation 
of law, particularly the role of the Strasbourg Court with regard to the application and 
interpretation of Union law, including the case law of the European Court of Justice, 
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in the interpretation of the Convention rights.976 It is a question of reconciling two 
systems of international law but upon the accession of the Union to the Convention, 
the proceedings that have taken place before the European Court of Justice and be-
come subject to a complaint should rather be treated as domestic proceedings in a case 
brought before the European Court of Human Rights.977 As for the substantive rights 
of the Convention, particularly from the point of view of the Union legal order, there 
should be no major conflict between the two systems as the Union’s primary law and 
the European Court of Justice have given significance to the Convention already today. 
The Convention has been taken into account in the drafting of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights although there are also some differences between the Convention 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The European Court 
of Human Rights has touched upon the European Union law already in existing case 
law, for the reason that it constitutes an essential part of the legislations of the States 
parties to the Convention today for those States that are Member States of the EU, 
for example, in the case of Matthews v. the United Kingdom978
In the case of Bosphorus, the European Court of Human Rights resorted to an even 
more profound study of EU legislation, analysing the state of protection of fundamental 
rights under that legislation and noting that the Convention provisions are increasingly 
referred to, even extensively, by the European Court of Justice979That assessment is fol-
lowed by an extensive analysis of the case law of the European Court of Justice980. It is 
presumed that upon accession of the EU to the Convention, the European Court of 
Human Rights even increasingly will resort to the case law of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) as a source of law, at least in those fields of law where the EU law plays 
a significant role for States parties, which creates potential for future transition of the 
976 For a detailed analysis of the problems, see Lock 2010, p. 781-784. Nevertheless, the accession 
should clarify the current legal situation. The European Court of Human Rights has already 
needed to take a position on the relationship between the different legal orders at stake. In the 
case of Matthews v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1999-I, § 32, the Court observed that Community acts as such could not be challenged 
before it and that the Convention did not exclude the transfer of competence to an international 
organisation provided that the Convention rights continued to be secured. The Court further noted 
that the Member States’ responsibility would continue even after such a transfer. This principle 
was reiterated by the Court in the case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi 
v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, §§ 155 and 
156.
977 Lock 2010, p. 788.
978 Matthews v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1999-I, §§ 34 and 35.
979 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, § 73.
980 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, § 74 and seq.
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legal culture of protection of fundamental rights and human rights. Challenges may, 
however, emerge in case there are differences in the approaches of the two courts to the 
application of sources of law and principles of interpretation of law. Although the objec-
tives of the European Convention on Human Rights and those of the founding treaties 
of the EU are different, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has chosen a somewhat 
similar approach with the European Court of Human Rights to the Vienna Conven-
tion, noting that the objectives of the Community (Union) and the context in which 
they were pursued differed from those of the Convention, which merely created rights 
and obligations between the Contracting parties and did not provide for the transfer of 
sovereign rights.981 As regards the application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Justice, there are already examples of cases in which 
the ECJ pays attention to the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto982
The ECJ has thus created a link between the constitutional traditions and the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, making it applicable as a source of law. In later 
case law, the technique of the ECJ in referring to the European Convention on Human 
Rights has slightly changed when interpreting fundamental rights as it has increas-
ingly started to refer also to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
for example, in joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01983. In those cases, the 
ECJ already demonstrates an elaborated technique of referring to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in order to seek guidance for the interpretation of 
the fundamental rights provisions of EU legislation. The technique used also suggests 
that the way of reasoning is rather similar as the ECJ advances from the existence of an 
interference to its justification, and from general principles to the concrete situation at 
hand. It demonstrates that there is a transition of the legal culture of protecting funda-
mental rights taking place in the European Union too, in that a larger variety of sources 
of law is used to interpret them. Those observations are confirmed by later case law984.
However, since 1 December 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is a binding 
source of law for the ECJ and the ECJ today combines the Convention and the Charter 
in the interpretation of fundamental rights. Before that, to apply binding provisions, 
it was necessary to resort to the European Convention on Human Rights, which was 
existing law between the Member States of the European Union despite that it was 
981 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 22. See also Arnull 1998, p. 120.
982 Case 44/79 - Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, §§ 15 and 17. See also 
C-5/88 - Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, § 17, which reaffirms 
those principles.
983 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, §§ 73, 74, 76, 77 and 82 to 84.
984 See e.g. joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, §§ 59 and 87. In those cases, the ECJ appears to put 
the main emphasis on the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a primary source 
of law, but seeks also guidance for its interpretation from the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights as an additional source of law.
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not formally part of EU law. It will be interesting to see whether accession to the 
Convention will again change the emphasis in case law. In any case, in the light of the 
existing case law of both European courts, there should not be any major problems as 
regards the application of the Convention, EU law and the case law of the two Courts 
as sources of law upon accession of the EU to the Convention. However, the degree to 
which the case law of the two Courts can be integrated, to allow transition of the legal 
culture, will also depend on the techniques of interpreting law and the preparedness 
of one Court to adapt to the discourse of the other, in the same way as in national 
jurisdictions. The techniques of interpretation of the ECJ are not analysed in detail here 
but it is interesting to compare briefly the principles and rules of interpretation used 
by the two European courts, particularly in order to assess whether there is potential 
of further transition of argumentation at the national level.
It has been concluded in respect of the European Court of Human Rights that the 
principles of interpretation indicating most signs of transition of the legal culture of 
protecting human rights and fundamental rights include, in particular, those of autono-
mous meaning and dynamic or evolutive interpretation. The idea of “Community law 
terminology” is more or less the same as that of the principle of autonomous meaning 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, the European 
Court of Human Rights has also justified this principle largely in a similar manner as 
the ECJ has done, namely with reference to the need to ensure uniform interpretation 
and application of the Convention throughout the States parties to the Convention. 
The European Court of Human Rights also has its equivalent for the principle of 
dynamic or evolutive interpretation. For example, in the CILFIT judgment, in which 
the Court developed the so-called “acte clair” doctrine985, the Court underlined that 
“every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted 
985 C-283/81 - Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo Sa v. Ministry of Health, judgment of 6 Octo-
ber 1982, paragraphs 13 to 17. In essence, the doctrine means that where the Court has earlier 
provided an opinion on the same question of interpretation in an earlier judgment, or where the 
Community law is so clear that there is no doubt as to what its interpretation is to be, the national 
court is under no obligation to refer the case to the European Court of Justice for preliminary 
ruling. Sharpston points out that in respect of the case law of the European Court of Justice, it has 
been recognised within the Court itself that not all the judgments are perfectly clear as to what 
is meant. She identifies five main reasons of potential inclarity: 1) the fact that the judgments 
constitute single texts without a possibility for expressing dissenting opinions, 2) despite that there 
is one reporting judge responsible for the drafting of a judgment, it is nevertheless to some extent 
a product of committee drafting, 3) the judgments are drafted, commented upon, deliberated 
and amended in French that may create problems for non-native speakers of the language, 4) 
in today’s situation, the Grand Chamber is composed of 13 judges out of 27, which constitutes 
a minority that often adopts a cautious approach to the exposition of reasons as there may be 
need to revert to the issue in later judgments with different compositions of the Court, and 5) 
the time pressure caused by the time-limits and expectations of speedy proceedings. (Sharpston 
2010, p. 416-418)
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in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being had to the 
objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in 
question is to be applied”.986 Such an evolutive and dynamic interpretation makes it 
possible to adapt Union law (particularly primary law) to new values, needs and situ-
ations.987 Senden, on the other hand, considers that the European Court of Human 
Rights refers to evolutive interpretation on a much larger scale than the ECJ.988 This 
may be perhaps explained by that case law on human rights is more value-bound than 
the vast majority of case law of the ECJ, considering the variety of spheres of legislation 
it needs to address. The supranational and binding nature of EU law is also a charac-
teristic that may be seen as an element limiting discourse. It remains to be seen what 
the impact on the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights will 
be, i.e. whether it will be more of a limiting or expanding nature, but it is particularly 
through the principle of evolutive interpretation that there is potential for changes in 
interpretation and thus for a transition of the legal culture of protecting fundamental 
rights and human rights. The application of the principle evolutive interpretation is 
also a challenge for national jurisdictions, even today. However, the coexistence of 
two legal systems in the case law of the two courts may have the potential of further 
increasing the application of evolutive interpretation in the case law of the Finnish 
supreme jurisdictions which have, already today, shown preparedness for even profound 
argumentation towards that direction.
As regards the Finnish supreme jurisdictions, the principle of proportionality ap-
pears to be the easiest one of the principles applied by the European Court of Human 
Rights, whereas the more challenging principles have appeared in their case law only 
recently. The principle of proportionality has also been applied by the ECJ in its case 
law since the 1950s989. In the view of Raitio, the approach of the ECJ and that of the 
European Court of Human Rights to the principle of proportionality are largely simi-
lar.990 The views of Raitio find support on the basis of an examination of the case law of 
the ECJ991. Considering the similarity of approaches, the application of the principle 
of proportionality should not cause major problems in the future for national supreme 
jurisdictions to reconcile the case law of the two European courts.
986 C-283-81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo Sa v. Ministry of Health, judgment of 6 October 
1982, paragraph 20. See also Arnull 2006, p. 607-611. For a detailed analysis of the CILFIT 
judgment, see Derlén 2007, p. 109-122, and Hummert 2006, p. 34-40.
987 Hummert 2006, p. 112.
988 Senden 2011, p. 399.
989 Raitio 2005, p. 359.
990 Raitio 2005, p. 364.
991 For example C-280/93 - Germany v. Council, paragraphs 78, 89 and 90. This can be seen even 
more clearly in later case law.
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Although the two courts may put a different emphasis on the principles of inter-
pretation they apply, there is reason to suggest that there should not be any major 
difficulties in reconciling the two legal systems upon accession of the European 
Union to the Convention, considering also that the ECJ has increasingly resorted 
to the Convention and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights, and the European Court of Human Rights has 
already on occasion looked into European Union law to seek guidance for the legal 
situation in the States parties, and even concerning evolution of law, which should 
make the reconciliation of the two systems easier. There are also examples of case law 
of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions in which the case law of both European courts 
have been referred to, which indicates that there are already signs of further transi-
tion at the national level. The fact that both European courts consistently refer to the 
principles of dynamic or evolutive interpretation, it is important that also the national 
jurisdictions are receptive to those principles.
5.5  Recommendations – towards a real dialogue
The analysis of the discourse of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administra-
tive Court shows that there are both similarities and differences in their approach to 
the application and interpretation of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Both have increasingly begun to resort to more detailed references to the case 
law, but in neither court is a profound analysis of the principles of interpretation still an 
established practice. In the decisions of both supreme jurisdictions, the discourse is still, 
due to the strong legalistic traditions, largely limited by the applicable national legisla-
tion particularly as regards legal argumentation in general, despite that the principle 
of human rights friendly application of legislation is also today a strong element in 
the legal discourse. In both courts, it seems to be rather frequent that the conclusions 
are drawn more on the basis of the national legislation or facts of the case, as elements 
limiting discourse, than through a profound analysis of the European case law and 
the references to that case law often remain rather weak internal justifications for the 
judgment. However, the increasing detailed references to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights are already as such a sign of a change in the legal culture 
towards using case law increasingly as a stronger internal perspective of argumentation, 
although the varying nature of those references shows that this change is still taking 
place and is far from definite. It is interesting to note that the impact of European 
case law can clearly be seen in those parts of judgments that contain references to it, 
whereas in other parts of judgments the style of reasoning is closer to a traditional 
one. In any case, the underlying presumption of a third phase of transition of the legal 
culture in relation to the language of the European Convention on Human Rights can 
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be confirmed and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has become 
social reality for the Finnish judiciary.
In both supreme jurisdictions, there are some examples of judgments in which the 
court has resorted to a more profound analysis of the applicable principles of interpre-
tation of the European Convention on Human Rights and the references to case law 
already constitute strong internal justifications for the judgment, but the way in which 
those principles, particularly the principle of proportionality, are applied is not uniform 
in the light of the legal discourse used in the judgments as a whole. On the one hand, 
there is linguistic incoherence both when comparing the judgments of an individual 
court against one another and when comparing the judgments of the two courts. The 
development of the legal culture towards improved reception of the argumentation 
of the European Court of Human Rights would benefit from more coherent applica-
tion and analysis of the principles of interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. This would contribute to a more harmonised interpretation between 
legal systems, provided it also takes place in other States parties to the Convention. At 
the European level, the application of principles of effective interpretation, dynamic 
or evolutive interpretation and autonomous meaning typically involve stronger signs 
of transition of the legal culture. The same appears to be true of national judgments, 
although there are exceptions particularly as regards the application of the principle 
of ne bis in idem. On the other hand, it is also important that the judiciary and the 
style of judgments is flexible, as it makes it more capable to adapt to changes in social 
reality, and certain differences must be allowed between the judgments of a general 
court of law and those of an administrative court. In principle, the style of writing of 
judgments in Finland is rather flexible despite the coherent structure of judgments and 
the strong legalistic traditions. Both supreme jurisdictions have also demonstrated this 
in their case law. Despite the flexible approach to the application of European case law 
in general, it is rare to apply the principle of evolutive interpretation, which has been 
called for by Lavapuro – there are only isolated examples.
Furthermore, although there is clear development towards better receptiveness to the 
argumentation of the European Court of Human Rights, there is still no real dialogue 
between the national judiciary and the European Court of Human Rights but rather 
a looser form of interaction. However, there are already cases in which the European 
Court of Human Rights has looked into national precedents and the supreme jurisdic-
tions have looked each others’ precedents, as well as repeated examples of cases where 
national case law has been adapted to judgments issued by the European Court of 
Human Rights. The same type of development appears to be taking place to some extent 
in the other legal systems analysed for the purposes of the present study, although the 
case law and principles of interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights are 
applied to a varying extent. However, it is important to note that there does not seem 
to exist any way of defining what is meant by dialogue in this context. In the present 
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study, it is understood as meaning stronger form of interaction and application of the 
cases of the other court than mere references to the case law.
As observed in the foregoing, the European Court of Human Rights has on occasion 
been criticised for obscurity in reaching its conclusions. That could be seen even as a 
factor weakening the receptiveness of the national legal systems to its argumentation, 
as obscurity diminishes applicability. It is also difficult to say whether an even more 
transparent judicial reasoning would really help, for example, Finnish courts for adopt-
ing the same type of argumentation. It could even be counter-productive and even 
result in resistance towards the legitimacy of the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The purpose of this thesis is not to present recommendations to the 
European Court of Human Rights. However, for the existence of a dialogue between 
national courts and the European Court of Human Rights, it is important that they 
apply the same principles to the application and interpretation of the Convention. This 
is also enhanced by the application of the same principles of interpretation to both 
the Convention rights and constitutional rights. A further challenge will be brought 
about by the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The foregoing comparison of the judicial styles of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and the European Court of Justice indicates that there should be, however, 
no major problems in adapting to the new situations. Both European courts have also 
begun to refer to each other’s case law. Thus, there is already an ongoing transition of 
the legal culture in both courts. It is also an established practice in Finland to refer to 
both sets of case law, and no problems seem to have appeared so far in applying both 
simultaneously. That should help also Finnish courts to adapt to the involvement of 
both European courts in the protection of fundamental rights in certain fields of law 
where the European Union has competence. However, challenges will be posed for the 
dialogue between the European courts and the national jurisdictions.
The national courts are better placed to put the Convention rights in a national 
context and for a real protection of human rights, it is crucial that the protection takes 
place at the national level so as to avoid further violations. Therefore, national courts 
should perhaps adopt a more active approach to the application of the Convention 
as has been called for by Lavapuro. Such an active approach might be easier to adopt 
where the courts indeed aimed at following the argumentation of the European Court 
of Human Rights more closely. The style of argumentation of the European Court of 
Human Rights is considerably different from the traditional style of argumentation 
in Finland, which is largely explained by the rather dynamic approach of the Court to 
the interpretation of the Convention. The Finnish judiciary, having largely focused on 
legislation as in force at the time of issuing the judgment, find such a style of argu-
mentation foreign. As observed in the foregoing in section 3.4.9, in the application of 
the dynamic approach to the interpretation of the Convention, the Court takes into 
account the development of society and changes in legal thinking in the States parties. 
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Even at the national level, such a dynamic approach to the interpretation of provisions 
on fundamental rights could be applied, despite that they are often included in a rather 
static instrument, i.e. the Constitution. It has been explicitly recognised in Finland 
that even the constitutional rights should be interpreted in accordance with the same 
principles as the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Some signs of change 
in attitude to a more evolutive approach can be already seen in some decisions of the 
supreme jurisdictions. 
In conclusion, the legal thinking in the Finnish judiciary appears to be at a phase 
of transformation as indicated by a series of national judgments issued in the past 
few years, and there appears to be preparedness in the Finnish judiciary to adapt to 
the changes brought about the European Convention on Human Rights and to apply 
the case law under it as a source of law. In particular, their strong effect on the inter-
pretation of law seems to be already widely recognised. However, there are relatively 
few judgments in which the national courts appear to have carried out a profound 
analysis of Strasbourg case law and the argumentation in those judgments, albeit it 
may be rather detailed already, is still not comparable to that of the European Court 
of Human Rights.
Insofar as the dialogue between national courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights is concerned, it seems that it does exist to some extent, but the interaction is 
rather slow. However, the analysis of the case law of the Finnish supreme jurisdictions 
show that they are receptive to the argumentation of the European Court of Human 
Rights and they have shown that this receptiveness can be further improved. There are 
already isolated cases in which the supreme jurisdictions have made an effort to ap-
ply the principle of evolutive interpretation, and they have done so successfully. These 
include, in particular, two judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court concerning 
the protection of private life and freedom of association but also a judgment of the Su-
preme Court concerning the establishment of paternity in which the ideas of evolutive 
interpretation have been followed rather closely. It is recommended that this approach 
be expanded. However, it should be applied in line with that of the European Court of 
Human Rights. For the effective protection of human rights and fundamental rights, 
it is also important that consistency is aimed at. The argumentation with regard to the 
application of the principles could also be made more profound and analytical, so as to 
allow other courts and the European Court of Human Rights to detect in which way 
it has been applied to the concrete case at hand. Although a detailed analysis of appli-
cable law is necessary and it is customary to the Finnish judiciary, the relatively strong 
reliance on reasoning conclusions with reference to the applicable national legislation 
even when applying the Convention principles could be abandoned to some degree, 
which would help in the path towards a more active dialogue. In addition, a more 
profound and elaborate reasoning in general – as can be seen in the aforementioned 
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three judgments of the supreme jurisdictions – would make the national judgments 
more transparent and easier for the European Court of Human Rights to apply in its 
own judgments, which in turn would allow a real dialogue.
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee Suomen oikeuskulttuurin muuttumista siitä lähtien, kun 
Suomi liittyi Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimukseen (ihmisoikeuksien ja perusvapauk-
sien suojaamiseksi tehty eurooppalainen yleissopimus). Ihmis- ja perusoikeuksien 
suojaamiseen liittyvä oikeuskulttuuri on laaja käsite ja tutkimuksen rajaamiseksi sillä 
tarkoitetaan tässä tutkimuksessa ihmisoikeussopimuksiin ja perustuslakiin sisältyvien 
oikeuksien soveltamista ja tulkintaa sekä niihin perustuvaa oikeuskäytäntöä. Tutki-
mus on myös rajattu koskemaan Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimusta ja siihen liittyvää 
Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntöä ja niiden vaikutusta Suomen 
kansalliseen oikeuskäytäntöön. Kansallinen oikeuskäytäntö on rajattu koskemaan kor-
keimman oikeuden ja korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden päätöksiä. Suomen valtiosäännön 
kehitystä ja perusoikeussääntelyä verrataan Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimukseen, ja 
ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntöä tarkastellaan ja verrataan suomalaiseen 
oikeuskäytäntöön. Tutkimus perustuu laajaan oikeusvertailevaan lähestymistapaan, 
jossa on huomioitu muiden ihmisoikeussopimusten vaikutus ja käytetty vertailukohtina 
tietyin kriteerein valittujen ihmisoikeussopimuksen osapuolten kansallisia valtiosään-
töperinteitä, perusoikeussääntelyä ja tuomioiden tyyliä sekä laintulkinnan periaatteita. 
Näitä on tarkasteltu erityisesti sen varmistamiseksi, että johtopäätöksissä huomioidaan 
muiden Suomen oikeusjärjestelmän ulkopuolisten tekijöiden vaikutus korkeimpien 
oikeuksien diskurssiin. Oikeuskäytännön tutkimuksessa on käytetty yksityiskohtai-
sempaa vertailua diskurssianalyysin avulla.
Tutkimus perustuu olettamukseen, että oikeuskulttuuri on muuttunut kolmessa 
vaiheessa siitä lukien, kun Suomi liittyi Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimukseen. Ensim-
mäisessä vaiheessa oikeuskulttuuri on muuttunut sekä Suomessa että koko Euroopassa 
ihmisoikeussopimuksen tekemisen seurauksena, kun neuvotteluihin osallistuneiden 
valtioiden valtiosääntö- ja perusoikeusperinteet saivat rinnalleen yhteisen eurooppa-
laisen oikeusperustan ihmisoikeuksien ja perusoikeuksien suojaamiseksi sekä tähän 
liittyvän valvontamekanismin. Suomi oli jo aiemmin ratifioinut Yhdistyneiden Kan-
sakuntien kansalaisoikeuksia ja poliittisia oikeuksia koskevan yleissopimuksen, jonka 
sisältö muistuttaa monilta osin Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimuksen määräyksiä, joten 
sisällöltään Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus ei ollut kovinkaan vieras. Yhdistyneiden 
Kansakuntien yleissopimusta ei kuitenkaan juurikaan sovellettu oikeuskäytännössä. 
Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimuksen vaikutusta Suomen oikeuskulttuuriin on pidetty 
merkittävämpänä siitä huolimatta, että kehitys alkoi pari vuosikymmentä aiemmin. 
Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimukseen liittymisen aikoihin muutettiin myös Suomen 
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perustuslain perusoikeussäännökset, perustuslain ja ihmisoikeussopimuksen yhtenäisen 
tulkinnan ja perusoikeussäännösten suoran sovellettavuuden varmistamiseksi. Tämä on 
osaltaan vahvistanut ihmisoikeuksien ja perusoikeuksien suojaa Suomessa.
Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus kuitenkin saa osan merkityksestään Euroopan 
ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytännön kautta. Toisessa vaiheessa Suomen 
ihmis- ja perusoikeuksien suojaan liittyvä oikeuskulttuuri on muuttunut sen seurauk-
sena, että Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuin on tulkinnut ihmisoikeussopimuksen 
määräyksiä yksittäisissä tapauksissa. Näistä on ajan myötä muodostunut yhtenäinen 
tulkintakäytäntö, jonka myötä ihmisoikeustuomioistuin on eräiden sopimusmääräysten 
osalta laajentanut niiden merkitystä tai soveltamisalaa huomattavastikin siitä, mitä 
sopimusmääräyksistä niiden kirjaimellisen tulkinnan valossa ilmenisi. Tuomioistuin 
on toistuvasti käsitellyt sopimusta elävänä instrumenttina ja on antanut osalle siinä 
käytetyistä käsitteistä itsenäisen merkityksen, joka voi poiketa kansallisen oikeusjär-
jestelmän mukaisesta merkityksestä, siitä huolimatta, että kansallisilla oikeusjärjestel-
millä ja niitä edustavien tuomareiden henkilökohtaisilla taustoilla ja kokemuksella on 
vaikutusta oikeuskäytännön kehittymiseen. Ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen käytäntöä ja 
tuomioistuimen diskurssia tarkastellaan sen soveltamien tulkintaperiaatteiden valossa 
siitä näkökulmasta, minkälaisia merkkejä oikeuskulttuurin muuttumisesta niihin liit-
tyviin esimerkkitapauksiin sisältyy. Toista oikeuskulttuurin muuttumisvaihetta koskeva 
tutkimus perustuu olettamukseen, että ihmisoikeustuomioistuin tulkitsee sopimusta 
itsenäisesti, mikä aiheuttaa haasteen omaksua sen tulkinnat kansallisissa oikeusjärjestel-
missä, joissa sopimusta myös sovelletaan. Ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntö 
on huomattavasti vahvistanut ihmis- ja perusoikeuksien suojaa, ottaen huomioon, että 
tuomiot ovat sitovia valtiolle, ja niitä myös Suomessa pidetään vahvana oikeuslähteenä.
Kolmannessa vaiheessa oikeuskulttuuri on muuttunut kansallisissa tuomioistuimissa 
ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytännön seurauksena. Ensinnäkin tuomioistuimen 
oikeuskäytännöllä voi olla vaikutusta kansalliseen lainsäädäntöön siinä tapauksessa, 
että lainsäädäntöä pidetään ihmisoikeussopimuksen määräysten vastaisena. Toiseksi 
sen oikeuskäytännöllä on vaikutusta siihen, millä tavalla kansalliset tuomioistuimet 
soveltavat ja tulkitsevat oikeuslähteitä. Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus ja ihmisoikeus-
tuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntö saavat todellisen merkityksensä sen perusteella, missä 
määrin kansalliset tuomioistuimet soveltavat niitä. Tämän kolmannen oikeuskulttuurin 
muuttumisen vaiheen tutkimus perustuu olettamukseen, että kolmas vaihe Suomessa 
ei alkanut välittömästi ihmisoikeussopimukseen liittymisen ajankohtana, vaan vasta 
muutamaa vuotta myöhemmin, kun tuomioistuimet alkoivat soveltaa ihmisoikeus-
tuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntöä todellisena oikeuslähteenä. Korkeimpien  oikeuksien
oikeuskäytäntöä tarkastellaan muutaman Suomen näkökulmasta merkittävimmän so- 
pimusartiklan valossa. Kolmas vaihe on ikään kuin tutkimuksen huipennus, jonka tar- 
koituksena on osoittaa kahden ensimmäisen muutosvaiheen tutkimuksen avulla, mistä
syystä ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytännön syvällinen soveltaminen ja sisäis-
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täminen on haaste suomalaisille tuomioistuimille. Ydinargumentti kolmannen tut-
kimusvaiheen osalta on, että Suomen ylimmät tuomioistuimet ovat yhä enenevässä 
määrin alkaneet soveltaa ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen oikeuskäytäntöä ja ovat muut-
taneet vähitellen tapaa, jolla sen tuomioihin viitataan. Tämä muutos ei ole vielä päät-
tynyt, mutta ihmis- ja perusoikeuksien suojaan liittyvä oikeuskulttuuri on vahvistunut.
Ihmis- ja perusoikeuksien suojaan liittyvän oikeuskulttuurin muuttumiseen vai-
kuttavat kuitenkin useat tekijät. Olisi virheellistä väittää, että kansallisten tuomio-
istuinten oikeuskäytäntö on muuttunut pelkästään Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomiois-
tuimen oikeuskäytännön seurauksena. Tähän ovat Suomessa vaikuttaneet erityisesti 
muut kansainväliset ihmisoikeussopimukset, oikeusjärjestelmän kansainvälistyminen, 
Suomen jäsenyys Euroopan unionissa sekä EU:n lainsäädäntö ja EU:n tuomioistuimen 
oikeuskäytäntö, tarvittavat muutokset kansalliseen lainsäädäntöön, mukaan lukien 
perustuslain muutokset, ja muutokset yleisessä suhtautumisessa kansainvälisiin 
oikeuslähteisiin. Lisäksi on muistettava, että oikeuskulttuuri ei voi muuttua täydelli-
sesti ilman perustavaa laatua olevaa ihmisoikeuksien ja perusoikeuksien ymmärtämistä 
koko yhteiskunnassa, mukaan lukien lainsäätäjä, poliittiset päätöksentekijät ja tuomio-
istuinlaitos. Tämä tutkimus on rajattu tarkastelemaan pelkästään ylimpiä kansallisia 
tuomioistuimia, mutta peruslähtökohtana on, että ylimpien tuomioistuimen tuomioiden 
diskurssi heijastaa oikeuskulttuurin muuttumista. Verrattuna aiemmin ihmisoikeus-
sopimuksesta ja sen vaikutuksista tehtyihin tutkimuksiin Suomessa, tämä väitöskirja 
poikkeaa valitun lähestymistavan osalta ja tutkimuksen viimeisessä vaiheessa keskittyy 
syvällisempään oikeuskäytännön vertailevaan tutkimukseen diskurssin kautta, mikä 
jossain määrin tarkentaa aiempia havaintoja. Tällä on myös vaikutusta tutkimuksen 
johtopäätöksiin.
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Annex
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
(ETS 5)
Article 5 – Right to liberty and security 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order 
of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed 
an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing 
an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision 
or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a
view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this
article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions 
of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
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Article 6 – Right to a fair trial 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independ-
ent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, 
public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his cor-
respondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10 – Freedom of expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
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The Constitution of Finland
11 June 1999
(731/1999, amendments up to 1112 / 2011 included)
(Unofficial translation, Ministry of Justice)
Section 7 - The right to life, personal liberty and integrity
Everyone has the right to life, personal liberty, integrity and security.
No one shall be sentenced to death, tortured or otherwise treated in a manner violating human dignity.
The personal integrity of the individual shall not be violated, nor shall anyone be deprived of liberty 
arbitrarily or without a reason prescribed by an Act. A penalty involving deprivation of liberty may be 
imposed only by a court of law. The lawfulness of other cases of deprivation of liberty may be submitted for 
review by a court of law. The rights of individuals deprived of their liberty shall be guaranteed by an Act.
Section 10 - The right to privacy
Everyone’s private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions 
on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act.
The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable.
Measures encroaching on the sanctity of the home, and which are necessary for the purpose of guar-
anteeing basic rights and liberties or for the investigation of crime, may be laid down by an Act. In 
addition, provisions concerning limitations of the secrecy of communications which are necessary in the 
investigation of crimes that jeopardise the security of the individual or society or the sanctity of the home, 
at trials and security checks, as well as during the deprivation of liberty may be laid down by an Act.
Section 12 - Freedom of expression and right of access to information
Everyone has the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression entails the right to express, disseminate 
and receive information, opinions and other communications without prior prevention by anyone. More 
detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. Provisions 
on restrictions relating to pictorial programmes that are necessary for the protection of children may 
be laid down by an Act.
Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, unless their publication has 
for compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public 
documents and recordings.
Section 21 - Protection under the law
Everyone has the right to have his or her case dealt with appropriately and without undue delay by a 
legally competent court of law or other authority, as well as to have a decision pertaining to his or her 
rights or obligations reviewed by a court of law or other independent organ for the administration of 
justice.
Provisions concerning the publicity of proceedings, the right to be heard, the right to receive a reasoned 
decision and the right of appeal, as well as the other guarantees of a fair trial and good governance 
shall be laid down by an Act.
